Despite the deaths of more than 500 Muslim Brotherhood supporters and the resulting retaliation against Christian targets nationwide, Egypt’s Christian community stands with yesterday’s decision by the military-backed transitional government to break-up the pro-Morsi sit-ins.
“If a peaceful sit-in took place in Times Square and locked down the city, how long would it take American authorities to disperse it?” said Ramez Atallah, head of the Egyptian Bible Society. “The government spent six weeks trying to solve this crisis, and finally used force. What were the alternatives?”
Youssef Sidhom, editor-in-chief of Coptic newspaper Watani, explained why one alternative—to simply allow the protests to continue indefinitely—was not a better choice.
“If it had been a peaceful protest, we should leave it there. Have the army encircle it to prevent more weapons from entering, and wait for their morale to falter,” he said. “But the sit-in surrounded 20 to 30 high-rise apartment buildings, and the people had to submit to daily checks by the Muslim Brotherhood simply to go in and out of their neighborhood.
“They were terrorists, holding hostage thousands of residents.”
Please click here to read the full article at Christianity Today.
Dutch scholar Johannes Jansen contributed an essay – ‘The Religious Roots of Muslim Violence’ (opens in a Word document) – to a 2011 anthology entitled, ‘Terrorism: Ideology, Law, and Policy’. In it he makes the case that violence and terrorism are part and parcel of the Islamic religion, traceable to its root sources at every level of sharia construction. Jansen’s scouring of the sources is admirable, and he launches several challenges to an irenic understanding of Islam. Unfortunately, he gives short shrift to worthy counterarguments, instead presenting the reader conclusions deemed unassailable, established on the basis of his insight. While his insight is formidable, it is not conclusive. As a scholar he would do well to simply present both sides.
Johannes Jansen
That Jansen does not is unfortunate, since it bathes his text in a bias which obscures a viable link between violence and Islam. Desiring to damn Islam in its entirety, he allows a critic to dismiss his work given its failure to admit other interpretations. Jansen instead takes upon himself the role of mujtahid (one who interprets) and throws down the gauntlet as well as any extremist scholar or caller to jihad. The only difference lies in condemnation versus approval.
This text will first present the legitimate challenges marshaled by Jansen, then demonstrate some of the ways he overstates his case, and close with a selection of examples where his argumentation is simply faulty, and at times, dismissive. A serious scholar of Islam would do well to outright refute many of his judgments; this review will suffice to proceed from a generalist’s knowledge. The reader is encouraged to lend his or her own fruits of study.
Difficult Matters
Moving sequentially through the text of Jansen, the first example of a difficult challenge lies in the verse of 9:30 in the Qur’an. The reference is to the delusion of Jews and Christians in imagining that God could have a son. This idea is met with an anathema – ‘God fight them’. Jansen notes that such a verse would make friendly religious dialogue difficult between Muslims and Christians, knowing that such a curse is leveled in the text of the oft-supposed friendly partner.
Later Jansen accuses Islam of dehumanization of its enemies. In verse 5:60 God is said to have turned some Jews into monkeys and pigs. This accusation is often heard among Muslims when they chant against Israel, for example. Also in 8:55 unbelievers are labeled ‘the worst of all beasts’. Indeed, it is much easier to oppose and kill those who are not given respect for their humanity.
Jansen then moves to consider the life of the prophet, referring to 33:21 in which Muhammad is declared to be an ‘excellent pattern’ for those who hope in God. He then goes on to describe how
Muhammad and his men raided their neighbours, captured these, and sold them into slavery. Mohammed and his men robbed travellers and caravans, and assassinated critics of their behaviour. According to the Muslim sources themselves, Muhammad and his men migrated from Mecca to Medina, but once there they rewarded the inhabitants of Medina by killing a large number of them. These sources themselves report how Muhammad beheaded 700 Medinese Jews, on the flimsiest of excuses.
This text is noted here with a contempt that belies the objectivity of a scholar, and each of these incidents listed is able to receive an explanation from Muslim historians. Yet Jansen’s argument is listed in this section not for its specifics, but its reference to Muhammad as an ‘excellent pattern’. Putting aside Jansen’s bias, there are aspects of Muhammad’s life that offend modern sensibilities and morality. These are a worthy field to consider linkages between Islam and violence.
Throughout his text Jansen brings up many of the oft-cited references in the Qur’an to warfare, fighting, and killing. These will be dealt with conceptually in the next section. Yet it is interesting to note here a commendation given by the prominent Azhar University in Cairo for a definition of jihad found in an English language guide to sharia law, called ‘The Reliance of the Traveler’. Jihad is often defended, correctly, as first an internal struggle against the self. Yet here Jansen notes the reference declares
Jihad means to go to war against non-Muslims (…). The scriptural basis for jihad (…) is such Koranic verses as: (1) ‘Fighting is prescribed for you’ (Koran 2:216); (2) ‘Slay them wherever you find them’ (Koran 4:89); (3) ‘Fight the idolaters utterly’ (Koran 9:36); and such hadiths as the one related by Bukhari and Muslim that the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said ‘I have been commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’ (…) and the hadith reported by Muslim ‘To go forth in the morning or evening to fight in the path of Allah is better than the whole world and everything in it.’
The challenge is not necessarily in giving nuance to these verses, but the fact that as eminent and generally moderate an institution as the Azhar has endorsed this reading of jihad.
Contested Interpretations
It is noteworthy that in twenty pages of text Jansen is only able to bring the above arguments to bear that do not receive immediate pause, at least in the eyes of this reviewer. Far more numerous is the evidence he draws from Islam that does indeed ask fair questions of the religion, but then shields the reader from alternate viewpoints. Again, the summation will proceed sequentially.
Jansen begins his argument by stating the proscribed penalty for apostasy in Islamic sharia law is death. He does not demonstrate this factually, but refers to the aforementioned ‘Reliance of the Traveler’ and quotes from the Egyptian judge Muhammad al-Ghazali who testified the murder of accused apostate Farag Foda was only to be classified as an ‘offense’ under sharia.
Indeed, the standard Muslim judgment against apostasy is death, and the offense against human and religious rights is valid. Yet other scholars condemn this interpretation through a variety of forms. One method is to understand that during the time of the prophet, affiliation with Islam was akin to the modern concept of citizenship in a nation. Apostasy, then, is equated with treason – a crime punishable by death in many modern nations. Given that this relationship no longer applies, apostasy in the contemporary sense does not merit death.
Another path of diffusing the absolutism of apostasy punishments is to recall Muhammad dealt with apostates from Islam during his life, and did not order universally their execution. Listing these two critiques does not infer the validity of textual and historical exegesis; this is a matter for Muslim scholars to decide. Rather, the point is simply to note their existence, even if a minority interpretation. Jansen fails to do so.
Jansen then critiques what he understands to be an undue Western sympathy for Islam, given that many have accepted the idea of religion as an expression of the Golden Rule. This is faulty, he argues, bringing 48:29 as evidence: ‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, those with him are violent (ashiddaa’) against unbelievers, compassionate amongst themselves.’ (Richard Bell’s translation)
The issue of translation in Islam is very tricky, and certain Muslim authored ‘interpretations’ of the Qur’an into English cover over issues which might offend Western sensibilities. Here, however, Jansen chooses a translation that makes his point but overstates his case. Ashiddaa’ can also be rendered as severe, strong, harsh, or powerful, though violent is possible. A more direct word for violent – ‘aneef – is not employed.
Even so, the double standard certainly betrays the essence of the Golden Rule, which is Jansen’s overall point. Yet he could have maintained this tension, identifying a source text which Muslim violence can summon, while also quoting from 3:159, ‘By the mercy of God, you dealt with them gently. And had you been severe and harsh-hearted, they would have ran away from about you; so pass over (their faults), and ask (God’s) forgiveness for them.’ This text refers to Muhammad’s dealings with a man who had killed many Muslims. When apprehended, he was treated as a guest, fed, and freed. Such treatment accords also with a hadith in which Muhammad declared, ‘He who is not merciful to others, will not be treated mercifully’ (Muslim 73:42).
Again, these examples do not undo the double standard given by Jansen, but they keep the reader from assuming Islam to be only as he describes. Jansen would have done well to provide them.
Jansen then moves into the controversial Qur’anic verses which either order Muslims to kill (2:191, 4:89, 4:91, 9:5) or to fight (2:10, 2:216, 4:74, 9:119) the unbelievers. He refers to the well known commentary of al-Jalalayn to confirm the violent nature of these verses. Next he heads off a predictable rebuttal by 2:256: ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’, and 109:5: ‘You have your religion and I have mine’, by bringing in the concept of abrogation. Islam commonly understands that verses revealed later void the application of earlier revelation. He states,
All standard and authoritative Muslim commentaries on the Koran, without exception, hold these two peaceful and reassuring fragments to be repealed and ‘abrogated’ by the later ‘verse of the sword’, Koran 9:5.
Having established the permissibility of fighting and killing unbelievers, Jansen seeks to establish two pernicious modern applications: Assassination and terrorism. Concerning the former he refers to 5:44 in which a leader who does not apply the laws God provided is labelled an unbeliever. Since he is from the community of believers, he is therefore an apostate, and as such, worthy of death. Jansen refers to the ancient commentator Ibn Kathir, the modern ideologue Sayyid Qutb, and contemporary preacher Sheikh Abdel Hamid Kishk of Egypt.
As per terrorism, he references 8:60 in which Muslims are commanded to ‘terrorize’ the enemy. He then returns to the Azhar to refute the idea this was only a concept to be employed during history. The former head of the Azhar, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, is quoted in his commentary stating the verses apply ‘first of all [to] the pagans of Mecca’. ‘First of all’, Jansen argues, signifies the beginning of a longstanding and commanded practice.
The seed to nuance these perspectives is provided by Jansen himself. He quotes a 1968 gathering of Cairo scholars to state 8:60 is equivalent to the Roman maxim, ‘If you wish for peace, prepare for war.’ Jansen even says, ‘They may be right.’
Whether they are right or not is worthy for debate, but though Jansen proceeds to provide what he calls ‘the standard Muslim denial and defense’ (to be given in the next section), he does not return to this very basic explanation. Muhammad began his ministry by calling to a religion, but the interpretation is clearly possible that he ended it by establishing a state. Commands to fight and kill, then, can be understood as a civil action akin to modern warfare. Even modern warfare can be condemned, and the including of religion complicates the matter considerably. Nevertheless, these verses can be understood as combat, and not as inquisition.
Furthermore, many Islamic scholars state that warfare is the domain of the state alone, which must abide by numerous regulations, including the duty to keep peace with a non-Muslim who does not oppose you. Therefore, while in war it is common practice to ‘terrorize’ the enemy through ‘shock and awe’, for example, this is legitimate only through proper and regulated channels, not through individual action.
Individual or small group action is also associated with assassination attempts. Muslim scholars need to, and have, refuted the interpretation of 5:44 as a call to kill a less-than-faithful Muslim leader. First of all the clear context of the verse applies to Jewish leaders who failed to apply the Torah. Jansen notes this, but calls again upon Kishk to argue that if true for Jews how much more true for Muslims, who have been given sharia law by which to govern. Yet the bulk of Sunni Muslim history has held that a ruler is to be obeyed and Muslims must not declare each other to be infidels, unless such unbelief is clearly advertised. Such assassination attempts, they warn, threaten to return Islam to its early days when extremist groups tore the community apart. This minority reading has now returned with an equal threat. The legitimacy of interpretation is for Muslims to decide, but Jansen makes no reference to where the burden of proof lies, or even that a burden against his argument exists.
The same critique applies to his statements about abrogation. Where he declares that all commentators agree about verses of the sword abrogating verses of tolerance, it would be well to check his sources. That the verses of the sword are later in timeframe than verses of tolerance is not disputed, but the issue of abrogation is not at all clear. Some scholars find only a handful of verses in the Qur’an to be abrogated, others find large swaths of its content. It is simply not true that a uniform opinion on abrogation exists in Islam, though as a concept it is accepted. Application, however, is disputed, which is a fact Jansen does not simply ignore, he obfuscates.
Last to be considered briefly is the extension of the argument to the individual Muslim. Given that jihad is a duty to be carried out in warfare, and furthermore that since the Islamic caliphate no longer exists, it is now incumbent on smaller associations to further this cause. Jansen describes how this has happened without providing rationale why it is Islamically necessary to happen.
Still, he quotes prominent scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi who states concerning suicide operations: ‘The one who carries out a martyrdom operation does not think of himself. He sells himself to Allah in order to buy Paradise in exchange.’ While this opinion should be studied in context, it appears Qaradawi describes the rationale of the martyrdom-seeker, and does not clearly provide license for his interpretation.
Failures in Argumentation
While sections one and two acknowledge the excellent, if insufficient, study Jansen has given to the Islamic sources, this final section highlights some of the ways in which he betrays his own effort. While only a few examples represent error, there are quite a few statements overvaluing his contribution. These will be followed by an unhealthy number of examples carrying a regrettable dismissive attitude toward opposing views.
Some of the errors are actually misleading use of rhetoric. For example Jansen notes how the fact of death for an apostate acts as a disincentive to advertise one’s disbelief in Islam. While certainly correct, he proceeds to state, ‘All statistics on the number of Muslims in a region or period [are] unreliable.’ With this broad stroke he renders meaningless the work of professional statisticians upon the assumption that Muslims everywhere hold to their faith out of fear of death. Unfortunately, Jansen offers no evidence to buttress this assumption.
Similar is the critique he levels at scholars and politicians for not understanding the essential violent nature of Islam. Were this properly comprehended, they would have prevented Muslims from ‘invading’ their countries. The word invade infers an organized plan, while overlooking the demographic fact that most Muslims in Europe, at least, originally were recruited to serve in low wage service industries to compensate for a relatively low continental population growth. Their increase in population share is a serious issue for European politicians today, but to label their presence an invasion is an ugly, if not deliberate, rhetorical error.
This may be true as well for Jansen’s denigration of the Qur’an for labeling Jews as ‘pigs’. A careful look at 5:60 shows God turned some Jews into apes and pigs, yet Jansen goes on to say:
It is clear that an enemy about whom Islam teaches that God himself calls him an ape, a donkey, a swine, a dog or just an animal, has no human rights. It is only proper to terrorize such subhuman unpersons.
This example leads well into a number of instances where Jansen establishes a point through the force of his own insistence. Is it indeed ‘clear’ that ‘it is only proper’ to mistreat the above mentioned groups? Is there no other possible recourse in all of Islam? Does logic dictate the necessity of agreement with Jansen’s pronouncements?
Elsewhere Jansen states, without reference to studies or statistics, that ‘large numbers’ of Muslims believe specific war passages in the Qur’an are meant to be generalized. Furthermore, it is ‘widely understood’ that Islam teaches to kill unbelievers if the cost is not too great for the Muslim community. Of course, ‘Muslims believe that outsiders hate Islam,’ which, ‘can only be understood as echoes of the fear and distrust Muslims themselves harbour against the adherents of other religions.’ The proof? ‘Printed testimonies from within the Muslim world abundantly illustrate that in general Muslims (with individual exceptions, one hopes) distrust and hate the West.
Jansen’s parenthesis in the previous example illustrates more than just his overstatements, it also reveals his dismissive bias. ‘One hopes’ there are Muslims who do not hate the West? With how many has he spoken, that he sees this as such an impossibility?
Further sarcasm is seen when he posits the chance that what is understood as terrorism is actually to be regarded as legitimate resistance. He says:
This needs to be researched seriously and extensively. Such research should definitely not be omitted or be neglected, no matter how enormous the task will be. It would be a huge project indeed, stretching out from Northern Nigeria to Chechnya, from the Darfur to East-Timor and Bali, and from Madrid, Amsterdam, Berlin, Paris and London to New York.
His highlight on ‘extensively’ is made moot through listing the sites of recent terrorist activity. As before, Jansen’s research is far too serious to utilize such mocking claims. He is not finished, however.
After listing the many verses which demonstrate the Qur’an’s instructions to fight and kill, Jansen exasperates, ‘Someone who is not convinced by these verses will not be convinced by more or even much more of the same.’ Furthermore, Muslims who seek to present an alternate interpretation of their faith by emphasizing verses of tolerance ‘forget to explain’ these have been abrogated.
Failing to recognize their effort as legitimate apologetics, Jansen proceeds to give what he calls the ‘standard Muslim denial and defence’ of their religion – in all its flimsiness. The first is to state that only perfect Arabic speakers can interpret the Qur’an, and that it is Western hatred which drives their criticism. The second is to dismiss the statements of clerical leaders, as these do not represent the people. The third and final technique is to ridicule Westerners who rely on the statements of misinformed young men involved in terrorism.
Jansen admits there is merit behind these defenses, but are they the only ones? Written by a non-Muslim, this text has presented numerous challenges to Jansen’s interpretations. Are none of these worthy to be found in the writings of ‘standard’ Muslim apologists? Jansen builds a straw man, and delights in knocking him down.
Conclusion
Much Western opinion of Islam is divided into two camps. One side finds the religion to be peaceful in essence despite misinformed extremists. The other finds the religion to be violent in essence despite the masses of ordinary Muslims who do not sufficiently understand their faith. As with most dichotomies, reality is often found in the middle.
Though Jansen places himself among the scholars of the second grouping, this text does not fault his essential questions. It is clear that there are violent source texts and examples within Islam. Yet it is also clear there is an impetus toward peace and tolerance. It is right and just for both Muslims and non-Muslims to interpret sources to determine what is the core of Islam.
The fault of Jansen lies in his failure to nuance his argument. His was not a short magazine article; it was a twenty page thesis. There was ample room to both display his conviction about a violent norm and present significant Muslim counterarguments.
His failure to do so is odd given his conviction. If Islam is essentially violent, would Jansen not wish to highlight and promote the many Muslims who seek to ground their faith on a foundation of peace? Are all who do so deceivers, wishing to delude the West to their true intentions? Can there not be validity to their wholly Islamic arguments?
This last question is the essential one. The crux of the issue is not the academic exegesis of Islam, however worthy. It is the social and cultural acceptance of interpretation that must speak to the hearts of Muslims the world over. Will violent verses be found anachronistic in the modern age, or will they define a coming renewed civilizational struggle? It is only within Islam, among Muslims, this answer can be found. Alternate viewpoints are rife, and often in competition.
Jansen may be able to demonstrate the weight of evidence – both in historic sharia understanding and in popular consciousness – lies with violent and jihadist Islam. What he will be unable to accomplish is to demonstrate this interpretation is correct. Islam is first and foremost a religion, and religions, while possessing vast storehouses of conserving tradition, are also adept at drawing from these storehouses to adapt according to the realities of the age. It is as wrong to state that Islam will adapt peacefully as it is to assert it will not. That adaptation is possible, however, is a demonstrated historical fact.
Islam, particularly in its Arab context, is before a potentially great adaptation from Morocco to the Gulf, as the masses demonstrate a desire to shed their current leadership. Whether or not the Arab Spring represents conflict or cooperation with the West is an open question. Prominent among the determining factors will be the emerging interpretation of Islam. Jansen is right to ask his questions; the answers are not nearly as fated as he assumes.
This essay was first published in Arab West Report in February 2012.
From my article at Middle East Institute, analyzing Egypt’s Salafi-Jihadis, but from before the recent deposing of President Morsi:
The Egyptian Islamist Mohamed al-Zawahiri is most famous for being the brother of al-Qaeda front man Ayman, but his story is also a gripping one. Zawahiri was arrested in 1999 for his alleged participation in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. He spent 13 years in Cairo’s Tora prison, where he was tortured by the mukhabarat and did a five-year stint in solitary confinement. He was released in March 2012 when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, who ruled after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, issued a general pardon for scores of political prisoners.
Just six months later, Zawahiri sent a message of peace when he offered to mediate a truce between the West and Islamists through his connections with al-Qaeda, promising cessation of global terrorist activity in exchange for non-interference in Muslim nations.
But Zawahiri’s doings aren’t limited to such an offer. As a leader of an Islamist organization called the Salafist-Jihadists, he is often in the public eye. Yet it is difficult to determine who he leads and what ideology the group espouses—and whether the United States and others should worry about the organization’s activities in post-uprising Egypt.
The group appears to thrive on such ambiguity. Ahmed Ashoush, a fellow leader, claims that the organization does not, in a sense, exist, as it has neither a leadership structure nor a membership count. “We know how wide our support is on the street,” he says, “but we don’t want to talk about it. We want you to see it, in the coming days, if God wills.”
As of yet, Egypt has not seen it. And as strong as the demonstrations in support of Morsi have been, they are far short of the ‘Islamic Revolution’ some predicted as a response to the Rebel Campaign collection of signatures for early elections.
Even so, this group of Islamists who graft ‘jihad’ onto their name bear watching for Egypt’s future. Please click here to read the rest of the article at Middle East Institute.
For Part One of this conversation, discussing Hani Nour Eddin’s background, please click here. For the full interview on Middle East Institute, please click here. Part Two explores Nour Eddin’s views on violence, and here is an excerpt from the published interview:
Al-Gama`a al-Islamiya is committed to nonviolence and has apologized for its past. In fact, you organized a demonstration recently to condemn political violence.
We saw that others had taken over the streets and were now using them to express their views. People might thinkthat they are the voice of Egypt. We wanted to say that the Egyptian street is not about violence and sexual harassment. Unfortunately, beautiful Tahrir Square has lost its symbolism. So we [demonstrated in] another place to avoid any contact with them. Our demonstration invited all to come and express their opinions, whether for or against the Islamist project, but with a commitment to nonviolence.
I noticed many of the speeches and chants were very Islamic, and quite severe. Instead of “no to violence,” the demonstration became about “yes to political Islam.”
Our demonstrations often take the color of the people who attend. Maybe this is because of our weakness in usingthe media; we use a strident voice to make our point and show we are strong. We are Islamists, and we do not accept separating religion from anything else, and the street welcomes this. And so they chant, “Egypt will remain Islamic!”
The protest also honored Khaled al-Islambouli [Sadat’s assassin].
Islambouli is considered one of the symbols of al-Gama`a al-Islamiya when it was in a period of resistance to the regime. We all saw Sadat as a dictator, especially in his last years when he used oppression and closed mosques. Islambouli has an honored place among us.
Even if you now confess that what he did was wrong.
If we could go back in history and reevaluate, perhaps we would not have chosen the path of violence. But what happened was necessary due to the situation. Unfortunately, the circumstances demanded it.
But this is the test of your principles. If nonviolence is a principle—not a means, not a strategy—you must commit to it.
Yes, this is right. It is a principle.
Unfortunately, for space issues Middle East Institute had to cut the conclusion, which seeks to test their commitment to non-violence through recent domestic and international examples. This part is posted here:
A few weeks earlier than your ‘No to Political Violence’ protest, Mohamed al-Zawahiri demonstrated at the French Embassy in Cairo against their military intervention in Mali. There, Ezzet al-Salamony, a leader in GI, spoke saying, “Why are they fighting us in our lands? It is we who should be fighting them in our lands!”
There are two issues here: One, Islamist support for the rebels in Mali, and two, the statement of Salamony itself. Do these violate your non-violent commitment?
I see what you’re saying. From what I know GI has abandoned violence and we will not return to it. We also agree we will not interfere in the politics of other nations. But as for that statement, he is the one responsible for it, and must justify himself.
Ok, but tell us about Mali, especially before the French intervention. Do you support the rebels from the north?
To a degree, but we do not have complete information about the nature of the Mali jihadists. Their primary slogan is the application of sharia law and building an Islamic state on the basis of it. Their situation is different; to what extent is there democracy or other means of change? We don’t know.
But we support the idea of an Islamic entity if it is true they are committed to Islam. At times some people will raise the banner of Islam but transgress it in how they behave. But yes, if they live as Muslims and seek to apply the sharia, yes, we support them.
But for the real situation between them and the Malian government, we don’t know.
But should you not condemn their jihad, as it is violent? Even if it is true the political system has not opened up the way it has in Egypt?
Again, we can’t evaluate their experience in jihad because we don’t know enough.
But you don’t know? It is clear to the world their rebellion is armed. They were marching on the Malian capital.
In the beginning it was not like this. They were a number of jihadi groups that gathered together and the government confronted them, but they began expanding their territory and announced themselves as a political entity.
But even this, expanding their territory in the north was at the expense of the legitimacy of the government. What gave them the right to seek autonomy or declare independence?
Yes, but their situation is different from that of Egypt.
But this is the point, we’re talking about a principle. In Egypt there is no necessity for violence – you have won by votes. But there the Islamist is in a position of weakness. Perhaps he is even suffering pressure. Is he allowed to resist violently?
(Laughing) I cannot condemn them before I know the circumstances which drove them to violence. Maybe it is violence in response to a greater violence upon them. What if my life or existence is threatened and there is no other way? But rebelling against a leader by forming militias? No, we must expend all peaceful and preaching means first, before resorting to violence.
Before? But your ‘Revisions’ were a complete condemnation.
The issue of jihad in Islam is legitimate, but it is not something to begin with. In our ‘Revisions’ we defined that jihad has stipulations that prevent it from resulting in even greater harm upon the people, the sharia, and the country. The jurisprudence in measuring jihad in Mali is different than the measure in Egypt.
But how can their situation be seen as worse than what you experienced here? There was a tyrant in Egypt, he oppressed you, he put you in prison, he killed you. He distorted the sharia and laughed about it. And even under all this pressure you condemned your own violent confrontation.
Because it did not result in any fruit.
So forgive me if this isn’t the right word, but does this show your condemnation of violence was opportunistic? You made a deduction violence is not working, so you give it up. You still believe in violence as a possible means of change.
No, in the reality in which we live it is not a means of change.
But maybe it is in Mali?
It depends on their circumstances; we cannot judge them.
So your commitment to violence…
We commit ourselves. We cannot compel others to be so committed.
So it is not a general interpretation of Islam. It is just your situation?
Jihad is legitimate in Islam; no one can deny this. The question is if you are engaged in it legitimately according to its stipulations.
So what are the domestic stipulations for jihad? The one in Mali is against the ruler.
Will our scholars permit their action? I don’t know. It depends on the type of ruler; it depends on the struggle between him and the various Islamic groups. I don’t have enough information to say.
Ok. Sudan.
Our party sent a delegation to Sudan shortly after it was created, to establish relations. We consider Sudan to be deeply important to Egypt, economically, socially.
What about the status of President Bashir as an international criminal?
No, there are other factors at play in these accusations. We don’t believe the government is complicated in any criminality.
So in a sentence, how do you understand what is happening in Darfur?
It began as a local tribal conflict, and then the government intervened. After that it became somewhat of a separatist movement. It was necessary for the state to preserve its authority.
As in Mali?
(Laughing) For example.
Please click here to read the whole article at Middle East Institute.
A few months ago, before President Morsi was deposed, I had the chance to interview Hani Nour el-Din, a member of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya who was elected to the most recent parliament. His group is still considered a terrorist organization by the United States, but they formally gave up violence as a doctrinal strategy in the early 2000s.
This fact – indeed question – is very important now that Islamists find themselves outside the political spectrum. They gave up violence at a time when there was still no means to enter Egyptian politics. The revolution opened up political space, but now it appears closed. Will the group decide they made a mistake – that the only way to transform Egypt into a political state is through a violent seizing of power?
This is a very necessary question to put to al-Gama’a al-Islamiya now. But in the meanwhile, here is a window into the group’s thinking while they were on the winning side.
The interview was reduced and published by the Middle East Institute. Please click here to read the article.
But here on the blog I will post parts of the interview that had to be trimmed for space. Part One here will concern Nour Eddin’s personal history before his group gave up violence. Part Two, in a few days, will concern his views on violence, whether or not the party truly has abandoned the principle. Please enjoy.
Please introduce yourself to us:
My name is Hany Nour Eddin and I represent the Building and Development Party and serve on its high council, and was a member of parliament in 2011 before it was dissolved. I got to know IG in university, when I joined it and engaged in a number of student activities and preaching campaigns. After university I was arrested and spent many years in prison. This is where I became better acquainted with the group’s leadership.
I have read about this experience, and you maintain your innocence. What happened during this clash with police?
Here in Suez we were giving lectures in opposition to Hosni Mubarak and his remaining in the presidency. It was around 1993 and the GI organized a campaign called ‘No to Mubarak’. The state line was to forbid any opposition to the renewal of his presidency. We organized a large exhibition against him and spoke about the damage he was doing to the country, whether politically, economically, or otherwise. So he gave the order to security to stop the campaign, and to do so forcefully.
A large number of police arrived and we understood we needed to withdraw, but were surprised at the gunfire that began as we were doing so. One the bullets struck an officer accidentally, and a campaign was launched against us accusing us of killing him.
Who did kill him?
Someone from security, as the bullet hit him from behind. Part of their tactic was to disperse the crowd with gunfire, but he was hit from close range. Afterwards we all started getting arrested.
What was your role in GI at this time? Did you organize the exhibition?
Yes, I supervised it, collecting pictures and articles to help educate the people. The level of arrests practically stopped the work of GI in Suez, except for taking care of the families of those incarcerated.
So if you were imprisoned unjustly, why were you released later on?
When we were arrested they wanted to dissolve the Islamist movements, and especially our operations, targeting even our preachers. A violent clash took place between us and the police which became an armed struggle, targeting leaders on both sides, including Mubarak himself on many occasions.
By 1974 we realized the struggle was shedding the blood of the nation in general, and not just of the GI. We wanted to overthrow the state, but our violence was met by greater violence by the regime. We considered that we were defending ourselves, but it resulted in oppression and hostility, which reached even our families and relatives. It was not good.
So we undertook a campaign in the prisons, suggesting a unilateral cease-fire, stopping all violence against the regime, both inside and outside Egypt. It is important to note the whole time, even from outside, we targeted only Egypt and were working on its behalf alone. This is opposed to al-Qaeda, for example; we specified our conflict and goals were only against the regime. By 1979 we launched the non-violent initiative officially, opposing all violence against the regime, whether in the media or with weapons.
For a period of time we tried to send this message to GI members internationally, while we waited for a response from the government. Unfortunately the regime did many things to undermine our credibility, representing us falsely. But by 2000-01 they accepted the initiative. We published our ‘Revisions’, publicizing them first in the prisons and then internationally. They began releasing us from the prisons, and I got out in 2005.
So you found normal work to do?
Yes, after the necessary legal procedures, I returned to my job in the Suez Canal Company. I have a BA in Agriculture but my work with them is administrative.
But you have the time to take off work and talk to me today?
(Laughing) Yes, it’s normal, it’s ok.
So from 2005 until the revolution, what were you doing for GI?
We chose to work in preaching, rather than in organization. We would meet in mosques, talk to the people, and engage in social work – helping the poor, the orphans.
Were you a preacher in the mosque?
Sometimes, but not much. I served on the Shura Council of the GI in our governorate.
Served? But not any more?
Since we started the political party it has taken my priority and I left the Shura Council. Politics is different than preaching and social work. But we agreed to keep the party as the political arm of the GI for about two years until its administration is complete and mature. Then it will become independent, and when the appropriate laws are passed the GI will register legally also.
Please click here to continue reading the interview at Middle East Institute.
From my recent article at Christian Century. It walks through the transition which brought Morsi to power and thereafter deposed him. Here is an excerpt from the conclusion, focusing on the position of Christians:
As for the nation’s Christians, they view the military intervention as salvation. Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros, who had pledged upon his ascension to the papacy to stay out of politics, appeared side by side with Egypt’s chief Muslim leader to back the move. Protestants appreciated this as a public signal of Christian equality, while the Anglican bishop rejoiced Egypt was now free of the ‘repressive rule’ of the Brotherhood.
But are such public celebrations wisdom? In the fluid chaos of Egypt’s transition, who is to say the situation will not flip again? Copts are very careful to align with the nation’s moderate Muslims; dare they align with an extra-constitutional putsch against a large swath of religiously conservative neighbors? As citizens they are free, but as an ever-vulnerable religious minority will they find sufficient protection in the army and a hopeful emerging civil democratic order?
Perhaps they have no choice. Perhaps they see more clearly than anyone the issues at stake under Islamist rule. Only a year and a half earlier they suffered their greatest massacre at the hands of the army, when a Coptic protest was crushed under military tanks. Still, they took refuge.
This is the same question now faced by Egyptians as a whole, and as such the transition becomes more of a revolution proper. Islamist or civil; religious or secular – inasmuch as these are false dichotomies they also represent the current struggle. All that is lacking for a true revolution is violence; for the sake of Muslims and Christians together, may this development not come to pass.
Please click here to read the whole article at Christian Century.
From my article in Christianity Today, published July 9, describing both Christians and Muslims killed in a worrisome escalation of violence. But this excerpt concerns another matter for Christians in particular: Should they have joined the revolt in the first place, on Biblical grounds?
Bishop Mouneer also called the [military] action an answer to prayer, which raises certain theological questions. In Romans 13 Paul writes that Christians are to be subject to the governing authorities. Does Christian participation in a popular uprising strain this interpretation?
“The leader must support human rights,” said Bishop Marcos. “Because Morsi did not it was acceptable to work against him.”
A more nuanced position is articulated by Rev. Emad Mikhail, president of the Alexandria School of Theology.
“The Bible in the first century does not address the situation of free expression as we have in many places today,” he said. “There was no voting and no means to change the system except through violent action.
“If we vote out a president [as in modern elections] this is not understood to violate Romans 13. I consider peaceful demonstrations to be like a vote.”
Please click here to read the whole article at Christianity Today.
When push comes to shove, as it has in Egypt, who should American Christians support? The recent military move to oust an elected president was almost universally backed by Egyptian Coptic Christians, which make up roughly ten percent of the population. But the move, called by many a military coup, also violates our profound democratic sensibilities. With forty-two dead today at the hands of the army – which claims it was attacked first by armed terrorists – basic issues of humanity are also in play.
‘Our citizenship is in heaven,’ writes the apostle Paul, seemingly elevating our Christian brotherhood above national ties or ideological convictions. But, he writes elsewhere, ‘Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.’
President Muhammad Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, was removed from office on July 3 following massive protests against his rule. The proximity to America’s Independence Day only heightens the tension of this question, demanding an introspection we are often loathe to consider. Before we sit in judgment on Egypt, was our own revolution contrary to God’s teaching?
But does not the Bible also demand a commitment to justice and solidarity with the rights of the oppressed? Certainly, and Egyptian Christians would be quick to assert the necessity of the putsch, not just for their own cause, but for millions of Egyptian Muslims beside.
The article then summarizes the situation in Egypt, and concludes:
Perhaps the most important question is this: No matter their fears, would aggrieved non-Islamists have done better to work within the system, no matter how flawed?
This last question is of political strategy, and Egypt’s Christians have clearly answered ‘no’. What now of American Christians?
It is important to note that American democracy – though also flawed for much of our history – has peacefully rotated power for over two centuries. Egypt is still trying to find its feet after a revolution. The American constitution, after all, followed thirteen years after independence.
Egypt currently is a political mess; within chaos, minorities are vulnerable. Christians have been used by all sides as a talking point. Liberals highlight their difficulties, the Muslim Brotherhood pays lip service to their equality, Islamist allies scapegoat them in conspiracies, and the old regime propaganda – ever present – erects the extremist boogeyman to maintain order.
Within this picture, American Christians have little to identify with. Our two options mirror our dual identity: As Americans, esteem the democracy; as Christians, condemn the persecution. Unfortunately, neither option correctly describes Egypt. Either one is a false choice.
What then, is the Biblical choice? Consider these words of Paul, perhaps to balance his advice given above: ‘But everything exposed by the light becomes visible, for it is light that makes everything visible. This is why it is said: “Wake up, O sleeper, rise from the dead, and Christ will shine on you.”’
The American Christian responsibility is not to take sides, nor to assert abstract principles. It is to find out what is happening, and support the light.
Whether through influence in Washington, or through influence in prayer, American Christian hope must be that Egypt will rise from the dead.
Does this latest episode help or hinder? Make Egypt visible, and then judge accordingly.
Please click here to read the whole article at Relevant Magazine.
Frustrated Egyptians will take to the streets June 30, on the one year anniversary of President Morsi’s inauguration. Dubbed the ‘Rebellion Campaign’, the grassroots movement announced the collection of fifteen million signatures to depose the president and demand early elections.
“The situation in Egypt is very serious,” wrote Bishop Mouneer Hanna of the Anglican Diocese of Egypt. “I do not know where this situation will take us. I feel that Egypt is at the verge of violent demonstrations, another revolution, or civil war.”
‘Rebellion’ organizers pledged their demonstrations will be non-violent, but Muslim Brotherhood leaders warn a violent turn – perhaps organized by supporters of the former regime – will undue the successes of the Egyptian revolution. Yet they insist on holding counter-demonstrations in advance of June 30, setting the stage for clashes between the two sides.
Please click here to read the full (brief) article on Christianity Today.
Among the difficulties in assessing the news of Egypt is the Cairo-centrism of journalism. A problem plaguing the nation in general, all major newspapers operate from the capital attracting the best talent away from other regions in search of promotions and a better life. Quality of information suffers; many newspapers simply investigate local developments through phone calls.
Finding a well-connected regional Egyptian journalist, therefore, is a contact to be treasured. On a recent visit to Upper Egypt Arab West Report met Mamduh Sarur, who appears to fit the bill.
Our conversation centered on the presence and nature of Islamic movements in the region:
Sarur confirms the existence of organized, trained groups of young men connected to the Islamist movements, especially al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya. In the opposition media these are often labeled ‘militias’, which Islamist consistently deny having. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya prefers to call them ‘popular committees’ using the terminology applied to each neighborhood in Egypt when they self-organized after the police vanished from the streets on January 28, 2011, during the revolution.
With his own eyes Sarur states to have seen these groups brandishing swords as they paraded through the streets. But he insists the Islamist leadership is practical and often floats test balloons before enacting their agenda. This is one of them, and reflects coordination between different Islamist organs.
Here is an example:
The talk of coordination between Islamist groups, therefore, requires nuance to see the divisions within that are either exploited by the Brotherhood or else a result of their charade. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya, for example, ran against the Brotherhood in alliance with the Nour Party during parliamentary elections. But Sarur asked, who funded al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya’s political arm – the Building and Development Party – in their campaign? Unlike the relatively wealthy Brotherhood, al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya leadership spent their years in prison, and upon release were continually harassed by security. The answer, he stated, was simple: Funding came from Brotherhood sources.
The mastermind is Brotherhood deputy guide and chief financier Khairat al-Shater. He plays the Islamist movements like chess pieces, moving different agents about in order to keep his organization above the fray. Hazim Abu Isma’il, for example, ostensibly operated independently as he led efforts to besiege Media Production City in protest of the opposition media. In reality they work closely together, and Abu Isma’il’s father was a Muslim Brotherhood stalwart. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya, meanwhile, took the lead in protesting against judges, and in particular the High Constitutional Court. As this activity damaged the reputation of their political arm, Asem Abd al-Majed recently resigned from the Building and Development Party in order to operate ‘independently’ against the counter-revolution. Sarur fully expects him to be appointed by Mursi to some government position in due time.
And here is what appears to be a more sinister example:
But one of the darker sides of Islamist symbiosis, if not coordination, concerns the economic pressures placed on the Copts. Many of the criminal, thug, and arms dealing elements in Upper Egypt come from the now-settled Bedouins as opposed to the traditional agricultural Egyptians of the Nile, Sarur explained. But al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya has a relationship with them. When a thug comes and illegally appropriates Coptic land, the owner will go to al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya because he knows they can solve the issue – as opposed to going to the police or the courts, which will take forever with uncertain outcome. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya takes a percentage of the land or a sum of money for their ‘mediation’, but there is not much else the set upon Copt can do.
Please click here to read the whole article at Arab West Report.
From my recent article at Arab West Report, an extensive, interview-based effort into the diversity of Coptic activist movements:
One of the distinguishing sub-themes of the Egyptian revolution which began on January 25, 2011, has been the proliferation of Coptic movements. Largely, though not entirely, contained in the church during the Mubarak era, Christian Egyptians joined their Muslim counterparts as ‘one hand’ to challenge the authority for the sake of ‘freedom, bread, and social justice’. After successfully deposing the president, many of these Christian Egyptians continued their revolutionary posture.
For years Copts presented their demands to the state primarily through the person of Pope Shenouda. When pressed to demonstrate for their demands, either by events or by clergy, they did so mostly within the confines of church walls. The revolution changed this equation, however, and the unity expressed in overthrowing Mubarak gave Copts a new sense of participation in rebuilding Egypt.
Some Christian participation remained along the lines of revolutionary values, enveloped fully in the youth movements that populated Tahrir Square. Others began sensing a threat to their full participation from the emergence and ascendency of Islamists groups, and rallied behind a liberal and civil cause.
Still others took the opportunities of the revolution to organize and demonstrate for particular Coptic issues. Though there is significant overlap between Coptic demands and those for a civil state, these movements are characterized by Coptic peculiarity, even though many boast the participation of Muslims, who tend to be liberal in outlook. This category is shaped by a desire for Copts to assert their rights as Copts, leaving the church to take to the street and integrate with society.
Yet as they do so they highlight the tensions of religious identity. Insisting upon their right as citizens to demonstrate, they move beyond citizenship and appear to many as sectarian. Conscious to defeat this charge, Coptic movements stress their belonging to Egypt, and their work on its behalf. The question is fair if they do more harm than good, but this question may miss the point if indeed, as they claim, it is equality they seek. When pursuing that which is right, popular reception is a secondary concern.
This paper seeks to analyze in particular the Coptic movements which adopt Coptic issues. It will discuss the pre-revolutionary history of Coptic activism, trace its development after the fall of Mubarak, and continue to the present with the current attempt to gather these movements together in what is called the Coptic Consultative Council.
The paper will then provide a map of these movements along with the names of key participants to the extent that current research allows. Then it will profile of a limited number of these groups, describing their leadership structure and spheres of activity. Finally, it will examine the questions of foreign funding and interference.
From the conclusion:
In closing, two remarks from the interviewees are useful. Sameh Saad stated the normal person works to earn a living and then goes home to enjoy his family and rest. The activist, meanwhile, sacrifices from his personal life in order to achieve success in a larger cause.
Similarly, Ehab Aziz stated that no one will give you your rights while you are sitting on the couch. You have to work hard to achieve them.
While many questions circulate around the Coptic movements – from finances, to cooperation, to the wisdom of separating from the larger Egyptian cause – the above observations must be remembered. They are balanced by the remark of Gaziri that they also have a tendency to exaggerate their issues.
In all these matters Coptic activists resemble activists around the world, exhibiting significant sacrifice and dedication in pursuit of their goals, understood to be righteous. Yet besides pressuring the government to fulfill their rights, they face also the challenge of awakening a religious community long accustomed to acquiescence to the status quo.
Further research is necessary to better understand their reality, their excesses, and their triumphs. But in the above description they must be commended. Their existence represents one of the many successes of the revolution.
Please click here to read the full, 19 page document at Arab West Report.
From April 25-28 I traveled with Arab West Report through a few Upper Egyptian Holy Family sites, places Mary, Joseph, and Jesus are recorded to have stayed according to Coptic tradition. This travelogue will share some of the insights and anecdotes learned along the way, by means of pictures taken at each location.
Please click here for the full commentary at Arab West Report. This posting represents the third of the articles I was able to write following the trip; I will only post the photos not used in writing about a cancelled Palm Sunday march through streets of a mostly Christian village, or about local perspectives of Copts toward the elephant in the room – emigration.
But the Arab West Report article is a good nine pages long featuring 35 photos. Most only have a paragraph or two of reflection, so it is easy reading. Here it will easier – pictures with a sentence or two. Please enjoy both here and there.
With professional photographers Norbert Schiller and Dana Smillie. Lining up a picture of a monk at Dronka Monastery, purported to be the southernmost extent of the Holy Family in Egypt.This is a Holy Family Tree at Sarabamoun Monastery, near Dayrut. Coptic tradition says they paused to rest under its shade. The white papers represent the prayers of pilgrims seeking intercession.The large tree in the upper right is the Holy Family Tree. The Sarabamoun Monastery is quaintly isolated in agricultural land. Here, a local farmer pauses by the side of the road.The village of Saragna is 90% Christian and on the way to perhaps the most holy Holy Family Site, Dayr al-Muharraq. It is a very traditional village built on the ancient pattern, extending out circularly from a high point above the elevation of the Nile flood, now halted by the Awsan Dam.The mayor and his deputy of Saragna. He is the 4th generation in his family to hold the position.Homes in Saragna pushing up against the massive new church recently built. Some homes were purchased and destroyed to make room.The greatly expanded Church of the Virgin Mary in Saragna. It cost just shy of $900,000, but had much free volunteer labor offered by residents. Most of the money came from Saragna men working abroad who tithed their earnings.The inside of the beautiful Saragna Church sanctuary.The Saragna church is modern in every sense of the word. Here the traditional wooden offering box is replaced and made more secure by electronic safe.The Monastery of Dayr al-Muharraq is esteemed as the southernmost extent of the Holy Family in Egypt. If this seems to contradict what I wrote earlier, you’re paying good attention. Do read on below. The walls are built to resemble the walls of Jerusalem, seeking to establish itself as an alternate pilgrimage site.Another example of the walls. For some reason I found this monastery strangely modern. It seemed more like a colonial villa compound than a place of asceticism.Almost all Coptic monasteries have been modernized. Here inside you can see the old versus the new.But here is old. It was great fun to watch the monks worship and interact. About 100 are resident in the monastery.Here a monk chants from the prayer book, joining his colleagues in unison.The chants were in the ancient language of Coptic, still used somewhat in the masses of Egypt but known only by a small group of specialized practitioners, such as in this monastery.I love this photo. Monks in Egypt are strangely free to join or not join communal worship as they see fit. It is a very individualistic calling, largely left to one’s sense of how to walk with God.On the way to the Holy Family site of Qusair we passed by a new but very traditional village. The women, Muslim, are doing dishes in the Nile.To get to the small chapel in a cave we had to cross the Nile in a traditional sailboat.Upon arrival we were met by tens of Muslim women coming out of their homes and cheering. As it turns out, arriving just after us was a released prisoner returning home for the first time in six years. The priests joined in the celebration.Upon returning north on the way to Palestine (from whichever location), the Holy Family rested in this cave before sailing the Nile. A small church is now inside; the priests lead weekly mass at 5am on Sunday.But we saw also the expansion of the site. The priests are preparing to host a summer festival for the first time, trying to increase the pilgrim awareness of this site. I fear it may ruin its pristine nature and tranquility.But can anything ruin this tranquility? This photo looks down from the cave upon the small distance we walked from the Nile.Returning now to the first scene, this is the Dronka Monastery on the edge of the Asyut Mountains. The connection with the Holy Family tradition is tenuous, and only accepted by church hierarchy in the 1970s. It has since been massively expanded from…… this cave, where the Virgin Mary is said to have appeared in an apparition. (Is that redundant?)Looking out from the monastery at the village and farmland below. It is said the Holy Family tradition emerged here when local businessmen had a falling out with the monks of Dayr al-Muharraq Monastery. In the AWR article I provide a somewhat extended reflection on how possible pious fraud can both strengthen and damage the faith of Coptic Christians.Concluding our trip was the celebration of Palm Sunday at the church in Saragna. Here, in defiance of the priest’s decision to cancel the street parade, Coptic youth go out the gate as opposed to into the service. Please read that article for further context, but fortunately, no trouble occurred.This is a good photo to close with, Coptic street vendors making palm leaves outside a church in Asyut. The little cross the man on the right is holding sold for $1.
The trip took in far too much in far too little time to really feel like I learned about these sites and the reality of Christian life in Upper Egypt. But I am very thankful for this first opportunity, hopeful for far better understanding in the future. Please click here for a few more photos and fuller commentary.
From my latest article in Egypt Source, culling attitudes on emigration from a recent trip to Upper Egypt:
Sara Shuhdi
“I have nightmares every couple of days,” said Sara Shuhdi, a 23 year old assistant professor of analytical chemistry at the German University of Cairo. “I don’t see a bright future for Egypt; maybe it would be better for me if I left.”
Fifty-five days of fasting concluded on Coptic Easter, celebrated this year on May 5 according to the eastern calendar. Always a period of reflection and joy for Egyptian Christians, this year the community is deeper in the former and subdued in the latter.
Here are the photos of each person sharing, with a quote from each:
Fr. Seraphim, an Orthodox priest in Dayrut
“Of course we must stay here,” he said. “Our history, family, and churches are here – we cannot leave Egypt.”
Emad Awny, a businessman in Asyut
“The civil current – Muslims and Christians together – must provide a different way of thought and raise consciousness through business,” he said, “especially in poorer areas susceptible to extremism and ignorance.”
Fr. Kyrillos, an Orthodox priest in Saragna
“Twenty years ago, I tried to convince Copts not to emigrate, but now because of the bad economy I bless them if they want to go.”
Bishop Thomas of Qussia
“I raised people here, trained them, and watched them grow and become productive members of society,” he said. “And then they leave? It is sad.
“I can’t prevent them but I encourage them to stay. I try to speak to their conscience to make their land a better place. Why would someone leave their home and become a foreigner forever?”
The article concludes with a stinging quote by Bishop Thomas for the conscience of humanity; please click here to read the whole article at Egypt Source.
Joyous Copts raised palm leaves and shouts of welcome as Bishop Thomas, dressed in his regal red clerical robe, entered the Church of the Virgin Mary in Saragna, 325 kilometers south of Cairo.
But departing from tradition he arrived by car for the first time this year. For years local Copts would first parade him through the streets of the 90 percent Christian village.
For the first time in this Upper Egyptian diocese, the ancient parade on 28 April remained within church grounds to control the behavior of Christian youth.
‘It used to be that all churches would parade in the streets, but because of the pressures of the last few decades in most places it has stopped,’ explains Thomas.
Saragna was the last village of his diocese to maintain the parade. ‘We are mostly Christians here, so all is well,’ says Ramiz Ikram, the fourth generation Coptic mayor.
‘Some Muslims complain due to their fanaticism, but we don’t march in their areas so as not to make problems.’
Fr. Kyrillos of Saragna
But according to Fr Kyrillos Girgis, a Cairo-trained medical doctor who has served as priest in the village for 23 years, local youth recently began shouting offensive anti-Muslim chants.
He threatened to bar them from communion for a year, but eventually had to stop the procession entirely.
This past Sunday, as everywhere else in Egypt according to the Eastern religious calendar, palms were raised within church grounds instead of in the streets as of old. (Please click here for video.)
Bishop Thomas remains positive however. ‘The challenging religious situation in Egypt reinforces our religious identity,’ he says ‘and today we enjoy being in the kingdom of God.’
Fr Kyrillos can also see the silver lining in the dark clouds gathering over this country. He is leading a vast expansion of the Church of the Virgin Mary, tripling its size and adding a second sanctuary.
The greatly expanded Church of the Virgin Mary in Saragna
Local authorities licensed the expansion before the revolution, along with construction of new churches in the roughly 50 percent Christian villages of Titaliya and Manshia.
‘We have good relations with security and with local people,’ said Thomas, ‘We prefer to obtain proper permissions because we do not want to take any risks.’
Illegal construction
Outside of his diocese, however, other bishops are less risk averse. The 22,000-strong village of Bayadia which is more than 90 percent Christian, had a single church for six different denominations, despite many applications for building permission.
‘We felt great injustice under Mubarak,’ said Orthodox priest Fr Girgis, ‘because we had only one church despite being the great majority of Christians.’
His solution was illegal construction of four more churches. Other denominations followed suit, and Bayadia now has fourteen churches. In the nearby village of Dair Abu Hinnis which is 100 percent Christian, Fr Bemwa boasts of an increase of from five to ten churches since the revolution.
Bishop Thomas explains it can take up to fifteen years to gain a church building permit, whether from bureaucracy or discrimination.
Many priests take matters into their own hands.
With the collapse of government, this is increasingly the norm in Egypt. The Ministry of Housing and Local Development announced recently the existence of more than five million unlicensed buildings. A BBC report earlier this year documented the post-revolutionary surge in building, including many that have already collapsed.
But when Christians attempt such illegal church construction in Muslim majority villages, there is often resistance. Sometimes this is the case even when permits exist.
‘As long as it is a primarily Christian area there is no problem to build,’ said Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of Arab West Report (AWR). ‘But when it is in a mostly Muslim area it can cause clashes if neighbours are opposed.’
AWR investigated an attack on a church in Aswan in October 2011, and a February 2013 attack in Fayyoum. In both cases Muslims had been offended when local houses used for worship were expanded or renovated.
But on Palm Sunday, Egyptian Copts celebrate the success of a community which has maintained Christian roots since the visit of the Holy Family fleeing from Palestine.
The faithful flock to pilgrimage sites, such as the rural Serabamoun Monastery, believed by local Christians to house a tree which provided shade to Jesus and Mary.
Fr. Seraphim, offering a loaf of communion bread
Fr Seraphim, Coptic priest in the nearby city of Daryut, said, ‘Christians in Egypt have seen more persecution in the past than we see now.
‘And of course you have to make use of the opportunity: there is no government.’
The new Egyptian constitution was unnecessary from the start, says Ragy Sulayman of the Free Egyptians Party (FEP). The 1971 constitution, with added amendments, would have served just fine.
Sulayman is the founding lawyer who brought the liberal FEP into existence following the January 25 revolution. A member of the party’s political office, he also heads its legal and constitutional committees. Though the FEP declined participation in writing the constitution in protest of the lack of sufficient women and Coptic representation, they actively opposed the final draft. Rather than delving into the problems of content, Sulayman preferred to describe how the process was flawed from the beginning.
The basic problem is that though nearly all segments of society agreed on the need for a new constitution following the success of the revolution, there was no unified justification for why. This lack of consensus would come to polarize the political scene, made worse by the initial decisions of the suddenly ruling military council.
His main critique of the text of the constitution is interesting, for he does not take aim at its increased religious language but its virtual replication of the old system:
Once formed, however, the Constituent Assembly proved uncreative and unprepared to write a new constitution. First of all, they failed to conduct any social studies to determine the problems of the Egyptian people and take them into account. But second of all, the new draft largely patterned itself off the 1971 constitution, often using the exact same wording. The only significant divergence, which Sulayman admits as substantial, is the transformation from a presidential system of government to a parliamentary.
Even the religious aspects of the constitution do not represent a radical change in parliamentary procedure. Watching the Muslim Brotherhood’s majority Freedom and Justice Party deal with recent legislation concerning Islamic bonds, it is clear they intended the Azhar to play only a consultative role when the Supreme Constitutional Court is brought a case. Sulayman agrees with this interpretation, actually, though the Azhar has insisted on prior review. But parliamentary procedures under the old system also called for sharia-compliant legislation, with a designated committee to seek the opinion of the Azhar on relevant draft laws. Even the controversial Article 219, defining the principles of sharia, does not significantly alter the system.
This convinces Sulayman the increased religious language of the constitution was mainly a campaign tool – coupled with efforts to convince the population of a yes vote for ‘stability’ – to ratify the document by referendum. A rushed process hammered through a flawed constitution to a population misled by propaganda. The Egyptian people were denied a chance to achieve a national charter worthy of their aspirations.
Elsewhere Sulayman takes note of a significant divergence from the old system, in which a mixed presidential-parliamentary system replaces the former presidential.
Overall his critique seems fair, but if the 1971 constitution would have been fine, why does he criticize the new draft patterning off of it? Especially if he approves (seemingly) of the new governing relationship between president and parliament?
I suppose it is due to the hodge-podge nature in which everything was done, but please click here for the full article on Arab West Report and decide for yourself.
As the world community condemned the recent bombings in Boston, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm joined the chorus.
“The Freedom and Justice Party categorically rejects as intolerable the bombings committed in the US city of Boston,” reported Ikhwanweb, the official English website of the Muslim Brotherhood. “The FJP offers heartfelt sympathies and solemn condolences to the American people and the families of the victims and wishes a speedy recovery to the injured.”
But, as many have complained, in Arabic the thought was different, expressed by a prominent leader on Facebook:
Erian proceeds to establish a timeline of suspicious violence, from Mali to Syria to Somalia to Kurdistan. No further mention is made of Boston, and he is led to questioning.
“Who disturbed democratic transformations, despite the difficult transition from despotism, corruption, poverty, hatred, and intolerance to freedom, justice tolerance, development, human dignity, and social justice?
“Who planted Islamophobia through research, the press, and the media?
“Who funded the violence?”
Erian’s musings on conspiracy are nowhere to be found on the Brotherhood’s English language websites.
But the focus of the article is to highlight a new blog which is translating questionable material on Brotherhood websites, both current and from their archive. It turns up gems like this one:
For example, an FJP article described “a growing case of hatred of the majority of Copts towards Islamists in general,” and “the Coptic spirit of hatred for everything Islamic.” The article concerned anti-Brotherhood chants during the funeral, but failed to condemn the subsequent attacks on the mourners exiting the cathedral.
From the conclusion, describing the blog’s grand goals, but subtle methods:
“Part of our appeal is that we make it very neutral – not in selection, but in translation,” said Carr. “We’re challenging the Muslim Brotherhood, but in an indirect way, we want it to be subtle.”
It is both subtle and a challenge, but Dabh and Carr are committed, expecting either the best – or the worst.
“We’ll continue until the Brotherhood falls or we fall,” said Carr. With a laugh she continued, “Or get shot.”
Please click here to read the full article on Egypt Source, and here to visit the mbinenglish website.
From my latest article in Christianity Today, from the April edition and published online on the 18th:
Nadia Mohamed Ali was raised in a Christian home, but when she married Mustafa Mohamed Abdel-Wahab in 1990, she converted to Islam. After his death, she obtained new identity cards—required under Egyptian law—that declared her and her seven children Christians.
Then came the ruling by a criminal court this January: “Egyptian Court Sentences Family to 15 Years for Converting to Christianity” read the Western headlines. Several U.S. religious freedom watchers declared Ali’s sentence a “real disaster” that “underscores the growing problem of religious intolerance” under Egypt’s new, Muslim Brotherhood-backed government. A shocking headline, indeed.
A cut-and-dry case of religious persecution? Not quite.
“They were imprisoned for fraud, not for conversion,” says Mamdouh Nakhla, founder of the Word Center for Human Rights in Cairo. The Coptic lawyer claims the family paid government workers to forge new identity cards. They registered their religion as Christian under Ali’s maiden name so that she could obtain her inheritance.
There is an underground market for such fraud:
“I was introduced to a certain priest—now deceased—who knew a certain Christian who works in the Civil Registry,” says Sheikh Saber (using his Muslim name, not his forged Christian identity). “He takes the bribe and distributes the money around for assistance in covering it up.” In 2003 Saber obtained new IDS, birth certificates, and a marriage license for his family. The cost of this illegal “service” now runs up to $2,500 per person.
The article proceeds to discuss in some depth the role of inter-religious love affairs and marriage in conversion, to which difficult social conditions also contribute. But there are accusations the conversions are not just a product of sociology:
Meanwhile, some Muslims target Coptic Christians for marriage to convert them. “The Coptic people are downtrodden,” says Isaiah Lamei, a priest who provides pastoral care for troubled Copts. “Muslims take advantage and get them to sign papers of conversion [so Copts can] fix their problems.”
Every year, Lamei ministers to 30-40 families in his diocese that have been approached by Muslims offering such “help.” “These problems can be emotional or financial,” he says. He estimates that in his diocese every year, “two or three convert to Islam.”
It’s hard to verify whether Muslims really marry Copts just to draw them into Islam. But it’s also hard to verify the sincerity of Muslim conversions to Christianity.
“We must be cautious,” says Cornelis Hulsman, editor in chief of the Arab West Report. “I have met converts who are sincere, and I’ve met converts who have other interests.”
Nakhla agrees. “Some converts come to me and say they want to marry a Christian. Or they request money, or work, or an apartment,” he says.
From time immemorial mankind has known of the power of religion in both fraud and piety, manipulation and sincerity. It is frustrating to navigate the divide.
Examples of grace and ‘ungrace’ abound, but in service of both mankind and God, toward whom religion is said to direct, the navigation is necessary.
Please click here to read the full article on Christianity Today.
If liberal values are going to spread in Egyptian society, politics is not the answer. Women are.
“The normal woman has a job, goes to market, and raises her family, but she is not part of a political party,” said Youssef Habib, editor-in-chief of the newly launched women’s magazine Lu’lu’a, or Pearl.
“Most Egyptian women think they are simply a servant in the home,” he continued. “We say no, you are a partner, and you are very important.”
Part of the research for this article included attending a festive gala with prominent Egyptian female personalities, and included the stinging quip below:
The name Lu’lu’a is drawn in comparison with the Egyptian woman. Like the sand in the shell which endures great pressure, she emerges beautiful. This point was made by Fatima Naout, the social and political commentator and self-described godmother of the magazine who is a hero of the liberal cause.
Naout headlined a gala affair hosted by Lu’lu’a to celebrate the launch of the magazine’s first bimonthly edition. Honored guests included luminaries such as Tahani al-Gibali, Lamis Gaber, and Farida al-Shobashi, in addition to Samira Qilada, mother of a January 25 martyred daughter.
Angham al-Gammal, a female co-founder of the magazine with Habib and Latif, also insists the magazine is non-political and does not belong to any particular trend. However true in intention, as Naout spoke of Maryam, Qilada’s daughter, she betrayed the sympathies of almost all in attendance.
“The martyrs have already taken their reward. They have gone to the place of beauty, justice, truth, and light,” she said, “a place where there are no Muslim Brothers.”
But the magazine is also a social initiative with a strong, though controversial message:
Latif hopes to take the subjects of the magazine directly to marginalized communities in at least one meeting per month. As such, he described Lu’lu’a as an initiative more than a simple business venture. Their team recently held an awareness meeting with over 150 teachers and 500 students from four private girls-only high schools. They discussed the importance of self-esteem and education, and the dangers of sexual harassment and early marriage.
Early marriage, in fact, is the cover story for issue one, and received the condemnation of Gaber, whose journalistic commentary includes calling the hijab a devaluation of women.
“If you want to silence a people,” she addressed the gathering, “silence the women, marry them early, and a whole generation will emerge ignorant.”
But lest a conservative public receive this message as godless, the editors assert they have a religious vision as well:
The magazine also seeks to accord with Egyptian religiosity, unwilling to cede the discourse on women to Islamists.
“Our core vision,” said Latif, “is that God created the woman and her value comes from him.”
From the conclusion, holding up the magazine as an example of Egyptian liberals trying to touch the people, whereas political leaders are often seen as elite:
Indeed, the revolution changed Egypt, but more is needed to transform the people. If liberal politics falter here, liberal Egyptians must extend the message themselves – socially.
Please click here to read the whole article at Egypt Source.
From my article on Arab West Report, on the recent attack on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral:
Sectarian violence struck Egypt again on Friday, April 6, as at least four Christians and one Muslim were killed in an incident in Khusūs, in the governorate of Qalyubia, to the north of Cairo. Clashes continued on Sunday, and spread to the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in downtown Cairo, where a funeral procession was attacked by unknown assailants. Religious and political leaders have condemned the violence and called for calm, but much about the original incident remains unclear.
The report aggregates information from varied local media sources, with links provided. But the unique contribution is the report of an investigative reporter who visited and spoke with local sources. His testimony is quite specific:
Many of these details are difficult to sort, but investigative reporter Rā’id Sharqāwī visited the area and offers a possible explanation. He collected testimony saying Muslim youths drew the Nazi swastika on the wall, and were confronted by authorities. A crowd gathered, as is common during disputes, and drew in local residents including members of a prominent Christian family living opposite the Azhar institution.
A younger member of this family confronted the Muslim youth, asking him why he was drawing offensive symbols on the wall. In the heated exchange this Christian drew his gun and shot the Muslim, killing him. This produced great tumult in the area, and took place around 12 noon.
The Christians, however, were not killed until around 4pm, and in a manner Sharqāwī found mysterious and perhaps conspiratorial. A group of men armed with automatic weapons drove in from outside the area on motorcycles and fired, somewhat randomly, at a group of assembled Christians. At this time stores were broken into and looted; Sharqāwī surmised it was an organized effort to take advantage of the chaos. The situation was not helped by the diffusion of rumors throughout the village, that each religious community was attacking the other.
The article continues by summarizing details of the attack on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral, the seat of the pope, during a funeral procession for the slain Copts. It was an ugly, ugly incident. The response of the presidency will be closely monitored, but in immediate rhetoric he declares the attack on the cathedral was an attack on himself. Most Copts would say this is well and good, but nearly all previous, smaller scale attacks on Christians have gone unpunished.
Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood protests and claims conspiracy against the stability of the state. This is from the conclusion:
Is there a conspiracy leveled against the Brotherhood to spark sectarian tension and drive the country to chaos? Or, must they invent a conspiracy to cover over the latent sectarian tension which exists and erupted naturally, in order to blame hidden hands for the failures of their governance? These questions are far beyond the scope of this report or any subsequent investigations. But they are the questions asked accusingly by both sides of the Egyptian street.
The nation is awash in conspiracy, allegation, and rumor, and who can say it does not exist? But it is hoped this report provides a first step at least in gathering the purported facts, to prevent manipulations based on only a sampling of the above.
Please click here to read a high ranking Coptic bishop’s spiritual response to recent events, and my brief reflection. Please click here to read the full article at Arab West Report. May God protect Egypt.
On March 28, 2013 Fox News broadcast an incendiary video report entitled, ‘US Silent as Christians are Persecuted in Egypt?’ It is understood that media relies on a level of sensationalism in order to attract the viewer or reader to a story. Yet this report moves beyond sensationalism to distortion, in which elements of truth are stretched to create an impression far removed from reality.
I watched this report after friends and family brought it to my attention. I’m sorry to say it made my blood boil. Several months ago I published a report on AWR examining if the Muslim Brotherhood was crucifying its opponents, but this alleged incident was reported only by fringe and internet-based sources. Here, we’re talking Fox News! Certainly it is known that the station has a conservative bent, but this video makes it seem as if they are pushing an agenda.
Egyptian news coverage is generally of poor quality, un-sourced, and designed to shape opinion rather than inform. Here, Fox News does its best impression. I have heard similar descriptions of US stations MSNBC, and to a lesser degree, CNN, only from the liberal side. I am fearful the American public has entered an era in which news is meant to entertain and confirm opinions, rather than to educate and challenge them.
I am also dreading this aspect of being back in America for an upcoming visit.
Of course, something very terrible appears to have taken place in this mosque in Cairo, and to a Christian in particular. From al-Monitor:
During the clashes that erupted last Friday [March 22] between the Muslim Brotherhood and protesters in Mokattam, the Brotherhood arrested left-wing activist Kamal Khalil and detained him inside a mosque. He saw a number of demonstrators stripped of their clothes and brutally flogged in the mosque, to the point that most of them lost consciousness. Brotherhood members were using a big whip to strike their victims. Khalil asked the flogger [about it], who replied: “It’s a Sudanese whip. I soaked it in oil a while ago. … A single strike can cut through skin.”
Luckily, Khalil recognized his neighbor from among the Brotherhood members, who intervened and prevented him from being tortured. Yet, Khalil posted his testimony about the Brotherhood’s slaughterhouse on the website of Al-Bedaiah newspaper. Soon after, the testimonies from victims published in newspapers confirmed that they had been brutally tortured. Amir Ayad, a demonstrator, revealed that when the Brotherhood found out that he was a Copt, they increased the severity of his torture, pushing him to the brink of death as they called him a “Christian dog.”
But excerpting from my report:
0:50
Broadcaster leads with words, ‘We were not able to independently confirm this reporting by Mideast Christian News’ which claims ‘Islamic hardliners stormed a mosque in suburban Cairo and turned it into a torture chamber for Christians’
…
If news is not able to be confirmed by a reputable news agency, it should not be repeated, and certainly not the lead story. At least they mention this detail up front.
Mideast Christian News did not report about a torture chamber for Christians, however, as best I could research following their newsfeed. On March 23 they ran an article featuring testimony from Amir Ayad, a Coptic activist. He related how he was ambushed by the Muslim Brotherhood during the clashes and tortured in a mosque in Muqattam.
Muqattam is the suburban Cairo neighborhood mentioned by Fox News. It hosts the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood and as such was the site of an anti-Brotherhood protest. The administration of the mosque in question publically confirmed that Islamist activists took over the facilities and turned it into a detention center.
A similar incident took place during the clashes at the presidential palace in protest of President Mursī’s declaration immunizing his decisions from judicial review during the controversy over the drafting of Egypt’s constitution. Muslim Brotherhood members attacked a small but peaceful sit-in at the palace, which led into large-scale confrontations between the two sides. During the clashes the Muslim Brotherhood also created detention centers in adjacent facilities, though not in a mosque.
Details and testimony about what happened at both events is contradictory, but it appears likely the Brotherhood or supporting Islamists assumed police-like prerogative to apprehend protestors – perhaps rioters – on the opposing side. Furthermore, there is no reason to dismiss the testimony of Ayad that he was tortured; the article includes a picture of him in the hospital suffering from multiple wounds.
The protest at the Brotherhood headquarters, however, was not a Christian protest, it was political. Ayad, as a Christian, was detained, perhaps along with other Christian protesters. The great majority of protestors, and therefore detainees, however, were Muslim, consistent with the makeup of Egyptian society.
For Fox News to report this incident as a mosque transformed into a torture center for Christians – with none of the context of these recent clashes – is an egregious distortion of a story terrible in its own right.
And finally, showing an element of the Fox News report which is absolutely contrary to reality, and would be known by anyone who spent any time in Egypt at all apart from the pyramids:
3:15
Peters continues, saying Miller went to the Coptic quarter where the Christians live. It’s a shabby slum where they are third-class – not second-class – citizens
…
It is fair to ask what Miller believes is the difference between a second- and third-class citizen. Clearly this is only a rhetorical device. But it is in service either of wanton ignorance or clear distortion. There is no ‘Christian quarter’ in Egypt or any of its cities. Christians are spread everywhere throughout the country.
Perhaps he was referring to the district of Shubra in Cairo, which has a large percentage of Coptic residents. Shubra is a lower- to lower-middle-class neighborhood, but it is hardly a slum. If it is, it is equally populated by Christians and Muslims together.
Or perhaps he had in mind Heliopolis, which also has a large percentage of Coptic residents, but is one of the wealthier districts of the city. In either case, these areas are characterized by the best relations between Muslims and Christians, as they grew up together in an integrated community. They are far from second-class citizens. They are neighbors.
Please click here to watch the original video, and here to read the rest of my point-by-enraged-point rebuttal (and occasional agreement).
Jayson Casper 