Old events and new repercussions affected Egypt this week. The semi-independent National Council for Human Rights spoke publically about its fact-finding mission on the August 14 dispersal of the pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda Squares, in which several hundred died.
Unrelated but poignant in timing, a row erupted in the Persian Gulf as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. Largely at issue is Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated a terrorist organization by Saudi Arabia, following Egypt’s lead.
God, a gulf is an apt description of perceived reality in the region. The report by the NCHR was not only rejected by Morsi supporters, it was criticized by some of its own members. They found the protestors had fired first at security, which then responded in ‘excess force’. Its criticism of the state is noteworthy, but little of its focus was on police abuses. The report has no power of law, but will those responsible for excesses be held accountable?
And God, none of the Gulf countries have strong reputations for promotion of freedom, democracy, or human rights. By contrast, most stand accused of being behind much of the terrorism in the world, at least via their citizens. There appears little principle in their spat, but much division. Its consequences, however, may be serious if there is escalation.
Help Egypt to choose her friends wisely, God. Or rather, to balance her interests. Many nations take interest in her stability/disruption, so give Egypt ability to put her own house in order.
And in this house, God, may August 14 not be swept under the rug. Much dirt has already been hid there, leading back to January 25, and beyond. Whether to protect power, interest, or principle, too many have treated cheaply the blood of Egyptians. May this accumulated stench rise to your nostrils, God, but be merciful in your judgment.
Do you not hold the kings of this world in the palm of your hand? Do the actions of bureaucrats escape your notice? What of those who plot chaos and violence? Bring justice to Egypt, God, and make your righteousness clear for all to see.
But if not, God, give eyes of discernment in the movement of events. Give faith to the people that your will shall prevail. Hold accountable all guilty; convict all who see themselves innocent. Lead the nation to repentance for all her ills these past three years, and many beyond.
There is a great gulf between self-perception and your divine standard. For the sake of Egypt and Egyptians, bridge it peacefully.
This excerpt is from the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, published by the American University in Cairo, and authored by a former Muslim Brotherhood member. It is a very long, scholarly, and essential summary of the history of Islamism in Egypt since the revolution. My brief reflection follows:
Another major factor that will affect the future of Islamism is the authenticity-modernity dialectic. Long decades of exclusion from the polity have hindered Islamist scholarship in sociopolitical domains. However, since authenticity is such an integral component of Islamism, Islamists cannot simply discard authenticity and unconditionally accept modern notions such as democracy. If more politically experienced groups do so, they are criticized by less experienced, more stagnant ones as ‘inauthentic,’ and their ‘Islamist legitimacy’ is consequently jeopardized.
This authenticity-modernity dialectic is most clearly manifested in the relationship between neoliberal Islamists and all the others. While the neoliberals’ unconditional pursuit of relevance to modern societies has boosted their popularity among globalized, modern segments of the society, their lack of focus on authenticity has almost completely discredited them among other Islamists.
Striking a balance between authenticity and sociopolitical relevance is a major challenge for different Islamist groups. Attitudes toward notions like ‘democracy’ and ‘the state’ reflect different groups’ positions on the matter. Al-Azhar—the symbol of authenticity—issued a statement outlining the principles of an ‘Islamically acceptable’ political system. While the definition was widely accepted by different social groups and by intellectuals, signaling success on the moderation parameter, it was criticized by Islamists, and particularly by Salafis. More significantly, none of the Islamic activists or intellectuals were invited to the first round of talks and workshops that Al-Azhar held in the run-up to the publication of this key declaration. Arguably, Al-Azhar made a political calculation—influenced by long years of disempowerment and state control and the difficulty of fighting Islamists in the struggle for legitimacy—to side with other social actors, and to win the battle for religious authenticity and representation on non-Islamist grounds.
The MB, being the most experienced political Islamist group, approached the challenge differently. The group resorted to the writings of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi40 and other credible scholars to justify its acceptance of a ‘civil’ state and emphasize the authenticity of that position. On other matters, including questions of public morality, the group’s position remains vague, as they attempt to appease audiences on both sides. The separation of the FJP from the MB has given the group more room for political maneuvering, wherein the party could adopt a politically correct stance while the Brotherhood as a whole stresses religious authenticity.
Identifying the authenticity-modernity debate is only one of many insights offered by the author, Ibrahim el-Houdaiby.
The Muslim Brotherhood, rightly, is often accused of a double discourse in which they shape their comments according to the audience listening. Without condoning, Houdaiby makes understandable the context in which they operate. It is a delicate balance to satisfy both the conservative and progressive electorates.
Of course, as events in Egypt unfolded the Brotherhood increasingly chose to lean towards the conservative base. On the one hand, Houdaiby does an excellent job highlighting socio-political factors which contributed, and presents the Islamist landscape as one of competition. On the other hand, current popular discourse presents it as shrewd, even sinister, cooperation. To some degree surely both are true.
Unraveling their true motivation is the necessary task, which includes now even the judiciary to determine the Brotherhood relationship to violence and provocation. But within this effort Houdaiby’s effort is invaluable; he elucidates the dynamics which govern modern Islamism. Set aside the article to read when you have a chance, and be discerning.
From the Hudson Institute, a very long but very worthy survey of Islamist reflection on current events in Egypt and the fall of Morsi. In addition, it translates in full three current articles on the subject by leading non-Egyptian Islamists, and here is an excerpt from Tunisia’s Rashid al-Ghannouchi:
What is called “political Islam” is not in a state of decline. Rather it is in the process of correcting its mistakes and preparing for a new phase, which is not far away, of the practice of better governance. It does not need decades to recover larger opportunities that await it in the time of open-source media spaces, and in the face of coup projects which nakedly lack any moral, civilizational or political cover.
They (Islamists) are deeply rooted movements in their societies carrying the values of peaceful democratic revolution and the values of communalism as a substitute for individuality in a successful marriage of the values of Islam and the values of modernity.
Two thoughts: First, as the Muslim Brotherhood was scrambling to after the fall of Morsi but before the full scale crackdown witnessed now, many Brothers admitted vaguely that their movement had ‘made mistakes‘. But this seemed less an admission as a plea for allies, and was rejected wholescale by the revolutionary forces who believed the Brotherhood betrayed them.
Above, Ghannouchi argues that this current trial is producing the reflection necessary to achieve better governance, chief of which is a spirit of inclusion. Perhaps he speaks confidently because of Tunisia’s experience, in which Islamists engaged in political give-and-take to produce a consensual constitution which falls short of Islamist hopes.
But if Egyptian Islamists are engaged in this reflection it is not demonstrated in the public discourse of Brotherhood leadership, mostly abroad. Instead the focus is on a full return of Morsi’s legitimacy and a prosecution of all involved in the ‘coup’. Perhaps this is popular rhetoric from which they can retreat at the moment of success, but it continues the problem from which their movement suffers: doublespeak.
For at the same time Muslim Brothers are reaching out to other revolutionary movements uncomfortable with the behavior of the army. They might find among them allies, but having had full opportunity to be inclusive, choosing instead to discard them at the moment of success, why should these groups trust them again? Now under pressure, have they really reformed? Especially when faced with Ghannouchi’s vision, stated in a 2009 article also translated by the author:
Nothing can stop the advance of Islamism:
which makes the task of empowering it a matter of time and standing in its way is pure stubbornness to the ways of history and society… attempting to stop it only results in more extremism and explosion. Islamism is not limited to a party or a group, the Islamic project is broader than being reduced to a party or a governance program, governance is merely a part of its project, and is not the greater part or the most important.
Would-be allies are invited to participate in the governance of the state, but only in light of the inevitability of full, Islamist triumph. It is not simply a matter of ‘why trust them again’. The Islamist goal, as articulated by Ghannouchi, is one of ideological domination. Within this vision is good governance and general morality, yes, but not ultimate plurality. If other revolutionary groups have a different vision, why should they enable?
Second, I wonder if Ghannouchi’s vision is anachronistic. He claims in the first quote above that political Islam is the union of Islam and modernity, but does he seek to inherit something that no longer exists? Western analysts say that civilization is now in post-modernity. Perhaps they are wrong and even defining the difference is beyond the scope of this reflection.
But have Islamists struggled a century to achieve a goal that is now but a vapor? If modernity was the effort to ideologically define the rapid industrial, educational, and technological advances of mankind – leaving many behind – post-modernity is an admission of this ideological failure. Islamists might say, ‘Wait, you haven’t tried us yet,’ but is the world willing to experiment? Or rather, by asserting a single ideology, worse, wrapped in religion, are they flailing against a general rejection of grand claims? Plurality, especially in the West, is the non-ideology of the day.
Can Islamism speak to this, or is it hopelessly behind the times? These are questions only, but Ghannouchi prompts them. Do even his hopeful answers miss the mark?
From my recent article at Arab West Report, describing an interview with a former security officer in the Sinai, who wished to remain anonymous. In light of the current accusations leveled against the Muslim Brotherhood, his comments, issued in May 2013, are very pertinent:
These known political figures, including leading Salafi-Jihadis such as ‘Adil Shahātah and Ahmad ‘Ashūsh, are currently playing a political role and not in charge of the operations on the ground, he said. But they still indirectly administer their policies and act as a go-between for the jihadists and non-violent political Islamist groups, and even the Mursī administration.
The Islamists, the advisor says, have divided up roles between themselves – this one to be violent, this one to be political – and having multiple entities helps fill the political space. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular is the head, and their deputy supreme guide Khairat al-Shātir is one of the chief beneficiaries of the tunnel economy. They have three main uses for Salafi and jihadist entities.
The first is to win elections. In keeping a unity among real groups that do compete with each other, they ensure better results at the ballot box. The second use is as a threat for their competition, liberal and secular minded Egyptians who might find it necessary to cooperate with a ‘moderate’ Muslim Brotherhood to ensure they do not side publicly with the more extremist Salafis. The third use is similar, but aimed at the West. By being in league with jihadist elements, the Muslim Brotherhood can demonstrate they are the only ones capable of deterring their violence.
And while the military is currently destroying the aforementioned tunnels, here is how the state used to deal with them:
But if Bedouins were frozen out of official state business, they thrived in the unofficial business of the tunnel system to Gaza. The advisor numbered tunnel totals around 1200, and at their height during the 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead a single tunnel could earn up to one million US dollars per day. The tunnel could be rented for one hour at a cost of $20,000 US, with administrative taxes taken on the other side by Hamas.
Before the revolution, Egypt used the tunnels as a foreign policy tool. Whether for pressure on Israel or Gaza, or indirectly on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar via their Sinai proxies, the flow of goods into Gaza could be variously eased or restricted. The nature of goods, also, could serve the state’s unofficial international policies. Technically, the Bedouins ran the tunnels, for all crossed through their land. But the government watched, which also provided an additional incentive for the tribes to cooperate.
The article also describes the demographic features of the Sinai and estimates the violent, jihadist elements. But given the severity of current political accusations, two lines from the conclusion are vital:
In reference to the information therein he assured its veracity. ‘This is not analysis,’ he said, ‘it is intelligence.’
Arab-West Report has not verified his assertions.
Please click here to read the full article at Arab West Report.
January 25 has come and gone, giving the now familiar images from all sides. Another massive gathering has celebrated General Sisi, while several smaller gatherings lambaste him. His posters are placed everywhere, and some have now been defaced. A festive, expectant atmosphere presides among his supporters, while arrests and deaths continue among those dedicated against him.
But he has not yet declared for president.
By all estimations he is close. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared he had a ‘mandate’ and an ‘obligation’ to run. They yield this to the choice of the people, and the constitution dictates election procedures can begin as early as mid-February. But it also permits a delay until mid-April, so Sisi can afford to take his time.
God, give him wisdom. Only you know if the waiting is due to calculation or hesitancy, but either are possible. Whether shrewdly maximizing popular anticipation or cautiously fretting over popular expectations, Sisi is in need of discernment.
Give him first and foremost a sense of duty and public service. Where ambition exists, may it only be healthy. But help him to see if his candidacy will help or harm the nation.
God, give courage to his rivals, whoever they will be. The prayer above is for them as well, but they are operating from a much less enviable position. They will have to stand against an impassioned tide, subjecting themselves to intense pressure and scrutiny.
Where men of vision and principle exist, have the public test them thoroughly. Ensure that competition is beneficial to Egypt.
God, give understanding to his adversaries. Help them carry on in righteousness and determination, but conscious of the harm they bring into existence. Whether this is their fault or not, have the people and law evaluate their cause. Purify, redeem, and reconcile, while casting any dross asunder.
And God, above all, give patience to the people. Much has been asked of them these past three years, much of their effort has been squandered. At the proper time, have them elect the president of your choice, one who will do right for Egypt.
From my recent article on Arab West Report, reporting a visit to Egypt by Avila Kilmurray, a veteran peace activist from Northern Ireland. The lecture was arranged by the American University in Cairo, hoping for cross-pollination of ideas.
Her lecture was entitled, ‘Peace Building during Religious Strife: What Can Citizens Do?’ But even the title demands questions about the Egyptian particulars. Is Egypt’s religious strife the suffering of Copts at the hands of Islamists following the deposing of Morsi, or the longer patterns of discrimination and neglect on the part of the state? Or, is the strife the suffering of Islamists after the coup and crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, or the longer patterns of discrimination and exclusion on the part of the state? Others would deny there is religious strife at all.
Within these options Kilmurray would counsel not a definition, but a participation. Citizens are free to label the troublemakers as they wish, but they must share a common purpose toward community peace. But a further recognition is necessary, at least from Northern Ireland’s experience. It will prove especially controversial in Egypt.
Kilmurray stated that early citizen initiatives sought to exclude the extremists. There was only one problem: It did not work. As long as the sponsors of violence remained outside the process peace proved elusive. Solutions began when they were brought into the room.
Kilmurray presented in November, 2013, before the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, but while official and popular sentiment was very much against them. They cannot be brought into the room now; what then are the possibilities for peace?
From this foundation relationships can be built, so that any proposed solutions to conflicts become mutually agreed upon, not forced. Otherwise, the culture of blame, which runs rampant when each group speaks among themselves, can result in accusation and acrimony when together.
Simply agreeing on these principles does not ensure success, however. Activist peacemakers from all sides must take care not to move too quickly. Otherwise their hopeful but perhaps reluctant constituencies grow uneasy and divisions will creep into each camp. Their commitment will be especially tested when sponsors of violence erupt again in community disturbance.
At times like this, it may be necessary for their representation to withdraw, but not absolutely. As meetings continue between normal citizens on both sides, those connected to groups of violence are to be briefed, so as to be part of the process, if from afar. When the time is right they must be encouraged to reengage, for no success can come unless every faction of society sees itself represented in these community groups.
The acrimony is present, and violence has erupted again. Are there any backdoor channels currently operating between anyone in the government and Brotherhood leaders, whether in prison or abroad? During the process of crafting the constitution, the participation of the Salafi Nour Party ensured that some Islamists could see themselves involved, though many others labeled them as hypocrites and opportunists.
But few mixed community groups exist; the above only describes the very limited official sessions. Here is one example of some citizens who are trying.
To progress, Kilmurray notes, they must leave out the politicians. But to succeed, they need them.
Community peace groups, therefore, had to have a positive agenda. Many took up the cause of human rights, holding accountable both militias and police. They also tended to operate without politicians, giving participants of sense of responsibility and risk taking that eluded electoral leaders. They would hold protests in the street condemning violence. But they would also work behind the scenes to craft a shared narrative history of ‘the troubles’, in order to work their perspective into society’s official institutions.
Participants in community groups were aware that peacemaking must not be surrendered only to the politicians, or else their rhetoric might become just one more tool in the political power grab. But lasting peace cannot be achieved without politicians, for they operate within government to make lasting agreements in the name of the divided peoples.
So perhaps this is too late, if it was feasible anyway. But from the conclusion:
Kilmurray did not speak about Egypt, but a number of her remarks engender reflection on the current political and sectarian struggles. Given the current rule of an army backed government that deposed the Islamist Morsi from power following popular demonstrations, especially critical will be any role for his Muslim Brotherhood.
I imagine Kilmurray would draw a distinction between participation of Brotherhood politicians and of citizens, both members and sympathizers. Of the former she would likely take little interest, for they, like their rivals, are involved in the back-and-forth power struggles that were unhelpful in Northern Ireland.
Instead, she would likely counsel the desperate necessity for greater civil society involvement in the issues of peace. Dialogue groups exist among clergy, and human rights groups exist as per the issue chosen. But where are the community groups that are deliberately inclusive for the sake of local relations and development?
Such groups must bring together Copts, liberals, Salafis, Sufis, Baha’is, Nubians, the non-religious, and yes, the Muslim Brothers, she would likely advocate. Here, Egypt’s challenge is potentially greater than Northern Ireland’s, for in Belfast the population is relatively evenly divided. In Egypt, the presence of any of these groups might offend the sensibilities of others right from the start on a conceptual basis. And furthermore, the inclusion of some tiny minorities might appear more a political statement than a representation of an actual community.
But community groups are not chiefly for the political statements. It might be hoped that local citizens within the above factions might bear less grievance against their neighbor. And if the tiny minorities are not present in any particular local community, there is no representation necessary. As the circles widen, however, all must be included.
This is another of Egypt’s challenges: 85 million people would engulf Belfast. Finding appropriate citizen participation to speak peace to the nation is a herculean organizational endeavor. But to start small, in each community, is the task at hand. Hold together, and hold to account. However Egypt’s sectarianism is to be defined, this is the beginning of the solution.
Please click here to read the full article at Arab West Report.
The referendum passed, decisively. Turnout was strong, comparatively. The meaning is debated, heatedly. And here the prayers are needed.
A few dispute the turnout, which was the key indicator. Supporters of Morsi have claimed only about ten percent of the electorate voted, while unofficial figures of both participation and affirmation supersede the results for the 2012 constitution.
Unless massive fraud is demonstrated, the people have ratified Morsi’s removal, the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the constitution itself, and perhaps, the presidential candidacy of General Sisi.
In this choice, God, bless Egypt. Bless her for the virtues displayed, for the wisdom exhibited, and in spite of the manipulations present. Whether this choice honors or dishonors your will, God, bless the nation moving forward.
For there was manipulation, God, and herein lies the arguing. State and media vigorously campaigned for a yes vote. The few campaigning for no were arrested. The boycotting opposition was either in jail or in the streets – and even here there is argument. Are the Brotherhood terrorists in label or in reality? Were their protests disrupted, or were they disruptive?
In these questions, God, bless Egypt. Make clear the status of those accused, that they may be tried and judged, sentenced or acquitted, justly and transparently. Make both their supporters and their condemners simultaneously resolute and compassionate. And protect the safety of the streets, for both traverse and protest. Too much traffic has been halted, far too much blood has been spilt.
But as Egyptians and analysts alike argue over the meaning of the referendum, sift the virtue from the vice like the wheat from the chaff. Do results indicate the sovereignty of the people or the authoritarianism of the state?
In this dichotomy, God, bless Egypt. If a mixed bag, then refine them both. Strengthen and encourage a necessary hard hand in difficult times. But rebuke and hold accountable that which violates the law, certainly, but also your standards of righteousness. In your time, God, unmix this bag that Egypt may move forward in full confidence of its cause.
And if it is not mixed at all, bless Egypt tenfold for the offense to which she is subjected, from whichever faction is in the wrong.
Harness the passion in these arguments, God, and marshal it for Egypt’s good. Then cool these fires, so that differing opinion might mutually benefit, educate, and reform. Give meaning to this struggle, and have the nation emerge clean.
Bless Egypt with her new constitution. May consensus come, and with it peace.
From Orient XXI, an insightful article on how Egypt is trying to find itself. Here is an excerpt for why it was not found within the Muslim Brotherhood:
All told, how did the Brotherhood rally against itself, within a year, such a large number of Egyptians as to make its undoing possible? How could so many of those who had elected them into power, or broadly accepted the polls’ results, reject them with such vitriol? How could the oldest, most established Islamist movement in the region become so quickly alienated in a religiously conservative society, to the point of being castigated as un-Egyptian?
Our sense is that the Brotherhood paid the price less for what it did, than for what it is. Although it presents itself and is perceived as a blend between religious movement and political party, it is mostly something else: a “secret society” and a vehicle for social mobility. By secret society we allude not to a scheming cabal but to a closed community. One does not simply join the Brotherhood, but fuses with it, marries into it, comes of age within it, and belongs to it profoundly.
There are nuances, debates, tensions even, within the organization, but being a Brother is a form of socialization, a frame of mind, a chain of command, and a perimeter within which one cultivates a distinction with the rest of society. The Brotherhood’s project, as conceptualized and proselytized by its founder Hassan al-Banna, is a dogma to which members wholeheartedly subscribe and are actively discouraged from questioning. It is a hierarchical organization where respect for (read complete obedience to) more senior leaders is a welcome sign of piety and dedication.
As such, the Brotherhood offers its members status, support and opportunities for social ascension – not least within its own ranks – in a broader environment that is not conducive to success via merit or other means. This is why leaving the Brotherhood bears such a trauma: you do not merely quit, but divorce yourself from its social, religious and business networks. For those who have gone through it, it is often a heart-wrenching process, in which one’s entire social world can turn its back. For its devoted members, therefore, the Brotherhood is more than a religious movement and a political party: it is a way of life that runs parallel to a larger society perceived as insufficiently pious and generally dysfunctional.
There can be a node of sympathy here. In the Mubarak years the Brotherhood was generally kept away from the political game, but mostly allowed to function as a social force. This force served as a network and an identity and a protest against society at large. As long as they kept to themselves they offered much both to members and to society.
But the Brotherhood also viewed itself as a vanguard to transform Egypt. And a vanguard almost by definition ends up either gaining the mantle of leadership or failing spectacularly. The January 25 revolution put the group to the test, but the broad societal basis for change meant the Brotherhood could not lead. They were a participant, a primary one, but not the vanguard.
So when they attempted to lead, especially in winning the presidency, it was not a natural progression. They couldn’t simply do what they wanted, and a vanguard is unaccustomed to having equal partners. As the article posits, perhaps they were incapable. But if a vanguard isn’t leading, it can be viewed even by semi-sympathetic would-be partners as an exclusive cabal.
The Brotherhood won the presidency, but the revolution was turned into a democratic process. Such was one of its successes, but also its loss. A revolution demands thorough, structural change; a democracy diffuses this energy into mere hopeful reform. The Brotherhood wavered between both, portraying itself as revolutionary and democratic. But in doing so it failed to win the confidence of either. As needed partners left its side, all it had to rely on was itself. It chose a populist, religiously conservative route to try to rally support, but this only cost it more among traditional state actors and elites, who became more determined than ever to resist. And again as the article describes, the people came to see them as something alien to Egypt; no matter how much they pleaded they wanted the best for the nation, they were seen in this as desiring the best for themselves.
And now they are gone. There is a node of sympathy for this loss in terms of the social attachments of their members. The dissolution of a family is always tragic, even if dysfunctional.
But there is no sympathy needed for the dissolution of a vanguard. Of course, some may outright rejoice. A vanguard is a wager for a goal greater than any family. By overreaching familial bounds, they risk contempt if they lose for laud if they win.
It is too early to write their obituary, though the contempt is palpable. But on the other hand if somehow the script is flipped, the Brotherhood might become the vanguard it always intended. If the ‘coup’ is reversed, it will be the Brotherhood in full leadership. They may wrap themselves around the January 25 revolutionary mantle, but now it will be their revolution. Perhaps then they will be comfortable; perhaps then they can win.
But must Egypt disintegrate to get there? Is this their current strategy? Or, is this the natural outcome of a revolution, rather than democratic reform?
In the meanwhile, Egypt is seeking to define its identity. The constitution notes almost every conceivable source, but grounds Egypt as the gift of the Nile. Will this satisfy? Identities involve negotiation, but they also involve choice. In a single person this can be messy; can it be simpler in a nation? The Brotherhood, in all its ambiguity, failed to provide a satisfactory answer. Will June 30? Will Sisi?
For all, let us look with sympathy. Not for the use of identity to forge political power, but for the necessity of a people to know who they are. From here, when their answer is settled, political legitimacy will flow.
This older interview, from August 2012, reflects a very different reality than the one Islamists experience in Egypt today. At the time they were in the ascendency; now, many of them scurry for cover. In preparation for a larger project on Islamist movements in general, however, Arab West Report only now is publishing this interview. Selected excerpts are below.
On his activity with the group in giving public lectures:
J: What is your history with the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah?
S: I joined the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah in 1979. I was at college during that time and thank God I worked with the Group and I used to preach on Fridays and give lessons. I was arrested in 1981. I am a member of the Guidance Council in Cairo, but regardless of my position, I serve as a Friday preacher and as a lecturer in conferences.
J: In a certain mosque?
S: Nowadays, I preach in many mosques. Of course before the revolution, we were totally prevented from preaching. There are two mosques here in al-Ma’ādi and another one in ‘Atabah, and on the fourth Friday of each month, I go to any mosque, for example in Helwan or sometimes outside Cairo, like in Suez or Alexandria, according to the desires of the people who want me to preach.
J: Are these mosques related to the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah? When you were prevented from preaching before the revolution, how could you have such relations with those mosques?
S: We have had relations for a very long time. I was prevented from preaching but not prevented from moving freely in society or from interacting with people. They would come to us to help them with their problems whether family issues or feuds between families and things like that. Instructions can be given to mosques not to let me preach in them, but I have great relations with society.
J: Are these mosques registered at the Endowments Ministry?
S: No, they are not. They are civil associations which house mosques. These associations resemble the Association of Religious Legitimacy [a longstanding Salafī non-governmental organization registered officially in Egypt and active since the early 20th Century].
J: Are they small, neighborhoodmosques?
S: No, they are large, but it depends on the civil association. There are many that have up to four mosques. They have permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs and they run their activities through associated mosques.
J: So they are legal?
S: Yes, but they are not supervised by the Endowments Ministry, which has no authority over them. The association and its administrative board supervises them and their expenses are submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Now, the government has reestablished (or, is reestablishing) its supervision and tight control of all mosques, allowing only approved speakers to appear. It is unlikely al-Gama’a al-Islamiya is finding official favor, though there is no campaign against them publicly as like with the Muslim Brotherhood.
But should their members wind up in jail, Salamony has been there before:
J: You said that you had been arrested for a while. When was that?
S: I have been arrested more than once. The first time was during Sādāt’s September decisions in 1981. It lasted a year and a half. Then there were other arrest periods that lasted between two months to a year up until 1990. In October 1990, I was arrested and stayed in prison for 15 years until January 2006, during Mubārak’s time.
J: What was the reason for that last long arrest?
S: There were many arrests during that time. I was arrested because I was a suspect in the case of the assassination of Rif’āt al-Mahjūb, the head of the parliament. But the judge gave amnesty to all the suspects and he said about me, “I have found one suspect in this case with no charges at all; that is ‘Izzat al-Salamunī,” and then I was set free.
We left the court to go back to prison with an arrest warrant. During that period my administrative arrest was open, which means that I could go to the court and present a grievance, and then receive amnesty. After that I would have to go to the state security, stay there for a night or two, only to be arrested again with a new arrest warrant.
At the prison in Damanhour there was a fountain in the center of the village, so the prison vehicle used to take the prisoners – who supposedly had be given amnesty – and go around the fountain once or twice, then send them back to prison.
But the main reason for that arrest concerned my preaching. I was preaching freely in mosques and conferences and criticizing the former regime, the tyranny and the injustice that have been unmasked since the January 25 Revolution.
Salamony says the campaigns against al-Gama’a al-Islamiya were all politically motivated, and that he personally was not involved in any illegal activity or assassination attempts. Instead, as above, he equates his group’s efforts to those of the January 25 Revolution, and the efforts of the state to prevent such an outbreak:
J: When it comes to preaching, did you call for the revolution or for any illegal movements?
S: No, I only preached about stopping injustice and corruption, and also about giving Egyptians all their rights so that no one would be enslaved or prevented from having a respectable life.
J: Did you use any means that you regret using, or perhaps you say they was suitable at that time but not nowadays?
S: No, the means I used did not go beyond words and preaching. We also called for demonstrating against any act of injustice, but all of our practices were peaceful. But starting a demonstration during that time worried the former regime, because people were submissive to oppression. If people who had influence went to the streets it was a very dangerous thing for them.
Once when I was arrested and blindfolded, in 1989, I asked one of the policemen, “Why are you doing all of this: torturing, arrests, breaking into mosques, and people get killed, why?”
He answered, “Honestly, if we let you carrying on all your social activities, and your Islamic preaching for one year, you will reach out to people and win them over to your side. Then you will overpower us and will strike us fatally, with no weapons at all. I will not give you the chance. When I arrest some of you, beat you up, and when you go on demonstrations against us, you only scratch us, which we can handle. But we cannot let you strike us.”
This has been their philosophy: to prevent anyone other than them from having influence over people, or to break the barriers of fear and terror that people had within themselves. That is why they thought that the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah was dangerous.
But it was not just political activism that al-Gama’a al-Islamiya was engaged in. It was social and moral activism as well:
J: What is Hisbah?
S: Hisbah, according to Islamic Law, is the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice. The image of this concept has been distorted to many people. Islamic law states that promoting virtue can only happen through virtue, and preventing vice can never be through vice. Although it is a very beautiful image, people try to deform it. If it is applied correctly, its great fruits would be seen clearly in society.
We have to warn people that some of the things they do are wrong and harmful such as smoking and drinking alcohol. I tell them that these things are bad for their health. But some acts require intervention, like if I am walking around and see some guys trying to kidnap a girl. Here, religion tells me to protect her, and that is exactly the prevention of vice.
The Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah practiced that guidance part within the limits of the Islamic law, and of course there were some mistakes as we are all human beings. Sometimes one may lose one’s temper, but we cannot blame our personal mistakes on the religious concepts.
He is keen to explain the ‘mistakes’. Elsewhere in the interview he describes how many occurred when the political leadership was in prison and could neither guide nor contain their youth. Escalation of attacks between the group and the police also contributed, he said.
J: What were your mistakes? You said you are just human beings who make mistakes.
S: Some of the youth misunderstood the concept of Hisbah and exceeded the limits. For example, if I saw someone committing a vice, I would go to that person and ask him politely to stop. But if I yelled at that person, I have committed vice. Religion only allows me to do what it takes to remove that vice.
J: To give an advice, for example.
S: Yes. I may only grab that person’s hand if it will remove the vice, but I am not allowed to slap that person on the face. So there are rules. Some youth would simply hit the person without giving him advice at all, which is religiously wrong. We have always warned our youth in mosques not to do such things. We have to confess these violations as we cannot prevent others from doing vice while we ourselves do it.
J: So now you know those mistakes, but during the 1970s and before your non-violent initiative, was Hisbah applied with few restrictions?
S: As leaders in the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah, we tried to put limits, but we could not following each and every member working here or there. But whenever we knew that a member of the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah did something wrong, we told him that was wrong, from the beginning.
But as I said before they were young, and youth were the majority of our members. With all of their excitement and with their little knowledge about religion, some incidents happened frequently. But as soon as we knew about them, we always acted and stated what was wrong. If a member hit someone, which is religiously wrong, we would go to that person and apologize to him and even give him the right to avenge himself by hitting that person if he wanted to do so.
J: I have read that in public gatherings, some youth used chains to disband meetings of mixed genders. These things really happened, but you see them as violations?
S: Those violations happened indeed, but some of them were done by people who do not belong to the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah, but their mistakes were blamed on us. Others were done by us and we stated that, before the initiative, but we were trying to settle things down. Now, thanks to age, experience, and increased religious knowledge, there are almost no violations among our members.
J: I have also read about attacks on liquor stores owned by Copts.
S: It happened once or twice.
But this was not a policy, nor was it permitted, Salamony said. But note how in his explanation he includes terminology that is very offensive to Copts, yet still has a sense of toleration about it:
J: The author quoted from Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān stating that it is permitted to loot the Copt’s money. He issued a fatwa about that. Do you know anything about that?
S: This is totally untrue, and I heard Dr. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān with my own ears once – as I accompanied him in many of his tours and lectures, and been with him around the whole country – saying that Christians’ and Dhimmis’ blood is prohibited to be shed, and that our religious laws state that their money is forbidden to be looted.
Even if I think that someone is infidel, not a Muslim, this does not give me the right to loot his money or shed his blood. Doctrines should be totally separated from practical life. For example, some Christians think of others as non-believers and infidels, like the Orthodox who believe that if someone does not take communion in their church, then he is a non-believer. To them I am a non-believer.
Belief issues have to do with people’s hearts. When it comes to the practical side, in the Qur’ān, God says: “God does not forbid you from those who fight you not for religion nor drove your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them.”
From that we get that belief is one thing and how to treat people is something else. The money or blood of any human being living in the same country with me, or anywhere else in the world, is prohibited to looted or shed, as long as that person did not attack me or my religion.
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya began a non-violent initiative and published their change in policy along theological lines in The Revisions. This allowed many, but not all leaders to leave prison. Since then they have not called for violence, though some return to their social activism has been evidenced. But having assassinated President Sadat in 1981, and with several attempts on President Mubarak, the absolute nature of the rejection of violence is not clear:
J: I understand what you say and I sympathize with that explanation, but a couple of days ago I read that Tāriq al-Zumur commented on Sādāt’s assassin and said that he is a martyr. But how can he be a martyr, especially after your peaceful initiative and declaring that assassination is unacceptable?
S: Here, we have more than one side of the story. As I told you, to judge an issue, I have to consider its surrounding circumstances. Sādāt arrested people and criticized religious leaders like Hāfiz Salāmah that he was Suez’s lunatic. Sādāt said politics and religion should not be combined. The treaty of Camp David was also signed at that time. The general evaluation of the situation was that Sādāt was an enemy of religion and of Egypt.
That atmosphere pushed people like Khālid al-Islāmbulī and his followers to take an action. When I regard that issue now, it is not like when I regarded it at the time it happened. They were motivated by patriotism and religion with good intuition.
So when Tāriq al-Zumur said he was a martyr, he judged them according to their circumstances, which are different from ours. All the circumstances at that time showed that Sādāt was an enemy of religion. In order not to falsely accuse al-Islāmbulī, I must evaluate his situation according to the circumstances which led him to do so.
J: Why do you not just praise him and explain what he did without calling him a martyr as if it is a kind of justification?
S: In Islam, no one has the right to call someone a martyr or not, because only God knows who is a martyr and who is not. What we say is that we consider him to be a martyr, or pray for him to be one of the martyrs, according to his good intention. We pray for our brothers who have been murdered so that God would accept them as martyrs. But we cannot insure that a certain person is a martyr, because God is the only one who decides that.
Interesting to recall is that al-Gama’a al-Islamiya did not initially favor Mohamed Morsi for the presidency. After describing similarities and differences among the Islamist groups, he explained why:
J: I understand that there is a unity among you and that there is no competition among you as you have the same purpose. But the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah supported Abu al-Futuh during the presidential elections instead of supporting al-Shater and Muhammad Mursī, especially Mursī. Why was this?
S: It was the result of a certain view of reality. The leadership of the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah at that time formed a general assembly to gather our 300 members, and over the course of the day we listened to the programs of Dr. Mursī, Dr. Al Awa, and Dr. ‘Abd al-Mun’im Abū al-Futūh. The discussion lasted for nearly 15 hours and the majority supported Dr. Abū al-Futūh’s program in the first round in a democratic way, though some supported others.
J: What were the most important points that made the majority choose Abū al-Futūh rather than Mursī?
S: The majority chose Abū al-Futūh because he was independent and was a part of the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah in the past. He was thought to be friends with the liberals, unlike the Brotherhood as some people dislike them. We though he could gather the people around him better than any other candidate. The main point was to have unity within society. But in the second round, the Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyah chose Muhammad Mursī because at that time, the people categorized the candidates as representing the previous regime or the revolution. So the whole group chose Dr. Muhammad Mursī and their choice was based on a realistic study of the current situation at that time.
Even at the time of Islamist success, Salamony expressed doubts about the democratic outcome. But he was certain the people would not rise against them. Looking backwards his comments are poignant:
J: As a Muslim, you will do your best to deepen the roots of Islamic law in Egypt, but my question is what if the society is against you, you will continue your struggle against the people’s will?
S: That controversial assumption has no place in Egypt because the society has a religious nature, whether Muslim or Christian. If someone wants to change the identity or the nature of that society, we will face that change in a democratic way. Unfortunately, the Islamists are being judged in an unfair way.
They are accused of not accepting the other, which is not true. We accept the other but there is a difference between accepting the other and the other forcing himself upon us and that we must follow him or totally agree with him. I accept you when you stick to your opinion and I stick to mine. We can argue together and express our opinions to society. But what happens with Islamists is that they are being prevented from expressing themselves and even from speaking.
Now, when they have recently gained control, restrictions that are not forced upon anyone else are being forced upon them. So in that case, the democracy is not complete. They are talking about democracy but when it comes to us, it is being prohibited.
Please click here to read the full interview at Arab West Report.
From Ahram Online, with a hilarious photo of Egyptian political reality in the national soccer league:
Even the referee is smiling…
For those not knowing the peculiarities of soccer, the only one who knows when the match ends is the referee. Its length is 90 minutes, but the official has discretion to add on ‘extra time’ to make up for time lost to injuries, excessive goal celebrations, etc. To signal an approximation to the players, with a few minutes left before the 90 minute mark, the referee will raise his fingers to indicate how much extra time he will allow.
For those not knowing the peculiarities of Egypt, the hand held aloft with four fingers is the adopted symbol for a mix of protestors who are some variety of pro-Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood, anti-army, anti-coup, or sympathetic with the lives lost in August when a protest camp at the ‘Fourth’ Mosque in Cairo was violently dispersed by the government.
Technically, the mosque is named after an 8th Century female Sufi saint, whose first name happens to mean ‘Fourth’.
But raising the four fingers can get one in trouble these days. A few sports figures have been suspended for flashing the sign, following a goal celebration or after a Kung Fu victory.
This referee, apparently, did not want any misunderstandings:
Atef El-Afi, who was refereeing an Egyptian league game between Gouna and El-Entag El-Harby, thought twice about how to signal that four minutes of time added on would be played.
He eventually decided to use both hands to do so, with each making a two-fingered sign.
…
“There is no place for politics in football. I just didn’t want to be misunderstood,” El-Afi told Egyptian sports website FilGoal.
“None of the Egyptian Football Association officials asked us [referees] to make any certain signs. We just want to avoid using anything that might be interpreted as political signs.”
Oh, and there is also this puppet being investigated as a terrorist mouthpiece, but that is a story for another day…
Here are some excerpts from three insightful articles about the current state of struggle in Egypt, between forces roundly and mostly accurately described as the military and the Muslim Brotherhood.
First, from The National, a publication of the United Arab Emirates:
While some parts of the Arab world are dividing along sectarian and sometimes ethnic lines, the smouldering unrest in Egypt is entirely ideological. Partisans on both sides view it as an existential struggle to define Egypt’s identity – and all conflicts of this type tend to be bitter and brutal.
…
The Egyptian government’s narrative since the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi has been that the military intervened, after overwhelming public demand, to stop the misrule of an out of control party and president who faced no other political checks. From the outset, they accused Mr Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of having deep ties to Salafist-Jihadist extremists in Sinai.
This account has been significantly strengthened by the evidently furious reaction of the Sinai-based extremists to Mr Morsi’s removal, and their reported offer in the days and weeks immediately following that violence would cease if he were restored to office. With both the government and the Muslim Brotherhood raising the stakes, violence has been spreading throughout Egypt.
…
The narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, by contrast, suggests all of this is nothing but excuses for a counter-revolutionary crackdown.
It always anticipated that the military and the rest of the Egyptian establishment would never allow an elected Brotherhood presidency and would find some rationalisation to overthrow it.
Everything that has followed has been interpreted through this framework as a campaign to destroy the Brotherhood jail, persecute and kill its members, and blame it for all kinds of things it has nothing to do with. The Brotherhood worldview predicts such a response to any political success, and its political comfort zone is much more attuned to the underground than the open air.
These competing narratives, however, are criticized as ugly and deceptive propaganda by this article in Daily News Egypt:
False narratives continue to play a dangerous role in the turmoil in Egypt. No group knows that better than the Muslim Brotherhood. Unsubstantiated claims of the group’s role in violence in Sinai and other parts of the country, along with rumours surrounding the Brotherhood’s links to foreign and domestic actors have made their way to state institutions and mainstream media, which has largely unabashedly rooted for the government in its ongoing crackdown.
…
It is sad and unfortunate to see that the Brotherhood has turned to the same tactics, constructing false narratives and facilitating the spread of baseless information for its own gain, often employing smear campaigns that closely resemble those from which they suffer.
The group is no stranger to employing sectarianism through various mediums. Even when Mohamed Morsi was president, party leaders made public statements blaming Christians and the Coptic Church for sabotaging the government while its satellite channel Misr25, which was promptly shut down on 3 July, repeatedly made claims that armed Christians were sparking violent protests.
After a summer of bloody massacres at the hands of security forces, the MB resorted to the same sectarian rhetoric, this time to paint the current conflict as one split along sectarian lines.
The FJP’s newspaper regularly publishes sectarian-driven misinformation, and has resorted to some of the most desperate forms of propaganda. It has done everything from blaming the Church’s alleged coordination with military intelligence and the US government for terrorist attacks in the country to publishing articles quoting a fake Pope Tawadros II Twitter account declared that Egypt is a Coptic state.
Following the Brotherhood’s defeat in the Doctors Syndicate elections, the FJP’s paper once again blamed the Church for playing a role.
Christians serve very useful for the Brotherhood’s narrative. In the group’s eyes, the fact that most Christians supported Morsi’s ouster is a convenient way to show that there is an ongoing “war against Islam.”
…
Needless to say the Muslim Brotherhood’s bigotry does not serve as justification to indiscriminately detain its supporters, respond to its demonstrations with disproportional force, violate a myriad of human rights standards, or even call it a terrorist organisation.
However it demonstrates that even when it suffers from the consequences of mass misinformation, the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP are willing to play a part in the game of false narratives, even if it means fomenting hatred and consequently jeopardizing the safety of other Egyptians.
Meanwhile, blogger Salama Moussa declares a pox on both their houses, and recalls a historical period where this pox decimated both:
The post-1967 years are often described as years of defeat and breakdown. There was that. The daily bread was often corrupted with saw dust. Staples were hard to come by. Oranges, for example, once plentiful, were in short supply, as they were used to pay the Soviet Union for weapons. The country suffered the effects of Israeli raids and occasional forays. But the years had a certain luminosity, as Said noted. Something felt very different in Egypt. There was an air of anticipation and possibilities. Economic growth, for the first time in several years, picked up. Students, some as young as 8 or 9, could demonstrate and even criticize the government openly. Al Azhar admitted women to its schools for the first time, and many came wearing short skirts. There was attention to merit; the commander of a major army was a Copt, for example. Government contracts were bid out fairly. Even the notorious Cairo traffic flowed smoothly, aided by newly constructed tunnels and bridges. How do we square these undeniable feelings and observations with the reality of defeat and the ever-present anxiety of failure?
Egypt between the wars, 1967 to 1973, was free of two influences that haunted it for nearly two decades prior to 1967. Nasser smashed the Muslim Brotherhood to bits. Israel smashed the army. Free from both the Brotherhood and the army, Egyptians glimpsed a vision of Egypt unchained by these two authoritarian and hectoring groups. After 1973 things changed rapidly, and not for the better. Sadat empowered the Brotherhood, initially on university campuses to counter the liberals and the left, but ultimately throughout society, and the army had its honor restored, although the best and most successful of its generals were booted out. Six days of war were followed by six years of hope and forty years of despair.
The fading year of 2013 has been one of despair in Egypt. Every week brought fresh horrors and searing images of pain. Who can forget the Port Said deaths, the lynching of Shi’a citizens, the attack on St Mark’s Cathedral, the horror of death at Rab’a, and the daily demonstrations often accompanied by injuries and deaths. The polarized country is left feeling that it must choose between one of two tormentors. That would be a false feeling. There is luminosity in Egypt, which only a third way will uncover, and chart a path forward unchained by the forces that gave the land forty years of despair.
Feel free to read these articles in their entirety, and hold on tightly.
Deaths among protestors are not new. Over the past few weeks it seems one or two have been killed in clashes with security forces every Friday. But today the government announced the death of eleven, while Morsi supporters claim nineteen. But it appears not just to be violence received; buildings and vehicles have been set on fire by protestors, and police have been injured in turn. As both sides maintain a zero sum contest, it is difficult to establish a clear picture of events.
A clearer picture the government seeks, putting forward in its first links between the Muslim Brotherhood and admitted terrorists. The son of a prominent Brotherhood leader has admitted joining the Sinai based group and liaising between the two, they say. Others scoff, recalling heavy handed police tactics from the days of Mubarak.
God, Egypt is in a difficult period. Set aside, for now, the questions of right and wrong. Preserve life. Preserve property. Preserve peace and good relations between men. For right now many are angry, and becoming increasingly so.
But do not set them aside forever, nor for long. Show the people, and show the world, the full extent of wrongdoing in Egypt. Then, God, set things right.
Are you already doing so? This has been prayed in hope many times over the past three years. How much longer? God, give Egypt patience and determination, but give her empathy and humility as well. Cultivate a healthy suspicion that honors one’s leaders as it holds them accountable.
And as others lose respect for leaders of all stripes, restore a wholesome ordering of society. Save Egypt from a decent into chaos; may fear of God and love of humanity hold steady amid the instability. But proper authorities are necessary, God. Give them wisdom and help them to act properly.
For death, God, is evidence of your incomplete will. May all Egyptians protest at this, and align their will to yours alone. First and last, may they seek your principles, and add to them every blessing beside.
Surely the two – terrorist and bombing – go together. But who do they go together with?
Fourteen people were killed in Mansoura in the Nile Delta when a bomb ripped through the security directorate. Two days later an apparent homemade bomb exploded on the roadside, injuring five civilians but perhaps also targeting the police. The government responded by officially designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, making criminal a membership in the group, or even marching in their protests.
The Brotherhood has condemned the bombings, and responsibility has been claimed by a jihadist group in the Sinai. The government designation links the two together, as well as with other crimes committed against Egyptian churches, police stations, and citizens. But the prime minister recently stated no designation could come without a court ruling, which has yet to take place – whether in favor or against the accused.
Transparency, God. Whoever is behind the unsettling of Egypt, bring them to justice in the clear sight of all. Perhaps the government acts prematurely because of the severity of the threat. Worse, perhaps the government applies the label to a political enemy taking advantage of the outrage. Worst, as some Islamists imply, the government is responsible for the bombing itself.
Egypt still swims in conspiracy, God, and perhaps she still suffers one. Bring to light what is hidden and build the nation anew. For these deaths and so many previously, hold to account those who are responsible. Rid Egypt of their poison, which kills politics and opposition alike.
God, give wisdom to the Brotherhood. If the label is true then give discernment to their many followers who are likely uninvolved. Lead them to help supply the evidence necessary. But if not true, what should be their response? Currently they pledge continued protests; will this help their cause or sacrifice their supporters? With whatever ideological links exist with those in Sinai, have them do more than just condemn, but pressure for full cessation.
And God, give wisdom to the government. Make their response to terrorism winsome. Help the state to protect the people. If the label is true then give them the evidence necessary to demonstrate their plight. Give them courage to combat an enemy willing to kill and lie for power. But if not true, have mercy on the people from a government willing to manipulate, or worse.
For those in between these parties, God, reconcile. It is never too late, but the stakes are rising. Help words of creative peace to be spoken, and to find ears willing to hear.
God, terrorism and bombings are not of your kingdom, so may they neither hold sway in Egypt. Establish instead truth and justice, for these go together with you.
In late August and early September I published an article and two other posts about Safwat Hegazi, one of the more controversial Islamist supporters of Mohamed Morsi.
The article collected links and information about his often inflammatory speeches and public statements, calling him a Bellwether of Egyptian Islamism.
The second linked to a full article describing an interview conducted by Arab West Report at the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest site. In it he comes across as very reasonable, denying any membership in the Muslim Brotherhood.
And the third was a link to a very surprising video confession by Hegazi about his regretful association with these protests, sad to see them provoking bloodshed. That post expressed a bit of shock leading to the title, Safwat Hegazi, Stool Pigeon?
Several weeks later in a conversation with a Salafi friend, we discussed Hegazi. ‘That video,’ he said confidently, ‘was faked. Hegazi might be dead or he might be in custody, but that video looked nothing like him.’
It made me recall my initial surprise, both in his confession and appearance.
Hegazi’s trial has now begun, in which he declared the released photos were fake:
Egyptian hardline Islamist preacher Safwat Hegazy said Saturday during his ongoing trial that photos of him following his arrest released by Egypt’s Interior Ministry were fabricated, according to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party website.
Hegazy, who appeared in court on Saturday along with FJP leader Mohamed El-Beltagy – both charged with inciting violence – reportedly said photos released online by the ministry upon his arrest in August were fake.
The photos showed him with a shaved beard and only a dyed-black goatee. Hegazy stated that he never shaved his beard prior to his arrest.
The allegedly fabricated photos of Hegazy stirred public confusion following their release over the significant changes in his appearance since his detainment. It was widely believed that he had changed his appearance to avoid detection.
Hegazy appeared in photos of Saturday’s court session with his trademark white beard.
The confusion continues. Were the released videos and pictures real, an attempt at character assassination, or irrelevant either because of his overall innocence or outstanding guilt?
Judges of Cairo Criminal Court recused themselves Saturday from the trial of Muslim Brotherhood leading figure Mohamed El-Beltagy and Islamist preacher Safwat Hegazy, saying it has felt unease over the case.
No further explanation was given. Was the unease due to an obvious miscarriage of justice, or fear of Islamist supporters if they carried out justice?Or, was it simply from an inability to conduct the trial, as in this related case:
A second panel of judges has withdrawn from the trial of Muslim Brotherhood leaders accused of inciting the killing of protesters.
The defendants refused to recognise the court, dubbed it “void” and “illegitimate,” and chanted “down with the military rule.”
The judges said they were unable to conduct the trial properly.
Like many questions of the revolution, we will have to wait and see, but waiting often takes a long time…
From an older article at the Hudson Institute, with a very thorough description of how one becomes a Muslim Brother or a Salafi:
First, the Brotherhood uses a rigid process of internal promotion to ensure its members’ commitment to the gama’a and its cause. The process begins at recruitment, when specially designated Muslim Brothers scout out potential members at mosques and universities across Egypt. During the process of recruitment, prospective Muslim Brothers are introduced to the organization through social activities, such as sports and camping, which give the Brotherhood an opportunity to further assess each recruit’s personality and confirm his piety. If the recruit satisfies local Brotherhood leaders, he begins a rigorous five-to-eight-year process of internal promotion, during which he ascends through four different membership ranks, muhib, muayyad, muntasib and muntazim before finally achieving the status of ach ‘amal, or “active brother.”
During each stage of internal promotion, the rising Muslim Brother’s curriculum intensifies, and he is tested, either orally or through a written exam, before advancing to the next stage. For example, a muayyad (second stage) is expected to memorize major sections of the Qur’an and study the writings of Brotherhood founder al-Banna, while a muntasib (third stage) studies hadith and Qur’anic exegesis. Rising Muslim Brothers also assume more responsibilities within the organization: muayyads are trained to preach in mosques and recruit other members, and muntasibs continue these activities while also donating six-to-eight percent of their income to the organization.[11] This process serves to weed out those who are either less committed to the organization, or who dissent with some of its principles or approaches. Muslim Brothers’ commitment to the organization is further established through their assumption of a bay’a, an oath, to “listen and obey,” which occurs sometime after the midpoint of this promotional process.[12]
Second, the Brotherhood pursues its Islamizing project by maintaining a well-developed nationwide hierarchical organization. At the top of this structure is the Guidance Office (maktab al-irshad), a twenty-member body largely comprised of individuals in their late fifties to early seventies. The Guidance Office executes decisions on which the 120-member Shura committee (magles al-shura al-‘amm) votes, and orders are sent down the following chain of command: the Guidance Offices calls leaders in each regional sector (qita’), who transmit the order to leaders in each governorate (muhafaza), who pass it on to their deputies in each subsidiary area (muntaqa), who refer it to the chiefs in each subsidiary populace (shu’aba), who then call the heads of the Brotherhood’s local cells, known as usras, or “families.” The usra is typically comprised of five to eight Muslim Brothers, and they execute the Guidance Office’s orders at the local level throughout Egypt. Such directives can include everything from managing social services to mobilizing the masses for pro-Brotherhood demonstrations, to supporting Brotherhood candidates during elections.
The union of a committed membership and a clear chain-of-command provides the Muslim Brotherhood with a well-oiled political machine and thereby a tremendous advantage over the Salafists. Indeed, whereas the Brotherhood is one cohesive entity that can summon hundreds of thousands of veritable foot soldiers, not to mention the millions of ordinary Egyptians who benefit from its social services, to execute its agenda, the Salafist movement is entirely decentralized and spread out among a plethora of Salafist groups, schools, and shaykhs.
In a certain sense, Salafists are mirror images of Muslim Brothers in that they privilege ideological objectives above organizational ones. Indeed, many Salafists are “quietist,” in that they view Salafism as a personal religious commitment and reject attempts to politicize it: “I don’t have to join any organization to be more religious,” stated Bakr, a Salafist who participated in the youth coalition that organized the 2011 anti-Mubarak protests, when asked why he never considered joining the Muslim Brotherhood, he said: “There is no organization in Salafism because an organization needs a target. And there is no target in Salafism, the only point is dawa (outreach).” Even those Salafists who are deeply involved in Salafist organizations view their affiliation as secondary to their personal religious commitments. “Salafist streams are movements and different schools, not an organization,” said al-Gamaa al-Islamiya member Abdullah Abdel Rahman, son of the infamous “Blind Shaykh” Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. “It’s a way of life. Anyone who follows the Holy Book and Sunna, they call him a Salafist. They don’t have a certain person to follow. … They all have their own schools, but agree on one way.”
Salafism’s deeply personal, self-directed nature is perhaps most evident in the independent process through which one becomes a Salafist. In stark contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s five-to-eight-year, four-stage process of internal promotion, one becomes a Salafist simply by declaring himself a “multazim,” or “obligated” to follow a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna. Typically, a multazim attaches himself to a specific Salafist shaykh, with whom he studies how to live a deeply conservative lifestyle. But the multazim can choose his shaykh, unlike a Muslim Brother, who is assigned to an usra and handed a standardized curriculum.
It is a long article, written after the passage of the Islamist dominated constitution in 2012, but still relevant.
It is too early to say how things have changed, but I imagine Muslim Brotherhood recruitment is rather difficult now. Much of their upper leadership is in prison, but presumably the lower ranks can carry on activity, however impeded. I gather their usras explain much mobilizing force behind recent smaller area protests.
As for Salafis, the question is if the leading sheikhs have been compromised by cooperation with the current government. It may be much easier, however, for the average Salafi-inclined individual to resort back to a quietist, non-political faith that had long accepted the misguided rule of Mubarak, which if less than legitimate made rebellion also illegitimate for the social strife it would incur.
But the present is still being written, so we will see.
If this seems like a boring title, read on. This article from Foreign Policy sheds much light on how Egyptian politics works, or at least used to work, and may again:
The attempt to restore the Mubarak-era way of doing business reflects the nature of the coalition that backed Morsy’s removal in July. The most critical opposition to Morsy’s rule outside Cairo came from the large families and tribes in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt, which comprised the Mubarak regime’s base and benefitted from its clientelist approach to politics.
“These traditional powers are the critical mass of voters,” Abdullah Kamal, a journalist and onetime official in Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), told me. These clans, he continued, “had sympathy” for Mubarak, voted for Mubarak’s former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik in the 2012 presidential elections, and would likely back Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi if he runs for president.
For decades, these clans wielded substantial political influence. They were empowered by the Mubarak regime’s use of relatively small electoral districts, which allowed them to mobilize their family members and local supporters to win elections. And since Egypt’s parliament was largely a mechanism for distributing state resources, the clans typically used their electoral victories to deliver resources back to their districts and thereby entrench their local support. Following the 2011 uprising, however, the new electoral system entailed much wider electoral districts that diluted these traditional powers’ support. Meanwhile the Islamist parties rode their internal unity to overwhelming, nationwide victories.
While the details for Egypt’s next parliamentary elections will be determined by the government, it is widely anticipated that the next system will feature smaller districts that will re-empower the old tribal networks. Influential players within the Egyptian state are pushing for a system that would shrink electoral districts considerably.
This is likely common knowledge to those who have followed Egypt for years, but it paints a very different picture than the argument issued after the revolution. Newer, non-Islamist parties complained about the large districts because they lacked the organizing power necessary to campaign across the whole area, as well as the social base of their competition and its charitable networks. What may have been meant is that they didn’t have the time to recruit and organize these stalwart power bases of old National Democratic Party support.
That could be a very unfair accusation. But the powers that drew the electoral districts – and I would have to research more to remember who did so (was it the Brotherhood-dominated Parliament or a state appointed electoral commission?) – made what could have been a revolutionary decision to break these ‘feloul’ power brokers, and it worked out very well for Islamists.
Gerrymandering. Politics is the same the world over, isn’t it? Alright, forgive me if it was still a little boring.
During the lead-up to the June 30 protests demanding early elections through the violent dispersal of the pro-Morsi sit-ins, several Brotherhood members spoke in vague terms of their ‘mistakes.’ It was a conciliatory gesture of sorts, admitting Morsi’s less than stellar performance but arguing this was not enough to undo his democratic legitimacy.
It is a fair enough logic, but it was never accompanied by any details concerning these mistakes. The closest to an admission came from Salah Sultan, who apologized for the Brotherhood’s negotiating with Omar Suleiman, opening channels with the military, not being honest enough about the efforts of corrupt regime figures to sabotage the revolution, and failing to absorb youth and women in their project. His statement was posted on the webpage of the Freedom and Justice Party, but later removed and described as only a ‘personal’ viewpoint.
This has been one of my frustrations in listening to the Brotherhood post-Morsi. They speak of mistakes, but are rarely specific. I understand the political logic, but wish for greater transparency. So I was thankful for an opportunity to press the issue directly:
But Darrag, instead, is put off by the question. “I don’t actually agree on the prescription that there are mistakes that the Brotherhood has to acknowledge and apologize for,” he said. “Of course there are mistakes, I am not saying that we don’t make mistakes. But this has to come through a process that all political forces, if they want to learn from past experiences, acknowledge their mistakes.”
Rather, he anticipates this process eventually coming from those who sided with the removal of Morsi:
“It doesn’t make sense to ask one side to keep apologizing and apologizing and apologizing. I mean, this is not helping.”
Perhaps it is not helping the Brotherhood, but if they tried apologizing even once, it might help the original revolutionary cause. But consistent with his position, Darrag anticipates the reflection coming from the other side. “People think and reconsider,” he said. “I am sure that one day the majority will join us in the same way that happened on January 25th.
“But when, I don’t know.”
Please click here to read the full article on Egypt Source.
Following the opening session of his trial, President Morsi was transferred to a public prison where he was able to release his first statement since he was deposed. He called his removal a coup, praised the people for their steadfast protests, and said Egypt would have no stability until his legitimacy was restored.
Meanwhile, the week upcoming marks the two year anniversary of some of the bloodiest protests from the interim period, when the military ruled and the Brotherhood left the revolutionary stage. Supporters of the current general are calling for a commemoration, but of the new unity between the people and the police. But it was the police who killed them, revolutionaries maintain, and the institution remains unreformed under any regime. They may protest afresh in counter-commemoration.
Will the protest movement widen? Will anti-Islamist revolutionaries recall their original ire against military rule? Or is it now nothing of the sort, and a true democratic transition is underway?
God, answer these questions in the hearts of Egyptians. May they hold their leaders accountable as they pray for them. May they join a consensual process as they protest all wrongdoings. Unite these dichotomies in both the diversity of the people and the uniqueness of the individual.
Give Morsi patience, discernment, and courage, God. He is frustrated, surely; give him hope. Judge both him and the nation, God, and bring both to a better place. Do likewise with all who support him.
Give patience, discernment, and courage to the revolutionaries as well, God. They have been frustrated for two years, having watched colleagues fall and justice fade. Will fresh protests renew their hope? Or has their hope come in newly minted unity? Reform the police institution, God, and show revolutionaries the best way to honor both their friends and their nation.
Protect Egypt, God. As she emerges after three months of a state of emergency and life under curfew, give self-discipline in place of security solutions. Amidst all her diversity in a cacophony of speaking, give her silence and reflection.
But whether within the din or its dearth, make the right voices heard. May yours be quietly audible, above all else. Then have Egypt’s roar follow.
Following on the heels of Morsi’s trial, it is difficult to see how the Muslim Brotherhood is called a terrorist organization from within the urban settings of Cairo. But this article from the Daily Beast describes the embattled position of police elsewhere:
“We never imagined that the violence could reach this point,” said Qadry Said Refay as he lay in the police hospital. The 37-year-old cop based in Fayoum, about 60 miles south of Cairo, had multiple head wounds, a broken right arm, and a deep, guttural cough.
On the morning of August 14, the same day the Brotherhood demonstrators were cleared away by Al-Sisi’s forces in Cairo, Refay reported for duty as usual in the ancient farming town near Egypt’s biggest oasis. The police station got a call: Brotherhood sympathizers were massing for an attack. Refay thinks there were thousands of them. Probably the numbers were smaller than that. But the four officers and 20 cops soon found themselves under attack by men with guns and Molotov cocktails closing in on all four sides of their little compound. After several hours the mob started coming over the walls and breached one of the gates.
I was sure I would lose my life,” said Refay. In the middle of the fray he took off his uniform shirt, untucked his t-shirt, and put his gun in the back of his belt. He tried for a few seconds to reason with the attackers, but they swarmed over him. They took his pistol. They slashed his face with knives. “The last thing I can remember,” he said, “is one of them reaching to the ground, picking up a stone, and smashing it on my head.”
To what degree is the Brotherhood responsible for such violence? There is a culture of revenge in Upper Egypt that is far more intrinsically grassroots than any social support for political Islam.
At the same time, when security forces recaptured some of the villages seized by local Islamists, Brotherhood statements portrayed them as peaceful villagers under police attack. Surely it was bloody on all sides, and revenge from both cannot be discounted. But the Brotherhood publicly stood with those who raided police stations and committed the atrocities described above.
The burned-out police station, its walls pocked with bullet holes, was covered with graffiti—“This is the price for injustice. God will have victory,” and “Sisi, you are next.”
But one Brotherhood leader paints the picture as one of simple revenge, and his organization as a restraining force:
“Families in Upper Egypt are not accepting condolences,” said El Magd. “So they will take vengeance. So I think killing will start in Upper Egypt. And I don’t think the [Brotherhood] movement can control this. In Upper Egypt, if families don’t accept condolences for their dead, then they set their minds to vengeance.”
El Magd had the practice of tha’r in mind. “This cannot be controlled. Nobody can control Upper Egypt vengeance. And now everybody has guns. They have guns in Kirdasah. I am not saying that it will be civil war. But at least Upper Egypt will go back to the ‘70s or ‘80s, where people were shooting at police officers just because they were police officers.”
Upper Egypt is hard to understand. What is the difference between a blood feud and terrorism? Does the distinction even matter?
Truth, justice, and reconciliation are urgently needed in Egypt. Will Morsi’s trial be the beginning of this process, or just one more obfuscation to keep it from happening?
US Secretary of State John Kerry met with top Egypt officials to convey Washington’s “deep concern” about the transitional period and to offer the US’s goodwill should developments move “on the right track,” according to Western diplomats.
But on CNN, the focus brushes over any difficulties at all:
U.S. ties with Egypt go deeper than aid, America’s top diplomat said Sunday.
“Let me make it clear here today: President Obama and the American people support the people of Egypt,” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said. “We believe this is a vital relationship.”
Both articles report the general thrust of the speech, but their opening leads are indicative. The US wants to avoid a crisis while Egypt wants to project one.
I cannot speak very well about the messaging coming from Washington, but Egypt is currently filled with belief that the US backed the Muslim Brotherhood and is even now working behind the scenes against the popularly backed military move to depose President Morsi.
After all, for many here, the timing of Kerry’s visit is auspicious. He arrives one day before Morsi’s trial is to begin.
Jayson Casper 