In the early days of the Egyptian revolution, one of the significant fears, especially in the West, was that a transition to democratic rule would usher in an Islamic government headed by the Muslim Brotherhood. This has since been established as the conventional wisdom, even in Egypt. Liberal groups urge postponing anticipated September parliamentary elections, in order to gain more time to form viable political parties able to compete with the newly created and Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party.
Conventional wisdom was established following the results of the March 19 popular referendum on amendments to the Egyptian constitution. A yes vote was the adopted position by Islamist groups, many of which portrayed the effort as a defense of religion. They won overwhelmingly, with 77% of the vote, in unprecedented 40% voter turnout.
Yet in recent days there have been a few contrarian indicators concerning widespread popular support for the Brotherhood. Gallop conducted a poll in which only 15% said they support the group. The poll does match the uncertain and contradictory state of Egyptian politics, however, for although only 1% support a theocracy, 69% believe religious leaders should have an advisory role in legislation. Depending on how campaign rhetoric is spun, the population may vote Islamist out of fear from godless liberals, or else run screaming out of fear of becoming a new Iran. Yet in terms of tangible support, if the poll is accurate, the Muslim Brotherhood is not inherently perched to assume political power.
Part of the assumption of Brotherhood popularity is built upon their reputation of providing support to the poor in social services. This is true from their inception, and in the 1940s they built a wide network of service provision throughout rural and urban Egypt. Yet in the more recent decades under Mubarak in which the Brotherhood was an outlawed, though tolerated, social presence and the only semi-legitimate opposition political force, measuring and verifying their welfare reach became more difficult. Nevertheless, the assumption remained.
This assumption has been challenged in research conducted by Daniella Pioppi. She argues:
The Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities after the Nasser parenthesis have never reached the levels of diffusion and organization of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, they are generally aimed at the middle to upper classes rather than the most disadvantaged social strata. Since the repression cycle that started in the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities have been drastically reduced and do not seem to play a significant role in popular mobilization, not least for lack of a clear political and social project.
Excepting the previously stated referendum, Egypt has not had open, democratic elections for over fifty years. In the absence of criteria by which to judge, it is nearly impossible to forecast the electoral choices of over 80 million Egyptians, most of whom have been depoliticized their entire life. Will the ‘uneducated, religious masses’ be swayed to vote Islamist, believing this to be a vote for God? Will the ‘taste of freedom and liberty’ make them forswear the Muslim Brotherhood, widely known as an authoritarian organization in its own right? No one knows. Neither the Gallop poll, nor the referendum should be taken as an accurate gauge of political currents.
Politics is always full of surprises. In all likelihood, an unfettered election process will produce nothing less, no matter what the end result may be.
The Middle East Media Research Institute recently highlighted a YouTube video issued by the former Mufti of Egypt, Nasr Farid Wassel, on May 7, 2011. In his presentation, MEMRI quotes him as saying:
The martyr bin Laden, Allah’s mercy upon him, waged Jihad for the sake of Allah against the Soviets and against America. … There was a call at the Al-Nour Mosque to pray for the soul of bin Laden, since he is a martyr. But I said that we were forbidden to pray for the soul of a martyr, and that bin Laden lives on. He is not dead. ‘Do not consider those who were killed for the sake of Allah to be dead. They live on, sustained by their Lord.’ Therefore, I said, immediately after his martyrdom, that he was a martyr, and that he had been killed by the enemies.
The link to the video clip presented by MEMRI can be accessed here.
Arab West Report spoke with Dr. Abd al-Muti Bayoumi, member of the Islamic Research Academy at the Azhar. Bayoumi did not know what would lead the former Mufti to issue a statement such as this. From his personal viewpoint, however, Bayoumi declared that bin Laden killed civilians, and therefore, was not a martyr.
Bayoumi stated that the Islamic Research Academy has not discussed the question whether or not bin Laden was a martyr.
Coptic protestors at Maspero suffered two separate attacks on May 14, attacks which included Salafi Muslims along with common ‘thugs’. This report updates a previous text written about the Maspero attack, which was crafted from interviews with leaders the day of May 14, supplemented with media reports the next morning and phone calls to Mina Magdy, the political affairs coordinator for the Maspero Youth Union (MYU). According to witnesses interviewed May 16, a number of the details related in the news have been incorrect, if not outright misleading. This report is unable to corroborate claims independently. Efforts to speak with local army and police personnel on the scene were politely declined, as would be expected, in deference to announcements made by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. To my knowledge, they have not commented directly on this event.
Security Measures
Testimony is taken primarily from Emad Farag. Farag is part of the committee for order, tasked with securing the northern entrance to the sit-in near the Foreign Ministry. In my earlier report I wondered why Coptic security measures were so tight, while a simple rope separated the sit-in area from the major thoroughfare running north-south along the Nile River. Farag explained the sit-in had previously cut off this road, but it was reopened through negotiations with Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. In exchange for agreement to retry arrested members of MYU, who were apprehended during the first sit-in, General Coordinator Rami Kamel consented to pull back the protest area.
Emad Farag
Upon arriving at Maspero on the morning of the 16th, however, I was surprised to find no Coptic security measures at all. Automobile traffic had stopped as dozens of riot police, army personnel, and military vehicles lined the road. Yet pedestrians, including myself, simply walked right through their lines, checked neither for ID nor weapons. Farag explained the army had assumed responsibility for safety after the attacks, and instructed the Copts to desist.
Farag then proceeded to relate the story of the evening attack. Around midnight, while he was stationed at his post, a group of ‘thugs’ began to gather under the May 15th bridge, and began harassing and beating individual Coptic protestors either leaving or joining the sit-in. Shortly thereafter, another group came from over the bridge, and began firing upon the Copts, though from a very far distance of about 1000 meters. When meeting up together, they began to advance toward the sit-in, carrying knives, swords, clubs, and stones, in addition to guns.
Off-ramp from the May 15 bridge. Blackened areas are from where Molotov cocktails burned.
Their approach took the attention of the protestors, but Farag instructed his colleagues in the committee to lock arms in front of the already constructed barbed wire, so as to prevent Copts from running out to meet them. Farag then phoned the captain of the police, who told him his men were ill equipped to meet armed ‘thugs’. They were stationed a few hundred meters to the north of the sit-in, blocking off a side road to the area. Their presence, though, was minimal, and outfitted only with riot shields and batons. The captain told him, however, he would phone the army to bring its weapons truck.
Farag then went personally to speak to an army officer who was stationed with his men at the Radio and TV building at the site of the sit-in. The officer refused to get involved, stating this was the responsibility of the police.
By this time some of the Copts had broken through the human chain and jumped through the barbed wire barricade. They wished to hold the ‘thugs’ far away from the sit-in, since several women were also participating there. Farag called the police captain again, who now responded that they could not get involved because they could not know who was who in the skirmish. Frustrated, Farag returned to his post and told the other assembled Copts to join in the defense, which he himself did as well.
Distance from the bridge to the sit-in area. The round building to the left is the Radio and TV building, where Copts were demonstrating.
Running out to meet the ‘thugs’, Copts broke off tree branches and wooden planks from sidewalk benches. Media reports stated they also broke up the sidewalk so as to obtain concrete to hurl at their assailers. Farag did not think so, but a few meters from the barbed wire was an area, perhaps one meter in diameter, that was pulled up. Perhaps Copts did so, Farag contemplated, but on the whole he believed they simply threw back the projectiles tossed at them. In any case, this was the only evidence of sidewalk destruction, not fitting with the impression of chaos described in some reports.
Sidewalk torn out to secure rocks for the confrontation. See the bench behind no longer with its wooden planks.
The two groups met about halfway between the sit-in area and the off-ramp of the May 15 bridge. There were immediate but brief clashes, after which Copts drove the ‘thugs’ back up the off-ramp where they took refuge on higher ground. From this point onward a buffer zone developed between the two sides, with rock throwing between them but also gunfire coming from the original attackers.
Farag confirmed media reports stating the Copts apprehended one of the ‘thugs’, and turned him over to the army. He was unable to confirm a report that stated the ‘thug’ possessed an ID card linking him to the NDP party of Mubarak. Yet Fadi Philip, foreign media spokesman for the MYU, stated he admitted to being paid 500 LE, the equivalent of slightly less than $100 US, by a sheikh in order to participate in the attacks.
Farag added incidentally that throughout the sit-in the committee for order turned over to the army a number of entrants upon whom were found weapons after being searched. He stated the army confiscated the weapons, but then sent the people on their way.
Given that he was a participant in the defense, Farag did not know exactly how much time had passed until the authorities arrived. He estimated that about an hour after the clash began, a police tear gas truck came from behind the Coptic position and launched its canisters which landed on the Coptic side of the standoff. The tear gas sent all parties scattering; Copts ran back to the sit-in area while the ‘thugs’ ran off into the distance. Farag states neither the police nor the army pursued the assailants. Media reports, however, claim that fifty ‘thugs’ were arrested for their role in attacking Copts during the sit-in. It is possible these were later apprehended.
Bullets and Tear Gas Canisters from the Attack
Farag then walked with me to the southern entrance of the sit-in area, to describe the attack which happened earlier. Though he was not present at the beginning, he ran to the scene to investigate when commotion occurred. Around 8pm a group of 100-200 ‘thugs’ descended the on-ramp of the October 6th bridge, and a similar story unfolded. Copts ran out to meet them, suffered injury from gunfire and other weapons, but drove them away after only ten minutes. In my earlier survey of the news, I was not aware of this attack. Farag stated that men in the appearance of Salafis were among the armed in this group as well. Salafi presence had been denied in earlier media reports.
On-Ramp for the October 6 Bridge
Media Manipulations
Along the way he refuted two matters that have been reported in the media. First, he directed attention to the Foreign Ministry and the Radio and TV building. It was claimed that Copts had attacked these building before the altercation, but neither showed signs of damage. It is possible minor damage may have been repaired, as a full day had passed between the altercation and my visit.
The second matter represented what Farag claimed was a propaganda falsehood. On the first floor balcony of the Radio and TV building was erected a video camera pointing to the main stage, but on a swivel pivot. Farag stated the camera was pointed toward empty ground to the side of the stage, and showed this footage on state TV, claiming the sit-in was over.
The Radio and TV Building, with Camera Mounted on the Balcony
Statements concerning the end of the sit-in may well have been believed coming on the heels of Pope Shenouda’s message on TV, apparently urging its abandonment. The pope declared the matter had moved beyond the level of expression, due to infiltration that was ruining the reputation of the protestors, as well as of Egypt. He feared for their safety after the attacks, and said they would be ‘the losers’ if they continued. Furthermore, he stated, the patience of the nation’s leaders was growing thin.
Fr. Mattias Nasr Manqarius, priest of the Virgin Mary Church in Ezbet al-Nakhl, Cairo, is the official spokesman for the MYU, and one of two priests committed to the sit-in. He stated the pope’s words were not meant as a directive for the protestors to leave; in fact, he stated he had visited the pope shortly before his announcement, and was given only encouragement for their ‘normal and righteous’ demands. The next day, however, Bishop Musa, bishop of youth, confirmed the validity of the pope’s encouragement to leave Maspero.
Media manipulations, however, are claimed by the MYU. Before the pope spoke on television, a report emerged from Bishop Musa urging the youth to give up the sit-in. Asked about their refusal to heed his words, Rami Kamel stated the bishop’s words were not conveyed correctly. He knew this from video messages afterwards from the bishop in which he denied asking them to leave. Instead, the bishop offered his blessing. Irresponsibility of the media, claims Philip, was one reason why the MYU chose to demonstrate at the Radio and TV building at Maspero in the first place.
Medical Clinic
Injured Copts from the two attacks were treated at a makeshift clinic. A total of twenty-four doctors, nurses, and pharmacists have set up shifts in order to provide medical care. All medicines have been donated, and George Sidky Eskander, who has taken a vacation from his pharmaceutical company in order to join the sit-in, states supplies and equipment have always arrived at just the right moment, as if from God.
Medicines Stored inside the Clinic
Three of the twenty-four medical team are Muslims, one of which even keeps to the Salafi trend, but rejects the behavior of those practicing violence. Another Muslim is Mustafa Ibrahim. Though possessing no medical education he has been trained in field-based first aid, and has volunteered previously in Tahrir Square and in Libya. He states he is willing to die here with his brothers the Copts. His assistant, the other Muslim Ahmed al-Masry, is a graphic design student at Ain Shams University, but learned medical care from his father, a surgeon. He is disturbed how religious groups are tearing the nation apart, after the experiences of Muslims and Christians together at Tahrir Square. As a revolutionary there, he was shot in the arm by police on January 25, the first day of protests.
Mustafa and George, in front of the ClinicAhmed, Showing Where he was Shot in the Arm
Eskander stated that many of the injured refused to be transported to hospitals, out of fear they would be arrested there. Instead, during the attacks of May 14 the clinic tent grew three times in size, treating open wounds and bruises as best they could. Many of the serious cases, such as one skull fracture, were rushed to local hospitals.
Legal Services
Karam Ghubriyal is a Coptic lawyer providing volunteer legal services and documentation for the MYU. He stated that fifty-six people were arrested from two hospitals, and only eight of these were Muslims. It is not known if this number corresponds to the totals announced of those involved in the attack, or has simply been unreported in the media. These arrested were taken from the Coptic Hospital on Ramsis Street and the Police Hospital in the Aguza neighborhood. They were charged with ‘thuggery’, and detained first in a military holding facility, before being transferred to a public jail.
Ghubriyal, working with a team of lawyers including several Muslims, was able to secure the release of thirty-two arrested Copts. Due to the late hour running into the designated curfew of 2am, Ghubriyal made sure those returning to Minya in Upper Egypt did not try to return home and perhaps be rearrested. Instead, the five went back to Maspero and spent the night at the sit-in. He is currently working with his team to secure the release of the remaining sixteen Copts in custody.
Area Management
As the day progressed Maspero appeared more and more chaotic, as pedestrians on foot traversed the area on their way north or south. The army permitted street vendors to enter the area as well, setting up booths for tea or snacks. More and more Copts also arrived simply to join in the demonstration. It was a working day, and thus numbers did not resemble the weekend totals of several thousands, but it was clear many Copts continued to support the effort, despite the message from Pope Shenouda.
Rolla Subhi is a twenty-two year old Coptic woman heading up the committee for order. She supervises the subcommittees for checkpoints, as mentioned earlier with Farag, the speaking state, food, drink, and cleanup, and a very important committee – given the increasing commotion – called ‘rangers’.
Ramon Nadir and Claire Makram are two of the approximately fifty rangers, ten of whom are women. Their responsibility is to roam the area and look for signs of trouble. They communicate with the Egyptian police and army, and were able later in the day to re-setup the separate Coptic checkpoints to ensure no weapons entered the area. They inquire about the hunger, thirst, or fatigue of key volunteers. Perhaps their most important responsibility is simply to check in on crowds. Whenever a group begins to assemble of more than three or four, and certainly if voices are raised, the nearest ranger investigates to see that everything is ok. Rangers make certain disputes are resolved quietly, before escalation. It is impossible to control every Copt who comes to protest, Subhi states; fears exist that less educated or more traditional Copts might respond to an insult given, becoming easily provoked. The ranger team, however, has kept problems to a minimum so far.
Ramon and Claire, to the Left
Conclusion
In his first live television appearance, General Tantawi of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces addressed the graduating class of the police academy. He stated the most urgent needs of Egypt rest in its economic and security stabilization. He promised he would not allow any forces to divide the national unity of Egyptians along religious lines, mentioning specifically that sit-ins harm the economy and provide opportunity for ‘thugs’ to wreak havoc toward their self-serving goals.
Many at Maspero believe the actions of the army and police, in this and other sectarian instances, to indicate they are against not only the Coptic sit-in, but biased against Copts in general. Coupled with an understanding that Pope Shenouda has declared them to be ‘the losers’ if they continue, the protestors believe more violence will be directed their way, and perhaps they will be evicted by the army. For now, their protest continues, but Fr. Mattias does not paint a pessimistic picture. ‘Yes’, he states, ‘some of our demands have been met. Sixteen closed churches have been promised to be reopened. We believe the authorities when they say they will open them. But we will stay here until it actually happens, so that lower level officials receive pressure from above to make it happen.’
It is difficult to say if the Copts, and several Muslims, at Maspero are correct in their actions. They press on contrary to the leanings, if not will, of both their civil and religious authorities. Yet they are people of conviction, courage, and organization, fighting for the rights of all Egyptians, not just Copts. Their appearance, either if manipulated through the media, or if truly in essence, is of a separatist action. Are they uniting Egyptians, or dividing them? If dividing, is it in positive effort to bring awareness to those in the dark?
Philip sees their struggle as akin to the civil rights movement in the United States. It is not only that laws are bad, but that good laws are not enforced. ‘It is not just for ourselves that we demonstrate,’ he says. ‘If Coptic rights are not respected, then perhaps next to fall will be the rights of Muslims of different persuasion.’
It is too difficult to judge, and furthermore it is not my place. Yet may prayer be asked for wisdom on their behalf, patience for those who grow weary of their voice, and forgiveness for those who violently attack them. May all find place to give blessing to the other, no matter how stridently they wrestle politically.
Two people were killed and scores were injured following an overnight clash at the site of an ongoing Coptic protest outside the Egyptian Radio and Television building at Maspero, Cairo. According to Mina Magdy, head of the political committee for the Maspero Youth Union organizing the sit-in, hundreds of thugs arrived around 12:30am and began attacking the protestors. Magdy stated the police did not involve themselves immediately, but the attack continued until 1am when police fired live ammunition into the air, and fired tear gas to disperse the attackers. Magdy relates there were around one thousand demonstrators at the time of the attack, and though the numbers have now decreased, the sit-in is continuing.
Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram reports there were 250 attackers, fifty of whom have been arrested by police. Attackers lobbed rocks and Molotov cocktails from an overhead bridge nearby. Al-Masry al-Youm reports the attackers fired ammunition into the demonstrators. CNN reports that the Coptic demonstrators broke up the sidewalk so as to defend themselves by throwing chunks of concrete at their assailants. One, it is reported, was apprehended and beaten badly.
Al-Ahram reports the altercation originated following arguments with the protestors and drivers of vehicles on the major road in front of the protest area. It quotes a protest organizer who stated the driver of the vehicle tried to enter the demonstration area, but refused to be searched for weapons, and tried to instigate trouble. The paper states the attacks were in revenge of this altercation, but the driver is not identified.
None of the reports or Coptic sources at Maspero stated the assailants were Salafi Muslims in their appearance; rather, they were thugs. The identity and motivations, however, are unknown. Salafis stand accused of fermenting and perhaps perpetrating many of the recent attacks on Copts and others since the revolution, though it is also claimed remnants of the former regime and security system have been provoking sectarian conflict.
I was able to visit the Maspero protestors yesterday, before the attacks, and learned of their organization, witnessing the layout of the area.
The protest area at Maspero has three main entrances, each with both army personnel and Coptic guards to search all before they enter. The system is similar to that established at Tahrir Square during the revolution, to ensure all weapons were kept out of the protest area.
Yet despite the precautions taken at the walkway entrances, the protest area stretches parallel with the major north-south thoroughfare running along the Nile River. There was simply a string of rope separating the protest area from the street, and traffic passed smoothly. Several policeman were present, but there was no cordon to separate the protestors from the street. Sporadically protestors would cross over to the opposite sidewalk, and relax on the other side. I witnessed what appeared to be one or two minor altercations with vehicles as they passed by. Nothing transpired, but traffic slowed as protestors emptied into the street inquiring about the vehicle.
The Maspero Youth Union is coordinated by Rami Kamel, a 24 year old law student at Cairo University. It represents a merger of several Coptic organizations which organized following the attacks on a church in Atfih, to the south of Cairo. The conducted a sit-in protest over several days, vacating the premises upon promise of the ruling military council to investigate and rebuild the church. Yet Fadi Philip, foreign media spokesman for the media committee, states their departure was not entirely voluntary, as they were attacked by the army as they were leaving. Nineteen protestors, including three Muslims, were arrested on charges of weapons possession and thuggery. Philip stated these charges were baseless.
The location of Maspero was chosen for three reasons. First, they believed holding their sit-in at Tahrir would be too provocative. Second, the site of the Radio and Television headquarters represented their belief concerning media bias against Coptic affairs, especially in the reporting about the Atfih church. Third, they had established Maspero as a place of protest earlier, following the attacks on Nag Hamadi, in January 2010, and Alexandria, on New Year’s Eve 2010. Before their initiative, Coptic protests had almost universally been within church grounds.
Following the attacks on churches in Imbaba, Copts returned to protest at Maspero, where the sit-in has now continued for over a week. On Friday, the day of protest at Tahrir Square for national unity and Palestinian solidarity, thousands of Copts joined the sit-in protest instead at Maspero, about a ten minute walk to the north of Tahrir Square.
The protest area at Maspero hosts a stage from which speeches are delivered and chants issued. Rami Kamel states the stage is open to anyone; Michael Munir, a youthful activist stated I could speak if I so desired, and introduced me to the committee member who could arrange this. Kamel states even Salafi Muslims are welcome to speak, though none have as of yet. Several Muslims, however, have joined their protests in expression of solidarity.
The Maspero area also houses several tents. One is for medical supplies, another for food, and two for providing space for interviews and committee discussions. Banners proclaiming Coptic slogans are everywhere, also lining the street in front of the area. Among these was a large sign showing sixteen pictures of recent incidents suffered by the Coptic community. Most banners were not provocative, but did emphasize a particular Coptic frame of reference.
Rami Kamel, however, states the efforts of the Maspero Youth Union are to emphasize Coptic rights within a framework of citizenship, far from sectarianism. He desires the sit-in to be seen as political action, not as religious or church based.
Two Coptic Orthodox priests have joined the sit-in, Fr. Philopater Jamil, from Giza, Cairo, and Fr. Mattias Nasr Manqarious, from Ezbet al-Nakhl, Cairo. Kamel states the presence of two priests helps lend legitimacy to the protest in the eyes of the Coptic faithful, but that it is good to have only two priests, and not more, or else the Maspero effort might appear to be more religious than is intended.
Fr. Philopater and Fr. Mattias were among the original Coptic demonstrators which merged into Maspero Youth Union, and Fr. Mattias is the official spokesperson for the group. They are also the editors of al-Katiba al-Tibiya,[1] a Coptic newspaper focused on reporting about grievances suffered by the Coptic community. The newspaper is widely distributed in Coptic Orthodox Churches, and has been understood as enflaming the widespread Coptic perception of persecution. They are linked also to Copts in the United States, which often call for the intervention of the US government or the international community in defense of Egyptian Copts. For their activities they have come under approbation from church hierarchy.
The CNN article quoted Rafiq Hanna, a protestor, as calling for international protection, stating the Copts are threatened all over Egypt. As I visited Maspero, identifying myself as an American, I was often asked why the United States did not intervene, putting pressure on the Egyptian government to secure their human rights. Yet during the national unity and Palestinian solidarity protests in Tahrir Square, Fr. Philopater, officially representing the Maspero Youth Union, addressed the crowd in the strongest language possible: We reject all international interference in Egyptian affairs. The concerns of the Copts are Egyptian concerns only.
Mina Magdy explained this was part and parcel of their Egyptian identity; the continuity of Christianity in Egypt is in their hands alone. If support was sought from a foreign power, this power would only support as long as it was in their interest to do so. Meanwhile, the effort to appeal internationally would be seen as traitorous. One only would have to look to Iraq, he stated, to see how poorly the United States has protected the Christian community there.
I asked Madgy if his position had changed after the attacks on Maspero. It did not, he said. We reject foreign interference in Egyptian affairs.
The goals of the Maspero Youth Union are to work for a civil state, the concept of citizenship, and equal rights and equality for all. Their particular rights, demanded in this sit-in, are for a unified law for building houses of worship, a law against discrimination in any form, the right to be ruled by Christian law in personal affairs (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.), opening of churches which had been closed by security prior to the revolution, the release of their imprisoned colleagues, and the release of a nun, Maryam Raghib, who was arrested for adopting children, as adoption is forbidden under the Islamic sharia.
Additionally, the union supports calls, made also by others, for a joint military-civilian council to guide Egypt through its transitional period of government. It seeks the trial of all criminals involved in recent sectarian attacks. It wishes the cancellation of all traditional use of ‘reconciliation committees’ to smooth over sectarian conflicts and release perpetrators. It does not call for removal of Article 2 of the Constitution, which declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, with the principles of Islamic sharia as the source of legislation. Though it finds this article to be contrary to principles of civil government, it believes the removal thereof to be impossible, and is thus not on the agenda of activity.
Kamel stated negotiations with the ruling military council were resulting in progress in crafting an anti-discrimination law, and also in securing the opening of several churches.
The Maspero Youth Union does not advocate any particular political position or party, but rejects official dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups. This is on the grounds that, whatever individual members of these groups might profess, sincerely or otherwise, as ideologies their written words speak against the concept of citizenship. Therefore, until this changes, the union will not allow itself to be co-opted into the betterment of the Islamist image.
Rami Kamel states that the political and non-religious stance of the Maspero Youth Union is informed by his personal philosophy of liberation theology, in an Orthodox Christian perspective. He emphasized this was not of the Latin American variety which promoted violence; rather, non-violence was the rule though self-defense is permitted. He believes the Christian faith should drive one to strive for social justice, though through means limited by Christian ethics. Specifically, one should submit to violence and not strike back, not cowering from the attack but insisting on one’s rights all the while. Paul the Apostle, in Acts 22, is taken as a model.
Yet it seemed that despite the sincerity of this philosophy among Maspero leadership, it did not necessarily reach the hundreds of ordinary Coptic Egyptians who populated the protest. Kamel stated they do their best to instill this value and reign in the excitement of the protestors. There were not, however, religious activities such as prayer groups or Bible studies, through which commitment and discipline might be achieved. These activities, Kamel stated, would transform the demonstration into a religious activity. He purposed their efforts be seen only as political action, in defense of Coptic rights, but from a position of citizenship, not religion.
The facts of the overnight attack on the Coptic demonstration are still yet to be determined. The day before, Mina, an ordinary protestor, stated that Maspero was suffering from attempts to instigate conflict. He was afraid that if fighting broke out, the army would use this as pretext to evict them from their place. In terms of instigation, this fear now appears justified, but so far, the army has allowed the sit-in to continue.
There is much distrust currently among Copts concerning the direction of the revolution, the space Salafi Muslims have to operate, and the suspected secret intentions of the ruling military council. Many Egyptians of all persuasions have equal concern and confusion, even if their questions are directed differently. May patience and wisdom be sought by all, as they continue to cling to calls for justice. May civility reign as this process, however messily, is determined.
[1] In Coptic history, al-Katiba al-Tibiya was an Egyptian legion from Thebes, fighting for the Roman army in Europe. When demanded to renounce their faith and worship the emperor, the entire legion refused, submitting instead to martyrdom.
The concept of martyrdom is key for the Coptic Orthodox Church; indeed, their church calendar begins from the era of Diocletian, a Roman emperor responsible for the deaths of thousands of Christians. A popular chant of Copts states, ‘with our souls and our blood we will redeem you, oh cross!’ As Kamel explained, this was not an aggressive slogan. Rather, as Jesus redeemed humanity through death, so also are Copts willing to suffer martyrdom for the sake of the cross.
Over 10 people were killed and more than 200 injured in an attack on the St. Mina Church in Imbaba, Cairo, which took place overnight on May 7, 2011. The following information is taken directly from the testimony of two Christians of the church, one named Rimon, the other wishing to remain anonymous.
Approximately 4pm following afternoon prayers, Imam Muhammad Zughbi led between 150-200 armed Muslims a distance of one kilometer to the St. Mina Church. There he inquired about a Coptic woman who, he believed, had converted to Islam who, he believed, was being held in the church. Both sources believe this rumor was completely unfounded, and this was only a ruse by these Muslims to instigate conflict.
Shortly after their arrival church officials called the police. The police were invited to enter and search the premises, but found nothing. They carried this report back to the crowd, and then withdrew.
Having originally arrived with weapons of all varieties – clubs, swords, and automatic guns – the Muslim group began to use them. Christians rallied to defend the church, largely weaponless, but with a few simple pistols. One source said local Muslims participated in the defense of the church; the other denied this, saying they joined in the attack. It is possible both reports are true. Sources say that community relations between Muslims and Christians had been good.
Around 5:30pm Muslims from other nearby areas – Warraq, Haram, Faysal, Umraniyya – heard the news and joined the attack, increasing the number to over 400. Eventually their total was estimated at 3,000. The dead and injured were carried into the church, and fighting continued at the local homes as Christian residents hurled stones from their balconies. In all, three homes near the church were burned, and over 50 shops were vandalized in the area.
The army did not arrive until 10pm, at which point it launched tear gas at the church. Sources stated this was aimed at them, even landing inside the walls, rather than at the Muslim attackers. The Muslims also began attacking the army, launching Molotov cocktails. The army responded by firing into the air, and sources stated they did not actively intervene to end the rampage. Instead, they arrested those in the immediate vicinity as they were able, including many Christians.
The presence of the army did disperse the assailants, who then scattered and attacked other area churches. The nearby Church of the Holy Virgin was set ablaze and completely destroyed around 2am. Three other local churches also suffered damage.
Gunshots continued throughout the night. The next day the army placed the area in complete lockdown mode, arresting anyone coming out of their home. Sources say the area around the church also had water and electricity cut. The minister of the interior and governor were set to visit the area, which was under a 24 hour curfew.
Both sources identified the attackers as Salafi Muslims, due to their appearance with beards and white robes, typical of their traditional dress. They cried ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attacks. Salafi Muslims are adherents of a conservative interpretation of Islam that desires strict application of the sharia in imitation of the era of Muhammad and his companions. Following the revolution they have been vocal in calling for an Islamic state and have been accused of multiple sectarian attacks on both Christians and other Muslims. Though admitting to their particular religious interpretation, Salafi leaders have either denied their involvement or condemned such violent incidents.
Regardless of the original intention of the attack organizers, accusations of the illegal imprisonment of Coptic converts to Islam in churches or monasteries have been rampant both pre- and post-revolution. A woman named Camilia Shehata, to be mentioned below, is the cause célèbre in this effort. Following the attack on a church in Baghdad in October of 2010, al-Qaeda declared Coptic Christians to be fair game for attack for this alleged crime. Yet rumors are also rampant that sectarian conflict in Egypt was stoked by the former security forces under the Mubarak regime, which have allegedly continued this policy since his resignation.
The above testimony was provided by two sources directly involved in the evening’s altercation. Independent verification of their testimony is not possible at this time.
Since the attacks public response has been both swift and polarized. Prime Minister Sharaf cancelled a scheduled visit to the Gulf region and called an emergency cabinet meeting. The army has arrested 190 individuals and will try them in military courts. Furthermore, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, currently governing the nation, has threatened the death penalty for anyone found inciting sectarian strife. Salafi leaders and popular preachers, for their part, labeled attackers ‘thugs, not Muslims’, and fully condemned the action. Similarly, many Imbaba Muslims harshly condemned the action as un-Islamic, and said the thugs were tied to the old regime.
Meanwhile, Copts took to the street to protest. A small group went to the US Embassy to demand a meeting with the US ambassador and ask international protection. A much larger and more representative group began assembling at Maspero, site of the Egyptian Radio and Television headquarters. Here, only a few weeks earlier, thousands of Copts protested over several days to demand official inquiry into an attack on a church in Atfih, an area to the south of Cairo. Instinctively, following this conflict, they return again.
Along the way they were met with derision and minor attacks from Muslim youths and other ‘thugs’. Once there, a few suffered injuries as stones were thrown upon them from the balconies above. Yet they were joined by significant numbers of Muslims, including fully covered women, declaring that Muslims and Christians in Egypt were ‘one hand’. Eventually, the opposition settled down and the protest is ongoing.
The rumor about the convert to Islam being protected has received more investigation since the initial altercation. Apparently, a woman named Abeer from Upper Egypt married a Muslim and adopted his faith. Though not required by Islam it is the near cultural necessity, especially in traditional areas, as both religious groups ostracize members who either convert to another faith or marry outside their faith community. Apparently, Abeer later on ran away from her husband, who later received a phone call that she was in hiding near the St. Mina Church in Imbaba. The official version related by the government is that her husband contacted Salafi groups in the area, and asked for their intervention.
Other sources relate that the incident/rumor circulated widely on Facebook and Twitter, identifying the location of the woman by the very street name of the church. The campaign picked up speed, and resulted in large numbers of protestors demanding Abeer’s release. Yet to date, no woman fitting this story has been identified at all.
Of consequence is that the social media campaign began a mere hours after Camilia Shehata appeared on a foreign Christian satellite program, denying she had ever converted to Islam. Previously, Salafi groups had organized seventeen separate demonstrations to demand her release from the monastery where she was allegedly being held. Pictures appeared of her wearing a hijab, but may have been easily Photoshopped. Meanwhile the church released a video of her Christian confession, but this was either ignored or dismissed by Salafis. Poignantly, she never appeared in a live setting to settle the matter once and for all. That is, until this satellite program, which was announced a day before.
Does this suggest the assault on the church was planned in advance, and that the rumor, however true the story of Abeer may be, was constructed to play on the emotions of disturbed Salafis reacting to their mistaken fury over Camilia Shehata?
This is impossible to ascertain at this point, but the location of Imbaba would have been well chosen as a Cairo neighborhood easily ignited by such a spark. Imbaba is one of the poorer districts of Cairo, hastily and haphazardly constructed in the 1970s following large scale population transfers from Upper Egypt to the city. Basic services such as water, sewage, and paved roads were absent, and the poverty combined with the resurgence of strident religious identity drove many toward extremist Islam. The conditions led local Muslim leaders to declare themselves ‘the Emirate of Imbaba’, which successfully secured practical independence from the state, keeping out all unwanted visitors, including police, for a period of weeks. During this time, there were few Christians in the area at all.
After the police broke the siege and reestablished government control, in the 1980s Egypt cooperated with USAID, an American aid agency, to bolster living conditions. The program was largely successful, improving infrastructure and microenterprise, but was also subject to local criticisms. Over time, Upper Egyptian Christians also relocated to Imbaba, and though there were occasional sectarian tensions between them and Muslims, nothing to the extent of this attack had ever been witnessed before. Yet given that community growth was random in constitution, the centuries-long historical bond between Muslims and Christians in traditional village settings, however tested on occasion, was absent from Imbaba.
What is next? It is too difficult to judge all the different conclusions being paraded. Christians are furious at the police and armed forces for taking so long to contain the violence. Accusations are that they deliberately stood aside, yet it may well be they were simply ill equipped to confront such a large, apparently organized attack in an urban setting. Some in Maspero were heard chanting, similar to the revolutionary cry, ‘the people want the downfall of the general’.
Others say this and other sectarian conflicts have been engineered by forces of counterrevolution. Most major former regime members are in prison, and Mubarak himself was recently cleared by doctors to be interred with them as well. Salafis traditionally and in their theology had always sided with the Mubarak government as being established by God. Assumptions abound that they are heavily financed by Saudi Arabia, which was loath to see an autocratic ally ousted from power, and now under judicial trial. With these allegations, the army could either still be implicitly aligned with the old order even as they ‘protect’ the revolution, or, such incidents are meant as a wedge to drive people against the army, invalidating their popular stand with the revolutionaries. Or, it could simply be the interweaving independent errors of misguided action coalescing into deep conspiracy.
Yet on the side of the Christians there is conspiracy-worthy evidence as well. Why was Camilia Shehata silent for so long, only to appear on a foreign, not Egyptian, program? Her lawyer chastised her publically for going against his advice to speak on Egyptian television, and legally with the public prosecutor. This was only days after he procured a photo with her reconciled with her husband, with public documentation he was entitled to speak on her behalf that she was a Christian, never having converted to Islam. Interestingly, even if irrelevantly, the satellite program she appeared on is produced in the United States, and carries frequent testimonies of Muslim converts to Christianity. Provocation could have been anticipated.
Arab West Report has been able to secure an interview with Camilia and her husband. She admitted to marital problems which caused her to run away. Likely ashamed, as often occurs in such situations in Upper Egypt, local Christians and perhaps her family instigated protests claiming she was kidnapped by Muslims. This played into a known narrative which Muslims picked up on, then assuming the reality that she did in fact convert to Islam.
As protests about her increased, Camilia testified she was a Christian online, but this failed to convince the hardened Salafi audience, believing the YouTube video was a fake. She grew and is increasingly terrified for potential violence against her, understandable given the events in Imbaba. All the same, her testimony in this case puts aside the many conspiracy theories surrounding her. She is simple a woman who made a mistake, which amplified exponentially and engulfed a nation.
Yet to return to conspiracy along the same lines, the subsequent Coptic protest at Maspero was their natural destination point. Why then did a few hundred gather at the US Embassy, demanding international protection? This call is consistently rejected by local Christians as being traitorously fatal to their interests as citizens of Egypt. It is heard from Copts abroad, but almost never internally. Simultaneous to their denouncing of the Imbaba attacks, Salafi leaders criticized Copts for appealing to America. Are elements of the Coptic Church or community, perhaps even the United States, also aligned with counterrevolutionary forces?
Or, does all this simply represent the coalescence of error in the midst of confusion? In all likelihood, yes. Deep conspiracy helps to make sense of facts difficult to connect together. Egypt is undergoing significant changes, and these are uncomfortable for all. Conspiracies such as these are on the lips of many, which do not help the effort to foster national unity and democratic development.
Yet it could also be said that once again this tragedy has engendered demonstrations of Muslim support for their Christian kinsmen. The revolution unleashed clear evidence of Muslim-Christian unity from Tahrir Square, confirming the solidarity witnessed after the church bombing in Alexandria. Then, Muslims around the country surrounded churches and joined Copts inside, willing to die with them should the act be repeated.
Now, Christians are worried that Islam in the hearts of Muslims will ultimately make them side against Christians in times of strife. Unfortunately, Imbaba offers evidence of this. Yet even during the hours of attack in Imbaba, groups of Muslims came together in demonstration, proclaiming Muslims and Christians to be ‘one hand’. Post-revolutionary freedom has also unleashed Salafi activity and fervor, threatening the revolution in the eyes of many. Or, could Salafi drum-beating cloud over the essential unity which normal Muslims assert has always been characteristic of Egypt?
Many Egyptians are tired. They have crafted a great revolution but are now running into the realities of their success. Interruption of the national economy has exasperated an already poor multitude. Freedom of expression has brought unwelcome views to the forefront, regardless of perspective. Governance is entrusted to military forces simultaneously valuing stability and seeking to carry out revolutionary demands, all the while having little experience in day to day management and public relations. Political factions argue over issues both major and minor, with consensus rarely apparent.
It is understandable to be tired; yet now more than ever commitment and resolve are necessary. Christians must cling to faith, both in God and their fellow citizens. Democrats must navigate political streams yet maintain unity in the reconstruction of government. Islamists must curb their quest for influence developed over long years of oppression, while continuing sensibly to shape society as they believe God intends. Salafis … I don’t know what is needed here; may God guide them as he guides all the above. May each commit to the other as an Egyptian, and refuse to allow legitimate differences to divide them in essentials. Egyptians have always been one people; perhaps there are forces, both internal and external, which seek their unfastening. Yet these are days of opportunity; a great future is before them. May the issues of Imbaba be brought justice in all its forms; may these be the labor pains following a great revolutionary conception. May belief be held that a baby is soon to be celebrated.
For an introductory essay to this text, please click here.
On August 19, 2010 AWR interviewed Dr. Rafik Habib, an Egyptian Christian scholar who has devoted his research to the realm of Christianity and Islam contemplating on Muslim-Christian relations, Islamic civilization, and the role of the state in the Egyptian society.
Dr. Rafik Habib was born in 1959 in Minya, Upper Egypt, into the family of Samuel Habib, an evangelical pastor who later became the President of the Evangelical Denomination in Egypt (1980-1997). Dr. Habib refers to himself as an ordinary Christian who came to Cairo to attend ‘Ain Shams University after finishing his secondary education in his hometown. He obtained a masters degree in psychology (1985) and later a PhD in the same field (1988). During his studies Dr. Habib researched significant issues in the Christian community, and later published Psychology of Religiosity for Copts in Egypt. He has since published over twenty other titles. Despite this, though he sought work in a university or academic research center such as al-Ahram, he was never accepted. Many suggested that it was due to the fact that he is a Christian. But, Dr. Habib is of a contrary opinion:
I found it to be a matter of social relationships. To have someone support you in this kind of issue is more important, in many cases, than if I am a Christian or a Muslim.
Dr. Rafiq Habib has been influenced by his family, as he himself acknowledges, and his father was a leading evangelical personality in Egypt at that time. Nonetheless, he is well-known for his ideological affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, an entirely Muslim organization.
Dr. Habib has never attempted to join the organization, nor would he be able to, but his adherence to its ideas led him to join the Wasat Party, a political organization based on the moderate ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. As he points out, religious movements (be they Islamic or Christian) are exclusive to their denomination, but organizations working at the political or social level should be open for anyone.
Yet being a Christian and a scholar, he has sought out dialogue with the political Islamists. Dr. Habib has been interacting with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Jama’a al-Islamyyia, and other Muslim groups since 1989. His has primarily involved himself with the peaceful groups, but has also received criticism for engaging with violent entities. He is quick to distinguish nuances:
At that time, it is important to notice that this organization (Islamic Jihad) was violent, when they murdered Anwar Sadat. But after that, they continued to be a preaching organization with a militant wing, a very weak one. (…) You could meet a member in al-Jama’a al-Islamyyia, who is not a militant. (…) In my opinion al-Jihad was a revolutionary organization from its basis, but al-Jama’a al-Islamyyia is in its basis a preaching group in its organization.
Nevertheless, Dr. Habib maintains that for a researcher is important to learn about the different groups, even those that are militant. Dialogue, however, is not possible with militant personalities, only with those who are peaceful within a militant organization. According to Dr. Habib, extremists reject dialogue altogether, making them inaccessible.
Who are the extremists? What is extremism for Dr. Habib?
Dr. Habib finds this difficult to answer as the term is drawn from western definition. Nevertheless, he asserts that extremism is not a permanent condition but a temporary phenomenon. In his opinion, most of the Islamic movements are becoming more moderate. But,
(Extremism is a) part of the Islamic project, where some make the most clear-cut points; all issues are white and black, even the values and variables. (…) Similarly some take a clear-cut position towards Christians, thinking the Islamic society is for Muslims only. For these, Christians can be present in an Islamic state, but only within their Christian community subsumed by Islamic society, not as a part of Islamic society.
How do Christians have a place in Islamic society? Dr. Habib offers his perspective based on his doctoral study of the national character of the Egyptian society. He maintains that Egypt is a part of Islamic culture and civilization, which is in fact a continuation of Pharaonic culture and civilization. Religion (first Christianity, later Islam) did not destroy the ancient culture, but rather reshaped it. Therefore, he argues that:
I think that the national character, culture, and values of the Christians in Egypt are similar to that of the Muslims, and I found that Christians themselves belong to the Islamic character and culture of Egypt. Muslims and Christians have the same national character and identity.
Based on the argument that Muslims and Christians in Egypt share the same national identity Dr. Habib believes that:
We can have a chance in the future for Christians and Muslims to discover their shared values and rebuild the Islamic culture together.
Nowadays, their mutual relations are negatively affected by developments of the 1970s. Dr. Habib argues that at the time of Anwar Sadat Egyptian society began to dissolve. Both communities began to develop separate religious identities leading to the enclosure of Christian community within the Church and to the establishment of numerous Islamic movements. These communities preferred their particular religious identity (Muslim or Christian) over the prior Islamic-Egyptian cultural identity. According to Dr. Habib, the separation of the communities happened because the state was unable to represent both Christians and Muslims in the same value system. Instead the state pushed a secular agenda foreign to both religious groups.
In order to restore the previous order – to bridge both communities again – Dr. Habib suggests a controversial idea:
The Egyptian society will continue to be an Islamic society and the Christians must return to their conservative identity and join it in one identity as happened before. If we go back 50 years, the whole society looked conservative and very Islamic, though the Christians were a little cautious of the Islamic identity. But if we go more than 100 years back, we find that Christians were unified with the Islamic society under Islamic Sharia and under the Islamic state and there was no problem.
Dr. Habib identifies the main obstacles to such a return as the secular nature of the state, the pressure from Western countries to secularize further, and the Christian community that wants to protect itself under secularization.
The core idea of Dr. Habib theory is that the revival of Islamic state would bridge the communities again. Originally, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to restore the Islamic state following the end of Ottoman caliphate and the establishment of an imposed secular nation-state model. Dr. Habib argues that the secular state model did not reflect the religiosity of the society which rebelled against it. The Brotherhood rallied such opposition, but was double crossed:
The Nasserists came to the power with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. It turned out to be a historical mistake, when they supported Gamal Abdel Nasser. Because after he took power with their support, he said I am not building an Islamic state.
Nasser introduced instead his own nationalistic vision of Arabism that was, to some extent, related to Islamism, in that Arabic identity can shelter both Christian and Muslim identity. The development of Arabism was, however, stopped by the 1967 defeat to Israel. The Six Day War significantly challenged the existing societal and political order in Egypt, initiating deep consequences:
When you’re defeated you return back to your deep, deep identity, and try to protect yourself inside the protection-point: your identity and social consciousness. And, the strong protection-point in our society is the religion. Then both Christians and Muslims returned back to their religions.
Dr. Habib provides an example of the daily routine at the universities in the 1970s:
If you entered a classroom, there was a special place for Christians guarded by members of the “Coptic Family” and for Muslims guarded by the “Religious Group”. But there was no conflict or violence between them; it came spontaneously. The different societies wanted to feel secure, and they turned to religion.
Therefore, Dr. Habib maintains that in order to bridge the communities again, it is necessary to return to the Islamic culture, value system, and civilization as the identity of the society, as both Christian and Muslim values in Egypt have been shaped by the same surroundings. Dr. Habib argues that these conservative religious values are embodied in the Egyptian society and therefore the existing project of the secular nation-state is failing. To succeed, the state must reflect the value system of the society which it is not the case in Egypt:
I think that this model (the secular nation-state) will not work in Egypt or in other Arabic countries, because it depends on the power of law, whereas society depends on the power of religion, which means the power of morals. If you want to organize society by the power of law, the society will not obey it. (…) All society thinks of the state as an enemy, because the state will not accept the societal identity; the state is meaning of law. (…) There is no reason for Egyptian Arab Muslims to obey the secular state, because the reason which is to be found in Western countries is not here. Western societies obey the state instead of the church. They obey the state, because it is the way of progression, and they think that if they obey the church, they will not progress.
Dr. Habib’s argument is based on the significant role religion plays in the societal order. He assumes that:
If the state obeys religion, then the people will obey the state. Because people will always obey the religion in their life, they will not obey anything other than religion, and if you want them to obey the state the state must obey the religion.
Conversely, if the state does not obey religion, the people do not find the justification to obey the laws imposed by the state. In Islam, people are to obey the ruler, even a corrupt one, as long as he applies Islamic Sharia. According to Dr. Habib, the Egyptian state fails to apply Islamic Sharia, even though it is embodied in Article 2 of the constitution.
If the present state applied Article 2 it would not be an issue, because Sharia as a basis can reshape the nation-state to Islamic state in 2 or 3 years if applied.
The proper application of Article 2 would enable the establishment of the Islamic state – an ideal type – restoring the harmony between society and the state. Dr. Habib goes further arguing that the society would be more free and powerful. The church, al-Azhar, and NGO’s would all be independent, as well as the fields of health care and education policy. There would be no interference of the state in civic society. The ideal form of the Islamic state would be a completely decentralized parliamentary system. In sum, it would mean less government in all sectors of society.
When society becomes powerful, it builds its frame of reference and it chooses its ultimate values, and then the state is obliged to behave according to these values.
Nonetheless, Dr. Habib notifies that there are several models of the Islamic state, e.g. the Iranian or Saudi models that are not desirable. He prefers the concept of the civil Islamic state where the authority is political, maintaining only the Islamic value frame of reference. Religious authority would be non-existent as there is no religious authority in Sunni Islam. The state would be governed by the rules of religion, but no one would have religious authority. Islamic scholars would have the right to say their opinion, but the people would have the right to choose which opinion to follow. Once both scholars and society agree upon something, it would become enforced.
Understandably, the question what the position of religious minorities would be like in the Islamic state arises. Dr. Habib offers two rationales that would secure the position of Christians in the Islamic state scenario. First, the freedom of confession would be guaranteed:
Nowadays Christianity exists inside the church but is limited to the Christian community. Thus, secularism surrounds Christianity and the church and weakens its role in society. Under the Islamic state it can be completely different because the main function of the Islamic state is to protect religion, not to restrict it.
Second, the majority of those significantly influencing the character of the state are moderate Muslims with moderate thoughts representing the underlying idea of the Islamic culture. Therefore, Dr. Habib maintains that it is essential for Christians to interact with the moderate mainstream (implicitly meaning the Muslim Brotherhood):
I call on Christians to interact or just even dialogue with the mainstream, because if you are against the mainstream, you make the extremists more powerful. I have a problem here, because the state and the secular elite are always against the mainstream. By weakening the mainstream and having a powerful nation-state, the extremists will take the state.
Dr. Habib defeats the plea that dialogue between Christians and Islamists is difficult to achieve, utilizing a love-your-enemy argument:
Because of Christian values you must love all of Egyptian society, not only your neighbor or the persons you know. Within Christianity there is the fundamental idea that the Christian is to love his enemy. If we apply Christian values in that way with our traditions, which are very social, we can make bridges with the Muslim community, Islamic movements, and other trends. But, the political issue here is ruining the whole situation, especially when the church became in coalition with the state, as the role of the church should be societal.
Accordingly, the current linkage of the church and the secular state harms the reestablishment of harmony between the two religious communities. Dr. Habib claims that once the church accepted the coalition with the state, it became a part of a secular political agenda which completely contradicts the Islamist movements. Dr. Habib asserts that:
The state knows that if the Christian community agreed upon a project with the Islamic movement the secular state will end. This is because the secular discourse here in Egypt uses the existence of Christians as a reason why the Islamic state cannot be established, and the government uses Christianity to say that they are protecting it and therefore the West must support it.
By maintaining a relationship with the government the church adopts the position of a supporter of the secular nationalistic model of state. As such, the Christian community is now in a unique situation: It is separated from society, preaching and practicing Christian love inside its own community, implicitly or explicitly supporting western interference in its homeland. Finding a way out of this situation, according to Dr. Habib, is very difficult.
Dr. Rafik Habib is a unique Egyptian Christian scholar who has not been afraid to stand out and address sensitive issues in Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt. He has devoted his academic career to enhance the mutual understanding of both groups. Though his findings might be controversial, it should not be forgotten that all has been done in his best belief to contribute to a better and healthier atmosphere between Christians and Muslims in Egypt.
On March 19 Egypt is slated to enjoy its first free election in decades. Following the resignation of President Mubarak the Supreme Council for Military Affairs appointed a committee to draft amendments to the Constitution, according to the demands of the people. The proposed amendments will be put to a nationwide vote in only three days. Yet many of the voices which led the revolution are calling for a ‘no’ vote to be cast. Why would this be?
Many of the amendments reflect exactly the demands made during the protests. Term limits are proposed, allowing an elected president two terms of four years each. Furthermore, there are stipulations putting supervision of elections under the purview of the judiciary – a generally well respected institution whose rulings were routinely ignored by the executive branch. Additionally, the restrictive rules determining eligibility for a candidate for president have been loosened considerably, allowing for greater opposition and independent opportunities. These and other proposals will go a long way to curbing the power of the president, which is in line completely with the demands of the people.
Yet a ‘no’ vote has been urged by many of those who struggled for these changes. Incidentally, the referendum does not allow consideration of individual amendments; the proposal must be accepted or rejected wholesale. Among those rejecting are the traditional opposition parties – Wafd, Tagammu, and Nasserist – who have often been understood to provide window dressing support for the democratic posture of the Mubarak regime. Yet the more dynamic and loosely related youth coalitions which led the revolution have also come down against the changes. So have independent candidates for president, such as Mohamed el-Baradei and Amr Moussa.
Noteworthy in the discussion are those groups which have publically called for a ‘yes’ vote. These are led by the remnants of the discredited National Democratic Party, which governed Egypt during the entire tenure of Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood, their officially banned yet primary opposition. Strange bedfellows are par for the course in politics – what brings these forces together?
While there is a lawsuit pending to dissolve the NDP altogether, there is no necessary reason why it could not reform itself and participate actively in the new Egypt. The NDP was less an ideological grouping than an association of opportunism – it was the best and easiest way to advance in politics. As such, it attracted many who craved privilege and access to facilitated business opportunity. Yet this fancy phrase for corruption should not be leveled at all its members, many of which are understood to have sought the reform of the party from within. Can new leadership purge its dead weight? Or is the ‘dead weight’ still in charge, waiting out the reforms until its network of connections and nationwide organizational structure is free to rule the day through democratic means? After all, politics and money go hand in hand; even a reformed NDP would be well versed in both.
The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, faces internal challenges. It has formed an official political party – named Freedom and Justice – but suffers a fissure between its old guard and youth. The former was cautious during the revolution and negotiated with Vice-President Suleiman when he called for ‘dialogue’ with the forces on the street. The youth rejected this along with their Tahrir Square compatriots. Meanwhile, a breakaway moderate Islamist party from the 90s – Wasat – has also been granted political license, and it is possible other trends will separate from the Muslim Brotherhood proper. Even so, the Brotherhood maintains the best organized political structure of all opposition parties, and stands to make gains in the coming democracy.
These gains seem to factor in to the movement for a ‘no’ vote. It is not purely pragmatic, however, as technical reasons are issued about why certain amendments are flawed. The major argument for ‘no’ however is not with the amendments themselves, but with the resulting Constitution.
Following the resignation of Mubarak the military council suspended the Constitution and dissolved Parliament. If a ‘yes’ vote succeeds, this will result in the reactivation of the Constitution, which was rejected by all as a flawed document designed to cement the powers of the executive branch, and president in particular. While the amendments go far, many state they do not go far enough. The revolution discredited the entire ruling system, including the Constitution; these voices believe an entirely new charter should be drafted through national consensus. These amendments, they say, were crafted behind closed doors by members appointed by the military. Though better representing society than anything in the previous regime, they do not reflect the creative, free voice of the people.
The second step following a ‘yes’ vote would be the holding of parliamentary elections. Though an exact timetable has not been promised – and even if delineated might yet be changed – these elections could be as early as June. Some voices call for presidential elections to be held first, but this does not appear to be the desire of the military council. It can be rightfully argued that a president without a legislature could become a new dictator, and at the least would have a powerful hand to guide the supposedly democratic transition.
Yet the ‘no’ party contests this timeline, stating that early legislative elections would lead to great gains by the NDP and Muslim Brotherhood, as the free and nascent political movements will not have had time to canvas nationwide. Many of these favor the formation of a temporary presidential council, composed of both civilian and military figures, to guide the nation until civil society can accommodate all candidate parties. Added to their concern is the understanding, if not promise, that the new government will indeed craft a new Constitution. While this is desired, if a legislature dominated by former regime members and the Brotherhood has a leading role, liberal forces fear what may develop.
In any scenario, neither the Constitutional amendments nor the military are clear about the next steps. All that is known is that the referendum will be held on March 19. Many oppositional parties desire greater clarity, but they do celebrate the opportunity at hand. Rather than calling for a boycott, they urge wide participation – for a vote of ‘no’. Operating under a newfound freedom, they hope that practices such as these will lead to a deepening of the democratic impulse. Even so, their fears are more than whispers, but the decision, at long last, rests in the hands of the Egyptian people.
This is the conclusion to this report, dealing with coverage of the issue by other media sources. For Part One, which outlines the story in its broad strokes, please click here. For Part Two, which covers contextual information, please click here.
Media Critique
At Arab West Report, we have had the benefit of time in order to research this issue and gather and compare multiple sources. This is done in commitment to nonpartisanship and objectivity, and the reader is invited to judge our analysis for any bias. Many news agencies, however, must rely on their immediate sources and produce reports as quickly as possible. Other agencies are organized in defense of worldwide Christian interests, often legitimately so, but can display a bias in their reporting that misconstrues the issues for their readership. In light of this and the above descriptions, this report will conclude in critique of two recent articles produced on this topic. Issuing organizations are the Assyrian International News Agency and Compass Direct.
The Assyrian International News Agency
Under the headline ‘EgyptianArmed Forces Fire At Christian Monasteries, 19 Injured’, the AINA uses language which does not accurately reflect events as they transpired. The opening sentence reads, ‘Egyptian armed force stormed the 5th century old St. Bishoy monastery,’ but the word ‘stormed’ paints a picture of a violent incursion into guarded territory. Rather, as video depicts, the military gathered at the point of the newly constructed wall, which was on government territory, not monastery land, and then proceeded no further.
Monk Fr. Ava Bishoy is then quoted, ‘When we tried to address them, the army fired live bullets, wounding Father Feltaows in the leg and Father Barnabas in the abdomen,’ but here the action is presented as immediately sequential, whereas several rounds were fired into the air before anyone was wounded. Then another monk, Fr. Hemanot Ava Bishoy is quoted, ‘The army was shocked to see the monks standing there praying ‘Lord have mercy’ without running away. This is what really upset them. As the soldiers were demolishing the gate and the fence they were chanting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and ‘Victory, Victory’.’ Yet other testimony denies these chants take place, and they cannot be heard on the monastery recorded YouTube video. While this may represent the word of one man against another, or simply conflicting but not necessarily contradicting statements, the tenor of the article in highlighting the Islamic ‘Allahu Akbar’ cry goes beyond the events in question.
Later in the article AINA references the statement of the military. ‘The Egyptian Armed Forces issued a statement on their Facebook page denying that any attack took place on St. Bishoy Monastery.’ Yet the word ‘denying’ paints a picture that the statement is untrue. Yet as described above, the military used force to demolish a newly constructed wall, and took no action against the monastery itself. Then Fr. Hedra Ava Bishoy is highlighted in the collection of bullet casing, with which the number of wounded, used ‘to prove otherwise’ against the military denial.
Compass Direct
The Compass Direct article begins with the headline ‘Monk, Workers Shot in Monastery Attack in Egypt’, and the opening sentence reads, ‘One monk and six church workers were shot and wounded last week when the Egyptian Army attacked a Coptic Orthodox monastery.’ Yet as above, the word ‘attacked’ is an inaccurate description, as the army never attacked the monastery. The paragraph goes on to report, ‘After a brief argument with monks and workers outside the monastery wall, soldiers opened fire on the crowd, sending them running for cover.’ Yet again, the opening of fire was directed initially into the air. While several did run for cover, others stood safely a short distance away. No mention is made that the crowd acted as a human shield.
Later in the article the context of the demonstrations, withdrawal of police forces, and escaping of prisoners is highlighted, but then a wrong context is established in providing reasons for the wall construction. The article states the monastery ‘had come under increasing attacks from raiders and criminals set free from prisons’. This, however, was described above as criminals who benefited from (albeit uninvited) monastery hospitality, which later morphed into the rumors of ‘thousands’ of criminals raiding the grounds.
Further, the interaction between the army and the monastery is described, along with the deadline issued to remove the wall. ‘The army later claimed the monastery had not acquired the proper permits’, but here the word ‘claimed’ is deceptive, since it implies the claim is not true. Yet the wall at the very least was partially on government property, and no permits had been issued for the wall to be built, let alone the land to be obtained. No one argues otherwise.
The article continues, ‘The army denied conducting the attack, despite a video widely circulated on the Internet in which Egyptian soldiers can be seen firing AK-47 assault rifles.’ Again, ‘denied’ needs to be highlighted, and if ‘attack’ is used it must be written the army attacked the wall, not the monastery. Furthermore, ‘despite’ in reference to video proof suggests to readership that the military has been caught red handed in its denial. The video, however, shows quite the opposite; military action was limited to the demolition of the wall, and had nothing to do with the monastery itself.
Further on the article describes the incident at the Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian. ‘The army claimed the wall was built on land set aside for a nature preserve.’ Again, the word ‘claimed’ places the army statement on trial with the burden of proof upon them. Yet it is a given fact that this monastery was illegally constructed on land belonging to the National Park Authority. Casting doubt upon this gives the reader the wrong impression.
Conclusion
It is difficult in journalism to produce reports that are timely, comprehensive, and contextual. The above examples may reflect work that aimed to be fast, relied on sources which were misinformed or biased, and did not have access to background information which would cast doubt upon the main line of the story. Journalism, however, often suffers from a temptation to sensationalism, and the word choice implied in the above examples suggests this story – an important news item in its own right – was transformed into a sectarian incident through the pen of the authors. It may also suggest bias or deliberate distortion, but this can only be known in the heart of the writer. The possibility, however, deserves to be raised. At the very least, what may have been a rush to judgment in the bustle of meeting deadlines must be reevaluated in light of further information, such as is brought out in this report.
This text began with the assertion that all parties were at fault, though the actions of all were understandable. It is reasonable that the monasteries would fear following the withdrawal of police forces. It is reasonable they would build additional walls for their protection. Yet, is it reasonable they would fail to abide by military directives to demolish their temporarily necessary structures? May they have been concerned also that having built a wall, they might later lay claim to the land? Were the monks and monastery workers provocative in making a human shield, placing the army in a very difficult position?
From the other side, it is reasonable that the military would seek to demolish illegally constructed walls on government territory. It is reasonable they would fire into the air to disperse a crowd gathered to prevent the execution of their orders. Yet, is it reasonable that live ammunition be used at all, some of which would strike unarmed civilians? Might some of the soldiers been caught up in the struggle, and acted with impropriety? Could some have born a particular grudge against ‘Christians’, even without an extremist agenda? Certainly this side deserves condemnation and rebuke for any casualties suffered at all. The military is used to being obeyed, and is inexperienced at government, politics, and public relations. Yet, if only due to their difficult position of running a country, restraint would have been the better policy.
Therefore, this report counsels all to exercise patience in discovering facts, humility in asserting unknown intentions, and charity in dealing with an oppositional party. Egypt faces a very tense situation in which security is lax, the stakes are high, and the future unknown. These types of incidents at the monasteries are likely to be repeated often in the coming days, in which misunderstandings or conflicting agendas could threaten to lead to deep conflict and venomous accusations. This statement is independent of any sectarian emphasis, though along religious lines the consequences can be even more severe. Where facts point to injustice, condemnation must be issued. Yet a more important value in these days is mercy, especially where confusion reigns and reality is disputed. Some will seek to take advantage of this situation for their personal benefit. Yet the majority must treat each other with kindness, sympathy, understanding, and a desire for the greater good. Otherwise, the gains won during the Egyptian revolution may descend into petty partisanship. Egypt is widely acknowledged as a highly religious society; may the grace and virtue of each religion prevail, especially in the inevitable disputes to come.
Note: This report was written through information gained by Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of Arab West Report, and Hani Labib, managing director of the Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation. At the website of AWR the report is listed accurately as having been co-authored with Hulsman.
For Part One, which outlines the story in its broad strokes, please click here.
Contextual Information
The details of the stories above, not all of which have been confirmed, raise the following questions:
Why were the monks in these monasteries in such fear while they lived in relative isolation?
Was this fear justified?
Might the monks have been attempting a land grab, no matter their level of fear?
Was the army response fitting with its traditional conduct?
While other questions may be posed and deserve attention as well, information is available to provide perspective on these issues. The following section will address the general threat recently issued by al-Qaeda against the Monastery of St. Bishoy, the security situation in the desert following the withdrawal of police, previous efforts by monasteries to create ‘facts on the ground’ in order to expand their lands or erect buildings, and the subsequent response of the army.
Al-Qaeda and the Monasteries
In the fall of 2010, following an attack on a church in Baghdad, al-Qaeda issued a warning to the Copts of Egypt. This community in particular was threatened due to the understanding that the church was holding Coptic women converts to Islam against their will within the desert monasteries. Specifically, Wafa Costantine and Camilia Shehata were wives of priests who, in the case of Costantine, took initial steps to convert, and in the case of Shehata, allegedly appeared in photographs wearing a hijab. Following church intervention these were turned over by the state to ecclesiastic authorities, and have not been seen publically since. Wide protests were held by Muslims in Egypt, and though no one outside the church knows their whereabouts, it was believed they were being held in one of monasteries of Wadi al-Natrun.
Though Egypt rallied around the church in its condemnation of the al-Qaeda threat, on New Year’s Eve there was a horrific bombing at a church in Alexandria in which twenty-three people died. Such a brazen attack was not fitting with the usual troubles that surface during internal sectarian tensions, and though many elements of the bombing remain unclear, the Egyptian authorities fingered a Gaza-based al-Qaeda offshoot as the culprit. Again, Egyptian Christians and Muslims demonstrated their solidarity in response, but the fulfillment of the earlier warning put the Copts on alert.
Then, on January 14 there was an incident at the Monastery of the Syrian. The personal vehicle of Bishop Mattias, head of the monastery, exploded in the garage after having been parked for an hour. Damages were limited to the car and the immediate area, no one was hurt, and the monastery chose to downplay what happened. Media coverage was minor, and the report was that the car exploded due to a leakage of gas.
The German Coptic engineer, however, investigated matters and ran a computer simulation of the event. He noted that the fuel necessary to run the car was different than published reports, and that an idle car would lack the necessary spark for combustion. Furthermore, even if it were to occur, it would cause an implosion, yet the pictures which reveal the damage clearly indicated to him evidence of a bomb.
Was this the work of al-Qaeda, or related to the suspected presence of captive converts to Islam? No one knows. Even if the engineer is mistaken, it represented another reminder of the general threat under which the monasteries existed. Certainly, after the withdrawal of police forces from the country in general and the monastery in particular, great fear on the part of the monks is understandable.
The Security Situation
While fear is justified, did it need to be amplified to the point of erecting new walls for security? More directly, had monasteries come under attack by criminal or sectarian elements in the days following the withdrawal of police? Evidence is inconclusive because it is incomplete. Yet there are reports which discourage the reader from over-generalizing the state of chaos imagined in the absence of police forces.
Most looting took place in the major cities, as would be expected. Some of it, however, expanded to the desert regions in search of antiquities. The German Coptic engineer reports that on February 28 the Pharaonic pyramids of Sakkara were raided by men with machine guns. Certainly this is indicative of instability that would worry any Egyptian anywhere.
Yet the general atmosphere between Muslims and Christians was highly positive even in the absence of security. Leaders from both communities celebrated that during the demonstration period and afterwards, the churches of Egypt – left unguarded – remained safe. It is true that during the period of lawlessness some took advantage of blood feuds across religious lines. One Christian family was slaughtered a year after a Christian man was discovered in illicit relations with a Muslim woman. Yet this type of violence affected the Egyptian population as a whole, and was not directed against the Christian community at large.[1]
In fact, evidence at the St. Macarius Monastery in Wadi al-Natrun, not far from St. Bishoy, indicates quite the opposite. Following the outbreak from the prison of Wadi al-Natrun, 31 escapees scaled the walls of the monastery, and requested food and drink. This was given freely, as the monastery offers all visitors, and then they were asked to leave, and they complied. There was no violence, no compulsion, and though the intrusion and trespassing were surly worrisome to the monks, the incident revealed only an example of hospitality, even to criminals.
Fr. Ruiess related the incident after receiving the news by telephone in the presence of Cornelis Hulsman on January 31. Fr. Ruiess resides at the Monastery of St. Anthony along the Red Sea coast, not far from the previously described Monastery of St. Paul. Hulsman was staying at this monastery while traveling with a group of European Christians, including four clergy, before the demonstrations began, and continued the tour in Upper Egypt despite the lack of security suffered in the country. The events at St. Macarius being known in St. Anthony indicate they were known also at St. Paul, for Hulsman relates that there were frequent contacts in these days between the neighboring monasteries. Hulsman stayed at both sites from January 30 – February 2, and describes that until this time there were no attacks on either monastery, or elsewhere in Upper Egypt, as confirmed by the numerous priests and laypeople with whom he conversed.
Later that day, the story of the escapees at St. Macarius was confirmed by Fr. Basilius, earlier described, a monk resident at the monastery, through a phone call by Hulsman. He also refuted rumors going around, passed on to Hulsman by expatriate Copts in Europe, that thousands of escaped prisoners had attacked the monastery.[2] There is no evidence of any monastery in all of Egypt which suffered damage during the period of general instability.
Were these three monasteries in question, then, justified in building new walls to protect themselves from lawlessness? This question must be left open for now, especially since the answer lies only in the heart of those involved. While fear was understandable, and precaution is always wise, and al-Qaeda related threats were in the air, general reporting about the danger faced appears to have been exaggerated. Perhaps the monasteries were justified in building the walls; were they then justified in resisting demolition?
Creating Facts on the Ground
In general, the Egyptian government suffers from an inability to extend the rule of law throughout its vast territory, much of which is desert. This is specifically seen in the area of land registration. As the population explodes upon limited arable land, citizens accede to the temptation to simply secure territory through traditional means, claiming land and building upon it even though their ownership would officially be in question, and without the necessary permits. Often unable to prevent such action, and appreciating the benefit of developed desert territories, the government frequently overlooks the means of acquisition and accepts the building / development as ‘facts on the ground’ which demonstrate ownership.
In general, Egyptian Christians suffer from an inequitable policy governing the building of churches. New construction has to be approved at least at the level of the governor, and the process of obtaining permits can be long with no certainty of approval. As a consequence, many Christians have resorted to a strategy of circumventing the law by building their church structure as quickly as possible, banking on the fact that the government would not risk local and international outrage should they destroy a place of worship. Again, ‘facts on the ground’ can establish reality, as Bishop Marcos of Shubra al-Khayma has related.[3] Interestingly, this strategy is employed equally by Muslims and Christians,[4] though Christians are usually in greater recourse since permits for mosques face fewer restrictions.
Documented Examples
The Christian strategy of creating facts on the ground has been documented by Arab West Report. A comprehensive survey of church building details many such examples,[5] and the case of the Abu Fana Monastery in Upper Egypt demonstrates how some monks also may seek the expansion of their grounds.[6] This next section, however, will focus on two examples: first, the Monastery of St. Anthony,[7] described above, and second, the Patmos Monastery, established by Bishop Butrus.[8]
The Monastery of St. Anthony is situated in barren, desert, mountainous land near the Red Sea coast. It is an environment suitable for ascetic monasticism far from the bustle of life. Likely in effort to preserve their sanctuary, in 2003 the monks built a wall encompassing much desert land owned by the government. This expanse was suitable neither for agricultural development nor for personal meditation, as it lay under the desert sun, lacking the historically favored caves of Coptic hermits.
Shortly thereafter the governor of the area sent bulldozers to demolish the wall, as it was built illegally on state property. The monks prepared for this with cameras and videos, and circulated the operation internationally among Coptic communities abroad. Though the governor was angry, the ensuing controversy led to negotiations in which the monastery purchased the land from the government.
The Patmos Monastery is located near the Cairo-Suez road, and was established on land Bishop Butrus bought through family members for the stated purpose of agricultural development. The monastery he created in actuality, however, was located adjacent to an army camp. In December 1996 the army issued a warning, and then returned to destroy the walls and building which were constructed without permit. The bishop complained that the military could have pursued legal action against the project, so that the matter be settled in court. Legal procedures in Egypt, however, are long and complicated, and certainly the military represents its own culture of dealing with problems. Like many Egyptians, they are more likely to resort to force to achieve their objectives, even, and perhaps especially, when they believe themselves to be in the right.
Bishop Butrus’ response cemented Coptic strategy oft-repeated, pursued in imitation by the monks of St. Anthony. He sought international media attention. In the ensuing controversy he won not only the right to establish the monastery, but also compensation to rebuild the demolished structures. Furthermore, the media attention helped with fundraising in order to further develop the monastery. Though disputes continued through the years with the military, each time the monastery was able to assert its claims.
To return to the three monasteries whose walls were demolished in recent days, it would be improper to accuse their monks of attempting a land grab by creating facts on the ground. At the same time, context suggests that this has been a strategy used by Coptic monasteries in the past, and pause should be given before insisting the walls were built solely for defense of the community during times of fear.
Would monks be troublemakers? Perhaps this is not the right word. Monks are often single-minded and independent, dedicated to the pursuit of God as they understand this. Like many Egyptians, many maintain a mistrust of government, even as they withdraw from the world. Further context, however, demonstrates that of the three monasteries of this report, one may deserve the reputation of being a troublemaker. At the least, its independent and uncompromising spirit may be noted.
Fr. Alisha and the Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian
The Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian is located in Wadi al-Rayyan near Fayyum, and was established by Fr. Alisha in 1998.[9] He chose the location in devotion to his spiritual hero, Matta al-Miskeen, who resided with his disciples in the area in the 1950s and 60s, before being ordered to rebuild the then-decaying Monastery of St. Macarius in Wadi al-Natrun. Today, the Monastery of St. Macarius in Wadi al-Natrun is a thriving community with over 100 monks in residence. One such monk, Fr. Basilius described above, relates its opposition to the efforts of Fr. Alisha. There is no relation between the two communities; indeed, the Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian is not recognized by the Coptic Orthodox Church.
One reason for the opposition of the Wadi al-Natrun monastery is that they wish to preserve the cave dwellings inhabited by their spiritual father Matta al-Miskeen in their original state. Yet the spiritual son of Fr. Alisha, Amir Milad, stated, ‘I suspect that he does not want to work under the authority of either the Monastery of Macarius or Pope Shenouda. He does not want to be told how the monks should live, what rules to follow.’ The new monastic community now boasts 15 monks, all consecrated without proper authorization by Fr. Alisha. He has developed relations with Copts in Germany, and through donations has invested over US$ 10 million in making suitable cells in the local caves, and in construction of a massive church building.
One further contextual piece of information is necessary, this one more relevant than all that has preceded it. In the 1950s Fr. Matta al-Miskeen lived in the wilderness, troubling no one, building nothing. Fr. Alisha is in the same wilderness, but today that land is designated as part of the National Park Authority. Every building constructed has been done without permit, and he has additionally employed several Christian workers originally from the city of Minia in Upper Egypt. The monastery is an expanding community, without license from the church, at odds with the government park service on which it has established itself illegally.
Since 1998 Fr. Alisha has been able to create facts on the ground without violent opposition from the authorities. On this occasion, however, the army proceeded to demolish the newly constructed wall. Again, it is impossible to know the monastery’s intention, and the accusation of a land grab cannot be substantiated over and against the desire for protection in times of instability. At the very least, however, given the history of the monastery, the question does deserve to be raised.
Army Conduct
It was mentioned above that the army pattern of issuing a warning and then returning to accomplish its task fits within its modus operandi. As such, the method in which it demolished the walls recently constructed by the three monasteries does not suggest any form of anti-Christian behavior. Even so, did their manner reflect anti-Christian sentiment, in particular with the violence and force employed to achieve their ends? Additionally, if the monasteries had requested official protection, why did the military not station at least a soldier or two in front of the gate?
This question was posed by Cornelis Hulsman to a diplomat in the Egyptian Embassy in The Hague. The diplomat asked that his name not be used in any official report, but even so, he provided little information. Basically, he referred to the statement of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, referenced above. This worked in line with the tenor of that statement itself: Provide no clarification. The army is not used to governance or politics; therefore, it says as little as possible.
At the same time the diplomat surmised a few reasons why there could be at least slight tension between the army and the church. One, unlike with the government, there has been no dialogue between the two parties. Whereas President Mubarak and Pope Shenouda maintained a relationship and channels of communication, the army has remained silent, as it has with many. Furthermore, it was not until after the incidents at the three monasteries that the church in its three Christian denominations issued on February 25 declaring loyalty to the current military rulers, while promoting the ideal of a civil state.[10]
Two, reflective of the above, Christians have been slow to embrace the revolution. The diplomat believed that in all only three bishops[11] visited Tahrir Square, while many Muslim imams were present throughout the demonstrations. Though Christians participated as individuals in the uprising, which never revealed a religious character, church leadership was clear in counseling its community not to get involved.
Three, there has been general discontent in society concerning the conduct of the church vis-à-vis the state. In 2010 there was a court ruling compelling the church to allow remarriage to its divorcees. After the pope publically made clear he would not abide by the decision, the government intervened and shelved the issue after the church paid a hefty fine of 100,000 LE (approximately US$ 18,000). In addition, the manner in which Copts have build churches and gained land in the monasteries, described above, has also caused friction in society.[12] Like many others, perhaps the military also disapproves of this conduct, and made it clear it would not tolerate the practice of placing ‘facts on the ground’.
If this is true, has the military been dismantling other ‘facts’ which were quickly created following the breakdown of security? If not, it would appear to be an action directed solely against these Christian efforts. Multiple sources[13] in the Egyptian press, however, describe the elimination of over 2800 encroachments against state owned land or other instances of illegal activity during the period of insecurity.
What then about the level of violence employed? The use of violence should be condemned in any and all circumstances against unarmed civilians. It should also be condemned here. Yet it does not appear that the objective of the army was to use violence; their objective was the simple demolition of the wall. It was only when they met resistance did the conflict occur.
It is unlikely the military was prepared to have to deal with a human shield. To dismiss the blockade they fired shots in the air, fired shots above the level of the head, and apparently, in a very limited proportion in comparison to the rounds fired, some shots struck civilian bodies. Was disproportionate force employed? Likely. Might there have been other ways to end the standoff? Perhaps. Is the military used to negotiations? No. In all, they appear to have sought only the accomplishment of their objective. Had they wished bloodshed, it would have been simple to produce multiple casualties. The military is understood to be a largely secular organization, very resistant to infiltration by extreme Islamist elements. While this possibility cannot be ruled out on the part of a few individual participants, the decisions to move against the three monasteries would have been made and coordinated at a higher level than ‘infiltration’ could have obtained. As for the account of binding the monks at the Monastery of St. Paul, and leaving them after the operation was completed, independent verification would be needed to establish this claim above and beyond the level of rumor.
[2] On February 3, Dr. Otmar Oehring of Missio forwarded to Hulsman a copy of an email sent by a German Copt to German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, in which it was reported that thousands of freed prisoners had attacked the monastery. Hulsman again called Fr. Basilius who denied this account, and was very displeased since he found this exaggeration to be dangerous, for it upsets people and makes things worse. Hulsman then wrote the Coptic author of the email who responded in an email on February 5, “The alarm started as one active person of the Coptic community in Germany called me last Monday/Tuesday [January 31 / February 1] and told me about that in detail (severity and that the number is thousands!). Tuesday this important person called me once again and confirmed this case from another independent person from Egypt, which has very close contact to the monastery.” The email, however, made also clear that the source had not come from the Monastery of St. Macarius itself.
[11] Though the diplomat stated ‘bishops’, it is likely that the religious figures were priests. Muslims often confuse bishops and priests in media articles, which is understandable as both wear long black robes and are differentiated only by headgear. It would be extremely unlikely, however, that a bishop would travel alone; generally they are accompanied by a number of priests, which would have been noted by the diplomat.
[12] A recent email, circulated among Muslims and was obtained from a Muslim friend of AWR in December 2010, describes the great expanse of land owned by monasteries throughout Egypt, revealing Muslim frustration with Christian complaints about discrimination. To list only one example from this email, the Monastery of St. Macarius in Wadi al-Natrun occupies 11.34 km2 of land, whereas by comparison Vatican City rests upon 0.44 km2 and the mosque of the Azhar only 0.012 km2. This monastery is only one of dozens of such monastic landholdings, many with majestic churches and numerous buildings, factories, and agricultural facilities. The email provides photos of these majestic churches. The authors of this report respond to this: To be clear, most monastic land has been obtained legally, and these figures have not been independently verified. Nonetheless, the figures help temper the notion of the impossibility for Christians to maintain religious presence in Egypt. The tone of the email also reveals that Muslim frustration with Christian complaints in lieu of these figures can border on the violent. The email was forwarded with an introduction which reads: ‘This report reveals great danger, and we ask God to make those responsible for the protection of our country aware of these strongholds and the widespread power of the church these last thirty years. This fang-toothed power is both domestic and foreign, and its followers resemble the Zionist gangs of Palestine.’ Certainly this introduction represents the opinion of its author only, but that it circulates in Egypt reveals the latent tensions which exist between certain Muslims and Christians.
On January 29, following four days of massive popular demonstrations[1] and the withdrawal of police personnel throughout the country, the military has been deployed on Egyptian soil, keeping the peace and maintaining neutrality during the political crisis. On February 11, following the resignation of President Mubarak, the military command assumed authority to govern the country through a transitional period of political reform toward democratic rule. The conduct of the military has been widely praised in Egypt, and from their initial deployment the demonstrators chanted ‘the people and the army are one hand!’ Politics and governance, however, do not come naturally to the military, and within the past few weeks their conduct, including that in regard to Christians, has come under question.
Beginning on February 23 the military undertook a series of operations to demolish recently constructed walls at three Coptic Orthodox monasteries in three separate locations. This action resulted in a number of Christian injuries and widespread outcry in the Coptic community, both in Egypt and abroad. As with many events that concern religious affairs in Egypt, the accounts are diverse and context is necessary to properly understand what has taken place.
This report will describe the incidents at the monasteries, explore the background events which shed light on the actions of the principles, and critique the reporting of certain agencies which brought the events to public knowledge. It will rely on firsthand testimony of eyewitnesses, details as reported in the press, YouTube footage of the operation, the understanding of expatriate Copts,[2] and previous reporting of Arab West Report. It will seek to demonstrate that fault is shared among all parties, but that each faced substantial difficulties which help make their conduct understandable, though not excusable. Final judgment on motivations, however, is not possible outside the inner workings of each person’s heart.
The Unfolding of Events
The three monasteries in question are St. Bishoy in Wadi al-Natrun, 120 km northwest of Cairo, St. Macarius the Alexandrian in Wadi al-Rayyan near Fayyum, 100 km southwest of Cairo, and St. Paul along the mountainous coast of the Red Sea. Events are best documented for the Monastery of St. Bishoy, and as such, this account will serve as a template for the understanding the three incidents as a whole. Each incident is unique, however, and known details will be integrated into this text.
The General Story
Following the withdrawal of police forces throughout Egypt, a period of lawlessness ensued with widespread rioting and the empting of several state prisons. Accounts differ as to whether prisoners took advantage of the situation and escaped, criminal, Islamist, or Bedouin elements attacked and freed prisoners among their constituency, or government-aligned forces allowed the evacuation of the prisons in order to spread chaos in society and develop antipathy toward the demonstrators. In any event, the violence that followed spread fear throughout the country, including the distant and generally isolated monasteries in question.
In what could be understood as a natural reaction to this fear, the monasteries began to build security walls in defense. Yet these monasteries already have walls around their territories, though not protective of all their lands. Additionally, these new walls were not built on monastery land, but on state land owned by the government.[3] This prompted the military to act, issuing an ultimatum for the walls to be demolished. When the monasteries failed to adhere to the directive, the military conducted the operation itself.
Monks and Coptic Egyptian workers, however, did not stand idly by. Their resistance and protest, though passive, was met by the use of ammunition. The army discharged several rounds into the air, seeking to clear the area in order to begin demolition. Rounds were both of the live and rubber bullet variety, and some struck the Christians in question, causing injury. Eventually military control was established, and bulldozers dismantled the walls.
The YouTube Footage
The account above has been written with an attempt to sanitize the information, so as to provide general facts without controversial commentary. Of course, such presentation itself may lead to controversy, as supporters of either the military or the monasteries may protest at the failure to judge misconduct on either side. Though this will be dealt with later in the text, pro-Coptic reporting and sentiment may be seen through links provided in the footnote below.[4]
These videos were filmed at the Monastery of St. Bishoy. Though some editing is obvious, and necessary, the following YouTube links offer a window to witness the events as they unfolded. Each will be accompanied by a running commentary in the text.
The video begins with a monk standing between a soldier and a monastery worker in an effort to prevent the soldier from hitting the worker. The reason for his anger is not clear. Five armored personnel carriers are seen with armed soldiers as well as a group of soldiers discussing with a group of Christians, including the monk described above. Meanwhile an officer is seen giving the armored cars instructions to move into position. At 1:16 shooting starts. It appears that officers had given Christians instructions to leave the area which they probably refused to do. The situation becomes chaotic. A number of Christians start running away while others remain. At 2:20 one sees the building material and the newly constructed gate. A man comes from the gate to the cameraman, carrying a wounded young man, apparently hit by a bullet. At 2:28 a civilian sits on the ground as two soldiers with batons stand beside him. A few seconds later, one of the soldiers beats him with his baton. At 3:00 a tank is seen demolishing a wall. At 3:20 a soldier (or officer?) with a gun, sitting on top of a tank, gives instructions to soldiers on the ground. Shooting has been continuous since it started. At 4:20 the military armored car runs into the metal gate. Copts realize that the gate will be destroyed and start chanting ‘Kyrie Eleison’, translated ‘Lord have mercy’. For a moment there is no shooting, but there is no indication this was because of the chanting. At 4:50 two armored vehicles hit the two concrete pillars of the gate. The chanting stops. At 4:58 a shout is heard, probably a soldier or officer, saying ‘Tahya Masr’, translated ‘Long live Egypt!’ At 5:26 soldiers are seen damaging the nameplate of the monastery, and later the chanting of Kyrie Eleison is heard again. The film shows vehicles and soldiers near the destroyed objects but the soldiers do not progress forward. It seems their task of destroying walls and the gate was accomplished. At 6:40 a soldier is seen cutting at a tree. The producer of the film narrates that the army even cuts trees, but this does not appear to be a fair comment. If one watches carefully the solder is cutting barbed wire which had been nailed to this tree. At 7:07 the sign with the name of the monastery is shown, riddled with bullet holes. A priest shows empty bullet casings, a clear proof that the army had been shooting. Other priests show additional empty bullet casings and say these must be collected as proof. At 7:40 there is depicted a young man who points to a wound in his belly. At the conclusion the army moves out.
This video opens with a red Toyota, the shooting of guns, and at a distance of perhaps a hundred meters a view of the wall and gate built near a line of trees. During the shooting a priest walks calmly across the street, apparently unafraid of the shooting as it was not directed towards him or the cameraman. At 0:28 two civilians, one apparently wounded, come running from the wall that is being destroyed. A military armored car moves toward the wall. At 0:48 a young man throws stones at the soldiers but he is much too far away to hit anyone. At 1:06 a man comes from the gate to the cameraman, carrying a wounded monastery worker, apparently hit by a bullet. Shooting continues to be heard until 1:23, with images of young civilian men, some throwing stones. At 1:28 while the wall is being torn down an older monk approaches the young men and instructs them to leave. The language he uses indicates he did not want them to be there. They do not leave, but instead argue with the priest. Shots are heard sporadically, but gunfire is no longer constant as it was earlier. Soldiers on foot destroy to wall with ease, revealing it to have been built rapidly and with poor quality. At 2:03 a young man, probably wounded, walks towards the camera crying as soldiers destroy the wall. At 2:30 a young monk is videoed filming the soldiers. At 2:55 there is more stone throwing from a distance. At 3:21 gunshots are heard again, perhaps because some young men had come too close to the soldiers. No one, however, runs from the location of gunfire. At 4:00 and afterwards a military vehicle destroys a wall close to the gate, as some watch on, others throw stones, but no one is running away. At 7:20 a car is heard honking, drives in the direction of the gate, and receives a bleeding young man carried by others. At 8:20 the door of the gate is forced open by soldiers, and a few seconds later much shooting is heard. The film ends with a quotation from the Gospel, in which Jesus tells his followers, ‘In this world you will have trouble, but take heart, I have overcome the world.’
Commentary
This footage accompanied several reports which decried the conduct of the army. Some of these reports will be analyzed more closely later in the text. Certainly the incident involved violence, which has not been characteristic of military behavior since they assumed responsibility for the country. Why then did it occur now? How should this be interpreted? These questions will be addressed as the text continues, but for now, a few observations are necessary:
The wall destroyed was a recent construction, and the scope of military action did not move beyond its demolition, certainly not to the monastery proper, which is never in view.
While gunfire was frequent, it appears to be localized at the point of demolition. From here young men are seen to be running, while elsewhere they stand around undisturbed.
Some people were certainly injured in the altercation, and at least one person was beaten.
Monks appeared to be working to prevent clashes between soldiers and workers.
Other Information Unique to Each Monastery
The Monastery of St. Bishoy
Information provided on the Monastery of St. Bishoy is primarily gained from Fr. Timon al-Suriyani,[5] a monk in residence. It is supplemented by reports from Fr. Basilius,[6] a monk from the nearby Monastery of St. Macarius, also located in Wadi al-Natrun. Hani Labib, managing director of the Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translations, provided further investigations. The text also relies on public statements issued by the monastery[7] and the armed forces,[8] putting forth their version of events.
According to the monastery statement, the wall in question was constructed following the withdrawal of police, and after an official request to the military for protection. When the military responded, ‘Protect yourselves!’ the monastery proceeded to build the wall on land previously sought for purchase from the state. This construction proceeded within sight and hearing of local military personnel.
When the army arrived to demolish the wall, monks and workers ‘emerged to see what was happening to their monastery’. They were met by seven armored vehicles, military police vehicles, and at least 150 soldiers who fired ‘an enormous quantity of ammunition, live, blanks, and rubber, and two RPG projectiles used for military training’. This resulted in one monk being injured, and four workers sustaining ‘penetrative injuries, including shots and gashes’. Among these four ‘one had his spleen removed and another his right kidney, which had three shots in it’. Two monks and three workers were arrested, following an incident in which ‘the monks were treated with the utmost violence, insults, and bad language’.
The monastery statement also makes it clear it believes this action to be untypical ‘of the mannerisms of the valiant armed forces responsible for protecting the nation’, and therefore appeals
to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which is responsible for the safety of all Egyptians, to investigate this insulting crime that does not fit with the honor of the Egyptian military, which we trust to the utmost and support completely. The monastery asks the honorable council to speedily release the monks and other persons still detained with them.
These were set free after a few days.
Fr. Timon adds a few more details to the narrative. The new walls (plural) were constructed on two sides of the monastery, ½ km out from the existing walls. The first week of February the army came to investigate, and they returned a week later to request the walls be torn down, since, they said, the police would soon return to provide protection. The monastery did not comply. Then, on February 19 at 10am, the army returned and began demolishing walls without negotiation. They followed this up on February 23,[9] the day in question, with seven armored vehicles and at least 50 soldiers. After about 90 minutes the walls and gate were leveled, and seven monks and workers were injured in the altercation.
According to some reports, the soldiers were said to have shouted ‘Allahu Akbar!’ and ‘Victory!’ as they fired their rounds and destroyed the wall. They quoted Fr. Hemanot Ava Bishoy, who stated, ‘The army was shocked to see the monks standing there praying, ‘Lord have mercy’ without running away. This is what really upset them.’ Fr. Timon[10] refutes this accusation, having seen no shock from soldiers at the monks’ prayer, nor heard any utter such cries. He also adds details to the accounts of the injured. The two youths critically injured (one was a worker, and the other a monastery visitor) while they rushed to the walls following the ringing of the church bells by the monks. One monk was running (not stated why), and then fell and broke his leg. Another monk received a superficial wound from a rubber bullet, and two others were detained in the hospital due to a herniated disc condition and high blood pressure.
Fr. Basilius adds the confirmation that the wall was built upon state land, but also a significant detail: The monks and workers made a human shield in defense of the wall. The activities of the monastery were later described as ‘unwise’ by Pope Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church.
Following the outcry, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces put out an official statement in which they declared they undertook no aggression against the monastery and that their action was limited to the demolition of ‘a number of walls that were built on the road and on state-owned land without legal justification’. Furthermore they stated they had ‘absolutely no intention to demolish the monastery, out of our belief in the freedom and sanctity of Egyptians’ places of worship’.
Final investigations by Hani Labib revealed that though the monastery stated it has previously sought to purchase the land in question, some sources say since as long ago as 1992, there is no documentation to prove this claim. He also discovered that the public prosecutor, Abd al-Majid Mahmud, transferred the case to the military judiciary.
The Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian
Information gained from the military operation against the newly constructed wall at the Monastery of St. Macarius the Alexandrian is taken primarily from the report of the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA). In a first article they related the incident at St. Bishoy, and referenced that the army had also visited St. Macarius the Alexandrian, in reference to their wall. This was built due to the attacks of thugs and Bedouins following the withdrawal of police forces, resulting in the injury of six monks. At that time the monastery was given the 48 hour ultimatum to demolish their wall. In a second article they describe the incident itself, when the army returned, demolished the wall, but in addition destroyed a room of the actual monastery and confiscated building materials.[11] During the operation one monk was shot and ten suffered injury while beaten by batons.
While we were not able to obtain other sources to verify, supplement, or contradict this account, there is highly relevant contextual background information which will be described later.
The Monastery of St. Paul
Information provided about the Monastery of St. Paul is gained from reporting by the agencies whose links have been noted above, but also from a German Coptic engineer[12] (who prefers not to be mentioned by name) who relates the news story as received from Free Christian Radio. Contextual background information was received by a visit to the monastery by Cornelis Hulsman on January 30, before the military operation, and will be described later.
Following the withdrawal of police forces, a catering car on its way to the monastery was stopped by escaped prisoners. While one person was killed, the second was able to escape and make his way into the monastery. Upon receiving news, the monks responded to this threat by constructing a wall and posting at the gate two or three monks with cell phones.
According to the engineer’s testimony, recalling the radio report, the army arrived later and stayed one week at the guesthouse of the monastery. The general himself stayed in the residence of the bishop. While undertaking the demolition of the wall, the army then bound the hands of the monks on guard, make them to lie face down, and then left them in this position while they left. One of these monks had been ill, and did not survive the ordeal.
Thereafter, the engineer was able to speak directly with Fr. Ya‘qūb, a monk from the Monastery of St. Paul, who was visiting Germany. The monk confirmed the story as the engineer recalled from the radio report, except for the detail of the monk dying. He also related that after demolishing the wall, the army recognized the legitimacy for the monastery to have a control gate, which they then allowed to be built in the same location.[13]
We were not able to obtain other sources to verify, supplement, or contradict this account.
note: Part Two to this report, describing contextual information to these incidents, will be posted next.
[1] Demonstrations began on Police Day, January 25, continued the next two days, and then greatly increased in number on Friday, January 28, as Egyptians exited their mosques, proceeded toward Tahrir Square and centers of town in many other Egyptian cities.
[2] As will be seen within the report, expatriate Copts often find their Egypt-based colleagues to downplay the severity of sectarian events. Conversely, many domestic Copts believe that their colleagues in the West exaggerate their claims. This report recognizes the legitimacy of their diverse opinions, but will weight most strongly the sources which are closer to the events in question, and therefore, within Egypt. This draft text has been seen by Dr. Mourad Lotfih in Germany. He his comments have proved valuable but where they conflicted with local Coptic witnesses we favored the opinions of local sources.
[3] Some suggest that the new walls were built partially on monastery land and partially on state land. While possible, no sources close to the event have been found in our investigation to substantiate this claim.
[6] His testimony was obtained through email correspondence with Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of AWR, February 28, 2011. Hulsman and Fr. Basilius are long time personal friends. As a consequence Fr. Basilius has been willing to comment on issues for AWR, and he has always proven to be very reliable.
[9] The timeline of military visits does not match their pattern of issuing an ultimatum and then returning to accomplish the job in one setting. While there is no necessary reason to doubt the accuracy of the dates provided by Fr. Timon, we were unable to reach him again to confirm these details.
[10] Information gained through phone call of Hani Labib with Fr. Timon, February 23, 2011.
[11] The actual monastery is built on the location where Father Matta al-Miskeen stayed with his first followers in the 1950s. Father Alisha started building here in the second half of the 1990s.
[12] Testimony gained through telephone calls and email correspondence with Cornelis Hulsman.
[13] According to email correspondence with Cornelis Hulsman, March 8, 2011.
Translation: Islam is the Solution / Together towards Reform / The Muslim Brotherhood / We Bring Good to All People
According to the Pew Research Center, US media attention for the Egyptian protests has exceeded every foreign policy story over the last four years, commanding 56% of all news coverage. While initially surprising, upon reflection this story hits at the conjunction of many popular flashpoints: Israel, Islam, and popular democratic movements. It also takes place in a familiar civilization from Biblical storytelling, and involves to a lesser degree ancient Christian populations which can attract foreign sympathies. Yet one of the primary angles within Western media coverage has been the role, suspected or actual, of the Muslim Brotherhood. The dominance of this narrative has threatened to obscure the monumental shifts occurring in Egypt. At the same time, the specter rises and cannot be ignored.
In analyzing this issue it is best that I place my biases up front for the reader to consider. I am a Christian living in Egypt with my wife and three young daughters. I work for the Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation, a media and translation center in Cairo, dedicated to improving understanding between the Arab and Western worlds, as well as between the Muslims and Christians of Egypt. I believe that groups and individuals believed to be opposed to American interests or Christian freedoms should be specially designated recipients of Christian love, service, and favor. Their ideas, if necessary, should be rigorously opposed; utmost care, however, should be taken that they never be misrepresented or thoughtlessly rejected. They must not be feared, for perfect love casts out all fear. And love, we are told, hopes all things, believes all things, and keeps no record of wrong. Love never fails.
I confess also that I am not an expert on the Muslim Brotherhood. They are a multi-faceted organization with a long history. As such, there is more information about them, even from their own sources, than can be easily digested in a short time. Complexity does not lend toward clarity. I hope to gain deep familiarity over time; I cannot yet claim it.
My background approach to this topic therefore suggests that I may be more openhearted and sympathetic toward the Muslim Brotherhood than they deserve. Though possible, it is not my intention. What follows will be my perspective, first hand and otherwise, in observing the role of the Brotherhood or other Islamist elements in the recent Egyptian protests.
To begin at the most basic level, I have heard Americans express sentiments worrying about these demonstrations, wondering what would happen ‘if the Muslims took over’. Egypt is more than 90% Muslim; the Muslims took over a long time ago. What is intended, of course, is the worry that a specifically Muslim government would employ sharia law and take away rights recognized in the Western world as universal, and assumed to be antithetical to Islamic law. The statement, however, betrays a deep unfamiliarity among many Americans about the diversity which exists among Muslims, and within Islam. Sharia law means different things to different people, and many Muslims do not favor its implementation in any form. The current Egyptian constitution states already that all laws must be based on principles derived from sharia law. Some Egyptian Muslims oppose this article in its entirety; others believe that its implementation has not gone nearly far enough. There is no monolithic Muslim entity.
Therefore, in the context of a greater than 90% Muslim population, the vast majority of those protesting have been Muslim. The key question is what kind of Muslims are they? Before considering this question, however, it is useful to take note that not all protestors have been Muslims. Among their number have been thousands of Egyptian Christians.
Christian participation has by and large taken place against the will of church leadership. The Coptic Orthodox Church, by far the largest Christian denomination, has counseled its members not to take part. The Catholic and Protestant churches have not been as unequivocal, but have looked as well to substitute organized prayers for organized protests, while leaving the decision to demonstrate to the conscience of the individual believer. These prayer meetings have been very well attended, and the majority of Christians look askance at the protests. They fear that they are being driven by Islamist forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and will only lead to instability and an eventual worse outcome for Christians in Egypt if they succeed. Orthodox Church leadership, as well as the common Egyptian Christian, is inclined to support the state from which it derives its protection, even if they simultaneously complain about discrimination and neglect.
What puts this confidence to question, at least temporarily, is the fact that churches have not been attacked during this period in which nearly all law enforcement personnel have disappeared.[1] Every church in Egypt is assigned a police security contingent, and these vanished as well with the rest of their colleagues. Sectarian tensions have been rampant for years in the lead-up to these demonstrations, most notably seen in the bombing of a church in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve in which 20 Christians died. At that time many Muslims poured out their sympathies and joined Christians in their churches the next week for Coptic Christmas celebrations, willing to stand in their defense and die with them if attacked.
During the protests, this spirit of interreligious unity has been reciprocated. As Muslims bow to pray in Tahrir Square, Christians have surrounded them in protection. Last Sunday witnessed a Christian prayer and praise service in the square, and Muslims joined in abundance. Signs and slogans assert that Muslims and Christians are ‘One Hand’, and the cross and crescent are intertwined, as Bible and Qur’an are lifted high together. These images and pictures are commonplace.
But they are not everywhere. This is not to say that they are opposed in sentiment by other strands of protestors, only to assert that there are many other strands of protestors. As Muslims in Egypt are not monolithic, neither are the protests at Tahrir Square. Never do all the protestors share in one chant; among hundreds of thousands of people this is not possible. Rather, groups are formed, mostly organically, as chant ringleaders shout out their messages. Around each will form a following of a few hundred, but these are fluid and roll one into the other. For the most part the chants repeated are the same throughout:
The people want the downfall of the regime!
Leave!
Illegitimate!
Fall, fall, Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabia is waiting for you!
Coward, coward, beloved of America!
And, to a lesser degree, there have been cries of ‘Allahu Akbar’.
I was able to attend demonstrations on two occasions. The first was on January 28, when demonstrators departed from their local mosques to begin their descent on Tahrir Square and other locations. I lingered near the tail end of the demonstrators from my neighborhood, and walked with them for an hour and a half as they joined with others merging into the demonstration path. There was an attitude of joy and freedom among the participants, as if they were enjoying something never before conceived of. Chants were in the manner listed above, but included clever additions to cajole the onlookers to join them. ‘Descend! Descend!’ ‘One, two, where are the Egyptian people?’ Many enrolled.
After a brief pause in my saunter I took a taxi down the path to rejoin them, but found instead a smaller group of about fifty youths. These were from a poorer neighborhood, and had a bit of an edge about them. ‘Allahu Akbar’ was heard a bit more frequently from their lips, whereas it had been absent entirely in the group of thousands I witnessed earlier. My neighborhood is composed more of middle to upper class Egyptians, but the route taken wove through many poorer neighborhoods. While representing a cross-section of Cairo, it appeared to be dominated by educated citizens, with at least sufficient means of livelihood, if not more. This was not true of the second group I encountered.
After walking behind this group for a while, I veered off and took another taxi in effort to get closer to downtown. When I finally arrived on foot after a circuitous route due to many road closings, I found thousands of protestors jammed into an artery leading towards Tahrir Square. These were under fire by tear gas and water cannon, blockaded by riot police. It was an impasse, and there was minimal violence on either side. No one was bent on destruction, and the police were using restraint. At the same time, tear gas is not pleasant. I witnessed demonstrators convulsing from the intake, and colleagues carrying them to the local hospital. On a side street I wondered why no one was using this path in their approach. I took a few steps and staggered backwards from gas used earlier that lingered unnoticed. Immediately my eyes watered and I began to choke. Quickly in retreat, I found fresh air and the symptoms subsided. Back on the main artery, however, the front lines refilled as some colleagues were evacuated. Most came prepared with surgical masks and onions. The people were not giving up.
As curfew approached I headed home, though the demonstrators remained. That evening the police disappeared, jails were opened by unknown forces, and looters descended upon the city, setting fire to the NDP headquarters and ransacking police stations throughout Cairo. Neighborhood militias were formed, and we barricaded our doors and slept unsoundly. This scenario followed for the next few days, as curfew obliged all to be home my mid-afternoon. Having by now taken Tahrir Square, the demonstrators ignored curfew, reticent to give up their hard won gains. Local militias in each neighborhood did so as well, reticent to surrender their properties to looters.
To return to the original question, then: Who are the demonstrators? First of all, it is important to assert that they were categorically not the looters. Those who took advantage of the police absence were either organized gangs of criminals or else ordinary Egyptians seeking quick profit. By distinction, the demonstrators, at least in the group I observed, had no inclinations toward violence or destruction of any kind. Even when under fire, there were no efforts against the shops which lined the streets of the artery. To be noted, however, a few Molotov cocktails were thrown at the feet of the police.
Second of all, though at this point it should be remembered that the crowd of my observation emerged from a middle to upper class neighborhood, they appeared educated, cultured, and aware of the new political import of their actions. They realized they were enjoying a freedom late discovered after the removal of fear. They were users of social media – Facebook, Twitter – and aware of freedoms enjoyed in other countries, and pursued by Arab colleagues in Tunisia. As I attempted to figure out the social makeup of the protestors, I wondered if they represented also the disenfranchised, largely depoliticized lower classes of Egypt. I did not notice these in abundance, though it is perfectly possible they emerged from other locations. Yet from my readings and following of the news, the protests appeared to be largely a middle class phenomena, to its credit or discredit. It was also disproportionately young, and there were significant numbers of women.
Third of all, there were no observable manifestations of religion. Many, if not most women wore the hijab, but this is representative of Egyptian society as a whole. Though it may be interpreted by many women as a religious statement, it is also the culturally mandated fashion at large. Not wearing a hijab in Egypt, for a Muslim, is more of a statement than wearing one. Christian women, to note, do not cover their heads.
As for men, a Muslim is indistinguishable from a Christian unless he chooses to identify himself. For a Muslim this can be through a particular dress – long robes and a beard – or by a callous mark on one’s forehead, indicating frequent prostrations. For a Christian this can be through wearing a cross around one’s neck or by a tattoo on the hand or wrist. These markers are harder to observe unless made obvious, and few of them were obvious to me. The crowd I followed appeared to have no religious identity, either in dress, appearance, or slogan. For a population in which religious identity is near paramount, this was remarkable.
Returning specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, they took a very cautious approach to the protests. The movement emerged rapidly, but there was advance warning. Social media sites began spreading the word that protests would be held against police brutality, in deliberate irony, on Police Day, January 25. A few months earlier a Facebook group had formed around the memory of Khalid Said, a young man allegedly killed while in police custody. This group mobilized the early demonstrations, and other non-establishment political movements, such as the one labeled April 6, carried forward the call.
The Muslim Brotherhood did not. Some members made statements that they would attend the Police Day protests, and then more official voices denied their participation. While in all likelihood there was involvement on the part of individual members, there was no leadership provision. Certainly the Muslim Brotherhood took no role in mobilization, which is significant as this is one of the strengths of their organization. Earlier, would-be presidential candidate Mohamed El Baradei, an established secular reformist figure, conducted a signature campaign to press for constitutional amendments, and the greatest number in support by far was brought by the Brotherhood. El Baradei expressed his support for the protests, though he initially did not attend. The Brotherhood, by contrast, was far from clear in their position, but noticeably absent in any tangible way.
Much like the Orthodox Church, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained an ambiguous relationship with the state. The church maintains official and public support of the ruling system, though it harbors complaints over its handling of Coptic affairs. Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood is officially a banned political party at odds with the ruling system, though it is widely suspected of making back door deals with the government to secure political gains for each. Over the past few decades there have been alternating periods of severe repression and relative openness toward the Brotherhood, with repression being the prevailing stance. Brotherhood members are routinely arrested and jailed, even if they are released shortly thereafter. This is especially common in periods preceding electoral contests, which bolsters their opposition to the state.
During the 2005 parliamentary elections the Brotherhood experienced a slight opening vis-à-vis the state. President George Bush was actively pressing President Mubarak for political reforms, and in a manner, Mubarak relented. While few will maintain that the election was free and fair, ‘banned’ Muslim Brotherhood candidates running as independents won nearly one-quarter of the seats. Had the elections been open it is possible that many of these candidates might have won anyway; the suspicion, however, was widespread that the Brotherhood made a deal with the regime. For the government, one-quarter representation would pose no threat toward legislative intransigence toward executive policies. Furthermore, the challenge posed by Bush was given an answer: If you don’t like our governance, look at the alternative. Shortly thereafter, Bush’s public stance toward the promotion of democracy began to wane.
For the Brotherhood, if a deal was reached, the benefit was a major step towards legitimacy. Their ‘independent’ candidates could monitor and criticize government policies from the inside, and achieve a national presence with several perks of position. Over the following years, many Brotherhood members became household names. Their grassroots activities of mobilization and social service provision continued, but they added a political platform from which to make their message known.
What was this message? I confess that here my lack of expertise in Muslim Brotherhood affairs will limit my ability to speak authoritatively. My impression, however, is that they behaved as a typical political party, and as such had a message that vacillated. Voices emerged in defense of a civil state; others preferred greater implementation of God’s laws. Voices asserted that Copts and women had equal rights with all other citizens; others stated that Copts would need to submit to Islamic law as dhimmis , in which they are tolerated, protected, but not equal. It was clear among all, however, that the movement had renounced violence, and while it opposed vigorously the ruling party, it did not want to be seen as an imminent threat to stability.
Fast forward to the 2010 parliamentary elections, and it will be clear that this time a deal was not in the works. Though observers imagined final results would shift the minority opposition from the Brotherhood to the liberal Wafd party, the results were astounding. A mere 3% of opposition candidates won seats, which included only one ‘independent’ candidate affiliated with the Brotherhood. Though several candidates advanced to the runoff stage, by this point the Brotherhood was ready to denounce the elections as fraudulent, boycotted the runoff, and decertified the one winning candidate who refused to give up his seat. Incidentally, El Baradei has urged all opposition parties to boycott the entire election. Muslim Brotherhood leadership which had supported him in his signature collection campaign ignored his advice, believing it better to work within the system and expose any fraud which emerged in the election process. Their position was not illegitimate, but the results were far from what they expected.
Given this reality, why did the Muslim Brotherhood not take an active role in advancing the Police Day demonstrations? Like most Egyptians, they were probably not anticipating the great turnout that emerged. Protests in Egypt had by this point become common. Though limited in size and cause, nearly every day downtown could be heard the chants of this or that group, protesting wages, housing, or some other issue. Yet it was clear that the Police Day protests were political, and the authorities gave ample warning they would not tolerate it. If the Brothers were present, in their likely estimation this would only increase the clampdown. Hundreds of Brotherhood members had been arrested in the recent parliamentary elections, and organizational focus was concerned with survival, as well as internal fissures that had emerged as younger members favored the boycotting position of El Baradei. Surely they figured these ‘social media’ protests would pass, and their battles would be best pitched at another time. Besides, though the parliamentary option was closed for now, might true political legitimacy be better won in cooperation with the state, rather than in outright antagonism? As an old and venerable organization founded in the 1920s, they could afford to take a long term view. Certainly, the power of the state showed no signs of enfeeblement.
As the protests gained steam, however, opposition parties across the board began taking notice. Observers generally posit that all legal opposition political parties have made similar deals with the government throughout the years, and do not have a broad base of support. This is not quite true among the Egyptian elite, but their reach does not generally extend to the street, to the common Egyptian. The Muslim Brotherhood does, though their appeal is debated. Substantial numbers of observers do not believe their political agenda is favored by the majority of Egyptians, even though their work in social service provision is appreciated. In any event, the Brotherhood operates in this regard as a quasi-political party that does deal with the ruling system, even if it is not aligned with it as the other parties are believed to be. Everyone, however, began making cautious statements in support of the protestors, waiting to see if some sort of spoils could emerge.
As I observed the demonstrations for the second time, I could sense the changes. On February 1 the protestors had taken firm positions in Tahrir Square, and the army had taken to the streets to reassert some control and stability, welcomed enthusiastically by the protestors. By and large the crowd was the same as I had experienced earlier. Though the majority was young and apparently middle class, all segments of society were present. Women were out in abundance; several bald heads were present; families held children on their shoulders with placards calling for the downfall of the regime. Several signs bore particularly Christian messages. Many asserted national unity. All exclaimed they were Egyptians, and flags flew with pride. It was a carnival atmosphere, though very serious. The people anticipated winning, and were reveling in their newly discovered political power.
From some quarters, however, the main chant began to change. Now it was ‘the people want the execution of the president’. By no means did this replace ‘… the downfall of the regime’; by no means was it present everywhere. But, neither was it isolated. It caught me off guard; nearly did I approach one of the chanters and ask him to reconsider. If there is to be a new system, it should be based on mercy and forgiveness, which are completely compatible with Islamic values. Yet the situation, as described before, was so fluid that by the time I considered raising the issue the group had changed chants again, this time to one of the more familiar slogans. Yet if you looked up, there dangling from a lamppost was an effigy of President Mubarak, hung from a noose. It must be emphasized that these were simply elements of the protest, they did not characterize it. But they were there.
It was impossible to tell if the sporadic groups chanting for the execution of the president bore any Islamic marks. This time as well, most men were indistinguishable as per religious affiliation. But in one particular section of the square 30 to 50 Muslim sheikhs had gathered, and were leading their own version of the chants. One changed the popular slogan into ‘The Azhar wants the downfall of the regime’.
These men were Azhar graduates, proclaiming in their dress and demeanor that they were Muslim scholars. It seemed the majority were employees of the Ministry of Endowments, which oversees the regulation of mosques and religious properties. Yet despite their proclamation, they did not represent the Azhar, which is the highest institution of Islamic learning in Egypt, and widely credited as chief in the whole Muslim world. It is also a state-run body, and the Grand Sheikh is appointed by the Egyptian president. These protestors wanted him removed as well.
Were these sheikhs members of the Muslim Brotherhood? It was impossible to say; within the Azhar there are scholars allied with the Brotherhood, while others are opposed to their agenda. Clearly, however, their chanted slogans were Islamic. They proclaimed ‘Allahu Akbar’. They cried for the implementation of God’s law. Yet they also preached that God’s laws brought freedom, to Muslim and non-Muslim alike. They carried signs that stated no church had been attacked during this period of lawlessness. They asserted that this was an Egyptian revolution, and they were simply one segment of the Egyptian population, and certainly not in leadership. They were frustrated with the government for corruption, for violation of Islamic rules of governance in terms of justice and equality. Allahu Akbar, they explained, was not meant as an Islamic cry of identity, but as a religious challenge to the regime. It was purposed as jihad in all its proper manifestations – an effort to put right what is wrong. I sensed deep anger; I did not sense violence or any anti-Christian sentiment.
Yet the mood in the square was slightly different, and in a way that was somewhat disturbing. The next day the horses and camels descended on the protestors, and a night of violence engulfed Tahrir. Pro-government gangs led a charge against the demonstrators, but by the breaking of dawn they had held their ground. Some of the chants the next morning reflected a night under siege: ‘The people want the execution of the murderer.’
Afterwards the government began reaching out and inviting the opposition groups into dialogue. The first day all of the traditional political parties rejected the overture, demanding first the resignation of President Mubarak. The next day, they agreed to talk. The Muslim Brotherhood was among them, though they insisted they were participating as a ‘feel out’ process to test the sincerity of the government, as well as to make sure the demands of the protestors were heard.
Regardless of the wisdom or sincerity of the Brotherhood position, it was at sharp odds with the amorphous, leaderless reaction of the protestors. They consistently rejected each and every concession as a simple effort to placate the protests and keep ultimate control over the system. Their rejection also stemmed from fear that if they would give up in this stage the government would find them later and punish them. Certainly the Brotherhood by this time was part of the protests, but their interaction with the government cost them much legitimacy among the majority of their colleagues, who had engineered these demonstrations on their own. How much legitimacy lost is yet to be seen, as the story is not yet over and this analysis describes a situation only a few days old.
Therefore, the big question remains; the specter over the entire proceedings: What is the Brotherhood up to, and will they emerge victorious in the end? Will the pangs for democratic change result ultimately in an Islamic state constructed by the Muslim Brotherhood? Are they taking over the movement? Are they hijacking it?
Again, it is impossible to say, for the story is ever evolving. Only yesterday, however, I received testimony from an evangelical pastor who visited the square. He related that he went not to protest, but to observe what was being said, what attitude was manifest. There were no signs, he related, of a peculiar Islamic character to the demonstrations. There were no Islamic slogans; there was no sectarian spirit. Instead, he declared it to be a fully Egyptian movement, with many Christians present. It is focused on freedom, not sharia. Did he misread the situation? It is possible; Tahrir Square is wide and its denizens are diverse in perspective. Yet he went wary of Islamic tendencies, and he found none.
This essay does not argue on behalf of the protestors or in defense of their demands. It takes no position on the question of whether President Mubarak should step down, or if his government will sincerely negotiate. It makes no statement on US policy objectives, or on legitimate political reforms. Rather, it is a description of the nature of the protests. Many concerns are expressed that these demonstrations are the work of the Muslim Brotherhood and an effort to achieve an Islamic state. From the perspective described here, this is highly doubtful.
What cannot be asserted with similar certainty is the outcome of these demonstrations. Is the Muslim Brotherhood waiting in the wings? If there is democratic transformation will their organizational prowess and social service reputation be sufficient to win governing majorities? Once in governance, will they reject pluralism and consolidate power, violating principles of freedom and human rights for which they now clamor? Will they marginalize Copts and restrict Muslims with opinions other than their own?
Or, if they win majorities, will they work sincerely according to their mainstream voices that reject violence and believe in a civil state? Will they incorporate the participation of women and Copts? Will their version of sharia be a moderate and inclusive interpretation of Islamic law? Will they create a political system different from the objectives of the West, but in accordance with the reasonable will of their own people? Widespread among Christians as well as secular leaning Muslims is the fear that the outcome will be a turn for the worst.
The Muslim Brotherhood should not be trusted, but on the account of their being politicians, not on account of their being Islamists. The West is rightfully wary of the outcome of these demonstrations, but Egyptians themselves appear to be more so, as is their prerogative. These are their efforts, and they do not wish to see them hijacked by anyone – the West, the government, opposition forces, or Islamist opportunism. Anyone of these forces may succeed in wrestling control of the movement in the end. Good analysis and political calculations must be employed by all in defense of their understood interests. Egyptian interests must be honored chiefly among all, as determined by Egyptians in their collective struggle.
This essay does not wish to outline the proper opinions, reactions, or policy positions to be adopted by Westerners. There are a variety of responses that are legitimate and logical. What is necessary is that the movement be understood for what it is. So far, it is not an Islamist movement; the Muslim Brotherhood is not in control. Attempts to paint the picture otherwise are suspect and perhaps manipulative.
They may gain control. This is a fair an open question. Similarly fair is the policy question of the balance between favoring popular democratic movements and controlling the results to ensure a government that favors Western interests, however defined. May the West have wisdom to advise and influence properly; may Egypt have the wisdom to decide best its own course in accordance with popular will and respect for basic freedoms and essential stability.
May all understand each other properly, and from the ensuing respect make their independent decisions, each to intend the good of all.
[1] In the town of Rafah, February 5, on the border with Gaza there was a fire set in a church while it was empty. Damage was limited and no one was harmed. This situation is believed to be unique due to the border tensions between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
Sunday, February 6 witnessed a peculiar exhibition amidst the drama unfolding in Tahrir Square. Christian Egyptians publically conducted a prayer service, honoring their fallen co-demonstrators who have died in the effort to topple the Mubarak government. Calling them ‘martyrs’, as is common Egyptian custom to designate all who perish in a cause or as a result of oppression, the opportunity was also used to demonstrate religious cohesion among all protestors. ‘Eid Wahida!’ – ‘One Hand!’ was the most popular chant uttered, exclaiming the essential unity between Muslims and Christians. Within context, a similar chant began when the Egyptian army took to the streets to restore order to society after the disappearance of the police, and was greeted with open arms by the protestors. They cried, ‘The people and the army are one hand.’ No less was the sentiment today confessed along religious lines.
This text was not composed based on first-hand experience, although the author was able to personally witness two days of previous demonstrations. Rather, it is compiled based on nearly eighteen minutes of footage posted on YouTube by the Coptic website Yar3any.com, and an additional two and a half minutes posted by BBC Arabic. It is also bolstered by the first-hand account of Dr. Amin Makram Ebeid, a board member of the Center for Arab West Understanding, which cooperates with Arab West Report.
It is noteworthy to begin by stating that each day’s protests have not been monolithic. Tahrir Square is a large area, and protestors have by necessity grouped together in several ‘stations’, each pressed up against the next. Other protestors ring the square in procession, and the chants that break out in one location soon dissipate into the cries of the next one over. Dr. Ebeid, who went specifically to attend the announced prayer service, had much difficulty finding the right location.
Nevertheless, the YouTube videos demonstrate that the crowd assembled was very sizeable. Christians, despite the Orthodox Church stance against participation, and the statements of Pope Shenouda on state television to end the protests and support President Mubarak, have joined in the thousands from the very beginning. During the service these were accompanied by many Muslims, who stood with their Christian co-demonstrators, holding the Bible and Qur’an aloft together.
This spirit of unity was exhibited by the service leaders. The popular Christian chorus ‘Peace, Peace’ had a line changed from ‘Peace to the people of the Lord in every place’ to ‘Peace to the Egyptian people’. Jesus was addressed as both ‘Yesua al-Masih’ (Jesus the Messiah, in Christian parlance) and ‘Eisa ibn Maryam’ (Eisa, the son of Mary, the preferred Islamic title). Some of the chants were political in nature, including the ubiquitous ‘Irhal’ – Leave! Others emphasized common human rights, proclaiming ‘Life, freedom, and the principles of humanity’, and the nationalistic ‘Egypt for all Egyptians’.
Excerpts from the spoken portions of the service included:
Egypt is free: Muslims, Christians, and those of no particular faith. Freedom and peace to everyone; we are looking for a civil state.
Let us pray together for the martyrs, help us to love each other and to love Egypt. Preserve Egypt, and its Muslims and Christians.
Quoting John 10:10 – I have come that they may have life and have it more abundantly. Christianity, Islam, and all religions want this; we are all together, we do not fear each other.
Many of these types of statements led to the repetition of Eid Wahida, Eid Wahida, and the Christians celebrated together with their Muslim partners. One statement, however, led to an odd proclamation. When the speaker proclaimed, ‘We stand with the martyrs, in a spirit of love, chanting for peace, standing for peace’, the crowd erupted in ‘Allahu Akbar’, the typical Muslim chant confessing ‘God is great!’ Apparently, as is possible theologically, both Christians and Muslims asserted this truth.
It seemed that this chant unnerved the service leaders somewhat, and they proceeded to lead the crowd once more in singing the popular Christian chorus, ‘Bless my country’. Other aspects of the service were more distinctively Christian, which did not seem to unnerve the crowd at large. One song declared ‘Son of God, you are our king’, despite the Muslim abhorrence at the thought that God might have a son. A prayer invoked ‘Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ’, despite the Muslim belief that Jesus was only a prophet, however elevated. Even so, it seemed the organizers were very careful to be Christian yet not offensive and supportive of the protests. A main line in the sermon quoted I John 4:18, proclaiming, ‘The Gospel says that perfect love casts out all fear; we saw this love on January 25[1] and on January 28.[2] Let us cast out all our fear in the name of the martyrs’.
Yet even so, Christian principles cannot simply serve the celebrated status quo. At one point the service leaders spoke the Lord’s Prayer, and after each line the people responded ‘Amen’. Upon the conclusion, however, the leader asked for God to forgive President Mubarak, and the people shouted, ‘No, no, no!’ Again, apparently, Christians and Muslims in attendance were united.
At this point it will be fair to introduce the service leader. He was Dr. Hany Kharrat, a psychologist and an elder in the Anglican Church. The flavor of the meeting was fully evangelical, lacking the gravity of the Orthodox mass, as well as its identifiable priestly leadership with its black robes and long beards. Instead, the service employed a guitar and was led by youth, representative of the makeup of the protests in general. It resembled a revival meeting in its fervor and participation. Yet it insisted on speaking on behalf of all Christians in Egypt, as Dr. Kharrat insisted, ‘All denominations of Egyptian Christians have come to share with you and to pray with you’.
This is less clear in conversation with official leadership. The bishop of the Anglican Church in Egypt is Bishop Mounir Anis, also a board member of CAWU. He has also taken a cautious approach to the protests, stating that most Christians fear that extremist elements will take these peaceful demonstrations in ultimately untoward directions. Instead of shouting slogans, he has encouraged his people to pray, which they have done in abundance. He believes people should be gracious to President Mubarak, though he supports a civilized transfer of authority. Otherwise, there might be chaos.
Rev. Radi Atallah is an evangelical pastor in Alexandria, who has worked extensively with local Muslims to secure dialogue and understanding, especially following the bombing in his city on New Year’s Eve. He also expressed concern that the protests were the organizational work of the Muslim Brotherhood, and worried they could go down a wrong path. Even so, he encouraged individual Christians to follow their conscience concerning participation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Committee for Peace and Justice, associated with the Council of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops, has stated that these peaceful demonstrations are as important as the nonviolent resistance of Gandhi in India and as the emancipation of American slaves. Ezzet Boules, a Coptic Orthodox activist living in Switzerland, believes that if Christians shy away from participation, it will lead only to their further isolation from society. Church efforts to prevent this, he believes, are counterproductive.
As such, the absence of Coptic Orthodox official representation at the Tahrir prayer service is noteworthy, especially given Bishop Anis’s comments that some were present at the pro-Mubarak rallies organized on behalf of the government. What should be made of their abstention?
The Coptic Orthodox Church represents the vast majority of Christians in Egypt, who represent perhaps 6-8% of the overall population. Since sectarian troubles began plaguing Copts in the 1970s, Pope Shenouda has taken a leadership role in speaking on behalf of the Christian community, seeking to secure its political rights and its protection against extremist Muslim elements. Though the relationship has been wobbly, Pope Shenouda has largely succeeded in crafting a positive political stance vis-à-vis the government of President Mubarak.
Having molded Coptic opinion behind his leadership, however, Pope Shenouda has faced accusations of turning the church into ‘a state within a state’, while President Mubarak has been accused of allowing the inflammation of sectarian tension when necessary to achieve political goals, either against the church or in larger society. Whether or not these opinions have merit, they do not mask the essential reality that all groups in society depend on the power of the state for police protection and preservation of order. Neither do they mask the Biblical reality that calls Christians to ‘honor the king’.
Therefore, though the reasons and motivations behind abstention may be many, it may be true that Pope Shenouda early on expressed sentiments similar to Hillary Clinton when she declared the Egyptian government to be ‘stable’, and when Vice-President Joe Biden declared President Mubarak to be a longstanding ally. Inertia in relationships is difficult to overcome. Falling on the wrong side of the state could be a great miscalculation.
Yet as a hierarchical organization, the Coptic Orthodox Church is built upon obedience and respect for the positions of its pope and bishops. In this regard some bishops have condemned the ‘spirit of insurgency’ that is pitted in some quarters against Pope Shenouda. The spontaneous and widespread Christian riots following the bombing of the church in Alexandria was interpreted by some as church leadership losing its grip on its youth. Youth participation in the Tahrir protests may rightly be seen as a second blow. Whether or not the Coptic Orthodox Church is right or wrong in its decision to abstain from the demonstrations, on February 6 they yielded ground to the evangelicals.
Long term, and even short term, this should not be understood as a significant challenge to Orthodox hegemony in Egypt. Although occasional flare-ups occur between the leaders of the Christian denominations, many ordinary Egyptian Christians dismiss the importance of distinctions. For these, when Christians represent less than 10% of the population, insistence on doctrinal divisions takes on less importance. They will not deny the specifics of their peculiar creed, but they will also not shy away from cross-participation in different congregations, and especially not from warm individual relationships of respect. A Christian, they believe, is a Christian.
In Tahrir, this has been extended to assert that a Christian, like a Muslim, is an Egyptian. What does this mean for the widespread fear that these demonstrations bear an Islamic stamp that will marginalize Christians in the end? Bishop Anis reflected the testimony that over time the composition of the protests has changed, and that some groups are trying to ‘take advantage of the youth’. Is this the case?
During the protests on February 1, the March of a Million, I witnessed one of the changes. As compared to the demonstrations on January 28, the Day of Rage, there was this time a large contingent of Muslim sheikhs, distinguishable by their deep crimson fez. Between 30 and 50 such individuals grouped themselves together in a section of the square, and led those around them in chants of ‘Allahu Akbar’ and calls for the implementation of God’s law (sharia). Yet they declared at the same time that this was a demonstration representing all of Egypt, and that God’s law grants freedom to Muslim, Christian, and non-religious alike. A sign upheld celebrated the fact that since the protests began, not one church in all of Egypt had been attacked.
After Islamic prayers there was a pause, and I sat down to discuss their message with Sheikh Mukhtar, one of the primary chant leaders. He is an employee of the Ministry of Endowments, which oversees mosques and religious establishments in Egypt. His particular position is as a ‘caller’ to Islam, that is, to full practice of Muslim religious requirements.
His testimony reflected anger at the government and its corruptions. He called for the deposing of all figures appointed by the government, including the Grand Sheikh of the Azhar, Ahmad al-Tayyib, the highest Muslim religious authority in Egypt. He bore no malice whatsoever toward Christians or non-practicing Muslims, but, emboldened by the successes of the demonstrations, now desired to take part. As an Egyptian, no matter an Islamist, he wished to display his share. He recognized, though, that leadership was in the hands of the youth, and he was a latecomer.
I asked him about his chanting of ‘Allahu Akbar’. I confessed that many either through ignorance or willful distortion seek to disfigure the Islamist position, especially in reference to these protests and this chant. Yet all the same, Allahu Akbar is an Islamic cry. If he was insisting that these demonstrations were Egyptian, and not Muslim, why employ it? Would it not only serve to confuse Westerners and scare Egyptian Christians? Would this not be against your own interests?
His reply initially suggested that he had never considered such a question. Among Muslims, the Allahu Akbar cry is near-instinctual, and does not necessarily convey a call to jihad. When there is a cause to rally behind, however, it is jihadic in all positive senses (and at times negative as well), and comes quickly to their lips.
Upon reflection, though, he stated that in this situation Allahu Akbar does not express a sense of belonging to a particular creed. Rather, it is a challenging directive against the government. It is meant to state deep, religious dissatisfaction against a power believed to have violated the Islamic principles of justice, equity, and good governance. Besides, in its meaning, he stated, a Christian should not disagree. God is great. Apparently, at the February 6 prayer service, many Christians agreed, and cried Allahu Akbar all the same.
The impression received across the board is that protestors are eager, even desperate, for validation. They know their movement is subject to suspicion, criticism, and accusation – certainly from the government but also from Western liberal supposed allies who fear an Islamist imprint. For the past several decades religion has been a dividing point between Muslims and Christians. Many, however, have insisted these difficulties are invented or engineered, not reflecting the essential national unity that exists between the two groups. Among the makeup of Tahrir protestors, this certainly reflects their reality.
Yet they go forward to make certain this message is heard. When Muslims bow during their prayer times, Christians have encircled them to offer protection. Now, when Christians conduct a prayer service, Muslims participate freely. Has protection been necessary? Yes, but have attacks been immanent? No. Are such sentiments sincere? Yes. Are they meant to be a picture representation before the outside world, and therefore at least partially staged? Perhaps. Should they be criticized for this? No. Should the outside world consider its guilt in assuming religious relations are bad, therefore making these exhibitions necessary? Probably.
What does all of this mean for the uprising? What does it mean for Christian participation? As throughout Egyptian society, opinions are divided. The question now appears to be congealing into a discussion for the long haul. Protestors have established control over Tahrir Square, and the government is in negotiations over demands and concessions. The atmosphere, only a few days earlier a war zone, is now conducive to church services. Things change rapidly, and wisdom is necessary. Will good come about, and if so, who should define it? What should a Christian do? What should an Egyptian do? These are monumental, historical days for a six thousand year old civilization. Rarely does life have such weight. When it does, what is demanded?
Perhaps the Western reader’s life does not bear such weight at the moment, but allow your mind to process the questions as if you shared in the Egyptian experience. How should you think? Who should you support? How should you pray?
We do not share in their struggles, but we share in their humanity. Where does the good of all lie?
On November 23, 2010, clashes erupted between security forces and Christian demonstrators at the construction site of a church service building in Umraniyya, Giza, just outside of Cairo. The protests began when authorities halted the construction process of a building which was rumored to be transformed into an unauthorized church. The protests were subdued by a show of force resulting in the death of two Christian protestors and the injury of dozens, including security personnel. The clashes attracted national attention, and as with many sectarian incidents, adduced differing interpretations.
This paper will focus on the interpretation of the Coptic Orthodox Church. The official church television channel ‘Aghabi’ devoted the bulk of two episodes of Nabd al-Kanisa (Heartbeat of the Church) to special reporting on the Umraniyya incident. Nabd al-Kanisa is hosted by Shenouda Victor, and describes itself as ‘the official church voice’, bringing ‘the truth from the church to you’. The first episode aired on November 26, and the second a week later on December 3. Supervision for the programming is provided by Bishop Armiya, secretary to Pope Shenouda III.
Reporting on episode one lasted about thirty minutes, twenty of which consisted of an interview with Bishop Theodosius, General Bishop of the Churches in Giza. The rest of the time provided video footage from the scene, clips from Pope Shenouda’s weekly meeting in which he answered questions about the incident, and commentary from the host. Episode two was devoted entirely to Umraniyya, with over an hour of video footage, statements from eyewitnesses, a survey of media coverage, and further commentary. The following will provide the presented summary of events:
The Official Church Perspective
Four years ago the church purchased the land on which the building in question stands. Though there were some complications at that time, the permissions were given to build a church service building, and Bishop Theodosius explicitly denied that there were Muslim-Christian tensions in the area over the issue. Then, in 2009 the church received official license to construct a service building. He also emphasized, though, that many of the common people in Giza cannot differentiate between a service building and a church, and assumed the building was to be a church, as it was on church property. Incidentally, this particular building had no distinguishing church characteristics such as crosses or domes.
Construction proceeded normally, until a violation was recorded and a work stop order given by the local Umraniyya district authorities. The violation concerned a second staircase, anterior to the building, which was not approved in the original blueprints. The bishop questioned why, with building violations all over the city, should an extra safety measure stop the whole project. A local Muslim was also filmed stating the original issue concerned only this secondary staircase.
When the work stop order was issued the workers and craftsmen began their protest. The program emphasized that it was composed of Christians and Muslims together, depicting one holding a sign stating, “I am a Muslim and I refuse the persecution of Copts.”
When the bulldozers came it was interpreted as a threat to destroy work on the building. The workers then, according to the bishop, quickly constructed a dome on the building to give it the appearance of sanctity.
They hoped that demolition workers would respect work done on a building with a ‘churchy’ appearance. During this time the protest began to swell. Certain vehicles from the district government entered the premises to investigate, but were attacked and had their windows smashed in. The bishop emphasized, though, that many of the people there were unknown to the church, and church officials immediately apologized for the damage and offered to replace the car.
As the protest continued, certain of the church priests went to visit the governor, with whom the church, it was stated, had good relations. They returned with a decision of the governor to turn the building into a church as soon as the proper papers were presented to him. The announcement of this decision to the protestors was met with great applause. Footage shown captured the enthusiasm.
That evening, November 22, however, security started to assemble. Dozens of policemen cordoned off the area, and also perched above on an overpass. Early the next morning, the order was given to attack. The bishop stated that he doesn’t know who issued this order. Tear gas was employed, and live ammunition was used. Rocks were thrown, both by protesters and by security. Chaos ensued, and everyone dispersed. Police began arresting the protestors, and eyewitnesses claimed they went around yelling, “You have ‘Christian’ on your identity card? Get in!” Over 100 people were taken into custody. Video and pictures captured that several of these were handcuffed to their beds in the hospital while being treated for their wounds. Two of the wounded later died.
Analysis and Questions
The above sequence of events was culled largely from the interview with Bishop Theodosius. Five eyewitnesses also presented testimony, but none of their names were given, and three were given in silhouette. For one of these, an eye patch – presumably from the attacks – was visible in the black and white profile. In addition, three priests provided brief statements, and official church press releases were read, addressed to the president, parliament, and others. In addition, three different newspaper articles were read, selected from al-Masry al-Youm, al-Uyun, and Nahdat Masr.
Music played a central role in the presentation of images and video. During scenes of violence it was presented in staccato, ominously highlighting shots of police firing tear gas or throwing rocks. During the aftermath of events the music shifted into quieter, mourning melodies, audible against the backdrop of bloody victims or hospitalized patients.
Coverage on the program revolved around three themes:
First, this was not a sectarian conflict. Christians and Muslims worked together in building the church, and protested together when the stop work order was given. Given the preponderance of sectarian issues in recent weeks, and also against the backdrop of elections widely believed to be fraudulent, the program emphasized this was an issue between government and people, not between Muslim and Christian.
Second, this was initiated by security, responding to administrative matters with disproportionate violence. Rumors about changing the building into a church were based only on popular misunderstandings, and violations in the agreed upon blueprints were necessary for safety reasons. A telling segment on the program offered video footage of police violence under the heading ‘for every action…’ followed by scenes of protesters throwing rocks with the heading of ‘there is a reaction’. The main question, however, asked but unanswered, is why such violence was necessary. Even had there been countless violations, could the situation not have been handled differently?
Third, this is a matter to be solved by President Mubarak. Bishop Theodosius stated his confidence in the wisdom of political leadership to solve this crisis. The building under construction displayed large banners with an image of the president, following the governor’s decision to initiate a procedure to license it as a church. One of the anonymous eyewitnesses also dramatically expressed his desire to see President Mubarak’s intervention, stating the president enjoyed ‘all respect, esteem, and love.’
The perspective of the church given during the program served effectively to create a narrative of events that makes sense of what happened. Yet, like any perspective, it left out elements potentially detrimental to the narrative. For example:
It is confusing to determine the status of the building. The bishop emphasized it was not originally meant as a church, and that the dome was not built as part of a transformation project. But when exactly was the dome built? The bishop stated it was after the threat of demolition, but other sources indicate it was the building of the dome which sparked the clashes. Furthermore, if the church did not intend it to be a church, why did the governor issue a statement that he would authorize it to become a church? Additionally, columnist and author Hany Labib notes that only the president can issue license for a church building; governors only have the authority to license repairs or reconstruction. How is the narrative affected by this fact?
It is confusing to determine the size of the crowd and their activity. Videos on the program show gathered protesters in the tens, or perhaps hundreds, and it is implied these were composed mainly of the construction workers engaged in building. The only act of violence admitted is the damage done to visiting vehicles. Yet other sources describe up to three thousand protesters. These are described as marching out to block traffic on the busy overpass near the church, and vandalizing government buildings and property. Without gauging the accuracy of these reports, there is no mention of them at all in the program. Yet a crowd this size, engaging in civil disobedience, might well qualify for a large contingent of security to subdue it. Whether or not the security response was warranted, these details cast doubt on the church narrative of innocent protesters being met by government thuggery.
It is confusing to determine the exchange of violence. The program represents the use of live ammunition as flagrant excess of force, but admits to an exchange of stone throwing between the two sides. Yet other sources picture the protesters as hurling Molotov cocktails at police. Hany Labib, however, emphasizes that Molotov cocktails result in conflagration, and there is no evidence of burned damage from the scene, nor reports of fire in the locality. The program contains no scenes of Molotov cocktails; is this because it would do damage to the greater narrative, or because there were none at all? If absent, who is trying to craft a different narrative of Christian weaponry, and why?
Finally, it is confusing to determine the nature of the protests. The program suggests that they emerged randomly, as workers and local residents took issue with government threats to stop their labor. Hundreds of people, however, and certainly thousands if that number is correct, suggests organization of presence. Furthermore, why were there so many so early in the morning? In addition, the protests took place over a few days, and sources indicate they drew attention to their cause by blocking traffic. Again, organization appears likely, but at the least, could not church authorities have stopped the protests had they wished this? Premeditation offers a different perspective on the narrative than spontaneity.
There is also the larger contextual issue of church service buildings themselves. These began to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s in reaction to the sectarian crisis at that time. Beginning on university campuses, there was a trend for students to segregate themselves by religion for social activities. As such, the church began providing places for Christian students to congregate. Mirroring also the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood and others, the church expanded the use of service buildings to provide education, training, and material support for Christians throughout the nation. As these buildings do not have the traditional appearance of a church, they tend to be less controversial in society and receive more easily official government authorization. At times, due to the difficulties in church building regulations, they have been transformed into places of worship.
So while aspects of the church presentation require greater research, some of their questions raised do so as well. For example:
Why did these building violations attract the attention of the government, when so many go unheeded throughout the city?
Why did security assemble in the dark of night, and why did they attack early in the morning?
Why would policemen throw stones at protestors, even if provoked (as seen in video footage)?
Why was live ammunition used?
Why were so many protestors arrested?
Is there any relation between these events and the parliamentary elections scheduled five days later?
Answering the questions raised in this text, unfortunately, are beyond the current resources of the AWR office. Raising the questions, however, serves to highlight a consistent theme: Easy answers and polemic accusations rarely reflect the reality of events. Should the government issue clear regulations for building houses of worship? Likely. Does security react with more force than necessary when dealing with protests? Often. Is the loss of life regrettable, and should those responsible be held accountable? Absolutely.
With this program the church, however, is walking a fine line. On the one hand it seeks to portray itself as an innocent sufferer at the hands of an aggressive security force. On the other hand it seeks to reiterate fidelity to the ruling regime on which it depends, it believes, for protection. Toggling between criticism and loyalty, while ignoring worthy considerations of its culpable role, the church risks giving evidence of acting as a state within a state. This is a damaging accusation against it, and the church would do well to work stridently against the perception.
Even Pope Shenouda has undone part of the greater church narrative. During the parliamentary elections he voted for the oppositional Wafd party candidate, signaling his displeasure with the government’s NDP party. With what, however, is uncertain. Is it simply a protest against government handling of the Umraniyya crisis, or reflective of a deeper change in his convictions? In any case, his personal vote and voice always signal more than that of one man, given his developed representation of all things Coptic.
In his response to a question on the Umraniyya crisis during his weekly meeting, Pope Shenouda quoted Colossians 3:21, applying it to the role of government – “Fathers, do not exasperate your children, so that they do not lose heart.” Though questions abound about the role of the church, ‘exasperation’ – with government, with society – accurately describes the condition of many Copts. Will they lose heart? Only they can decide.
While sectarian issues exist, the church does well in emphasizing this particular conflict is not sectarian in nature. Muslims and Christians alike oppose violence, and express shock at the level of aggression meted out in Umraniyya. As such, perhaps the antidote to losing heart can be found in a Muslim voice, highlighted during the program from an article in al-Masry al-Youm. Recalling the Christian values described in the Sermon on the Mount, Fatima Naout wrote: “We pray for all those who practice violence … so that from us the great love of God may be revealed.” In times of exasperation, greater purpose is needed to lift the sufferer from despair to hope. Perhaps a positive commitment to demonstrate God’s values can suffice. There is no loss of heart in love.
How is Christmas held in mourning? For the Coptic community of Egypt, Christmas is traditionally a time of celebration. Midnight on Christmas Eve ends a forty-three day period of fasting, concluded during mass in which the Eucharist is served. Afterwards, families congregate and break the fast joyfully, eating the meat, fish, milk, and eggs from which they had previously abstained. Early the next morning parents return to church with their children, who play games and receive gifts, all wearing their new holiday outfits. And since 2003, Christmas has been a national holiday, with all Egyptians receiving a day off from work. Along with Easter, it is a centerpiece of the religious year.
Yet all this merriment was threatened one week earlier when a bomb ripped through worshippers at a Coptic Orthodox Church in Alexandria at the conclusion of the New Year’s Eve mass. Twenty-three people were killed, dozens more injured, and threats were issued for continuation at Christmas. At first Pope Shenouda, pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church, considered cancelling Christmas celebrations altogether. In the end, the church decided to push forward, although the churches of Alexandria decided only to conduct the Christmas Eve mass, and cancel the next day celebrations. How can Christmas be held in mourning?
If one returns to the Biblical story, there was little joy in the coming of the first Christmas. Forced into a difficult period of travel, Mary gave birth to her child in the dingiest of circumstances. Later, that child would grow, and warn his friends of his coming death, promising them their grief would turn to joy. Approaching Christmas, few Copts could anticipate a similar transformation. Even if they attended mass in defiance of terrorist threats, it would be in the shadow of death and the fear of repetition. Grief, not joy, would mark Christmas 2011.
A woman giving birth to a child has pain because her time has come.
St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Church in Maadi, Cairo has become our church home in Egypt. It has not been easy adjusting to Orthodox traditions, and though an open, friendly spirit exists among the congregants, they are not used to making foreigners welcome in their midst. Over time, though, our girls have attended the church preschool, and we have made friends. Of course we would attend Christmas Eve mass.
The newspapers had warned that extensive security procedures would be in place, so as we walked to church, passports in pockets, we did not know if we would be allowed entry. There had been a groundswell of support from Muslims in Egypt, condemning the bombing and seeking to stand in solidarity with their brother Christians. Many had expressed a desire to attend Christmas Eve mass, either in defense of the church, or else to die together. Yet rumors abounded that either security or the church would not allow Muslims entrance. Pope Shenouda strongly refuted their rejection, but who could know? If Muslims were to be barred, what about foreigners? While we are known to church leadership, and the regular guards outside the church see us every week, what about their amplified staff? Would they risk the death of foreigners on top of all the other bad press associated with this terrorist crisis?
Approaching the church, we marveled at its military headquarters-like appearance. St. Mark’s Church occupies a place on al-Nahda Circle, between two side roads which receive regular, but minimal, traffic. Since the Alexandria attack took place outside the church, originally believed to be from a car bomb, traffic barriers were placed along a full half of the circle. No cars were allowed to park anywhere, and the two side roads were cordoned off entirely. The barriers were erected to also serve as a channel for approaching pedestrians. As we stepped forward, we were asked for identification.
The checkpoint experience was strangely odd. Security personnel were all around, but we were inspected by plain clothes individuals with badges hanging from their necks. As it turns out, the church had organized its own security team, which helped identify regular congregants from questionable interlopers. We did not recognize the woman who took our passports, but in retrospect there seemed a note of awareness in her eye. Whatever the reality, we were allowed to pass.
But when her baby is born she forgets the anguish because of her joy that a child is born into the world.
We arrived at the church about 8:00pm, hopeful that by arriving early we would secure a good seat in the balcony. Instead, there was hardly a place to be found. Though we found a place in the last row of the side balcony, by the end of the evening every place was taken, as well as every step in every ascending aisle. Two lower rooms were also packed, watching the mass projected live on screen. Terrorist threats, security concerns – at St. Mark’s, at least, Copts were observing, if not celebrating, Christmas.
I have heard reports that in many churches the congregants wore black, to symbolize their mourning. Here, the term ‘celebrating’ may not be inappropriate. Many people were dressed to the nines; new outfits were visible in abundance. St. Mark’s in Maadi has a reputation as one of the more well-to-do churches in Cairo; economic stability allows festive possibilities. All the same, people seemed determined to defy terrorism not only through presence, but also through insistence on celebration. Surely their hearts were heavy, but life, including holiday, must continue unabated.
As we scanned the audience we noticed what appeared to be two Muslim women, distinguishable by hijab, seated in the upper opposite corner from us. We wondered if there were others, as religious identity is not determined by physical characteristics. Everyone else seemed to blend together. As will be seen, this was quite appropriate.
The mass continued as it always does, and always has, for hundreds of years. There seemed to me to be more Coptic language chanting than normal, which could result from a desire during times of crisis to reassert original community identity. As a language, Coptic fully gave way to Arabic in about the 14th Century, and the tongue withered away until its liturgical revival in the 20th Century. Or, the Coptic chants may have meant nothing special in particular – I should reemphasize our newness to the tradition. All the same, along with the Muslims in the corner, it felt like a slight divergence from the norm.
As the time for the sermon approached, it was introduced, as normal, by a reading from the Psalms and the Gospels. Then, an unusual but timely procession advanced. Twenty-three individuals, each carrying a lone candle, advanced toward the pulpit and sat down in a vacated pew. One, we noticed, was wearing a hijab.
When they sat Fr. Boutrus began his sermon. This Christmas was wrapped in sorrow, he spoke, but we must always look in hope for good to arise from evil. Indeed, he continued, Jesus promised his followers that there would be grief, but that grief would be turned to joy. Just as a mother suffers labor pains, so Egypt is groaning under the weight of this tragedy. The newborn baby, however, displaces the pain. What will displace the pain of Egypt? Where is the new baby to be born? It is here, in this church, in churches throughout Egypt. It is Muslims greeting us in peace and consolation. It is a national unity that will emerge from the challenge of sectarian tension. I have received so many phone calls and messages, he said, from Muslim friends who have wanted to be a part of our celebration tonight. It is their presence here that fills me with joy. In fact, I must say, today is the happiest Christmas I have had in my life.
Fr. Boutrus acknowledged that there were differences, but he spoke of Jesus on the cross demolishing the dividing wall of hostility, making the two one. We each have our faith, and we must respect each other. Yet we may all follow Jesus in good works, among which is the ministry of reconciliation. Fr. Boutrus thanked the Muslims who had joined us, and reiterated his feelings again: It is right that Egypt is in a period of mourning, but today, in what develops, this is the happiest Christmas of my life.
Ask, and you will receive, and your joy will be complete.
As Fr. Boutrus ended his sermon, the procession of twenty-three, representing those who perished in the bombing, exited down the center aisle from which they came. As they did, tens of others from around the sanctuary also rose and exited. Caught off guard, we realized, these were Muslims seated everywhere in our midst.
It is traditional in the Coptic Orthodox mass that non-Christians are welcome. Visible in the ancient monasteries, but not so much the modern churches, the sanctuary was divided into sections. Up front is the place for the priests to administer sacraments, and behind them are the deacons who facilitate. Next come the believers, who are in fellowship with the church, living Christian testimony. Behind them are other Christians, but mixed also with the curious of other or no faith. These Christians are the ones who do not partake of the Eucharist, due to issues of unconfessed sin and evidence of broken fellowship. Known as the ‘Preached-to Ones’, they with non-believers listened to the Bible readings and the sermon. Immediately afterwards in the liturgy proceeds the preparation for the Eucharist and the transubstantiation of the host. Only baptized Orthodox believers may partake. Traditionally, everyone else leaves.
The tradition is not hard and fast in the modern world. We are not baptized Orthodox, and as such we do not advance for Communion, but neither are we expected to leave. In fact, not all Muslims left either; a few hijab-ed women were seen remaining in the pews. Yet it is customary for figures of state to attend Pope Shenouda-led masses during holidays, and at the appropriate moment, he acknowledges them, and they leave. For years this was a perfunctory, if admirable, feature of church-state relations; today, at St. Mark’s, it seemed poignant and appreciated. Officials from the governorate and district, friends of the priests, friends of the people – all were welcomed, and present in abundance.
In this world you will have trouble, but take heart, I have overcome the world.
After the Muslims’ exit, the liturgy proceeded as normal, but towards its conclusion we were reminded of reality. Before serving the Eucharist the priests asked each congregant not to leave their shoes behind in their seat as is customary. (Coptic Orthodox remove their shoes at Communion.) Instead, they distributed plastic bags in which they could carry their shoes while taking Communion. Following the bread and wine, they were to exit the church, don their shoes, and leave quietly one by one.
It is common following a midnight mass for the Copts to congregate outside the church as they wait for their friends to finish Communion. Having fasted, having waited through a lengthy liturgy, they finally meet up together and begin Christmas celebrations. It was this fact that led to so much destruction in Alexandria. Many people had exited church early, and were just hanging around outside when the bomb detonated. Anxious to avoid the same fate, the priests and security agreed to have each person leave immediately after their Eucharistic share.
Not all did, but many obliged. As we left we filtered through a subdued, porous crowd amidst reminders from the priests to leave. We passed through the gate, navigated the erected corridor, thanked a few security guards as we left, and headed home. It was a somber evening, despite the signs of hope and promise. The questions could not be dismissed: Will this same encampment be present next week? Will the terrorists simply delay until the next mass when both people and security let their guard down? Can the guard ever be let down? What about tomorrow morning, when celebrations should take place?
We woke early to bring our girls to the festivities. Indeed, they were festive. A puppet show was arranged for the youngest children. All age groups had activities going on. The high school students prepared to visit a local home for orphans. As before, people were dressed well, decked out in new outfits. It was enough to make me forget the circumstances; upon seeing some friends, I asked an impertinent question.
One’s guard is lowered quickly. The same security layout was present as the day before. Once again we presented our passports for a security check. At the gate Fr. Boutrus greeted each coming congregant, standing with a contingent of policemen. One policeman, though, produced a pink flower he offered to our four year old daughter. Throughout the day I saw several sporting theirs somewhere on their person. Greetings were exchanged; children played and laughed. Christmas was here, held amidst mourning.
I stumbled. “Are you having a joyous holiday?” My friends lost their smiles produced upon our meeting and replied, “Half and half.”
—–
Perhaps Jesus has overcome the world. Perhaps if these Copts ask, their joy will be complete. Did Fr. Boutrus speak from a sincere heart, or was he trying to will his words into reality? Has a newborn baby entered into the world?
One year ago six Christians and a Muslim security guard were killed in Nag Hamadi when alleged Muslim assailants opened fire upon Christian worshippers exiting Christmas Eve mass. Following the incident many similar expressions of condolences were offered by Muslims, and national unity was asserted in the face of tragedy. One knowledgeable Muslim journalist friend stated that he felt something was changing in society. The outcries were louder, more sincere; he expected the sectarian situation to improve. Yet the year that followed was filled with incident after incident of tension and conflict. This can be traced to a number of factors, far broader than religious difference. If at that time, though, the baby was stillborn, what gives hope this one will survive?
Certainly this occasion is different. The scale is far more serious and the stakes far higher. The past year was filled with recriminations, each to the other. Perhaps, on their part, the Copts never asked. They rallied, they worked, they sought legislation – did they seek God?
In his sermon Fr. Boutrus praised the Muslims, quoting Scripture: “He who loves, knows God.” He continued, expressing his wish, “May they be brought to complete unity to let the world know that you sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me.”
The message is Christian, but its borders are porous. Have Copts sought unity? Have they loved? The tragedy in Alexandria has brought substantial love to them; what will they do with it?
Certainly some of this love is perfunctory. Some of it is surface level condolence. But much of it is sincere. It is a love that brought Muslims to enter a church so as to express their solidarity, in the middle of heightened tensions and personal risk.
A Christian skepticism is warranted. They came, but they left early; the bomb would have gone off near the end. If they don’t condemn the massacre they will be perceived as supporters of it. It is the reputation of Islam they are concerned to defend primarily, not us. If they entered a church under normal circumstances, they would run afoul of security, and we would be accused of evangelizing.
Perhaps. But what Copts do next is of the utmost importance. If rebuffed, those Muslims who have sought reconciliation will have little reason to try again. The cycle of mistrust and mutual accusation will begin anew. Can they, with Jesus, overcome the world? Can they overcome themselves?
It is no easy task, but the life of a newborn baby is at stake. The mother, however, remains in critical condition.
Irony can emerge from the midst of tragedy. While the world awaits the emergence of good – from somewhere, somehow – irony is often first to make its appearance on the scene.
On Monday, January 3, two days after the horrific bombing at the Church of Two Saints, St. Mark and Pope Peter in Alexandria, the government sent a construction crew to repair damage caused to the church by the blast. Christian demonstrators, however, prevented them from entering the premises, stating that damage and blood must remain until the perpetrators are brought to justice. While their response is understandable in light of the circumstances, other observers may notice another angle: Christians often criticize the government for complicating or preventing church construction, repair, or renovation. In this instance, it is the Christians who prevent the government from restoring the church to its original state.
Since the bombing there have been angry Christian demonstrations throughout Egypt, many of them violent. A representative video, with English subtitles, can be found on the al-Masry al-Youm website. The following is a sampling of recent events. All statements are as reported in various Egyptian newspapers; sources can be tracked by following the links.
Immediately after the bombing area Christians swarmed to the scene and clashed with security forces. It is also reported that they stoned a nearby mosque.
On Monday the demonstrations began in earnest. During the funeral of the deceased, Christians chanted anti-government slogans. Demonstrations broke out at the papal cathedral in Cairo, in which 43 policemen were injured. Three of the most prominent Islamic leaders in the country had come to pay their condolences to the cathedral to Pope Shenouda, but their cars were assaulted while there. 90 people were injured during demonstrations in Shubra, a section of Cairo with a large Christian population. Thousands of Christians joined with activists in a protest in downtown Cairo, during which time 47 were arrested and 20 cars smashed in. One headline read: “Angry Coptic demonstrations sweep Cairo and governorates.” A popular protest chant was: “With our souls and our blood, we will defend the cross.”
On Tuesday the violence continued. In Giza protestors blocked the ring road around the city. In one location in Cairo demonstrations led to the injury of 20 Christians and 37 policemen. Throughout the country 125 policemen were injured.
Immediate context can be traced not only to anger stemming from the bombing, but to Christian anger that has been swelling for some time. The action in Giza to block the ring road is the very same strategy employed a month earlier in late November, to protest what was understood as government interference in a church building project. This, and other more violent Christian protest, eventually led to government security forces using live ammunition which resulted in the death of two protestors and the hospitalization of dozens.
Other events could be summoned in which Christians have been largely passive recipients of violence, at times accusing security forces of lending a hand. Other times still they have been left wondering why justice was never served to perpetrators. In many of these cases the violence was due, at least partially, to normal community tensions, during which religious differences caused the spark that exploded the conflict. All the same, many Christians view security as their problem, rather than their protection.
There is substantial irony in the Christian community, self-understood to be beleaguered by security violence, now violently confronting the security apparatus. Elsewhere, there are emerging signs of good. The sources above also describe significant outpourings of interreligious protest against the bombing. Thousands of Muslims and Christians demonstrated together, in both Cairo and Alexandria. They carried signs uniting the cross and the crescent, lifting high their Bibles and Qur’ans.
Certain Muslim groups have even responded creatively. Eight thousand Muslims have signed up for an initiative to ‘go to the churches and die with them’, proposing to create human shields around church locations. In the aforementioned neighborhood of Shubra, Muslims went to the churches and distributed sweets and flowers to entering churchgoers.
It must be understood that the majority of violent Christian protestors come from poorer and underdeveloped sections of urban Egypt. These tend to be young, and their poverty and lack of education, shared by all Egyptians in their areas, contributes to their easy radicalization. In one particularly disconcerting scene, depicted on the video at about the 3:50 mark, Muslim counter-protestors chanted at Christians, “With our blood and our souls, we defend you Prophet Muhammad.” Though not captured on the video, clashes erupted between Muslims and Christians in circumstances like these. Religion plays a role, but social, political, and economic factors lay the groundwork.
Christian leadership has done its best to counsel patience and calm. Bishop Bisanti of Helwan, a large area on the southern outskirts of Cairo, states that this agitation of Coptic youth is due to shock, and is a temporary phenomenon. Pope Shenouda urges the Christians to have self-control, and priests in general have been urging their congregants to resist anything which leads to further sectarian tensions. This is necessary advice, absolutely required given the circumstances.
It would be difficult to expect more, but the thousands of Christians who have joined Muslims in denouncing the action are beginning to act upon the advice of Bishop Musa, bishop of youth. Imagining the bomber to be an Egyptian, he declared him to be a traitor to the nation, not just a criminal against Christians. Furthermore, he urged the people: Love is the answer.
It is an act of love to join with fellow citizens to set aside religious differences, even religious tensions, and project one voice to renounce violence and assert national unity. But it is also true that this author has not yet seen reports of Christian creative love, such as that evidenced by the Muslims mentioned above. There is little fault, for who can think of blessings when the natural human instinct is to curse?
Yet it is hoped that Christians might be able to find expressions of creative love to offer to those beyond their natural Muslim allies who rallied together with them. Here is one idea:
Currently, collective Christian anger and frustration is aimed at security. Rightly or wrongly, many Christians view the security apparatus as negligent, if not complicit, in their sufferings over the last few decades. Following this attack, one week before Coptic Christmas, the government is sure to place the maximum security presence around each and every church, to prevent a subsequent attack.
Though intensified, this is not a new procedure. Each week as my family goes to church, we pass by two or three security guards at the entrance. These have been assigned their post in precaution; there have been attacks, though far less severe in scale, on churches before. Most all worshippers enter church without giving the slightest pause to their presence. Most often these guards sit idly and stare out into space. They have become part of the established church architecture.
This coming Thursday evening, January 6, Coptic Christmas Eve, everyone will be on full alert, and no Christian will enter church unmindful of the security presence. What will their visceral emotions be?
One year ago to the day, six Christians were shot dead exiting Christmas Eve mass in an attack on a church in Nag Hamadi in Upper Egypt. In this attack a Muslim security guard was also killed. One week ago to the day, a bomb exploded and killed 22 worshippers at a church in Alexandria.
For Christians, will your church be next? For security, will your church be next?
Christians have legitimate space to be frustrated with security as a system, but on January 6, they and the individual security guards at their churches will all be in the same boat. These guards are not volunteers; they are on assignment. All the same, their life is on the line.
Imagine the goodwill that might develop if each Christian worshipper shook the hand of a security guard on his way into the service. Imagine if he stopped, looked the guard in the eye, and thanked him for his service. What if they took a moment, realized the gravity of the situation, and cried together? What if this occurred in every church throughout Egypt?
I am not under the presumption that many Egyptian Christians will read this text. But if you do, and you believe this idea has merit, please sow this seed among your fellow believers. In times like these, hope must be found in creative expressions of love. Egyptian Muslims have taken the lead in certain places; it is fully understandable that Egyptian Christians are lagging behind. More than anything else, they need now to be the recipients of love.
Their faith, though, calls them to more. They believe they have been loved undeservedly by God. Having received, they must now give. In many of their eyes, security is among the least deserving of all Egyptians. May they embrace them unconditionally. May they find greater and deeper expressions that ring far more powerfully than this simple idea. May they transform evil into good.
Otherwise, it is only irony and sadness which will continue to emerge from this tragedy.
By now much of the world has heard of the horrific attacks perpetrated against Coptic Orthodox Christians in Alexandria, Egypt. As of the latest count, 21 people are dead and another 170 are injured following an explosion outside the Church of St. Mark and St. Peter, as the New Year’s Eve mass ended and people were filing out into the streets. It is yet unclear if it was a car bomb or the work of a suicide bomber. Various international terrorist groups have claimed responsibility on the internet, and Alexandria Governor Adel Labib claims that foreign hands are behind the massacre. Investigations, however, are ongoing.
In the aftermath of the October 31 attack on the Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad, al-Qaeda in Iraq issued threats against the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church. They warned that due to the presence of Christian women converts to Islam held in monasteries against their will, attacks would commence if their freedom was not granted. The church denied this report, stating that the women in question, Wafa Constantine and Camilia Shehata, both wives of priests, remained Christians of their own free will. Both women were apparently fleeing bad marriages, disappeared, and Christians raised protests about their abduction. While Wafa officially began the process of conversion to Islam before yielding to church admonition, and Camilia is understood to have released a video confirming her adherence to Christianity, neither has appeared publically since the church intervened in their cases. The Coptic Orthodox Church has strict regulations concerning divorce, making allowance only for adultery or conversion to another religion.
While most analysts deny that al-Qaeda has any operational capability in Egypt, there has been intense Muslim protest against the church in certain quarters of the country, especially in Alexandria. This city is known as a stronghold of Salafism, which is a conservative, traditional interpretation of Islam calling for imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions, as well as reconstruction of society based on the order they created. While not inherently violent, many Salafis recognize Christians as Ahl al-Dhimma, a protected minority which accepts Islamic societal predominance. This was the arrangement for much of Egyptian history, though the modern secular state has disrupted their understanding and crafted equality on the basis of citizenship. Many Christians complain this concept is unevenly applied, but many Salafis see the church’s ‘comeuppance’ as defiance of God’s order. Certainly when Muslim women are prevented from living their faith freely, as they see in the cases of Wafa and Camilia, society has gone wrong.
Certain eyewitnesses in Alexandria have claimed that they heard the cry ‘Haya al-Jihad’ coming from the nearby mosque Sharq al-Madina. The typical closing call from the early morning minaret microphones is ‘Haya al-Salat’, or ‘Come to Prayer’. There is no similar call during the remaining prayer times, making this call to jihad, if accurate, especially chilling.
Rev. Radi Atallah, pastor of the Attarine Evangelical Church in Alexandria, knows nothing about this call, whether it was issued or not. He does report, however, that several non-government affiliated area mosques had preached recently that Muslims should not associate with Christians, a very conservative interpretation of verse 5:51 in the Qur’an:
O you who believe! do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends; they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a friend, then surely he is one of them; surely Allah does not guide the unjust people.
This, however, has rarely been the practice in Egypt, where Muslims and Christians have maintained strong bonds for centuries. Sayyid al-Qimni and Muhammad Sacīd al-cAshmāwī, are among the prominent Egyptian intellectuals who declare this verse is taken out of context, and that other verses in the Qur’an establish the basis of respect, cooperation, and friendship between Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, it is clear that al-Qaeda figures such as Ayman al-Zawahiri utilize such verses in defense of their ideology. Again, though not equivalent with violence, such Salafi thought is noted to be on in the increase in Egypt.
Coptic Orthodox ideology is rarely understood to conjoin with violence, but recent events have demonstrated that the ideals of faith can run up against the tensions and frustrations of reality. Following the massacre in Alexandria Christians rioted in the street outside the church, near the hospital where many victims were taken, and outside the Sharq al-Madina mosque, with some pelting it with stones. Several policemen were also hit with stones. These demonstrations were broken up by security with tear gas and rubber bullets.
The emphasis on rubber bullets is necessary in light of the recent riots in Giza, only one month earlier. Christians, protesting security interference in their building of a church service center rumored to be converted into a place of worship, exited church grounds en masse and blocked traffic in a major thoroughfare of the area. They also damaged government buildings and vehicles, and sources claim they also threw Molotov cocktails at security forces which had come to subdue the protest. In their efforts live ammunition was used, resulting in the death of two Christian young men and the injury of dozens more. This incident sparked deep Christian resentment against the government, and even Pope Shenouda expressed his discontent by voting for an opposition party candidate in the recent parliamentary elections.
While in the Giza incident Christians were the aggressors against understood government discrimination, a better parallel is found in the Christian reaction to the Nag Hamadi killings which took place at Coptic Christmas on January 6 of this current year. Three Muslim gunmen randomly fired at worshippers exiting mass, killing six and a Muslim policeman stationed outside the church. In response the Christians there took the street and vandalized the local hospital where they believed the bodies of the victims were being mistreated.
Claims of mistreatment are also associated with the massacre in Alexandria. Some sources quoted the hospital public relations director stating that the Red Crescent refused to give blood bags to the victims. Other sources, however, quoted a hospital physician stating that the hospital ran out of blood bags.
The scene is said to be one of sectarian tensions. Christian protestors are quoted as chanting religious slogans, such as “With our body and blood we will defend the cross!” Meanwhile, Muslim groups are quoted as chanting “Allahu Akbar!” (God is great), which is an historic Islamic battle cry. Christians are also said to have attempted to burn down the local mosque. Christians claim that security beat them with batons in response to their chanting.
Christian testimonies of suffering and injury set the stage for this violence. A YouTube video captured inside the church at the time of the blast also shows the chaos that erupted. It is chilling, but noteworthy, to notice the cries of the priests. “Don’t fear, it’s nothing!” was repeated over and over. Finally, at the end, they respond by spontaneously breaking out into religious psalmody.
The priest is understandably trying to calm the crowd, but the refuge in religious worship is symbolic of an earlier age in Coptic negotiation with state and society. During periods of difficulty Copts were encouraged to respond in prayer and quietism. Thoughts turned to God, and perhaps also to the dangers of taking on a majority culture. In recent years many Copts have imitated an overall, though still marginal, Egyptian trend toward activism. The freedom, and perhaps excesses, of Coptic communities abroad have also encouraged Christians to voice their complaints and strive for their political rights. Within this rubric, confrontation has emerged as a viable Christian option. While usually attempted through legitimate channels, the attitude has opened an avenue for frustrations to boil over into violence.
President Mubarak has noted that both Muslims and Christians died in the massacre, and that this gives evidence that terrorism knows no religion. He vows that the perpetrators of this crime will be found and prosecuted, also alluding to the fact that the origin of the crime comes from outside Egypt. Many Copts will likely receive his words as an empty paean asserting national unity in the middle of obvious sectarian tensions. Yet Copts would do well to not give up the cause, and the overall reality, of national unity. After al-Qaeda issued its warning to the Egyptian Church and the government responded quickly to denounce the threat, Pope Shenouda praised God that the effect of the terrorists was to rally all Egyptians together as one people. Though the government failed in its promise despite measures to bolster security should not result in the wholesale dismissal of the social contract.
The universal human constitution is to cry for justice. This is an unassailable pillar of civilization, that law is respected and lawbreakers punished. Yet at times like this, people of faith must supersede the desire for justice with the cry for love. Justice must not be neglected, and Christians have worthy fears they may once again be disappointed. The mob attacks in al-Koshh in 2000 resulted in 21 deaths, but only the lightest of sentences were meted when individual culprits could not be adequately identified. Furthermore, the trial of the three accused in the Nag Hamadi killings are still awaiting trial one year later, after multiple postponements. Will justice come in Alexandria? If so, who will receive it?
The cry for love demands pause. If this is the work of a foreign infiltrator then there is no direct comment on Egypt’s sectarian issues. If it was a sole Egyptian influenced by al-Qaeda rhetoric then the larger community is to be excused. Regardless, many in the Muslim community have immediately expressed their condolences, with Nagwa Raouf, professor at Cairo University, even apologizing on behalf of her co-religionists. A Muslim, in all likelihood, is guilty. Some Muslims may have been accomplices. Many Muslims may hold an ideology which contributed to the atmosphere of tension in Alexandria. But most Muslims decry violence in the name of their religion, and more generally in the name of humanity. A cry for love must include justice, but it must carefully differentiate.
A cry for love must also seek reconciliation and unity. A fine example of this is demonstrated by Rev. Atallah, who in addition to his pastoral work is a member of the Alexandria Intercultural Dialogue Committee, and the local parliamentary committee on conflict resolution and crisis. In response to the attacks he met with his dialogue group and issued a statement condemning the massacre, urging reconciliation, and petitioning for a clear law against religious discrimination. Furthermore, the group announced the following six steps it would take in light of the incident:
1. All imams and Muslim leaders in the city are invited to attend the funeral.
2. A group has been formed to visit the injured in the hospital
3. The families of those killed or injured will be consulted for any financial support needed in the wake of their suffering and the losses incurred
4. University leaders will be asked to lead blood donation campaigns
5. The governor will be asked to designate a citywide moment of silence to honor the slain
6. On January 26 the first of monthly meetings will be held to unite Muslims and Christians in changing the sectarian climate of Alexandria. Currently, 35 people, including journalists, religious leaders, and young people are committed to attend.
Steps like these are necessary, and provide opportunity for moderate, peace loving people of both faiths to use this tragedy for good and knit relationships of cooperation that will marginalize extremism. May it be that the monthly meetings will create further good ideas to promote understanding and national unity.
Yet the cry for love must not stop there. While many Salafis can likely participate with full sincerity in condemning the massacre and binding together with Christians in dialogue, others will not. The imams, for example, who were recently preaching non-friendship with Christians will likely remain venomous. Average Muslims under their tutelage may condemn the violence but harbor animosity against Christians or Christianity, or even the secular developments of the nation. Somehow, these must be engaged. They will not come to meetings; people of faith must go to them. And when they go, they must go in full commitment to love, to understand, to bless, and to do good. Efforts to change their mindset must be wholly secondary. Perhaps the dialogue groups can consider how.
Yet these Muslims are not the only ones harboring resentment. Christians, too, must be engaged with this cry for love. Many of them have chosen the path of violence in response to their victimization. Those they have harmed, including moderate leaders of their own faith, must treat them with the same patience and commitment necessary for hard-line Salafis. They must walk with them through the difficulties of forgiveness.
This is a monumental, perhaps superhuman task. But in times of crisis the choices are clear. Members of both faiths will shrink back into their own communities and assumptions about the other, or, less negatively but equally futilely curse the darkness that is encompassing them as they band together with interreligious friends. Or else they may find the only meaning possible in suffering, which is the hope of redemption. It is the cry for love that can prevent a heart-hardening emphasis on justice and seek the freedom of those enslaved by violence and its various ideologies. Justice is necessary; interreligious friendship is vital. But love expressed tangibly to the least deserving is transformational.
Today Glen Beck led a rally in Washington, DC on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial where Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his famous ‘I have a dream’ speech. In fact, today was the anniversary of that speech, which came to symbolize the struggle and eventual triumph of the civil rights movement. Beck denied he knew about the congruity of dates until after he planned the rally, but this denial has not stopped many from labeling this rally as an offense to the legacy of King.
I will confess to not following this issue too closely. I understand Beck to be a conservative and religion-friendly newscaster, but do not know exactly what he does or does not support in detail, outside of the fairly obvious battle lines in American politics. Furthermore, I have no insight as to whether or not he is playing games with the civil rights history of our nation, but I do also see what appears to be a highly symbolic convergence of imagery. Is he honoring the legacy, exploiting and redefining it, or just, as he confessed, ignorant of the whole matter?
Perhaps given that I have not closely followed this controversy, I can easily connect it to another controversy I have not followed closely: the Ground Zero mosque. (It is an advantage of living overseas that the headline dominating news stories in the US are received with considerably fewer decibels.)
In both cases it is clear that those engaged in the controversial activity have the right to do so. Glen Beck obtained the necessary permits to conduct a rally on national property, and the mosque/community center organizers own the land on which they seek to build and have received zoning clearance to do so.
It is also clear that those who are protesting do not challenge the legality of these endeavors, but their appropriateness. Many African-Americans and their then-liberal supporters in the civil rights struggle do not share the conservative worldview of Glen Beck. They find it offensive that he advance his agenda on the same day, at the very spot that their hero’s dream is most enshrined.
Meanwhile, many New Yorkers and Americans of all stripes have defined Ground Zero as sacred ground, after the devastating attacks perpetrated there in the name of Islam. Most of these would not oppose a mosque being built elsewhere, regardless of what they think of Islam as a religion. Why, however, build it there? Even if the mosque represents Islam of another stripe, why plant its flag at the gate of such an atrocity?
The response of an individual to the sense of appropriateness may vary, as may the ‘logical’ assessment of these claims. What is disturbing in both cases, however, is that opponents are seeking either to stop or sully the endeavors through loud and distant protest. Consider: If those in favor agreed their efforts were inappropriate, would they have undertaken them? And since they do not, will they be convinced by rancor and misinformed assumptions of intent, cast from afar?
Certainly the masses feel helpless. What can a patriot in Virginia do to influence Imam Faisal in New York? How can an activist in California effect Beck in DC? Let the cry be heard in the media, on the radio, in a blog. None of this, however, has any influence on law. Worse, it has contrary affect on the people involved.
Opposition and controversy, especially when loud and public, generally serves only to cement someone in their opinions. If there is a way forward, however, imagining for a moment that these endeavors are not appropriate, it can only be found in engagement. It is possible to change the mind of a friend. Very little in the public discourse concerning either Glen Beck or Ground Zero, however, is contributing toward bridge building. On the contrary, all seems polarizing.
Here in Egypt there is a similar, though not identical, issue surrounding church building. The law is ambiguous; there is no formal discrimination but the process of gaining approval is universally acknowledged as difficult. In places a church can be constructed quickly and easily; in others the plans labor for years waiting for the governor (the governor!) to give his approval.
Oftentimes Christians decide to go ahead and build anyway (as will Muslims, at times, with a mosque), knowing that if they can get the building up then the government will not knock it down. There is far less public relations damage for a stalled authorization process than for the demolition of a house of worship. The former will languish on the desk of a bureaucrat; the latter may attract international condemnation.
Very few Egyptian Muslims would argue that there is no place for a church in a Muslim nation. It is not uncommon, however, to hear their protest that this church is too close to a mosque, or that the church steeple equals or exceeds the height of the tallest minaret in a village. Frustrated by delays in authorization Christians will often proceed without consulting their Muslim neighbors. Feeling threatened or dishonored, Muslims have sometimes reacted in violence, damaging the building that has been constructed as an affront.
Many Christians and Muslims will argue that the situation must be remedied by law – that is, a clear and impartial system must be created to govern the building of all houses of worship. There is much merit in this discussion. Unfortunately, many of these same advocates for religious freedom stop there. They press the need for legal reform, but do not continue to engage the opposite community on the ground, in real relationships.
For people on the ground, however, the issue of church building is not one of law, but of appropriateness. The law may force their hand, but this only results in furthering community tension. Neither Muslims nor Christians profit from this situation. Yet since few Muslims would oppose the right of Christians to build a church, overcoming the issue of its appropriateness can only be done through engagement.
The din of struggle and opposition will always be heard over the quiet, dogged pursuit of relationship. In both the cases of Glen Beck and Ground Zero, there may have been extensive efforts at engagement that have gone unreported, since engagement is not conducted in front of cameras.
At the same time, engagement is insincere if it is only seeking its own interest. I might sit down with my opponent once for tea to hear his argument, but if he only repeats his position each and every time, I will no longer invite him over. Engagement is willing to see the other side, validate, and appeals in humility to that which it desires.
Many today, both inside and outside of Egypt believe that sectarian tension is increasing rapidly. This is due to the same phenomena that dominate media coverage of Glen Beck and Ground Zero. These polarizing images ignore the many efforts at racial reconciliation engaged in by both liberals and conservatives. They ignore the fact that most Muslims in America live a normal middle class lifestyle in complete peace and tolerance with their neighbors.
Similarly, most Muslims and Christians in Egypt live together in peace. Where there is tension it must be addressed. Where an issue arises the media must cover it. In the face of real difficulties in certain places, though, the assertion of peace may ring hollow. If so, it does reflect a growing pattern, not of tension, but of disengagement. While percentage-wise the troubles are few, the level of harmonious interaction between Muslims and Christians decreases ever so slightly, but steadily.
This is the risk America now faces in the issues of Glen Beck and Ground Zero. Polarizing voices and opinions only serve to lessen consensus and engagement. On either racial or religious grounds, the genuine peace which exists between all Americans may ring increasingly hollow. If so, it is because these normal Americans have disengaged from their diverse communities, finding fellowship only with their kin.
Though God is often portrayed as the one with the loudest voice of all, silencing his opposition by power of miracle, he is also characterized by stillness and whisper. Jesus spoke of God’s Spirit as a gentle wind, with man knowing not from whence it came or where it is going. Many today in pursuit of their agendas
usurp God’s right of bombastic pronouncement. We would do better to search instead for his whisper, finding places where he is at work, but quietly, and ignored by most of those around.
Note: This post today was originally written in February of 2010, but never published on the blog, only at Arab West Report. I was reminded of it by the controversy in recent weeks concerning the proposed Muslim community center / mosque at Ground Zero. The leader of the project visited Egypt several months ago, and I attended his lecture. Imam Faisal Abdul Raouf was not a household name at that time, though the Ground Zero plans were already contemplated, if not underway.
The essay which follows has nothing to do with his Ground Zero plans, but addresses the larger question of the place of Islam in the West. The post is a bit lengthy, but I hope you progress through to the end to read along with my efforts to look inward at the psyche of America, indeed my own misgivings and hope, in order to find the best way forward. I wish that in light of the issues being raised at Ground Zero, my conclusion might help us find that way.
On a lighter note before we begin, I have experimented with placing a survey at two places in the post. I’ll be very interested to see your vote, and will look forward to any comments you have to offer. Thanks.
In recent days I have had the opportunity to encounter a picture of Islam as a message of love and tolerance from two very different Muslim voices, Imam Faisal Abdul Raouf and Sheikh Ahmad al-Sayih. Imam Faisal is head of the Cordoba Initiative, an independent organization seeking to promote international understanding and acceptance between the Western and Islamic worlds. He is the son of Egyptian sheikhs from al-Azhar, but was educated in Great Britain and served many years as an imam in a New York City mosque. He visited Egypt and presented his work at the Sawy Culture Wheel, sponsored by the US Embassy, in which he outlined his vision, distributed an Arabic translation of his book, and sought to recruit support and partners for his international organization. A summary of his presentation can be found here.
Sheikh Ahmad, meanwhile, is an Egyptian sheikh from al-Azhar, now retired. He has taught in Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and currently is concerned to combat the growing Wahhabi influence on Islam, both in Egypt and worldwide. He believes this is a corruption of Islam as it tends to reject the religious other, whereas Islam in its essence is the same message as that which was revealed in the earlier religions. Sheikh Ahmad is from the region near Nag Hamadi, where six Christian young men were recently killed exiting Christmas mass, along with one Muslim police officer, and has spoken out against this crime. I interviewed him in this context, hoping both to better understand the situation and gain counsel on how to assist in peacemaking there. A summary of this interview can be found here.
This essay will be an attempt to compare and contrast these two Muslim voices based on the reactions they produce, first in their Arabic audience, second in me, as a Western Christian. Though I was unable to interview Imam Faisal, the question and answer period of his presentation revealed the controversy his ideas elicited from the predominantly Egyptian audience. Conversely, though I have not personally witnessed the effect of Sheikh Ahmad’s teachings on Egyptian public opinion, he himself highlighted much of the controversy he has engendered. As mentioned above, both men preach a message of Islamic love and tolerance. Why should love and tolerance produce any controversy at all?
This essay will begin from the starting point of Islam as a world religion, and therefore like all its peers it is comprised of vast and flexible source material. Believers in Islam can find ample texts to support a variety of positions, and while each may argue with the other over best interpretations, inasmuch as they work from the same basis and maintain the accepted boundaries of faith—themselves open to dispute at times—they represent a message which is intrinsically Islamic. As a non-Muslim it is not my place to comment on the message of love and tolerance as opposed to extremist thought; it will be the perspective here that Islam, like all religions, can support many emphases, which can be highlighted or downplayed according to the person, movement, culture, or age.
Both Imam Faisal and Sheikh Ahmad highlight Islam as a message of love and tolerance. They differ widely, however, in their presentation and audience. Imam Faisal, though born to Azhari Egyptian parents is thoroughly comfortable in the Western cultural world, to which he speaks primarily. His English pronunciation is perfect and his dress impeccable. He declared that his motivation to help Americans understand Islam grew exponentially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when he and his community were put to the test in defending their faith against the actions of Islamic terrorists. He discovered that America was not necessarily against Islam, but needed to see an Islam which was not a threat, first to its safety, second to its cultural values. In the course of explaining the true message of Islam over and over he saw also the need for Muslims in the West to practice their faith within this culture, so as to win a place of natural being and acceptance. Concerning the controversy in Switzerland over the building of minarets, he urged Swiss Muslims to build Swiss mosques, acceptable to the culture so as to become part of the established and normal landscape. His message was for Islam to become Swiss. He noted, also, that in his presentations he discovered a growing Western hunger for spirituality, which many were finding in Islam.
Sheikh Ahmad, meanwhile, speaks no English whatsoever, dresses like a traditional Azhari scholar, and converses even informally in Arabic diction fit for the Friday pulpit. Through his many years teaching in the Persian Gulf states he became very familiar with Wahhabi teaching, which he grew more and more to find was poisoning the precious Islamic message of love and tolerance. He writes and speaks extensively to expose the false foundations of Wahhabi thought, which he finds grounded in some of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, most of which his scholarly study has found to be baseless. Among these traditions is source material for violent and separatist preaching highlighted by some Muslims today, which in actuality, he believes, were composed when the later Islamic community was growing apart from the Christian milieu of the fading Byzantine Empire which it had largely conquered. His message was to return to the original preaching of Muhammad, which emphasized the community with and respect for other religions, Christianity in particular. He had special praise for the monks of Makarius Monastery in Egypt, in whom he found the real Islamic spirit of love and tolerance.
The controversy of Sheikh Ahmad’s views is found in his calling into question many of the inherited traditions of Islam. In doing so he disturbs the traditional acceptance which many Muslims have given to the traditions in general, potentially prompting a reevaluation of the faith, as so much currently accepted as Islam is built from this source. Sheikh Ahmad declares, actually, that 60% of current Islam stems from faulty traditions, and therefore must be jettisoned. This is not an easy message for ordinary Muslims to hear.
The controversy Imam Faisal’s views produced was different, as he questioned not the religious sources of Islam, but its cultural ones. Though only a quarter of the world’s Muslims are Arabs, its foundations are still largely Arabic, certainly through the language, and also through the culture of Arabia which birthed the faith and established its early patterns, generally accepted as normative. Imam Faisal, however, highlighted that in history Muslims have always adapted their faith to the local culture, and urges Muslims today to do the same in the West. If Islam there remains foreign—Arab, Pakistani, etc.—it will not become accepted. Though not as controversial as the source criticism of Sheikh Ahmad, for the Muslims of Egypt attending the Sawy Culture Wheel presentation, proud of their self-identity as leaders of the Arab world, this is not an easy message to hear.
Therefore, though the vast majority of the Egyptian Muslim audience of both Muslim voices would agree with the message of Islam as love and tolerance, the manner of establishment was discomforting for many. One called into question the accepted cultural basis of the religion, the other the accepted religious basis. The discomfort should not be surprising, for most believers of any religion inherit their values without much thought or questioning. For these, Islam is love and tolerance. Practitioners of religion, however, especially those who are forced to consider their faith outside its comfortable context, must deal with the faith in its entirety and complexity. Imam Faisal has found the fear of Islam in the West to be tied to the foreignness of the culture of its adherents. By removing the cultural component the message of love and tolerance is better received. Sheikh Ahmad, however, has found that Islam is threatened by Wahhabi emphasis on certain traditions. By invalidating this religious component the message of love and tolerance is better established. Yet in explaining why Islam is a message of love and tolerance to those who already believe this, they cause ordinary believers to think about their received faith, and examine it. This is not an easy process to bear, and controversy is the natural result.
Thinking about received traditions is not limited to Egyptian Muslims, and this Western Christian found himself in similar territory. This next section of the essay is meant as exploration of psyche, and not necessarily evaluation of ideas, certainly not confidence of convictions. Yet as I was interacting with both Muslim voices I found myself drawn to and favorable toward one, while I was questioning of and guarded against the other. I wonder which the reader, especially the Muslim reader, might suspect of me before I continue. In which ways have my biases been experienced so far?
It is important to emphasize that the message of Islam as love and tolerance is an easy one for the Western Christian to accept, and the promotion of this message within Islam would certainly call for rejoicing. The Western Christian, inasmuch as he or she knows Islam, either condemns it as a religion of violence or commends it as a religion of peace and tolerance. The more generally educated Western Christian comment on Islam may be seen in that thought with which I began this essay: Islam is composed of vast and flexible source material, from which self-described Muslim voices draw both messages. The Western Christian may or may not be as conscious that both the Western and the Christian traditions are similarly variable, but this fact is true of almost all world systems of thought. It is impossible for worldviews to hold historical and international sway unless they are of this nature.
Therefore, the Western Christian of any ideology would be glad to find love and tolerance promoted within Islam. For the Westerner, this means that adherents of the religion will not threaten us, in either our safety or our cultural values. For the Christian, this means that the dominant expression of faith can find common ground in what is often seen as a rival, and thus oppositional, religion. In theory, though practice is always a different and more difficult matter, joint declarations of love and tolerance presents Islam as an ally of both.
Yet the voice of Sheikh Ahmad is much easier to digest. From this point forward I must state that I am describing my own palpitations of heart; though I believe these to be representative of an average Western (or at least American) Christian, I can speak with no certainty about this matter. Each is invited to speak for himself.
Sheikh Ahmad dares to critique the received traditions of Islam, commenting directly on the sources which promote interpretations of violence. Should the Western Christian crassly rejoice in the long awaited exposure of Islam, he or she does so poorly. Sheikh Ahmad is purifying Islam from what he believes are false accretions from pure religion; yet what remains is still pure Islam. Still, he speaks to the Western Christian fear that violence, though certainly not the only message of Islam, exists truly within the heart of this faith. By stating it does not, he puts his foreign audience at ease. We have no idea if he is or is not correct in his assessment, but we are glad to hear it nonetheless.
Drawing only from the presentation of Imam Faisal, combining with experiences of other Western Muslim preachers, this thorny issue of sources is often left unaddressed. The message of love and tolerance is appreciated, but if background issues of both textual and historical violence remain only in the background, the Western Christian remains wary. Is love and tolerance the message of Islam when it is a minority faith, or in a weakened state, which will give way to sources, emphasized currently by some adherents of Islam, which highlight differences and propose superiority, when its foundations are stronger? Put another way, is Islam about love and tolerance in its essence, or is this a means to attract enough support until power is adequately accumulated? At that point, of course, love and tolerance will not disappear, but other messages may come out from the background. All religions must answer this question; given the complex relationship between the Western Christian and the Islamic worlds throughout history, it is asked contemporarily of Islam. Perhaps Muslims should also ask it of us.
The question I wished to pose to Imam Faisal during his presentation was this: Pope John Paul II had been a leading critic of Western violence, as in the current Iraqi war. He has also strongly condemned and apologized for Christian uses of violence, as in the Crusades, Inquisitions, and Christianization of Latin America. Most Muslims and you today condemn the attacks of September 11; are Muslims in general, and are you in particular, ready to condemn those who have committed violence in the name of Islamic empire, common to all empires, as being against the nature of true Islamic faith? Specifically, were the wars of Islamic expansion (al-futuhat al-Islamiya), in violation of Islam? Middle Age believers of both faiths mixed religion and empire without apology. Many 21st Century Christians now apologize for this; are 21st Century Muslims able to do the same?
I wavered considerably in asking this question. In the end I decided against it, for I felt I would be asking not of sincere inquiry, but of combativeness and challenge. The question may be valid, but I would not have been asking from a proper spirit. Furthermore, my question would rightly be seen as a trap. If he were to answer ‘no’, he would undue his message of love and tolerance in the eyes of the West, authenticating the suspicion of it being the message of Islam as minority or weakened faith alone. Yet if he were to answer ‘yes’, especially given his Egyptian audience, he would likely unleash a torrent of controversy, as Muslims rightly celebrate their golden ages of civilizational superiority. Yet would Islam in essence declare the manner of establishing this civilization as faulty, flawed, and sinful?
Yet there is another, more pernicious question that gets raised in the heart of the Western Christian, one which undermines his own values of love and tolerance. The message of Sheikh Ahmad is more easily digested because Sheikh Ahmad, no matter the symmetry of his values and those of the Western Christian, remains ‘other’. He remains foreign. Imam Faisal, on the other hand, is a Westerner. He is one of us, but he is a Western Muslim. Does being a Westerner overpower his Muslim identity, making it easier to accept him as ‘us’? Or is his Western state simply a garb under which beats a Muslim soul, making his acceptance more difficult, threatening to group him with ‘them’? Yet, regardless of his constitution, why do these questions concern us so?
The values of Western Christian civilization have in recent ages extended a welcome to people of all faiths. Freedom of religion is a cherished and inviolable right, and nations of the West added to their melting pot Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Sikhs, and allowed all to build their houses of worship, practice their rites, and even spread their religious beliefs. Perhaps America has integrated these communities better than Europe, but all have held that religion should not be a barrier to welcome and participation in society. If the reality falls short of the rhetoric it reveals the sublime ideal for which to aim.
Yet despite the declining significance of religion in Western life the cultural foundation maintains its Christian basis. This is an understated value for Westerners in general, though it is present below the surface, but it is cherished by the Western Christian. The inclusion of foreign faiths has not bothered either group, for until now they have been welcomed as full participants in society—but here is the unspoken reality—as long as their faiths remain foreign. The Muslim in the West is generally free to construct a mosque, conduct his prayers, and fast as he wishes. Yet these values, no matter if the response is of condescension or respect, remain imported, cherished by a welcomed ethnic group, but belonging to them and not to us. This Muslim may play on the work sports team, join in the national day neighborhood celebrations, and attend parent-teacher meetings at school. He is free to be an Arab, or Pakistani, or whatever citizen of the West. His Islam, or his Buddhism, or whatever, is his own, and not ours.
This is a very delicate matter, and it would not be spoken like this publically. The discourse esteems the right of religion, and the Westerner, including the Western Christian, will rejoice that the Muslim is free to have his or her Islam. Imam Faisal, however, has recognized that the natural result of immigration is transformation of culture; his efforts threaten to disturb the balance by making Islam ‘ours’.
This is not an accusation against him; in his focus and words he is very wise. More so, his discourse is inevitable. As long as communities of Muslims exist in the West, no matter their place of origin, there will emerge a Western Islam. This speaks back to the opening premise of religion as being vast and flexible. Western values and Islamic values have been and will increasingly negotiate together to produce a new, and viable, interpretation of the religion, one which will likely express itself in congruity with the greater host culture. Imam Faisal wishes to speed up this process, but it will happen with or without him. All families wish to live in peace with those around them; as Muslim families live in peace with Western culture, they will invariably be shaped by it. Their expression of Islam will likewise bend to this reality. In dominant Islamic cultures the purists, though they be misnamed, may protest, as was seen at the presentation of Imam Faisal, but these cries will be futile, falling on the deaf ears of an emerging Muslim community.
The careful reader, however, will notice that the second half of the familiar couplet has fallen out of the last paragraph. This is what will happen in the West, but what is the effect on the Western Christian? He can only be confronted by his schizophrenia. As a Westerner he is powerless to protest, for the process of assimilation is a cherished part of his being. His own ancestors negotiated this path long ago, between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, and of which he or she is a result. Yet as a Western Christian this assimilation of other religious groups undermines the particular Christian nature of the culture. Perhaps with Islam this is felt more deeply because of ingrained historical attitudes between the faiths. If Islam becomes Western then it becomes ‘us’. Yet there is that within Christianity, as with exclusivist tendencies in all religions, to restrict ‘us’ to those likeminded. The Western Christian has no problem inviting the Muslim to become ‘us’ in a Western sense, but this entails leaving Islam as his personal, foreign expression of faith.
This is further complicated by uncertainties about Imam Faisal, here and hereafter used as an expression of Western Islamic preaching. Is he a missionary? He is free to be, of course; Western Christian values demand this. When the odd Westerner converts to Islam and dons a traditional robe, grows a long beard, and changes his name to Muhammad so-and-so, this causes little concern, for every individual is free, and he has clearly left many expressions of his culture to adopt those of the peculiar foreigners. Yet Imam Faisal is urging Western Muslims to become, and presumably to remain in the case of a convert, Western. It is more of a challenge to accept the reality of Jeremy Smithson, Muslim, wearing a three piece suit, or perhaps jeans, t-shirt, and baseball cap.
Therefore Imam Faisal is open to the challenge: Is his bridge building work done in order to make fertile ground for Islam, so that over time Islam becomes part of the Western cultural identity, and more and more Westerners find peace within its fold? Again, it is his right, but is this his message? If it is, is it admitted? The Westerner may feel the suspicion under the surface, whereas the Western Christian may be immediately more defensive. Yet how can one know? It is uncharitable to toss around accusations, and as a Westerner, the Christian cannot protest. He can only lament the declining status of his faith within his own culture, at least inasmuch as Christianity is the primary, or among the leading, informants of the culture.
Of course there are several other options available. The Western Christian can adjust and resign himself to the inevitable social demographic patterns of life. He or she can renew internal Christian energy and seek re-evangelization of the culture and the inhabitants thereof. He or she can become angry and hostile toward these new Muslim interlopers, and seek the defamation of their faith, warning of the hidden agenda behind the slogans of love and tolerance. At least, this can be done within the allowable limits of Western culture. Passing special favor onto a man like Sheikh Ahmad might be seen as a clever passive-aggressive expression of this last option.
I dare not choose between these options listed, but if there is a path to be proclaimed as ideal, it may have to decouple two of the often used expressions of this essay. The first to be dissolved is ‘Western Christian’. In doing so it leaves each identity free to be honest with its own nature, and exposes the unholy alliance between the two. Western Christian culture is the last remaining remnant of Western Christendom, which coupled Christian faith with temporal power. It is not as if there was no good produced from this union; the humanistic values of the West were ultimately formed in negotiation between faith and power. Perhaps the same could be said of the great and tolerant Islamic civilizations of history. Yet in clinging to the desire for Christian culture the Western Christian is longing for superiority, dominance, and control. Though never to be expressed in this way, when spoken in these terms it exposes the distinct unchristian nature of this desire.
This does not mean that Western and Christian should become oppositional; on the contrary they make keen allies. Yet why should not Islam, or Hinduism, or Buddhism also become allies in this endeavor? Most Western Christians have already transformed the once despised Jews into participants in an acclaimed ‘Judeo-Christian culture’. The questions posed to Islam in this essay are essential for determining if indeed this religion can become an ally in the equation, but is there any reason to suspect that possessors of a vast and flexible religious heritage could not become as such?
The second decoupling involves the epithet ‘love and tolerance’. Tolerance is a negative virtue. It speaks to the right to leave one alone to do as he wishes and to believe what he will, provided respect is granted similarly for the rights of others. As such, it is the perfect, correct, and cherished value of Western culture. The Western Christian, however, needs to evaluate where his truest identity lies. Christianity speaks not of tolerance—though it is not absent from the discourse—but of love. Love extends welcome. Love shares resources. Love forgives faults. Love hopes for the best. Love humbles itself. Love sacrifices for the success of others. Love is willing to perish rather than deny its nature.
It is difficult to translate these sentiments into practical reality, but I believe this is the necessary attitude Western Christians must adopt toward the emerging Muslim communities within their midst, as well as toward Islam worldwide, and all other religious adherents beside. If in the end these prove themselves ungracious recipients then this is the risk associated with love itself. It is poured upon all, worthy and unworthy. Christians should be conscious of their own tradition which declares them to be unworthy recipients of the love of God; how then can they be miserly toward others? If these take such love and trample upon it, undoing the very nature of the societies which welcomed them then this is the risk associated with love itself. Christians should be conscious of their own tradition in which Christ, in obedience to love became obedient to death, even death on a cross.
At this the Western Christian will long again for the Western nature of his identity; after all, from this base of power he or she can find protection. The answer of God, however, is resurrection and redemption. This hope, however, is only in God; it is the attitude of Christ which Christians must hold.
Within this arrangement the Christian, now potentially free of his limiting couplet, must face the question earlier posed to Imam Faisal: Are you a missionary? The Christian is free to be, of course, inasmuch as anyone is free to be a salesman for a preferred commodity. In fact, the commodity is valuable, both for the individual and for the world. It would do well to be marketed. Love, however, seeks not its own. The Christian must consider long and hard his motivations. Is a desire to see one’s faith in the lives of others emerging from the natural and human desire for strength, importance, and triumph, however defined? If so, these are the very attitudes denounced by Christian faith. If not from love nothing is gained, though mountains be moved in the process. Given the vagaries of the human condition, who can confess to a pure heart? God is gracious; he will redeem all which comes from love, and allow all else to be burned as chaff. Where in this equation falls the desire to see ‘love’ proclaimed by the lips of others? May each Christian, may each human, submit this question only to God.
It is imagined, not unreasonably, that Sheikh Ahmad, Imam Faisal, and the author of this essay trust that within ourselves there is the desire to please God; though this be submitted to him, it is only through our actions these desires become of use to people around us. Please judge, but be charitable. May we all extend such charity to one another.
Georgette Qillini is a member of the Egyptian People’s Assembly. A Copt, she gained prominence during the crisis of Nag Hamadi, in which six Christians and a Muslim policeman were killed outside a church on Coptic Christmas. Qillini spoke boldly and decisively during the governmental review, laying blame on the Coptic governor of the region, Magdi Ayyub, Muslim People’s Assembly representative for Nag Hamadi, Abd el-Rahman el-Ghoul, and the Ministry of the Interior for their share in the “persecution”, in her words, suffered by Copts in the region. In her stance she was rallied around by many Muslims and especially Copts, who found in her a defender of their rights.
Finding a defender, however, is no easy matter. Copts comprise less than 1% of the membership in parliament, though their population in Egypt is estimated to be roughly 6-10% of the whole. This disparity was addressed by Qillini during a presentation given on June 28, 2010 at a youth meeting at St. Mark’s Orthodox Church in Maadi, Cairo. During her address she called the Coptic community to task for failing to participate in politics, encouraging them to “change themselves” rather than simply complain about their understood mistreatment in society.
Qillini opened her remarks with admission that ‘politics’ as a subject was on the lips of everyone. This is election season in Egypt and Copts as much as anyone pay attention to the national developments. Qillini expanded the thought, however, stating that politics is grounded in a political party system, of which most Egyptians, but especially Copts, are woefully absent. How then can they effectively participate at any level more substantial than conversation?
The first step, Qillini delineated, is simple knowledge of the system as constructed in the Constitution. Within this document our rights are found, she said, but we do not know them. Every Egyptian citizen – man/woman, Muslim/Christian, rich/poor – is guaranteed the same rights and must be offered the same opportunities. Failure to participate, however, unbalances this equation. Though rights are guaranteed, opportunities go by the wayside.
The second step is to focus on the maintenance of dialogue in society. Since the Copt is a person, complete, a full citizen before the law, he or she has every right to speak from personal perspective. Dialogue, however, requires being with the other, being open to the other, and knowing the other. Many Copts isolate themselves in church activities, and thus, know as little as they are known. If you have studied a subject, pursue it with diligence; then, be present in society so as to speak about it. Once in the public square, ask and be asked about all things.
The third step is to participate actively in elections, but even more so, in the political party system. Several months ago the leadership of St. Mark’s Church repeatedly encouraged the congregation to register to vote in the upcoming elections. Aware or unaware, Qillini asked those present, roughly 200 young adults but with substantial members of the older generations, how many of you have received your voter registration cards? Only about 25% raised their hands. Qillini pressed further, asking how many of these had voted. Of the 25%, only a quarter signaled affirmatively. Her last question asked how many present were members of an established political party. Only two identified as such.
Within her remarks Qillini anticipated and spoke to a common Coptic objection. What chance is there for participation, many wonder, when the political atmosphere is not pluralistic and anti-Coptic sentiment exists in many fields of society? Though not dismissing the assessment, Qillini stated though discrimination is an obvious growing attitude in the society, there are still many balanced voices which oppose it. The negative attitude of Copts in participating in politics, however, stems primarily from two sources: frustration and fear. Fear, however, has little to do with Christian faith. We pray ‘Our Father who is in heaven’, she counseled. If this is true, why should we fear? Have we forgotten that nothing can happen unless God wills it? Yes, there may be consequences which follow our efforts, but there is also reward. Qillini accepted that, of course, not everyone has the courage necessary to speak fearlessly. Nevertheless, everyone can gradually, but conscientiously, prepare themselves to build the courage required. Society will not magically change. We are the ones who must change ourselves first.
Following the presentation Qillini was presented with a banner on behalf of the youth of the churches of Maadi. The banner spoke of everyone’s support for her election campaign, celebrating her as the bravest voice in parliament and the best representative of Egyptian Copts. Afterwards, Fr. Yunan clarified that this banner was not a statement on behalf of the church, for the church should not involve itself in politics. Certain youth prepared this on their own, he said, and wished with it to honor Qillini. It was a telling sign, however, for the extent to which Coptic political sentiment has adopted her as one of its chief representatives. Should Qillini’s words have any fruit, however, she may in time prove to be less exceptional. She certainly would prefer it this way.
Watching the World Cup matches in Egypt has been an experience. Games here are 2:30, 5:00, and 9:30pm, so while some fall during working hours, others have been able to be viewed. I have made less of it than I would have liked, but so has Egypt, for a reason to be explained.
One reason that Egyptians are having a hard time getting excited about the World Cup is that so few games are on television. Al-Jazeera (yes, the al-Jazeera many Americans complain about for supposed anti-US bias) has an extensive sports network, and they have bought the rights to Arabic language World Cup broadcasts. They have worked out a deal with network Egyptian television to grant access to some of the games, but they are not contractually obliged to say which ones. Egyptians without the resources to shell out the cash for the al-Jazeera package (most) can only hope their favorite nations will be televised that night.
For me, without a television at all let alone al-Jazeera, this mean going to the trendy restaurants or coffee shops populating Maadi which can afford an al-Jazeera subscription. For the cost of a plate of French fries or desert (I hate buying drinks – water is the best thing for you and provided free by God), I get to watch whenever I choose.
Julie, I, and the girls went this afternoon to a favorite trendy restaurant and watched the compelling US comeback against Slovenia. For the evening’s game – England vs. Algeria – given that I was getting a little tired of French fries, though, I set out on my own in hope of finding a traditional Egyptian coffee shop that perhaps was carrying al-Jazeera. Fortunately, find it I did.
At 9:30pm the crowd was a bit sparse, but within the first five minutes of the game the patio of the coffee shop had filled with patrons, all interested in watching the match, given the presence of the lone Arab squad to qualify for the tournament.
Here is the twist, however. Most Egyptian soccer fans hate Algeria’s national team. Egypt and Algeria finished tied in their World Cup qualifying group, and Algeria won the subsequent playoff match. The matches, though, were accompanied by nationalist fervor which spilled out of the stadium into the lives of normal people. The Algerian team bus was pelted with stones and their embassy in Cairo needed to be protected by riot police. Egyptians in Algeria, meanwhile, were being assaulted and a large Egyptian telecom company suddenly, mysteriously, was assessed millions of dollars in back taxes. Though Algeria edged Egypt for World Cup participation, Egypt returned the favor and walloped Algeria in the African Nations Cup on their way to their third consecutive title. Some of these reflections can be read here, here, and here.
Needless to say, with Egypt missing from the tournament local fervor has been muted. Egyptians are still soccer-crazy, and love watching their favorite stars no matter who they play for. So whereas one might have expected an outpouring of Arab brotherhood support for Algeria in their match against England, understood as an American lackey supporting neo-colonialist enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was nary a cheer when Algeria came close to goal. Every English touch, however, brought on cheers of expectation. As Algeria, surprisingly, carried the run of play, the atmosphere was rather tense and subdued.
Again, oddly, though the only foreigner in the crowd, and a Western Christian at that, I was also the only supporter of Arab Muslim Algeria. I like England, generally, and though I have nothing against Algeria, I was disappointed to see them put Egypt out of the Cup. An Algeria win or draw, however, would better the chances to see the United States advance to the knockout stages of the World Cup, predicated on a victory over Algeria six days from now. My support was silent, but real. The 0-0 draw at the conclusion was not an indicative byline for what had been an enjoyable and competitive match, but was among the best results possible for US rooting interests.
The telling tale will come in six days. The United States will play Algeria with both teams needing a win to advance to the round of sixteen. America does not draw the vitriol of the Arabs currently as it did during the Bush administration, but President Obama is not meeting the high expectations he set for a change in US policy when he spoke in Cairo early in his presidency. Overall, the US image in Egypt remains poor.
Will Sam’s Army receive the brunt of this geopolitical frustration? In the Arab world at large I would put their chances at 50-50. There is a good and legitimate chance that Arab solidarity backs the Algerians with just a little extra mustard. Still, since the US is not dominant in soccer the national team does not generally suffer from a backlash, and Arabs are generally quite astute at separating their opinion of government from their estimation of a person, or in this case, team.
In Egypt, however, hopefully, the coffee shop crowd may be composed entirely of Yankees. During the founding of the Egyptian Republic in the 1950s President Nasser mesmerized the masses with cries for Arab nationalism. The children of his revolution now only imbibe the fumes of his vision, dashed upon the realities of World Cup qualifying. Politics, it is said, makes for strange bedfellows. Sport, it seems, can do the same.
Jayson Casper 