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Asia Christianity Today Europe Published Articles

Christians Fret as Muhammad’s Family Comes Under Fire

Aisha (L), at the Battle of the Camel

Founding fathers are often sacred, but not sacrosanct.

In recent years, Americans have wrestled with the slave-owning legacies of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. Confederate statues have been toppled, ideologically refighting for some the Civil War. Pilgrims have become pillagers; Plymouth Rock equated with imperialism.

Muslims are having a similar moment.

Their prophet is called a pedophile. Their miracles, a myth. Successors to Muhammad are compared to ISIS. And it is not just Islam’s historic men. Two current global controversies concern two of the faith’s celebrated founding females: Aisha and Fatimah.

The International Union for Muslim Scholars has renewed its call for an international ban on insulting religions. And from India to England, Muslims have poured into the streets this month in protest.

Christians—whether leading such polemics or suffering under blasphemy accusations—have often been embroiled in such Muslim controversies. These latest episodes, many are relieved, are centered elsewhere.

“But Christians in both India and Pakistan are quite frightened,” said Juliet Chowdhry, a trustee for the British Asian Christian Association. “It is inevitable that as a vulnerable religious minority that is incorrectly perceived to be in league with the West, Christians will find themselves caught up in the anger.”

Thus they are keeping silent, said a Christian leader in Pakistan who—illustrating the point—requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the situation.

Last month [May 26], a spokesperson for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India cited Aisha, often considered the favorite wife of Muhammad. Appearing on a talk show with Muslims, the Hindu official responded passionately when chided about a disputed temple.

Her prime minister, Narendra Modi, has led India in the direction of Hindu nationalism, stoking tensions with its 15 percent Muslim community. Though always a minority religion there, Islam ruled the subcontinent for centuries, with some ancient temples turned into mosques.

In one location, shivling idols were allegedly discovered last month. The Muslim talk show guests said no, their shape—holy to Hindus in honor of Shiva—resembled instead a fountain. The panel then descended into a heated discussion over the mocking of gods and goddesses.

“Should I start mocking claims of flying horses … and having sex with [Aisha] when she turned nine?” exclaimed the official. “Should I start saying all these things that are mentioned in your scriptures?”

Buraq is the name of the winged animal mentioned in Islamic tradition as carrying Muhammad on a night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem. Similar traditions quote Aisha on her tender age at the time her marriage was consummated, while some more contemporary scholars cite evidence to argue she was in her teens.

At least 15 majority-Muslim nations—led by those in the Arabian Gulf—have condemned India, which in turn censured both the BJP spokesperson and another offending official. The grand mufti of Oman called the comments a “war on all Muslims,” while Egypt’s al-Azhar mosque described them as “real terrorism.”

Muhammad was 53 when he married Aisha, and Islamic sources indicate a happy existence together. Aisha grew up to become a scholar and a military leader, often honored by modern day Muslims as an example of feminist egalitarianism.

But she is also a center of controversy—resurrected in a recent British film.

After the death of Muhammad, a faction of Muslims believed leadership should remain in the bloodline of the prophet. Known as Shiites, this sect believes the caliphate was promised to Ali, the prophet’s nephew and husband to his daughter, Fatimah. About 10–15 percent of Muslims are Shiites, with the great majority residing in Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan.

Sunnis, the majority sect, believe Muhammad did not designate a successor. The community then met to elect one, a caliph, and the first three were chosen from among Muhammad’s closest companions. Ali became the fourth caliph, but in a clash known as the Battle of the Camel, Aisha rode the Arabian dromedary in a rebellion against him.

The Lady of Heaven builds its story around Fatimah, who Muslims esteem as akin to Mary, the mother of Jesus.

In a poignant introductory scene, Fatimah is introduced as the first victim of terrorism, paralleled as an elderly woman comforts an Iraqi child whose mother was killed by ISIS. Winning awards for visual effects, the $15 million partisan film relates a Shiite perspective that the famed daughter of Muhammad died in childbirth—due to injuries suffered earlier in a raid ordered by his first successor.

Sunni orthodoxy honors the first four caliphs as “righteous.” Thereafter the community descended into civil war, with Ali and Fatimah’s children on the losing end. Hussain, the younger of two sons, was killed in battle, and his commemoration by Shiites is often accompanied by mourning and ritual self-flagellation.

Though Shiite-dominated, Iran banned the film as divisive to the Muslim community, while Pakistan, Egypt’s al-Azhar, and the Muslim Council of Britain all condemned it also. Following large-scale Sunni protests, most UK cinemas canceled upcoming screenings. According to Rotten Tomatoes, the film’s approval rating…

This article was originally published at Christianity Today on June 24, 2022. Please click here to read the full text.

Categories
Europe Lapido Media Published Articles

The Muslim Brotherhood in England and Egypt

MB England EgyptLondon and Istanbul have become the new base of operations for the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.

Following the ouster of Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and their subsequent banning in Egypt in December last year, the organization is recalibrating abroad.

An early base of operations was Qatar, where the al-Jazeera network was widely perceived, even by its own staff, as being biased toward the Brotherhood.

But the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia joined Egypt in labelling the MB a terrorist organization, and their pressure on Qatar resulted in the expulsion of some leaders.

Now several office blocks on London’s A406 North Circular Road comprise one of the two main centres of operation, the other being Turkey.

An investigation into MB links to terrorism was completed by former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir John Jenkins in July 2014, but its results have not yet been made public.

And bar a few lone journalists keeping tabs on the story, there is little public accountability about the presence and growth of such a controversial movement in Britain.

The MB is accused of burning up to 50 churches and Coptic businesses following the violent dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins on August 14, 2013. In December, in an Asyut court 40 Morsi supporters were found guilty, while 61 others were acquitted.

Ian Black of the Guardian has followed the story, implying the inquiry is being leaned on by Gulf nations who have banned the MB.

Delay in its publication is attributed to their displeasure that the report clears the MB of terrorism.

Black quotes MB apologist Anas al-Tikriti, founder Director of the Cordoba Institute, who says Islamists like the MB must be seen as a middle ground in the fight against extremism. If allowed to govern, he says, they would liberalize and sideline their hardliners.

Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institute debunks this theory, saying Islamists only ever moderate their behaviour under duress. Once enjoying democratic freedoms, they tend to revert to their original illiberal religious conservatism.

Tikriti, whose father was in the Iraqi Brotherhood, recently denied on Twitter being a member or lobbyist of the MB.

Al-Jazeera however describe the Cordoba Foundation as a Brotherhood front. And the Hudson Institute, in a study of UK-based Islamism, calls him one of their shrewdest activists.

But Ibrahim Mouneer, an MB senior leader in London, told the Times that if the group were banned it would result in increased terrorism at home, with moderate Muslims concluding that an irenic approach didn’t work.

Lapido Media has argued this purported dichotomy between Islamism and jihadism is a false choice, and the government should not be gulled.

According to Andrew Gilligan of the Telegraph, the UK inquiry will confirm that the MB is not a terrorist group and should not therefore be banned.

And a British security source told Lapido they prefer to turn a more or less blind eye within the law, believing this offers opportunities for ‘influence’.

But Gilligan provides extensive evidence the group is linked – directly and indirectly – with terrorist groups, in particular with Hamas, and is at least potentially outside the law.

Cordoba Foundation is named by Gilligan as one of 25 groups with Muslim Brotherhood links. The Muslim Charities Forum is mentioned also.

A June report by the UAE based The National linked Takriti, his family, and associates also to the Middle East Eye and Middle East Monitor.

The Egyptian foreign ministry has asked in vain that London shut down UK based pro-MB satellite channels and newspapers like Alarabi, al-Hewar, and al-Araby al-Jadeed, saying they incite terrorist activity in Egypt.

The BBC has examined this growing media outreach that fails to promote impartial journalism, and is said to be funded by Qatar.

According to the Washington Post, this incitement is clear in the MB’s other haven abroad, Turkey. It says the Masr al-An channel, funded and managed by the MB, warned that the families of Egyptian police officers would be ‘widowed and orphaned’.

Other Turkey-based pro-MB channels like al-Sharq, Mukammilin and Rabaa employ similar rhetoric, and even allowed one MB supporter to issue a fatwa during a live interview to assassinate Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Others advocate the killing of media figures and warn foreigners to leave Egypt lest they become legitimate targets.

The fatwa caused uproar, leading the Brotherhood on its English language Twitter feed @IkhwanWeb to condemn it and deny endorsing the channel.

The call to kill Sisi was made to audible applause by grinning Egyptian cleric Salama Abd Al-Qawi who said: ‘Doing this would be a good deed that would bring (the killer) closer to Allah.’

Although Al-Qawi was official spokesman for the Endowments Ministry during the presidency of Morsi, it is hard to pin down his ‘membership’ in the Muslim Brotherhood.

The MB is a hierarchical organization with strict guidelines for who is in and who simply is like-minded. Those who are members follow policy. Others aid and cooperate. The MB does not publish its membership list.

Many MB self-identify. And the period in power gave the opportunity to see new faces emerge. But without an admissions policy, it is very difficult to identify ‘members’.

MB-watchers have not seen the sheikh identified either way. But clearly he is at least a supporter and often featured in their broadcasts.

On January 25 this year a delegation of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council and the so-called Parliament in Exile, including leading MB figures, visited Washington and met State Department and White House officials.

They asserted that the revolution was non-violent and the only way to undo the coup. The State Department had previously said Egypt had given it no evidence of MB links to terrorism.

Just two days later the MB released a statement urging its supporters to prepare for a long and uncompromising jihad, stopping just short of an outright call for violence.

Charl Fouad El-Masri, editor-in-chief of Egyptian daily al-Masry al-Youm said: ‘Egypt’s Copts suffered during the Muslim Brotherhood rule greatly.’

Anglican Bishop of Egypt Rt Revd Mouneer Hanna Anis had his Suez church attacked by pro-Morsi supporters following the dispersal of the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins in August 2013. He strongly suspects the MB to be behind Egyptian violence and terrorism.

‘They may not be directly involved in terrorist attacks,’ he told Lapido Media, ‘but they encouraged the flourishing of terrorist groups in Egypt.’

This article was originally published at Lapido Media, as a press briefing service.

Categories
Arab West Report Middle East Published Articles

World Cup Role Reversal

Watching the World Cup matches in Egypt has been an experience. Games here are 2:30, 5:00, and 9:30pm, so while some fall during working hours, others have been able to be viewed. I have made less of it than I would have liked, but so has Egypt, for a reason to be explained.

One reason that Egyptians are having a hard time getting excited about the World Cup is that so few games are on television. Al-Jazeera (yes, the al-Jazeera many Americans complain about for supposed anti-US bias) has an extensive sports network, and they have bought the rights to Arabic language World Cup broadcasts. They have worked out a deal with network Egyptian television to grant access to some of the games, but they are not contractually obliged to say which ones. Egyptians without the resources to shell out the cash for the al-Jazeera package (most) can only hope their favorite nations will be televised that night.

For me, without a television at all let alone al-Jazeera, this mean going to the trendy restaurants or coffee shops populating Maadi which can afford an al-Jazeera subscription. For the cost of a plate of French fries or desert (I hate buying drinks – water is the best thing for you and provided free by God), I get to watch whenever I choose.

Julie, I, and the girls went this afternoon to a favorite trendy restaurant and watched the compelling US comeback against Slovenia. For the evening’s game – England vs. Algeria – given that I was getting a little tired of French fries, though, I set out on my own in hope of finding a traditional Egyptian coffee shop that perhaps was carrying al-Jazeera. Fortunately, find it I did.

At 9:30pm the crowd was a bit sparse, but within the first five minutes of the game the patio of the coffee shop had filled with patrons, all interested in watching the match, given the presence of the lone Arab squad to qualify for the tournament.

Here is the twist, however. Most Egyptian soccer fans hate Algeria’s national team. Egypt and Algeria finished tied in their World Cup qualifying group, and Algeria won the subsequent playoff match. The matches, though, were accompanied by nationalist fervor which spilled out of the stadium into the lives of normal people. The Algerian team bus was pelted with stones and their embassy in Cairo needed to be protected by riot police. Egyptians in Algeria, meanwhile, were being assaulted and a large Egyptian telecom company suddenly, mysteriously, was assessed millions of dollars in back taxes. Though Algeria edged Egypt for World Cup participation, Egypt returned the favor and walloped Algeria in the African Nations Cup on their way to their third consecutive title. Some of these reflections can be read here, here, and here.

Needless to say, with Egypt missing from the tournament local fervor has been muted. Egyptians are still soccer-crazy, and love watching their favorite stars no matter who they play for. So whereas one might have expected an outpouring of Arab brotherhood support for Algeria in their match against England, understood as an American lackey supporting neo-colonialist enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was nary a cheer when Algeria came close to goal. Every English touch, however, brought on cheers of expectation. As Algeria, surprisingly, carried the run of play, the atmosphere was rather tense and subdued.

Again, oddly, though the only foreigner in the crowd, and a Western Christian at that, I was also the only supporter of Arab Muslim Algeria. I like England, generally, and though I have nothing against Algeria, I was disappointed to see them put Egypt out of the Cup. An Algeria win or draw, however, would better the chances to see the United States advance to the knockout stages of the World Cup, predicated on a victory over Algeria six days from now. My support was silent, but real. The 0-0 draw at the conclusion was not an indicative byline for what had been an enjoyable and competitive match, but was among the best results possible for US rooting interests.

The telling tale will come in six days. The United States will play Algeria with both teams needing a win to advance to the round of sixteen. America does not draw the vitriol of the Arabs currently as it did during the Bush administration, but President Obama is not meeting the high expectations he set for a change in US policy when he spoke in Cairo early in his presidency. Overall, the US image in Egypt remains poor.

Will Sam’s Army receive the brunt of this geopolitical frustration? In the Arab world at large I would put their chances at 50-50. There is a good and legitimate chance that Arab solidarity backs the Algerians with just a little extra mustard. Still, since the US is not dominant in soccer the national team does not generally suffer from a backlash, and Arabs are generally quite astute at separating their opinion of government from their estimation of a person, or in this case, team.

In Egypt, however, hopefully, the coffee shop crowd may be composed entirely of Yankees. During the founding of the Egyptian Republic in the 1950s President Nasser mesmerized the masses with cries for Arab nationalism. The children of his revolution now only imbibe the fumes of his vision, dashed upon the realities of World Cup qualifying. Politics, it is said, makes for strange bedfellows. Sport, it seems, can do the same.