Egyptian presidential campaigns have entered the mudslinging stage. Ahmed Shafiq has been on the defensive since his entry into the race, in which he is accused of being a member of the former regime and seeking to reconstitute it. He has also faced charges of financial corruption during his time as Minister of Civil Aviation.
In recent days he has hit back, especially against the Muslim Brotherhood. He has accused them of working with Qatar to sell/lease the Suez Canal to the Gulf state, and working with Mubarak to make secret deals in exchange for a proportion of parliament seats. In terms of the revolution he said they are the often-touted third party who killed protestors and burned police stations.
As best I can follow, no conclusive evidence has been issued to support his charges. Yet the political climate reminded me of a project I have been working on to establish a chronology of Islamism in Egypt since the dawn of the Muslim Brotherhood. The following list is disputed in points, and is compiled from a book entitled ‘Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics’, by Barry Rubin. It outlines moments in history where Islamists have been violent, and others where they have shied away.
Shafiq asserts we are now in another violent period. I have significant doubts, but as with all things revolutionary, anything is possible, even plausible.
1929 – Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banna
1930-39 – MB grows to tens of thousands of members, including in police, army, and government institutions, and includes a Secret Organization for militant activity and terrorism
1948 – MB raises funds, buys weapons, runs training camps, and sends volunteers to Palestine
1948 – Egypt’s government dissolves the MB using emergency law from Palestine war
1949, February – MB member shoots Prime Minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi, regime retaliates by assassinating Hassan al-Banna
1951 – MB supplies many fighters during the Suez Canal crisis, links with Free Officers in the army including Anwar Sadat
1952, July – Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrows monarchy during revolution/coup d’etat
1952 – Sayyid Qutb returns from America horrified at its society, becomes a leader in the MB and was involved in meetings with Nasser
1952-54 – al-Banna’s successor Hassan al-Hudaybi works as a reformist to prevent consolidation of Nasser’s power, while Qutb plays hardball and promotes seizing power
1954, August – al-Hudaybi opposes Nasser’s treaty with the British over the Suez Canal and is arrested
1954, October – MB member (allegedly) opens fire on Nasser; he survives and takes over as head of state, 6000 arrested as organization is outlawed
1954 – Qutb arrested and sentenced to 25 years in prison, after he developed theory of jahiliyya, which describes Egyptian society as non-Islamic
1954-64 – Nasser establishes Muslim credentials as mosque building flourishes, Islamic radio is established, the Azhar is incorporated into the state and modernized, and religion is made a compulsory subject in schools
1964 – Nasser frees MB members in prison in an effort to counter Egyptian Marxists
1965, August – Nasser accuses MB of assassination plot, 27,000 arrested, 26 tortured to death, Qutb, Yusuf Hawash, and Abdel Fattah Ismail hanged
1967 – Egypt suffers humiliating defeat against Israel, undermining Nasser’s legacy and legitimacy
1970-85 – Government supported mosques double their religious programs, with triple student enrollment
1970, October – Anwar Sadat becomes president
1970 – First Islamist association founded in Qasr al-Aini Hospital among doctors and interns who treated Islamists released from prison
1971, May – Sadat purges socialists and frees MB prisoners to combat them, including al-Hudaybi and future leader al-Tilimsani
1971 – MB works with Sadat on new constitution making ‘the principles of the Islamic sharia a principle source of legislation’, but complain it does not make it the sole source of authority
1971 – Shukri Mustafa breaks with the MB following his release from prison, sets up Takfir wa Higra
1971-77 – MB cooperates with Sadat and his ‘Corrective Revolution’, until splitting over his peace initiative with Israel
1973 – al-Tilimsani becomes Supreme Guide of the MB, was a close associate of al-Banna
1974, April – Islamic Liberation Organization, led by Salah Sariyya (a Palestinian) fails in coup d’etat at the Military Technical Academy in Heliopolis, 92 people indicted, including 18 cadets; 30 officers and 100+ soldiers discharged for sympathy
1975, July – Sadat issues full pardon to MB members still in prison
1976 – Sadat creates Arab Socialist Union to open up political life, MB supports him during parliamentary elections; wins right to publish al-Da’wa journal
1977, January – riots breakout over Sadat’s policy to trim food subsidies, MB mocks government for blaming the communists
1977, July – Takfir wa Higra kidnaps and murders former Endowments and Azhar minister Husain al-Dhahabi, who criticized their idea of jahiliyya and isolation from society in preparation for violent overthrow of the government
1978, March – Takfir wa Higra leader Shukri Mustafa hanged with four others, many imprisoned
1978, September – Sadat crafts Camp David Accords with Israel
1978, December – Parliament forms committee to study if current laws comply with sharia
1979, March – Egypt signs peace treaty with Israel, MB opposes it and Camp David harshly, but al-Tilimsani calls on Arab League not to ostracize Sadat
1979, June – Sadat suspends publication of MB’s al-Da’wa journal
1979, July – Sadat accuses al-Hudaybi’s successor Omar al-Tilimsani of trying to overthrow regime
1979 – Islamist independent candidates Sheikh Salah Abu Ismail and Hassan al-Gamal elected to parliament
1979 – Sadat cracks down on Islamic associations, especially in universities, arresting many and limiting freedom of association, criticizing them for Muslim-Christian clashes
1979 – Asyut Islamic association succeeds in forcing university to segregate students by gender
1980 – Army publishes religious magazine for soldiers to keep them from radicalism, increases mosque construction on bases; government publishes two religious magazines, al-Liwa’ al-Islami and al-Urwa al-Wuthqa
1981, June – Muslim-Coptic riots in Zawiya al-Hamra, Cairo; al-Da’wa accuses Copts of slandering Islam and gathering arms to kill Muslims
1981, September – Popular preacher Abdel Hamid Kishk accuses Sadat of betraying Islamic principles, following his sermon Muslims exit and attack neighboring church
1981, September – Sadat arrests 1500 activists, 90% of whom are Islamists, including al-Tilimsani, MB spokesmen Saleh Ashmawi and Mohamad Abdel Qudus, as well as Kishk; also arrests Copts and secular activists; government assumes control over 40,000 privately owned mosques
1981, September – Among the above Sadat arrests brother of Khalid al-Islamboli who was a member of an Asyut Islamic association
1981, October – Sadat assassinated by Khalid al-Islamboli of al-Jihad
1981, November – al-Tilimsani denies the MB ever used violence or terrorism
1982, March – Investigation into Sadat assassination sentences al-Jihad leader Mohamed Abdel Salam Farag (author of ‘The Neglected Duty’ about jihad) to death with four others, five given life imprisonment, twelve long sentences, but Omar Abdel Rahman acquitted, though he authorized the assassination with a fatwa
1982 – al-Tilimsani suggests violent Islamic groups were set up by the government to counter the MB
1982 – Government sends Azhar and MB clerics into the prisons to instruct extremists about proper Islam, program mostly publicity and false reform
1982 – Parliament committee finishes work finding most laws already comply with sharia, the rest should be reformed gradually
1984 – al-Tilimsani secures MB-Wafd Party partnership with Fuad Sirag Eddin to elect MB members through Wafd’s legal structure, wins 15% of the vote with eight seats for MB
1985, February – After Mubarak permits resumption of Islamic associations’ work, Egyptian University Student Federation reestablished
1985 – Wave of bumper stickers spread through Cairo bearing Islamic slogans
1985, June – Hafez Salama, popular war hero, tries to launch a demonstration from his mosque in Abbasiyya, Cairo in support of sharia law, relents, re-launches later, is removed from his pulpit and arrested; MB did not support his efforts
1986, April – Four officers and 29 people arrested for stealing ammunition in a plot to take over the government, linked to al-Jihad
1985, May – Parliament defeats law authorizing sharia as the law of the land
1986, May – al-Tilimsani dies and is succeeded by Mohamed Abu al-Nasr
1986, October – Police foil an armed effort to takeover an Alexandria radio station
1986 – MB breaks with Wafd over internal power struggle, joins with Liberal Party instead; Salah Abu Ismail becomes vice-president and party drops support for Camp David
1987 – Jihadist group Survivors from Hellfire fail to assassinate al-Musawwar magazine editor Makram Mohamed Ahmed and former interior minister Nabawi Ismail
1987 – Mohamed Abu al-Nasr revises MB history claiming the regime made them out to be violent promoting myths of their earlier insurrection, though he took MB oath fifty years earlier on a Qur’an and a gun
1987, April – Islamist Alliance wins 17% of seats in parliamentary elections with 36 seats to MB
1987, July – MB agreed with ruling NDP to support Mubarak’s bid for second six-year term
1987, Members of Islamic associations sweep student elections at all faculties in Cairo University
1987, MB electoral program calls for ending military cooperation with the United States, but favors Western ‘People of the Book’ over Soviet Russia
The headlines in the West will read, ‘Mubarak sentenced to life imprisonment.’ They may also say, ‘Egyptians take to the street in protest.’ Confused?
Unless one reads more deeply the obvious connection must be that protestors wanted his head, literally. The reality is rather simple, just not within the headlines.
Mubarak and the former Minster of the Interior Habib al-Adly were convicted, but the chiefs of the Ministry of the Interior were declared innocent. The statement says there was insufficient evidence to link them to the charge of killing protestors during the revolution.
So the primary revolutionary reaction sees a political ruling pure and simple. Mubarak and Adly were thrown under the bus – though many fear the case may be overturned on appeal. Meanwhile the figures on the ground who represent the backbone of the old regime are let free. The cry is that the regime is rebuilding itself, just in time for presidential elections.
To add salt to the wound, Mubarak, his two sons, and other financial cronies were declared innocent on corruption charges.
Therefore, this is where Egypt currently stands. A year and a half after the revolution, the president is in jail, but still no one knows who actually killed the protestors.
What is far more curious is the estimation of what is going on behind the scenes. It is little coincidence that the verdict was issued today; closing arguments were presented months ago. The only difficulty is deciphering what the coincidence means.
To preface, however, it must be stated first and foremost this may have simply been a ruling according to the evidence. Sufficient or otherwise, all involved may be honest men. It is noteworthy few voices are asserting this at the moment, though some have celebrated the achievement of a guilty verdict being issued against a former Arab strongman. Like the trial itself, it is a marked change in the traditional status quo.
But it is much more fun to engage in conspiracy, however sad the fact it is still the traditional status quo.
There are three main variations espoused:
The immediate judgment, for which thousands have now descended to Tahrir Square, is that the old regime is defending its own henchmen, though Mubarak has outlived his usefulness. Fitting in with halting efforts at implementing social justice and real democracy, protestors see this judgment as one more nail in the revolution’s coffin. The final one will occur with the election of Ahmed Shafiq, by hook or by crook. Many of this ilk judge his presence in the run-off elections as due either to their outright interference, or to the fostering of conditions prejudicing the people to desire the return of law and order.
How does the confusing judgment against Mubarak aid the Shafiq campaign? This removes the conspiracy one step beyond the revolutionaries who have been sucked in. Conspiracy number two has two prongs, the second nastier than the first.
The first prong states the verdict was made exactly to draw protestors back into the square. Over the past eighteen months the legitimacy of street politics has been whittled away as the people grow tired of endless protest. Given the revolution is still largely leaderless, protestors can be relied upon to trip over themselves in greater and greater radicalization. If not, well-placed infiltrators will foul things up for them. This pattern has been seen over and over again. Repeated once more on a large scale, the public will say – ‘But they convicted Mubarak, what more does the revolution want?’
Then they will go to the booths and elect Shafiq.
The second prong posits the conspiracy is not working solely for the preservation of old regime or military council power, but for a United States and Israel who desire to see Egypt devolve into utter chaos. Here, the powers-that-be are accomplices, but the Mubarak trial and the presidential elections are simply means to pull the rug out from under those whose appetite was whet for reception of power.
This could be the socialists, or it could be the Islamists. The point, as mentioned before, is radicalization. A coming corollary to the manipulation of Mubarak’s trial could be the ruling on the constitutionality of parliament, or on the constitutionality of parliament’s law to isolate Shafiq politically, not yet applied. Any number of vague, unclear, or manipulative judgments on these issues could get people back to the streets en masse. Take care to watch if somehow or other the presidential run-off elections are ‘postponed’.
At what point will aggrieved parties take up arms? This prong of the conspiracy is salivating at the question.
The final conspiracy batted about is not nearly as nasty but nearly equal in cynicism. This has been heard most often by Coptic voices and some liberals, finding a scheme in the works to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power.
To introduce this strand of thought, it is noteworthy the Brotherhood has called upon members to take to the street in protest of the Mubarak verdict.
Of course, drawing the Brotherhood in fits well with the different prongs of conspiracy two. Back before parliamentary elections the Brotherhood stood aside while revolutionaries were being killed on Mohamed Mahmoud St. They feared a trap, and did not want to jeopardize the elections in which they were poised to do well.
As it turns out, pragmatically, they made the right decision. But though they won the great plurality of seats, they lost almost all of their revolutionary legitimacy. Now deeply committed to the presidential election, the Brotherhood is trying to claim it back. As Shafiq is clearly a non-revolutionary candidate, they must capture the revolutionary constituency if they wish to win.
Now back at the square, they can either be discredited or radicalized, but conspiracy three posits otherwise. It notes the Brotherhood has been in close collaboration with the military/intelligence service since the revolution began. It furthermore asserts that Brotherhood-regime bickering has been mostly a show.
The point at hand is in order to cede power to the Brotherhood legitimately, the population must embrace them democratically, and by a wide margin. A wary public and international scene would demand no less. Step one engineered the victory of Shafiq, to the detriment of other candidates with more revolutionary cred. Step two is to engineer crises in order to get the Brotherhood to lay claim to revolutionary leadership.
Most revolutionaries have not bought any of the Brotherhood’s efforts at rebranding, but this does not matter much. They have already been strong-armed into at least a boycott if not grudging support for Morsy out of their deep conviction against the old regime. They have little appetite for an Islamist project, even if some to many have Islamic sympathies. But they feel they can deal with the Brotherhood whereas a Shafiq victory will crush them.
But revolutionaries have no nationwide electoral weight, though the revolution bears much electoral sympathy. The conspiracy states the public is being shown every reminder of old regime corruption – gas shortages, shady court cases, financial fraud, and even the reconstituting of the Ministry of Interior – in order to lend their vote to anyone but Shafiq. Who would this be now, after the run-off? Only the Muslim Brotherhood, as all other revolutionary forces have been set aside.
Since this scenario is so counter-intuitive to the traditional status quo, the question must be asked about why. The simple answer is that in order to remake the old regime, it needs the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak’s political power rested in the National Democratic Party, which was thoroughly dismantled – and headquarters burned – after the revolution. No suitable party exists to take its place, except the formerly hated Islamists.
Of course, if this conspiracy is true, there are even more possibilities. The first is that the presidency is given to the Brotherhood for the same reason parliament was given – to discredit them in the eyes of the people. Perhaps the old regime, not truly in cahoots with them, will give four years to watch them fail in handling every crisis they inherit, and others to be provoked along the way. Then, finally, Islamism can be dismissed without weapons or prison terms – the ineffective methods of the traditional status quo.
The second and third possibilities return the conspiracy to the international scene. The United States (Israel features less prominently here) desire Islamist rule perhaps to foster regional stability in accordance with democratic principles. Egypt is Muslim, let the pro-business and pragmatic Brotherhood rule, and we can get on with our lives without incessant instability from Cairo.
Or, in the apocalyptic scenario, the United States desires another eventual enemy. The war on terrorism is running thin, with the only current conflicts parried about through drone warfare. The military-industrial complex needs more than that. The region – through Islamism – must become stronger to at least enable another Cold War. This will permit defense contracts to remain plumb parcels of every budget for years to come.
Unfortunately, this scenario works well to prove the depth of depravity to which conspiracy thinking leads. Unfortunately further, this is the reality in which Egypt is currently operating.
Perhaps the Mubarak verdict was perfectly just given the standards of law. The standards of revolution, however, are always murkier.
The nation has settled into the reality of an election between the Brotherhood and a figure from the old regime. They have not settled in happily, nor have they particularly made up their mind. But as the candidates negotiate for support and endorsements, seeking the middle as they only last week were seeking their base, even the final ballot is not yet guaranteed.
But if firm, God, guide the politics. Give wisdom to the electorate to make a sincere and honorable choice. May you reveal the nature of each candidate over the next few weeks.
But tomorrow could be a disruption, or it could be a collective yawn. The verdict in Mubarak’s trial is scheduled to be delivered – on live TV.
God, may justice be done. May the nation recognize the legitimacy of the verdict, and may the various partisans remain calm. Prevent opaqueness and manipulation, but care first for those on trial, and those who await recompense for past ills. In the end, God, bring reconciliation and healing to Egypt.
A little further off lies another trial, in which the constitutional court will rule if the regime figure is a legal candidate. The Parliament passed quickly a law to prevent him from running, but it was referred to the court and he was allowed to proceed.
What is best for Egypt, God? That he continues to the runoff as per the will of the people? That he be eliminated by the law as per the will of the parliament, and by extension, the will of the people?
Should Egypt be spared the choice of an old regime member and have the number three qualifier take his place? Or would his disqualification throw the whole process for a loop? Would the Brotherhood candidate run unopposed? Would the whole first round need to be redone, extending the transition?
So many interests are wrapped up in the possibility, God. Please ensure the process is transparent and the judiciary is independent. May they rule according to the law, but is the law fair? Post-revolution, is there even a law? There isn’t yet a constitution. Who can judge what is right?
Beyond these trials, there are the further pending judgments over the legitimacy of parliament, and even the legitimacy of the military council’s constitutional declaration. Any blow to these foundations could shake Egypt further. There is no timing, seemingly, but are held in abeyance.
God, honor Egypt with justice, with truth, and with transparency. Give her the right to rule over her land, to choose the people most accountable to her will. May these lead with integrity and righteousness in the weeks, and years, to come.
Make Egypt whole, God. Make her vibrant. May she reflect the glory you have given her ancient land.
On February 28, 2012 the leaders of the Evangelical Churches of Egypt met with the Muslim Brotherhood, and produced a document delineating the shared values of both organizations.
About a month ago I posted the text of this agreement online. Today, my article was published on Christianity Today, drawing out from leaders on both sides the substance of what exactly was agreed upon. Please click here to read it on their site.
Seventeen evangelical signatories are listed; perhaps the one most surprising comes at the very end.
Rev. Rifaat Fikry is the pastor of an evangelical church in Shubra, a densely populated suburb to the north of Cairo well known for its high concentration of Christian residents.
Rev. Fikry is well known for his strident anti-Islamist stance. In fact, it is this very posture which involved him in the dialogue in the first place.
President of the Evangelical Churches Rev. Safwat el-Bayadi and Vice-President Rev. Andrea Zaki first contemplated the quiet invitation of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued through Dr. Rafik Habib. Habib is a controversial figure in evangelical circles. He is the son of Rev. Samuel Habib, founder of the Coptic Organization for Social Services – one of the largest charity and development groups in the country.
He is also a vice-president in the Freedom and Justice Party, the political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Coptic community of Egypt is very wary of Islamists, fearing an agenda they believe will result in their marginalization and loss of citizenship rights. Knowing full well the sentiment of their flock, Bayadi and Zaki turned to Fikry as the best exemplar and most informed of those who could express Coptic fears through an evangelical lens.
They asked him to write a letter to the Brotherhood detailing every concern, complaint, and consternation. After review, Bayadi and Zaki placed their names on the document, and sent it to the Brotherhood through Habib.
As the original author, it was only appropriate for Fikry to attend the subsequent meeting. He was especially interested to sit face to face with Brotherhood leaders, to ask them the questions at the heart of his opposition. During the sessions, he did so, with boldness.
In the end, Fikry was very pleased with the document. His main complaint lies in the Brotherhood’s rejection of referencing international treaties on human rights. MB leaders were concerned this could open the door to an acceptance of homosexuality, but Fikry argued nothing of the sort. His concern was for religious rights principally.
Even as the meeting ended, Fikry maintained an anti-Islamist stance. He was skeptical; after many months he finds confirmation that the Brotherhood simply used the evangelical churches for political gain.
But he is not regretful. Fikry is clear that he will sit for dialogue with anyone. The lasting value in the meeting comes not only from the agreed upon document, but also from the beginning of relationship. Though this has not continued in subsequent months, it still exists. If Islamists reach to power – a proposition Fikry finds very unlikely – these relationships could be invaluable. If not, they are valuable all the same.
They enable a man to say his piece, and to hear an answer directly.
As the evangelical churches and Muslim Brotherhood agreed, this is part and parcel of citizenship.
The only question, for Fikry especially, is of implementation. Even so, fear thereof should not preclude the effort.
On the contrary, such fear demands it.
Note: Christianity Today also published a feature text on Egypt and the responses of Christian leaders to the transition period. Please click here for access, and click here for the article on the MB-Evangelical agreement.
Posting to the blog has been a little scarce these days, after a furious run-up to the elections. The good news is that the writing focus has been directed to publications seeking coverage, and the first of these was published this afternoon at Christianity Today. I hope another one will come due next week, but for now, please enjoy this preview, and if it grabs you click below to conclude the reading on their site.
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After a year of new forms of political engagement, why do Copts still face the same ‘bitter choice’ of old regime vs. Islamists?
Despite the best efforts of Christian and Muslim revolutionaries, the first free presidential election in Egypt’s history has resulted in an all-too-familiar choice: old regime vs. Islamists.
The nation’s Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission confirmed on Monday that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsy advanced to the run-off election against Ahmed Shafik, former president Hosni Mubarak’s last-ditch appointee as prime minister during the revolution’s early days. Both candidates gathered nearly 25 percent of the vote. Only a few percentage points behind was Hamdeen Sabbahi, whose late surge as the revolutionary choice was not enough to displace Egypt’s traditional combatants.
The majority of Copts voted for Shafik, according to Mina el-Badry, an evangelical pastor in Upper Egypt. “Not from love, but to oppose the Islamists,” he said, “because [Shafik] is from the army and will know how to run the transition, and because he is clear and firm in his word and decision.”
Youssef Sidhom, editor-in-chief of Coptic newspaper Watani, also sees the necessity of Christians supporting Shafik. “The revolution is now in the hands of political Islam,” he said, “and Copts must make a bitter choice to support the civil state.”
Yet many Copts wonder why this bitter choice has returned.
Click here to continue reading at Christianity Today.
Thank you for a successful first round of voting. Preserve Egypt these next three weeks and through the final run-off.
Thank you for the voice of the people being expressed, being free, and being diverse. May it still be heard, and may it still be decisive. May it stay free and diverse – though united – in the years and elections to come.
Yet as the election is worthy of celebration, the results – still preliminary – give pause to many. The top two candidates represent the Muslim Brotherhood and the old regime. This is the standard dichotomy, the voice of the people did not move away from it. Will a win for either be decisive, or simply prolong the struggle?
God, honor the partisans of both these sides. Recognize and honor their dedication, in many cases, to oppose their opposite. Each bears flaws, and each hosts virtue. May their struggle refine and not destroy.
But God, give wisdom to those of neither side. What would you have them do? If the see the choice as between two evils, which is the less? Must they choose? Does such a choice exercise the necessary wisdom and responsibility you give each person? Or does it make them complicit in the flaws of either?
Should love push them to embrace one or the other, clinging to the virtues they find? Is there any way to embrace both? Or is a boycott their best and most honorable option?
Egypt has succeeded today, God, but not completed its task. It is likely to remain unfinished even after the run-off. If the struggle continues, in either direction, may it not be lengthy, debilitating, or violent. May Egyptians honorably rebuild their state.
May they find you a help and support, and not a source of division. May all dichotomy end on the side of right.
The Islamist front-runner in today’s historic presidential election in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsy, has ‘clarified’ the Islamic position on conversion, in what could be seen as an appeal to liberal election watchers.
He said on the popular al-Nahar satellite TV station, on 17 May, in Arabic: ‘There is a wrong concept widely misunderstood, that the apostate [convert] is subject to Islamic punishment. This needs clarification,’ he said on the eve of the first free elections in Egypt’s history.
The man described by the Times today as an ‘uncharismatic party bureaucrat’ was not the Brotherhood’s original candidate, but emerged after the interim authorities banned Khairat al-Shater, who had spent time in jail under the Mubarak regime.
His pronouncement is startling since apostasy – renouncing Islam – carries the death penalty in much of the Muslim world. It is not proscribed by the constitutional law in Egypt, although citizens can bring cases against those suspected of contravening any aspect of the sharia which is still the primary source of law.
Opportune
Morsy’s own conversion has come at an opportune time, on the eve of the second day of polling. He believes he has found a new perspective on what is widely seen as the root cause of oppression in the Islamic world: ‘The Egyptian citizen, between himself and God, if he wants to change his faith or his doctrine, he has complete freedom.’
Morsy, like all candidates, in appealing to as many voters as possible, speaks the language of Islam, with competition fierce between him, other Islamist candidates such as Abdul Moneim Abou El Fotouh and secular figures like former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa.
Current polls show Morsy trailing in as low as third or fourth position, but few people doubt the organizational capabilities of the Brotherhood to get out the vote.
For his part, Morsy predicted he would capture 60 per cent of the vote in first round elections which began yesterday (23 May) but there would be a run-off if any candidate failed to win 50 per cent-plus-one of the electorate, between the top two, on 16/17June.
A third case concerns around 100 Coptic applicants seeking re-conversion to Christianity, having previously adopted Islam.
Countries where conversion is treasonable are Iran, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Qatar, UAE, according to the Amman Center for Human Rights Studies’ 5th annual report in 2010, and this has a chilling effect on Egyptian religious freedom.
A case can be made against any Egyptian citizen for any crime against Islam and a judge has the ability to accept or deny that case.
In the past decade, a number of judges have taken it upon themselves to rule according to Islamic law regardless of what the constitutional law says, and have imposed draconian punishment ranging from imprisonment and torture to enforced divorce and loss of position.
The apparent arbitrariness of this as a system – since Sharia is so widely interpreted in the Muslim world – accounts for the insecurity felt by many.
Revd Fayez Isack is a pastor at the evangelical church of Kasr el-Dobara in Cairo, the largest Protestant church in the Arab world. He maintains these legal cases are only the tip of the iceberg, but there is no sound research on precise numbers.
He finds little comfort in Morsy’s statement.
‘This is typical of the way they talk. The apostate has all the rights until he becomes a threat to the system of God, and then the law of God is applied,’ he said.
According to other Protestant sources, who asked not to be named for the sake of security, there are hundreds of thousands of ‘secret believers’ who have converted to Christianity. For these, the ‘clarification’ Morsy mentioned is important.
Morsy contends that religion is a private matter – up to a point. He stated: ‘Anyone who keeps his trouble in his home, to himself – no one has the legal or Islamic right to knock on his door and ask what he’s doing. But when the home begins to affect society, this is where the law and the sharia have the right to interfere.’
Official Brotherhood spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan backs up Isack’s critique. ‘Egyptian society is not like the West; calling to a different religion causes social strife, even if just one person to another.’
Jerusalem
Morsy’s appeal to liberal voters contrasts with other MB efforts to reach conservatives with a pan-Islamic vision that has horrified some commentators in the wake of the Revolution.
Sheikh Safwat Hegazi, a popular television preacher who appears frequently with Morsy at rallies, was banned from entering France in April.
Safwat Hegazi
Endorsing Morsy, he declared recently before thousands at Cairo stadium: ‘We can see how the dream of the Islamic caliphate is being realized, God willing, by Dr. Mohamed Morsi.
‘Our capital shall not be in Cairo, Mecca or Medina; millions of martyrs march toward Jerusalem.’
Ghozlan dismissed these comments, but stopped short of condemning them.
‘Egypt is a sinking ship, and we need to get back on our own feet before we can worry about regional issues.
‘This is less a strategy than a dream, and his comments are not based in any reality.
‘We are part of the Arab world and we believe in Arab unity and greater integration both politically and economically, but we would need to wait decades, even centuries, before we can see a caliphate realized.
‘Wisdom says let the statement go and seek to clarify, rather than embarrassing the person who came to support you.’
Yet another MB commentator, Hassan Abdel Sattar Mohamed, member of the media committee of the Brotherhood for south Cairo, is clearer. He stated: ‘Hegazi sees in Morsy one who will apply the goals of sharia, and who has a vision for the unity of Arab and Islamic states.
‘We refuse the Zionist entity which occupies al-Aqsa [in Jerusalem], and we support the Palestinian cause.
‘It is the ultimate goal to have Jerusalem as the capital and to march for its liberation, but reality does not permit this now.’
Politicians around the world seek ‘big tent’ politics, but often by default fall back on the strength of their base. Seeking the centre, the Muslim Brotherhood has made countless statements on their intention to create a civil state with full citizenship rights for all.
The question that remains to be resolved is whether such statements as these on apostasy and the caliphate represent an appeal for votes – or core policy objectives.
This piece was originally published on Lapido Media.
‘Felool’ is the Arabic word designating ‘remnants of the regime’, that is, those who lost power and influence after the revolution, having formerly benefited by proximity to Mubarak and his circles of influence. An Islamist favors a system of government in which sharia law plays a principle role in determining legislation. What then are they doing in my home?
Well, they belong there. They are my two oldest daughters, aged 5 and 4. Our youngest, age 2, does not yet have political consciousness.
Once the revolution began becoming politics, ‘felool’ expanded in meaning to include those who support some continuation of the old regime, perhaps saying things like, ‘It wasn’t so bad,’ or, ‘Not everyone in it was corrupt.’
But in many cases, ‘felool’ also served as an accusation to throw around against political opponents deemed not sufficiently revolutionary, or sufficiently Islamist.
In its final incarnation, used thereafter in this article, it applies specifically to the candidacies of Ahmed Shafiq and Amr Moussa, and their supporters.
So why is my oldest daughter felool? Here is the imagined explanation, sufficiently plausible.
The Egyptian political spectrum has evolved into basically three camps. The first camp is Islamist. Mohamed Morsy represents the Muslim Brotherhood, and while Abdel Munim Abul Futuh has sought to position himself as a centrist, he still identifies as an Islamist. Having gained the endorsement of many Salafis, he has scared away a number of former centrist or revolutionary supporters.
The second camp, as mentioned above, is felool. Ahmed Shafiq was Mubarak’s last-ditch prime minister, appointed to stem the tide of the protests. He carried on for a little while after Mubarak stepped down, but continued protests in Tahrir forced Shafiq’s sacking as well. Running for president, he does not outright call for a return to the days of Mubarak, but he does call for a return of stability and opposition to Islamists, with lip service to the youth of the revolution.
Amr Moussa is less felool, having served in Mubarak’s cabinet early in his administration but having more detachment from the regime while serving as chairman of the Arab League up until the outbreak of the revolution. Still, he is old, and certainly a product of the Mubarak era. He will be gentler with diverse political parties, most likely, but still represents stability and non-Islamism, as well as a vote toward ‘reform’ rather than ‘revolution’.
The third camp says a pox on both your houses. Hamdeen Sabbahi is an old school Nasserist, which means he is a nationalist with socialist tendencies. His campaign has been advancing as of late as many voters are fed up with the above choices. They have rejected Mubarak, but don’t trust Islamists.
This is where my daughters come in. We are an American Christian family living in Egypt. We have attempted to live in the culture, speaking the language as best we can. Within this choice we worship at the Coptic Orthodox Church, and my daughters both attended preschool therein. The oldest just completed kindergarten as the only non-Egyptian in her private school.
If you tweak out the demographics of this simple description of our lives, you will find we are predisposed to supporting the felool, and to a lesser degree, Islamists.
We are Westerners, and Islamist candidates unnerve us no matter how many reassurances they issue. (Living here, we can also see the opposite of these reassurances at times.)
Yet we also see the conservative religious make-up of much of Egyptian society, and recognize the right of a people to be governed according to its mores. Islamism should not be dismissed in principle, though certain interpretations may be.
We are comparatively wealthy, having our daughter in a private school. Those who benefitted economically from the Mubarak era are more inclined to support felool candidates.
Yet Islamists are also successful businessmen in Egypt, having much support among the middle class, which populates the private school our daughter attends.
We are Christians, and rub shoulders with the Copts. This community is desperately worried about the possibility of Islamist rule, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Their oft-spoken preference is for Ahmed Shafiq.
As is the preference of my oldest daughter.
Yet we also place high respect on the values which drove much of the Egyptian revolution, and recognize the corruption and lack of representation characterizing much of the Mubarak regime. We sympathize with those who desire an Islamist, yet revolutionary candidate, and their oft-spoken preference is for Abul Futuh.
As is the preference of my second daughter.
My daughters do not know the names of any other candidates. Perhaps they simply picked up on the name their Western, school, and Coptic friends banter about, who themselves have picked up on the name uttered by their parents.
That is the plausible, though invented explanation. The reality is much simpler.
Driving about in a taxi the other day a Shafiq supporter tossed his political brochure into the vehicle. A little further on a truck full of Shafiq partisans beeped their horns loudly, flew high his banner, and chanted as they drove, ‘Ahmed Shafiq! Ahmed Shafiq!’
Now my daughters do the same, even the Abul Futuh supporter.
Many Egyptians have shown political acumen far beyond their nation’s democratic experience. Others, perhaps, have made their decision in a similar matter, gauging the preference of those in the area, or gravitating to the candidate with the greatest name recognition.
Surely, however, they have not done as my second daughter.
Each candidate sports a symbol to help illiterate voters find their preferred candidate on the ballot. Mohamed Morsy, of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, has the scales of justice. Sabbahi, the Nasserite nationalist, bears an eagle akin to that on the Egyptian flag.
My four-year-old, simply, likes Abul Futuh’s orange horse.
Translation: Abul Futuh, for president of Egypt; Number 5
As a foreigner I escape the responsibility, and privilege, of having to decide. Yet my respect and admiration goes to the Egyptian people seeking to craft the future of their nation amidst diverse paths.
At times the rhetoric has been strident, and there is sufficient cause for worry in multiple directions. Yet as we have learned much from the Egyptian people, we hope there is at least one lesson we may offer them:
Felool and Islamists may reside peacefully in the same home.
From left: Shafiq, Sabbahi, Mousa, Abul Futuh, Morsy
Egypt’s presidential election polls are all over the map. Most have had Amr Moussa and Abdel Munim Abul Futuh in the lead, with Mohamed Morsy of the Muslim Brotherhood trailing significantly.
And then results of the overseas ballots were revealed, putting Morsy significantly in the lead.
More recent polling indicates that the nationalist, semi-socialist candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi is gaining, as he is free from ‘contamination’ either from the former regime or Islamist trends. Meanwhile former Mubarak emergency prime minister Ahmed Shafiq is also gaining, as he projects confidence to restore stability and take the Islamists head on.
And in the last days, Moussa and Abul Futuh are seen as reeling, as their efforts to be centrists crumble as the political scene polarizes. See notable Egyptian blogger Mahmoud Salem – Sandmonkey – for analysis to this effect.
Perhaps a poll off the subject, then, may help to clarify things. Though unlikely, here is the effort. Several months ago Arab West Report authorized a survey consulting five thousand Egyptians through personal interviews throughout the Egyptian republic. They sought citizens’ opinion on Article Two of the Egyptian constitution, which states Islam is the official religion of the state and sharia law is the main source for legislation.
Following the revolution this article became a political hot potato. While some Copts and liberals found it to be a discriminatory element of Sadat-era sectarian politics, it was the conservative Islamist element that made the most use of it. They warned Egyptians at the time of the national referendum in March 2011 that a vote against the army-endorsed transition would result in a wholly new constitution (as opposed to the army-sponsored amendments) which would threaten to remove the article – and the centrality of Islam – from the national identity.
It is unlikely that this campaign affected the referendum results too seriously, but in a nation weaned on identity politics during the Mubarak era, it had an effect.
Arab West Report tested that effect several months afterwards. The results were interesting, and as follows:
Only 36% of Egyptians have even heard of Article Two, but once informed…
88% of those polled favored keeping Article Two as it is in the constitution
92% of those favoring desire to preserve Islam as the official religion
43% of those favoring desire for Islamic law to govern all Egyptians
12% of those favoring believe it is too sensitive to change it
9% of those favoring desire a religious, as opposed to a civil, state
Only 2% of those polled favored cancelling Article Two from the constitution
6% of those polled favor amending Article Two
74% of those favoring desire to achieve equality between Muslims and Christians
17% of those favoring desire to protect the civil character of the state
Obviously, a vast majority of the population is comfortable with Islam as the designated national religion. Somewhat telling is that of these, a significant plurality desire sharia law to govern as well. Furthermore, a sizable minority wishes outright definition as an Islamic state.
Though ‘significant’ and ‘sizable’, this sentiment remains a minority among the ‘vast’ support for keeping Article Two as is. What might this mean for the elections?
On the one hand, it could mean the victory of an Islamist candidate. Elections are often won by the constituency most dedicated to a particular issue, which can resonate with the population and mobilize their support. 40+% of the population desiring the rule of sharia law perhaps is ripe for activation. (Other polls put this percentage even higher.)
Yet I would argue against this trend, though I am making a prediction based on the unknowns of the Egyptian political landscape, a bet on the average Egyptian citizen.
To run down the candidates, borrowing from Sandmonkey’s analysis, each of the candidates represents a specific element of the general constituency.
Mohamed Morsy of the Brotherhood represents Brotherhood interests, and their very sizable following of adherents. Still, it is a limited and definable circle. The somewhat negative reaction to parliament following the 70+% Islamist victory will hamper their sympathy vote immediately following the revolution.
Ahmed Shafiq represents the interests of old regime, perhaps the military, business and capital, and a large share of Coptic sentiment. He has the potential to win a large number of undecided voters who react negatively to post-revolution instability, and those who favor reform over revolution. Yet over the past year the nation has adopted the idea of Mubarak’s corruption and the validity of the revolution, and he is too tainted with it to succeed.
Abdel Munim Abul Futuh, the other Islamist and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, represents the general Islamist sentiment which is not comfortable with the Brotherhood. He is poised to capture a significant share of the Salafi vote, if not the majority, but also a significant share of the revolutionary vote. He is on friendly terms with Mohamed el-Baradei, who remains a hero to much of the revolutionary core. The unfortunate matter for him is that this core is generally elite. Though Salafis are not, his popularity is likely limited to the upper crust activists and does not spread to the countryside.
Hamdeen Sabbahi suffers a similar problem. Though a long term opposition figure, the opposition to Mubarak pre-revolution was basically a movement of dissatisfied elites. He represents the interests of many Egyptians who maintain their dissatisfaction – now with the front running choices of Islamist or old regime candidates. This includes a number of revolutionaries, liberals, and Copts, but their numbers are far too small.
This leaves Amr Moussa. A very unsexy candidate, he positioned himself early in the revolution as a candidate for president. He is tainted by association with Mubarak, but is also recognized as not having been a vital cog in the regime’s wheels. He is older in age, satisfying those who desire a transitional figure to guide the movement to democracy. He is a statesman with wide name recognition, striking a presidential figure. His skill in diplomacy suggests he will have few natural enemies, able to navigate all competing interests, both foreign and domestic.
Yet his greatest asset, I argue, is that he does not represent any interests in particular. Though it would be naïve to state this unequivocally, it is clear he is not a partisan.
I argue, neither is the Egyptian citizen.
The development of party interests and zeal is (probably) healthy for Egyptian democracy. If allowed to nurture without any one party taking immediate control, and perhaps dominance of the political scene, these diverse constituencies will mature and coalesce and lose the stridency marking current campaigning. This fanaticism is natural following a revolution, but it is also transitory.
The Egyptian public was depoliticized for sixty years. Though awakening, I do not believe it has been transformed. Moreover, the Egyptian personality is not fanatic or partisan. It is national, it is centrist, it is even, perhaps, accepting of the inevitability of a strong, dare-it-be-mentioned, Pharaonic figure.
If the public support for this election was not so strong, the result would likely be taken by the best organized particular constituency. As with the parliamentary elections, this would likely be an Islamist.
Yet the turnout for the first free, and hopefully fair, elections in Egypt’s history is expected to be overwhelming. If so, the average citizen will come to the forefront. I estimate this average citizen will support Moussa.
Might he be motivated by religious politics, perhaps. Might he be motivated by calls for stability, perhaps.
I expect rather his rejection of particular, well-definable interests. Amr Moussa, for better or worse, is best positioned to win their favor.
Alas, and alleluia, no one knows. This is a virgin electorate, and the glory of Egypt. May her vote be true, and may it be accepted by all.
May it be the beginning of popular and national sovereignty.
As campaigning continues for president, candidates are seeking their strategy. Two find their path to victory by mobilizing core constituency; two instead seek to claim the Egyptian middle.
On the one hand the Muslim Brotherhood candidate increasingly speaks of applying sharia law, while his handlers go as far to imagine a revived caliphate out of Jerusalem, all the while predicting fraud against them before it happens.
Meanwhile, Mubarak’s last ditch prime minster during the revolution increasingly assails the Brotherhood, warning of all the trouble to befall Egypt if they – or any Islamists – come to power.
On the other hand the former Muslim Brotherhood candidate continues to portray himself as a centrist, the only candidate capable of uniting liberals, revolutionaries, and Islamists.
Meanwhile, Mubarak’s longtime semi-colleague continues to portray himself as the voice of stability and experience, able to navigate the corridors of power while professing both piety and the ability to work with all.
Somewhat on the outside of the main challengers are two revolutionaries/leftists/nationalists. A significant part of their campaign appears to be that they are not the above listed four, attached either to the former regime or political Islam.
God, weigh each of these men and find where they are worthy or wanting. Give discernment to the Egyptian electorate, so they might perceive as you do.
Help each candidate to represent himself honestly, truly, and justly. Keep him from besetting self-deception and empty pandering. May each be a servant to Egypt, and not a purported savior.
In the end, God, make these elections to be real. May the experience and the process be more important than the result. Above all, may people not grow weary, cynical, or disillusioned.
For those who honestly hold to a base, cause them to respect the center and loosen their convictions.
For those who loosely reside in the center, cause them to respect the partisans and honor their convictions.
For the winner, may he unite Egypt and not divide it further. May he honor both supporter and opponent. May he open the arena for all to participate. May he grant the noble demands of the revolution.
May he be a man of upright character. May he lead Egypt well. May he be a good president.
Sheikh Osama al-Qusi is a Salafi Muslim scholar in Egypt who has won a level of notoriety since the revolution. Prior to January 25, 2011, Salafis were a largely unknown and mostly silent religious trend in Egypt, with strength concentrated in Alexandria. Their theology encourages absolute submission to the ruling leader, while encouraging devout imitation of the early Islamic lifestyle. As such, they were marginal, though through the influence of Gulf-promoted satellite television their numbers increased steadily.
After the revolution Salafis exploded on the scene urging a now democratic Egypt to construct itself as an Islamic state. Though democracy was traditionally a rejected concept theologically, pragmatic Salafis urged political participation to reorient a Muslim Egypt on the proper path. A number of their scholars became household names, most notably Mohamed Hassan and Safwat Hegazi, who became media figures and were encouraged by the ruling military council to intercede in sectarian conflict. Public reaction to Salafism has largely been negative, fearing the austere vision of Islam they promote, likening it to Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia. Yet the strength of their numbers is undeniable, though it is not at all certain they can translate this into political victory.
Osama al-Qusi’s moderate celebrity has not come by riding this wave, but by criticizing it. While truly a Salafi, he finds the political machinations of his group, and other Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to be a severe departure from the Salafi spirit. Furthermore, he finds that in seeking to force implementation of an ancient paradigm Muslims risk running afoul not only of domestic and international realities, but also of the Prophet Muhammad himself.
In the interview that follows Osama al-Qusi discusses these matters, as well as sheds light on diverse controversies such as violating Ramadan, converting from Islam, and brushing your teeth. He gives judgment not only on the proper source of law in modern Egypt, but also on whether or not the traditional Salafi dress and beard is mandatory for Muslims. For all of his opinions Osama al-Qusi has been sharply criticized by other Salafi figures. Yet in his own mind he remains convinced of his affiliation, and hopes his influential and historic school may be conformed to reality and modernity. Read on for yourself to judge between them:
JC: I understand that Salafism, in its basic understanding, is an imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, the Followers of these Companions, and then the Followers of the Followers, stretching three generations. Is this correct?
OQ: Yes, Imam Malik ibn Anas, who was of the third generation and founded one of the four major legal schools in Sunni Islam, stated that nothing is useful for the latest Muslims, except that which was useful for the first Muslims.
In Islam, it is understood that all the prophets completed one another, bringing one message. As such, the doctrines of Islam do not change from one generation to another, and similarly, neither do its values or principles.
One of the issues between me and others lies in the fact that I understand Salafism to be a religion, while others make it out to be politics. But Islam in itself is not economic, nor physical, nor medical, though its values and principles inform all of these areas.
There is no such thing as ‘athletic Islam’, for example. But in any sport there is a referee, who must preside over the game according to the rules therein. Islam’s values and principles do not set the rules of the game, but they do set the attitude of the referee, who keeps all in line.
JC: But many Muslims maintain that everything is Islamic, and should be governed by religion.
OQ: This is a new idea in Islam. It comes from Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, and Mawdudi of Pakistan, who were reacting to the fall of the Islamic Caliphate, and who wished to restore it politically. But Salafism is not politics; it is doctrine, principles, and morality. It is not the details of life; it is the purposes and not the means. The means of life change from one generation to another.
JC: Why then do you maintain a long beard?
OQ: In some of the hadith, Muhammad stated that men should grow their beards, which puts this in the category of religion, as a command. It is also mentioned that earlier prophets had beards, but furthermore, it is part of nature. God did not give men their beards for nothing, and it is not fitting for men to resemble women, or vice versa. We should preserve the natural order as God created it.
The fact of God’s direct commands also applies to the hadd punishments of Islam, which are corporal in nature, such as cutting off the hand of a thief. Even so, I differ from many Muslims. Islamists say these punishments should be applied without distinction, while liberals say they were for a time and that we can change the punishment while keeping the principle. I am with neither group. God commanded these punishments just like he commanded men to pray; we cannot change his instructions. But at the same time, his instructions come with many distinctions that moderate its application.
In such a manner, God’s commands are not found in other parts of life such as business, agriculture, or others. There are few proscriptions here, if any. We must figure these out on our own, in light of Islamic principles.
JC: So you keep your beard like most Salafis, but you do not dress like them. What makes the difference?
OQ: Yes, the hadith records that Muhammad wore a long white robe, but it does not record that he commanded others to do so. He simply did this because he received it from his parents, and there is no reason to necessarily dress this way from generation to generation.
JC: Is this similar to the siwak (a traditional wooden shard used to clean teeth)? It was also used before Muhammad.
OQ: In Islam there are five categories of action. There is wajib (duty), mustahib (desired), mubah (allowed), makruh (detested), and muharram (forbidden). Most scholars put the beard and the siwak in the category of ‘desired’. He ordered them to use the instrument they found around them, and today we have other instruments. The principle is to clean your teeth.
Interestingly, if you look to areas where the siwak is found naturally, such as Yemen and Sudan, you notice that the people have very healthy teeth. This is in contrast to Egypt, for example, where it is not found.
JC: But if the instrument of siwak can change, why with hadd punishments must you keep the means of cutting off hands?
OQ: The problem with Islamists is not the means of punishment, but the application. For example, there is a hadith that states the thief’s hand is not cut off unless he steals a certain amount. There are other stipulations as well.
In Islam there are only about five or so specific hadd punishments, while there is a broader category called ta’zeer (reprimand). In this category the punishment is left for man to determine, but with hadd, as mentioned, it comes from God’s direct command. In terms of the means of cutting off a hand, however, this can change from generation to generation. It used to be with a sword, but there is no reason it couldn’t be by laser, for example, to provide a cleaner, more sanitary cut.
Some Islamists, though, say we have to apply the hadd punishments now, but this is not fitting, especially as there is so much poverty. During the time of Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab there was a harsh famine, and he made the decision to suspend the hadd punishment of cutting of hands. As such, we should wait until the economic situation stabilizes, because then, if someone steals, he truly is a criminal, deserving of his punishment.
Unfortunately, there is not much flexibility in many Islamists. Yet if we look at the life of Muhammad we see he lived through many different stages of life. Taking note, this provides flexibility in our understanding of the Qur’an and sunna. Many Islamists, however, take the final stage of Muhammad’s life, when he entered Mecca as a conqueror and governed as its ruler, and believe this period to abrogate his other teachings and behaviors.
Yes, there is abrogation in Islam, but not of this manner, it comes in much more specific forms. In terms of his life, we should see how he behaved differently depending on his different circumstances, and learn from what he did. No, we cannot compare our situations exactly to his, but we can notice that when he was weak, he acted in one manner, and when he became strong, he changed his manner accordingly.
An example that may guide Egypt today is when Muhammad first returned to Mecca as a pilgrim, with many followers, aiming to do the umra. The leadership of Mecca denied them, and many wanted to fight, but Muhammad instead secured the Treaty of Hudaybiya with Meccan leadership. According to the treaty he decided to leave, but would have the right to return as a pilgrim in one year’s time. Upon fulfillment, Muhammad and the Muslims conducted their pilgrimage rites marching around the Ka’aba, even though it was full of idols. Though these were anathema to the Islamic religion, he did not destroy them, since he had no authority to do so.
Today, many Islamists want to apply the hadd punishments, but they do not consider if Egypt possesses the authority to do so. Islam may command certain matters, but it is not always possible to do everything we should in every time and place.
For example, what if we apply the hadd punishments, but then the United States declares this is against human rights, and cuts off their grain supply? In Islam, we must always consider the overall interest. Can we apply the laws we want? Maybe, and maybe not – the world has become as one village. We must evaluate based on what is possible, with its consequences and benefits. All this must be weighed in light of Islamic values and principles.
JC: Understood. But is not this reasoning similar to certain Islamists who delay the path to power, but desire it in the end?
OQ: Islamists believe the Islam must result in the creation of a state, for governance. I do not. Yes, you are right, there are aspects of what we can accomplish now, and what we cannot. But Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis – believe that they are the ones who should rise to power.
There are two things to take into consideration: Egypt, and the Islamic state, which represents the Islamic religion, all Muslims, and does not currently exist.
The Vatican is a Catholic state, and it is the only polity that can speak on behalf of Catholics, since there is no other pope. The Islamic caliph, however, is a civil and administrative position, not a religious one. He is not a man of religion, but of politics. He speaks on behalf of Muslims, representing them. Some institutions of the state are religious, like the Azhar, and need to have a Muslim presiding over them. But Egypt is not an Islamic state, so it does not need a Muslim administrative head.
JC: But should it become an Islamic state?
OQ: In Egypt there exist both Muslims and Christians, and each one must govern their own institutions. The administrative head must allow for both to do so. Egypt does not need to become a religious state, though this does not prevent religion from having its share in the state, especially in the religious laws that govern personal status.
JC: But do not some of these laws, especially the hadd punishments, require a Muslim to implement them, since a Christian might not?
OQ: The problem is that Islamists think the whole state must become religious, with them the ones to rule it. In their conception the Christians are our ‘guests’, not citizens.
JC: But ‘ahl al-dhimma’ (the concept of Jews and Christians being a protected minority in an Islamic country) is not a horrible concept…
OC: In the Islamic state, this is correct. But we are speaking about Egypt.
Today, Muslims have been constituted into many peoples and states, which is from the wisdom of God, who created different groups of people so as to get to know each other.
JC: But should not the man of religion look to the ideal, and seek to implement it as much as possible?
OQ: Yes, but the ideal is a state that encompasses all Muslims. This is not Egypt, and does not exist.
It could be that in the future the Islamic states will unite as did the European states, and the president or caliph of that state will implement the hadd punishments in a moderate way. The problem is that people think Islam is politics. No, it is religion.
JC: But is it also governance?
OQ: No, not for me. Governance is a non-religious task.
We should craft our state based on Islamic principles, but the sharia does not have the details to say what we should do in this situation, or that situation. Its unchangeable aspects, such as the details of a marriage contract, are few.
If there is an Islamic state, the leader has the right to represent the Muslim people – all of them – but this does not exist. Even if it did, it would not apply Islamic laws on its non-Muslim people. The Qur’an states that Christians should judge themselves by what their book contains.
JC: But Egypt now has an opportunity to craft its state as it wishes. Why not craft an Islamic state?
OQ: Egypt is a Muslim state; it is not an Islamic state. I do not accept anyone manipulating religion or making a business out of it. Egypt used to be part of an Islamic state, but it itself is not an Islamic state. The president of Egypt must speak on behalf of both Muslims and Christians.
JC: But what if Egypt merges with Libya…
OQ: No, it will still not speak for all Muslims in the world.
JC: But what if it gradually unites them all?
OQ: This is a good idea, and it is what I call for. Even so, it will not prevent any religious groups from practicing their religion within it.
But for now, the president of Egypt does not have to be a Muslim, or a male. These were requirements of the caliphate, but not of the Egyptian state, which is a political and administrative institution. The best person should govern.
Unfortunately, Islamists live in the past, but the past will not return along the same means as before; times have changed. If there is to be a caliphate, it must come by new means. In fact, there will be a caliphate, for Muhammad stated there would be a caliphate at the end of the world. At that time he predicted several stages the caliphate would enter – becoming like a possession handed from father to son, as in the Umayyad period, and then would become corrupted and fawn after the wisdom of the world, as in the Abbasid period.
But how will the new caliphate come? There are many possible means. Perhaps one by one, or through the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But it will not come through the use of armies, as in the previous ages. But when it happens, then the state will be Islamic and the caliph must be Muslim, since he will represent all Muslims politically. In this situation, it will be the role of the state to protect religion, to keep it from growing weak.
But returning to Egypt, take note again that Islam is a practical religion. It is not practical for Egypt to be an Islamic state. Why? Because most of us reject a religious state.
Even many Muslim Brothers and Salafis reject the Iranian model of a religious state, for example, preferring the Turkish model. But there is also the Gaza model, and even the Hizbollah model, which is an armed entity within a state. I am not afraid if some religious trends take over government, since they will be governed by the realities of the international situation.
Can any of these models be enacted in Egypt? Reality will dictate. Perhaps the Turkish model, since it has been successful, and has been enacted in stages. But it is not as if the Turks love Islam; no, before they hated religion, thinking it was the source of backwardness and ignorance. But as their situation stabilized and their economy developed, the people became happy.
So it could be in Egypt, but whoever rules will have to deal with international realities, even if someone here or there calls for ‘ahl al-dhimma’. But no, the future of Egypt will be one of citizenship, which itself accords well with Islamic teaching. The word ‘dhimma’ comes from one with whom you have made an agreement or contract for protection, as seen in the Compact of Medina, where Muhammad first ruled over a polity of Muslims, pagans, and Jews. The concept of citizenship can be seen in his example, should it need to be justified religiously.
JC: Is this reasoning similar to that of al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdo, who sought to modernize Islam by finding modern concepts within Islam’s ancient texts?
OQ: Yes. These were good students of the Islamic school of reason, but at times they treated verses of the Qur’an as if they clashed with reason, and so sought a different explanation. I disagree; we must accept verses that our reason does not understand, and hope that someday we will. Rejection is out of the question.
In this aspect sometimes the school of reason resembles the Mu’tazila of old (an early Islamic philosophical school) who went as far as to reject even certain parts of Islamic doctrine. It is not correct to raise divisions between reason and revelation. Instead, Muslims should return to the trusted path of Salafism.
JC: Very good. But let’s return to the main subject.
OQ: Yes, that’s right. Despite all that we are saying, I believe most Islamic currents, even the extremist ones, are adjusting to the times. If they do not learn from their texts, they will learn from reality.
What I do not want to see from an Egyptian state is any law issued from parliament that goes against Islam or Christianity.
JC: But wait, who will determine this?
OQ: The parliament itself will. It is made up of Muslims and Christians. In parliament there exist many committees for different subjects – agriculture, trade. There should also be a religion committee for which members can refer to in questions of religion. I’m sure President Obama is not an expert in economic policy, but he has advisors on whom he leans for support. It should be the same way with our legislators, but ultimately, the decision only comes down to them.
JC: So what if I want to eat publically during Ramadan? Can I do that, even if I am a Muslim?
OQ: Well, let us look to the parliament; they have the authority to craft laws. Maybe they will decide to close restaurants during Ramadan. Maybe they will leave them open for Christians or tourists. Regardless, it is up to the people to decide through the parliament.
Even if there were to be groups on the street (such as exist in Saudi Arabia, religious police), their function would be to advise people to respect the values of others. Their function could not be through law. There are no details in the sharia about what to do with restaurants in Ramadan, or what to do if people eat in the streets.
JC: Shall we take an even more controversial topic, then? What about the freedom of a Muslim to change his religion, or to deny Islam?
OQ: There are certainly references in the hadith that prohibit conversion from Islam, even to the point of proscribing death. But unlike the cutting off of hands, this is not found in the Qur’an. The key question is if there is anything that establishes the prohibition of leaving the faith as absolute, or relative to its time.
The Qur’an describes a time when people were entering Islam but then leaving it quickly. This was done in an inappropriate manner, and may have even been instigating trouble. It would require more research to see if the hadith about killing an apostate are connected to this text. If so, it would have been to put a halt to this process, saying, ok, religion is not a game, make your decision and choose.
So I expect, without being sure, that this hadith came for certain reasons at a certain time. This would accord with the fact that there are other verses which guarantee the freedom of choice in religion.
In this and in many other issues, scholars consider context and previous understandings of the text. This demonstrates that the jurisprudence of Islam is very flexible.
A good example is of Imam Shafa’i, a founder of one of the four main Sunni Islamic legal schools. He lived a long time in Iraq and issued many legal rulings. Yet when he came to Egypt he issued different rulings on the same questions. This shows he adapted his decisions to the environment he was in. These differences are part of the intellectual wealth of Islam.
So, I agree completely with freedom of religion. It is fitting for this time, it is fitting internationally, and fitting in Egypt also. But, if someone is playing with religion, like as in the Qur’an account I mentioned, he is akin to acting like a spy, and should be so treated. But we cannot generalize this special case on freedom of religion in general.
JC: Thank you Sheikh Osama. In respect of the time perhaps that will be sufficient for today. But I look forward to speaking with you again soon.
One must be cautious when writing about religious leaders, as they have mastered the art of speaking to an audience. Humans have a penchant for self-deception and self-justification; when mixed with religious language manipulation is easily manufactured, even if unintentionally advanced. People who seek to represent God may be the best of all possible men; they may also be among the most devilish.
With this caveat I would like to introduce a man with a remarkable history, Sheikh Osama al-Qusi. There is a third category of religious leader, that of the innocent. With a heart given to the study of God, such a man may be naïve in the ways of the world. It is in this light I experienced Sheikh al-Qusi, following the lead of his testimony. The proper rendering of his life may be possible through further experience, but is known ultimately only to God.
Sheikh al-Qusi was born in 1954 in Cairo, after his father moved from their family home in Qusa, from which his name is derived, a village thirty kilometers outside of Luxor. He enrolled in the faculty of medicine at Ain Shams University, but instead of diligently pursuing his studies, he became attracted to the religious life of the campus.
These were the 1970s, and Egypt was undergoing a religious indoctrination following the ascent of Anwar al-Sadat to the presidency. In an effort to solidify his policy to open up Egypt to Western capitalism, he appealed to religion to counter the socialist ideology of his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat gave wide space for Islamists to operate, and one of their chief fields was the university campus. Osama al-Qusi was swept up in their enthusiasm.
He had never seen this type of Muslim before, one so dedicated and public in his faith. Their claim of persecution added to their aura, as many spoke of previous imprisonments under Nasser. Furthermore, as some of their literature remained banned, the nature of a young man almost always makes the forbidden attractive. The works of Sayyid Qutb were handwritten on notes of paper and passed around campus. His sermons on cassette tape were distributed likewise. Osama al-Qusi began to be radicalized, without even knowing it.
Sheikh al-Qusi makes the case that to him at this time, these campus evangelists were simply Muslims, albeit abnormally active in their faith. He later learned that they belonged to ‘groups’, and these groups were many. Among them was the Muslim Brotherhood, but to these were added others like Islamic Jihad and other more militant associations, but all of which were political. In time he began to sense something not quite right, especially given the multiplicity of groups. If all of these claimed to be Muslims, dedicated more than the average Egyptian, which group represented Islam correctly?
By now Osama al-Qusi had lost almost all interest in medicine, wishing to discover correct religion. In 1978 he decided to take the umra pilgrimage to Mecca, but instead of staying the permitted two weeks or so, overstayed his visa and studied Islam. This was not in any of the approved universities, however; rather, he moved from mosque to mosque under individual Islamic scholars. He lived the simplest of lives, working odd jobs just to make enough money to survive. He poured himself into the study of Islamic texts, especially the hadith, and eventually found himself in the company of a certain group of students, likewise dedicated.
By this time Osama al-Qusi came to believe that all groupings of Muslims were of deviant Islamic practice. He became convinced that Islam was practiced best in devout imitation of Muhammad and his early companions, the followers of these companions, and those who came after them. These three generations of Muslims knew Islam best, recorded the traditions as found in the hadith, and crafted the sharia law schools still foundational today. This is the core belief of what is known as Salafism, though in Saudi Arabia, it is interpreted largely through a Wahabist lens.
The students surrounding al-Qusi, however, had a different lens. These were influenced by the idea of the coming mehdi, a messiah-like figure who would appear at the end of the world. They were led by a man named Juhayman al-Utaybi, who would later lead his group to storm the Ka’aba of Mecca, the holy sanctuary visited by millions of Muslims each year. In 1979 his siege was violently put down, though not before shaking the Muslim world through this provocative action.
Osama al-Qusi was not among them, and states he knew nothing of their political/eschatological conspiracy. He did study with them of their unique interpretations, and wondered if their faith was too political, or if they had grievances with the House of Saud. In any case, he was expelled from Saudi Arabia a few months before their campaign began.
At that time the students attracted the attention of the authorities, who arrested them en masse. When the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn al-Baz, examined them after a month and a half in prison, he believed them to be harmless, and allowed them to be released. Osama al-Qusi, however, as a foreigner was forced back to Egypt as he had no legal residence permit. His personal teacher, though not a ringleader of the group, was also fingered as a foreigner, having come from Yemen.
This teacher was Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wada’i. Though a foreigner, he did possess a legal residence permit, having enrolled in the Islamic University of Medina obtaining a degree in the science of hadith, and in pursuit of his Masters degree. Upon intervention of Sheikh ibn al-Baz, he was allowed time to complete his Masters, passing with high marks, and then immediately returned to his native country.
Back in Egypt, Osama al-Qusi thought only of returning to his religious studies under the tutelage of Sheikh Muqbil. Yet he desired also to marry, and left for Yemen with his new wife, praising God that he did not wind up involved in the scandal of the Ka’aba. Little did he know he was leaving just in time to avoid another.
Following his marriage his family was disappointed that he was not returning to his medical studies. Osama al-Qusi, however, was still quite extremist in his thought. Though he had learned to dismiss the varieties of Muslim groups as contrary to Islamic teaching, through his uncle his name was passed on as one qualified to join in the band of Abdullah al-Samawi, a lesser influential group dedicated to greater Islamization of society. He listened to the sermons of Abdel Hamid al-Kishk and Hafez Salama, and still considered strongly the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. For Qutb, the concept of a nation was paganism, and the flag of a nation was an idol. Furthermore, given the mixing of sexes university study was impossible, and besides, al-Qusi’s only interest was religion.
During that time female relatives from his wife’s family were approached by two suitors from the army. Osama al-Qusi found them to be pleasant people, but they discussed at length whether or not service in the military was fitting for a Muslim. In the end, he convinced one to discharge, while the other remained. Shortly thereafter, both became his in-laws.
In 1979 Osama al-Qusi left for Yemen, found Sheikh Muqbil, and settled into the very simplistic life of a devoted Islamic student. Sheikh Muqbil had several students, for whom he provided out of his own means. Yemen was a very poor country, and the disciples lived with their teacher in a mud brick compound with a garden. Sheikh Muqbil received a small stipend for his teaching from Saudi Arabia. He and his students also received in kind gifts for teaching the village children. Teaching during the day, learning at night, eating from the garden, Osama al-Qusi, his wife, and all lived in near subsistence.
From 1979 to 1985 Osama al-Qusi remained in Yemen, never once returning to Egypt. He arrived on a student visa, which permitted his stay for one year, but again overstayed due to the joy of his religious learning. In 1981, however, he learned of another reason why it might be best to stay put.
In May of that year President Sadat conducted widespread arrests of his political opponents. Over 1500 people were arrested for being part of what were deemed ‘treasonous’ groups. These came from all sectors of society, and included intellectuals such as Mohamed Hassanain Haykal. The vast majority, though, were Islamists, and Osama al-Qusi was informed his name was on the list, due to his nominal association with Abdullah al-Samawi. The police visited his parents’ home, but they convinced them he was in Yemen. They also urged him to stay, for the time being.
Five months later Osama al-Qusi learned that the sweep was not wide enough. President Sadat was assassinated during a military parade; listening to the news on a simple radio, he was shocked to hear the names of his assailants. Khaled Ahmed Shawki al-Islamboly, the chief assassin, was the husband of his wife’s cousin and the one who remained in the army, while Abdel Hamid Abdel Salam Abdel-Al Ali was the one he convinced to leave.
Osama al-Qusi asked God’s mercy on Sadat, who had now reaped the fruit of his error in letting loose the Islamist current earlier in his presidency. He also praised God that he was kept from involvement in such error.
Meanwhile in Yemen, the group of Sheikh Muqbil began running afoul of the local Muslim Brotherhood. To help ease financial pressures the sheikh tried to gain employment for his students in the nearby universities. This effort, however, was denied administratively by Brotherhood members who occupied key posts. Osama al-Qusi explained that Yemen depends on Saudi Arabia for substantial economic support, and would naturally lean toward the Salafi/Wahabi interpretation of Islam, as opposed to the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, as the Brotherhood does elsewhere, members seek each other out, trying to infiltrate key positions in society. They seek to rule; and this, not for the good of the nation, but for their own good.
Having established themselves in university administration, the Muslim Brotherhood frustrated Sheikh Muqbil’s attempts to establish his students on firm financial footing. Soon thereafter came another opportunity, though far less suitable to the desires of Osama al-Qusi, devoted disciple.
Sheikh Muqbil’s reputation was growing, and from thirty kilometers away came leaders from a nearby village asking for a teacher. Three times Osama al-Qusi refused his sheikh, but in the end he acceded. He knew the challenges Sheikh Muqbil endured in providing for his disciples, but lamented the distance that would be between them. In those days due to Yemen’s poor infrastructure, the thirty kilometers meant an hour and a half journey by car.
During this period Osama al-Qusi finally succeeded in gaining basic financial independence, though through a circuitous route. After getting established in the village Sheikh Muqbil introduced him to the Yemen Minister of Islamic Endowments, who appointed him as village imam and provided him with a salary. Sheikh Muqbil would return on regular visits, but eventually, Sheikh Osama al-Qusi became beloved by the people of his village.
This was fortunate, as the Muslim Brotherhood proceeded to cause more trouble. Though unable to cancel his contract with the ministry, they interfered and forced his transfer to another village, much further away. For Sheikh Osama, he was loathe to be at such distance from his teacher, which would make his itinerant visits impossible. Furthermore, the villagers came to love their sheikh, and did not want him to leave.
Sheikh Osama therefore refused this assignment, which led to the loss of his contract with the ministry. The villagers agreed to provide for their sheikh, but this meant a return to the simple living off the land which he had grown accustomed to on first arrival. Soon thereafter, however, the village mayor was able to make amends. He traveled to visit the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh ibn al-Baz, and arranged for Sheikh Osama to receive a stipend directly from him. It is admitted that the competition between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the mufti’s support.
Sheikh Osama’s life continued so on until 1985. Though he loved his life and learning, the absence from Egypt was especially difficult on his wife. Towards the end her psychological difficulties resulted in the semi-paralysis of half her face. Hoping that the political difficulties in Egypt had subsided, they returned home. Passing through Suez Sheikh Osama was interrogated at the police station, but was allowed to proceed without incident.
He settled with his wife in the Ain Shams area of Cairo, wishing to stay in the path of religion but wishing also to avoid regular employment which might curtail his time. Before too long he agreed with the imam of the nearest mosque to provide evening lessons, and as his reputation spread, he began teaching in more and more locations.
In terms of finance, however, life was more complicated. The situation was stable since he saved most of the money he had earned in Yemen. This he used to begin small projects – he bought a taxi, he bought a microbus, and was a managing partner in a religious publishing house – but none succeeded. Sheikh Osama readily admits he is not a businessman, nor did anyone in his family growing up have any business sense; they were all scholars. He managed as best he could and provided for his family, but there was little money in religion.
Certainly this was true of the religion he espoused. Upon his return to Egypt he sought out others of the Salafi trend, but found even the word ‘Salafi’ was not widely known. Only in Alexandria was there a following, but he found these too closely related to the Muslim Brotherhood. They called themselves Salafis since Sayyid Qutb had used the word, as indeed the Brotherhood does as well. Yet while they claim to be Salafi they also admit they follow the path of the Brotherhood. Sheikh Osama did not find a home with them.
Neither did he find common cause with other Muslim trends in Egypt, and grew increasingly frustrated. By 1996, though he was teaching regularly about Salafism in the mosques of Ain Shams, he felt isolated and alone in society. Everywhere he looked was bid’a – innovation – which went against the practices of the first three generations of Muslims. He feared especially for his children, finding their Islamic education in schools to be insufficient. Eventually he made the decision to withdraw entirely.
With basic savings from his earlier projects Sheikh Osama bought a small farm on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, and purposed to live off the land with his family, homeschooling his children. He maintained his weekend teaching in Ain Shams, but otherwise lived in seclusion. Like all his business enterprises, the farm eventually failed.
It was the family moral failure, however, that brought Sheikh Osama back to his senses. In 1998 his oldest son, at age 13, led the family rebellion against him. ‘Why are we different? Why don’t I go to school? Why don’t I have any friends?’
It was this crisis that helped make Sheikh Osama into the man he is today. He realized he had been living his whole life ‘in the book’. Now, he knew he must live life in light of reality, ‘by the book’. Religion is life, and God’s ways must be known. Yet these ideals cannot sustain life on their own; they must be lived out, taught, and practiced, so that society is transformed to enable life by the ideal. Cursing its failures to reach this goal, however, only lead to extremism.
Sheikh Osama came to realize that as he preached the Salafi way, he must also preach against the extremism practices by so many of his community. Extremism is based on hatred and rejection of the other. Its natural extension is terrorism, which is an attack upon the other, either in word or deed.
Pursuing that path, Sheikh Osama nearly lost his family. Oddly enough, when abandoning the path, he wound up in prison for the second time.
He sold the farm and moved back to Ain Shams, with some funds but needing work. He immediately began teaching in earnest, and associated himself with an effort to build a new mosque in Ain Shams. The land upon which the mosque would be built was zoned agricultural, however, and a resident of the community raised issue against it.
Ain Shams at that time was known as an area deeply ingrained in extremist Islamic thought. He, however, enjoyed a good reputation with the authorities, given that he did not preach against the government. All the same, Egypt was ruled by the emergency law, and once arrested over the illegal mosque construction, he was bound for prison. The policemen responsible apologized, and they even made it possible for him to receive favorable reviews within prison, so that he was able to leave after only two months. He personally was not mistreated, but admits the horrible condition many prisoners endured. Yet upon his release his reputation in the area suffered a minor blow, as he was deemed to have received preferential treatment. He became known in the area, falsely he claims, as belonging to the hated state security apparatus.
Yet among Salafi tendencies his reputation continued to grow, and was about to explode, stumbling upon the best opportunity he had to date. Finally, he could earn money through religion.
Proving the corruption endemic to Egypt, the ‘agricultural’ land purposed for the mosque was eventually turned into a Suzanne Mubarak Public Library. He, however, became established at another mosque, becoming its imam. There was no salary from the Ministry of Islamic Endowments, however, as the Mohamedian Guidance Mosque, as it was named, was not registered.
Today, after lengthy and ongoing campaigns, the Ministry of Islamic Endowments claims 95% of all Egyptian mosques are registered and under its supervision. This has been done in response to extremism, which has issued so frequently from small community mosques beyond the reach of the more moderate government license. Sheikh al-Qusi’s mosque remains unregistered, but the government gave greater space to Salafi mosques, as they tended to be nonpolitical, not threatening the legitimacy of the state.
Yet this mosque, through Sheikh al-Qusi, began to attract several foreign Muslims. One of these was a Canadian of Jamaican descent, who invited Sheikh Osama to preach for one week at an Islamic conference in his home country. He did, and as fame often leads to fame, he began to receive further invitations, including in the US, Europe, and the UK. It was not unusual for him to receive $1000 for a week of work. From 1998-2001, he made over forty such trips.
2001, of course, is the year of September 11, and though Sheikh al-Qusi does not believe his name to be on any blacklists, he deemed it wise to cease his international travel. This decision was confirmed as he watched numbers of Muslims held in detention in Guantanamo Bay, and furthermore when he learned that the ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, attended one of the mosques in Britain at which he had delivered lectures. Since 2001, Sheikh Osama has remained in Egypt.
Also, in 2001, his teacher Sheikh Muqbil passed away. Today, Sheikh Muqbil is considered the founders of one of the most influential Salafi schools in the world, located in Dammaj, Yemen, not far from the Saudi border. Sheikh Muqbil studied directly under Sheikh Mohamed ibn al-Uthaymeen, and attended lectures of Sheikh ibn al-Baz and Sheikh al-Albani. These three are considered the chief Salafi scholars of contemporary Islam.
Sheikh Muqbil has been clear in rejecting political Islam such as of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as terrorism, such as adopted by al-Qaeda. He did receive envoys from Osama bin Laden, seeking his help in contacting the tribal leaders of Yemen to purchase weapons and spread influence. He rejected them, however, and told them never to visit him again, labeling bin Laden as the head of all religious ignorance. Nevertheless, several detainees in Guantanamo Bay are held specifically due to their association with Sheikh Muqbil, who was deemed to be a supporter of the Taliban and armed jihad.
Sheikh Osama, meanwhile, needed to find another source of income. From 2001-2005, he relied on donations from wealthy Egyptian businessmen who supported his Salafi preaching. Eventually, however, he found that the reception of money often brought along with it additional pressures. On one occasion a businessman offered to build Sheikh Osama a mosque, provided that he would always come and give lessons. This was easy to agree with, as he regularly provided lessons in his itinerant ministry. Sheikh Osama enjoyed the support of this businessman for a good while, up until the interference of state security demanded he stop moving about and remain in one mosque only. The businessman felt betrayed, but Sheikh Osama argued there was nothing he could do. Their relationship deteriorated thereafter.
Such experiences convinced Sheikh Osama to once more seek to rely on himself for income. Re-entering the world more and more, he decided to return to university to complete his medical studies and in 2008 received his degree. He is now a medical practitioner, though he does not make much money from this field. Instead, he offers free medical care from his mosque two days a week, and hopes this may develop eventually a separate paid clientele.
He has also begun studying for a psychology degree, but closer to his heart is his religious education – now pursued through the High Institute of Islamic Studies run by the Ministry of Higher Education. Upon graduation he will receive a diploma, which will be the first official certificate in religion he has ever possessed.
Sheikh Osama has currently become newsworthy for the promotion of his relatively liberal Salafi viewpoints. While many Islamists are calling for an Islamic state, Sheikh Osama believes that anyone, even a Copt, should be able to become president, as it is an administrative position, not a spiritual one. Though he maintains the long beard characteristic of Salafis, he now feels free to wear contemporary clothing, eschewing the long, white robe donned by most of his co-religionists. He speaks frequently on Arabic satellite news programs, though apart from al-Arabiya and ART, who gave him $100, they do not pay anything.
The big money in religion comes from traditional Salafi satellite programming, such as al-Rahma and al-Nas, from which Egypt’s major Salafi preachers have become known. Sheikh Osama has no place here, however, as his line of thought differs considerably from what he believes to be the extremism of these contemporaries.
Sheikh Osama now lives in a comfortable though not luxurious apartment in Nasr City, a middle-to-upper class neighborhood of Cairo, not far from one of the largest malls in Egypt, City Stars. He continues to follow the way of religion, but has done well enough with his money earned to carve out an existence honorable to his family. In all interactions with him, he appears to be an honorable man.
At the same time, so many questions surround him. How is it possible to have been in association with so many violent, extremist individuals, and yet maintain innocence about knowing their true intentions?
Sheikh Osama does admit his previous extremism, reformed gradually over many years. Yet could he possibly have been ignorant of all he professes? Furthermore, though he was completely open about the sources of his money at each stage in his life, short of opening up his checkbook, can it be believed he provided for his family over the past thirty years on failed businesses, in addition to greater sums earned in Yemen and through his travels?
Currently, what is to be made of Sheikh Osama’s Salafi liberalism? Is it a conscious decision in light of Egypt’s changing times? Or could it be an effort to put a modern, acceptable face on a still ultraconservative ideology? Or, by the hard edge of experience and reality has he truly experienced a personal reformation?
It is impossible to say at this point in my relationship with him, which has been thoroughly enjoyed. I currently lean toward the sincerity of his testimony, which was shared with openness and humility. Above all, he struck me as kind.
This text is not the place to examine the Salafi question, its impact on Egypt, or its stance toward Christians. It is not to examine if wholesale reform can come to the movement, if this is necessary, or how it is to be achieved. Perhaps some of these topics will be addressed through subsequent interviews.
One thing that was remarkable from Sheikh Osama’s testimony, however, was the impact of family. The anecdote of his own was given above, and the share it had in moving him away from extremism. Yet he also mentioned his father and mother, with their Upper Egyptian values of acceptance and morality. However much he was indoctrinated in extremist theology, and however much he espouses Salafism today, he notes he was inoculated against violence through proper, traditional upbringing.
Societies are liable to change, for better or for worse. There is a sentiment current in Egypt these days that may tend to give rise to extremism, in any number of directions. The best antidote to protect Egypt may simply be to be Egyptian. These remain the vast majority; may all ongoing political developments give rise to their great voice. May they be the ones to govern Egypt.
Click here for an interview with al-Qusi: On the Caliphate, Conversion, and Brushing your Teeth, and here for his explanation on the science of Islamic traditions.
As Egypt’s presidential elections grow closer, parties are beginning to choose sides. In a moment to celebrate, however, Egypt hosted its first ever televised presidential debate. The two leading candidates squared off for nearly four hours in an effort to win the endorsement of ordinary citizens.
One of these candidates, the revolutionary somewhat liberal leaning Islamist, received the endorsement of the largest Salafi political party. Yet a debate non-participant, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, received the endorsement of non-political Salafis.
As for the disqualified populist Salafi presidential candidate himself, he has promised to declare his endorsement over the weekend. His large constituency may either decide or further complicate the split inside the newly politicized Salafi camp.
God, give wisdom to the Salafis. Their desire is for your law to be honored. Their interpretation is at odds with most other Egyptians, but for many if not most, their motivation is pure and their sincerity unmistaken. Honor them; guide and lead them in their choice.
Give wisdom to their leaders as well, who may or may not be as pure. As they begin to play the games of politics, may they not cross the thin line into manipulation and hypocrisy.
As for the other main candidate, it may be harder to receive endorsement. The long time semi-member of Mubarak’s administration, he represents the popular wish for a strong executive and a return to stability. Yet any political group may find it hard to endorse such a non-revolutionary figure.
One of the speculated but ever-unspoken endorsements is that of the ruling military council. They have pledged neutrality. May they honor their word. There is frequent criticism of their intentions on the part of revolutionaries, and increasingly from the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet their pledge to honor the revolution and lead the transition is nearly at its close. May they cede power peacefully, in accordance with the will of the people.
God, grant Egyptians a rapid education in politics, and bolster their resolve to not grow disillusioned. Keep the people from surrendering their affairs to others; may they grasp their agency from local to national. May they vote as informed citizens.
The revolution was conducted as close to the ideal as possible, God. May it now close with a result as close to the ideal as well. So much is still unresolved, and with a yet unwritten constitution, more troubles are surely expected.
Give Egypt the best, God. May she not settle, nor tear herself apart in conflict. Give Egypt a good president, and a good government.
Back in February I had the opportunity to participate in an Arab West Report interview with Abdel Munim Abul Futuh, a presidential candidate who was formerly part of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the time he was one of many. Though several candidates are still running, he and Amr Moussa, long time secretary of the Arab League, are considered the two frontrunners.
The interview was prepared by all but conducted by AWR Editor-in-Chief Cornelis Hulsman. The following are selections which I found most interesting. Please click here for the full transcript at AWR.
Egypt is currently deeply divided, including Islamists and liberals in the sense that many Islamists and Liberals primarily operate in their own circles. This also applies to many Christians. How would you be able to unite all Egyptians, regardless of their background, to rebuild the country?
First of all, your words that Egypt is divided are not right. Egypt has pluralism, but is not divided and the basis of pluralism in Egypt is political, not sectarian or religious, like many other countries. …
The Christian brothers after the Revolution left the “ghetto” [he means that they came out of their isolation] they were in before the Revolution. They became present in the Egyptian community, participating in political parties; they are present in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and other parties, doing their work. Christians went from protesting inside the church to protesting in their community, the community of all.
The nation belongs to all Egyptians, whether they are Christians or Muslims, men or women, Islamists or they have Islamic, leftist, or liberal ideologies. This is the state of our community: I believe it is a positive and a vibrant state and does not engender any division—this expression is not accurate.
When I go in circles of course these people who are crossing the boundaries are definitely there, but there are many who are not and who are afraid and they lock themselves up in their community. How would you unify them? How would you be a president for all?
The most important trait he should have is seeking and achieving the independence of the nation, meaning that the strategic decisions of the presidency seeks the interest of Egypt only, not the interest of a specific political party, or any foreign body; the interest of only Egypt and the Egyptians. This, in itself, will unify Egyptians because it means that the icon that brings them together and whom they elected to be their leader, is seeking to protect their interests.
The second most important trait is that this president is reconciled with religion. Egyptian people, Christians and Muslims, are religious from the time of Pharaohs; they are a religious people, they love religion. We do not have extremist secularism in Egypt as there is in Tunis or Turkey, which is why it cannot be imagined that a president who is against religion or who is secular will rule Egypt. There is no way the Egyptian people are going to elect him.
The third important thing is that this president seek to deepen the meaning of citizenship, so that citizens may feel that they are equal before the law and that the basis for any Egyptian to apply for any position is his qualifications not his gender, faith, or political orientation. …
The fourth trait: When there is justice with the presence of a real independent judiciary, it will make the citizens, whose rights were violated by any means, to refer to the judiciary to take their rights. Then the nation will be independent and will grow and develop.
You mentioned on October 2, 2011 that you would appoint a Coptic vice president if you win the election and then the caliphate was mentioned. What are your thoughts on the caliphate?
What is the caliphate? Caliphate is not a religious term, in all cases it is not a religious matter, it expresses the cooperation and unity of the Islamic countries, represented by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). That is it. But some of the ultra-conservative Islamists lent certain incorrect meanings.
In addition, we are not thinking about these matters now: Neither the unity of the Islamic world nor alliance, because we are occupied now with reforming the nation. What is the value of a unified world when it is ruled by dictators, corrupted, and diverted people? Of course it has no value.
Consequently, we are occupied with building our nation, not unity, unity with who? [laughing] Weak nation ruled by tyranny and corruption for 60 years! It is better to reform it and strengthen it before even thinking about cooperating with others.
According to Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, God has given Muslims the right of sovereignty and hegemony, what does this mean?
What is Hassan al-Banna saying? Is this book written by Hassan al-Banna? Ah yes, “Who are We and What do We Want”. That is not the meaning of the verse and when God says “…you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you.”
If he interprets, “You will be witnesses over the people” as, “You will be guardians over the people” and dominance too, that is not true. Yes of course, if he wrote that text… I do not know where that text came from. Even if that text is of Hassan al-Banna or even Ahmad Bin Hanbal, that text is unacceptable because God in the Holy Qur’annever appoints a person to be a guardian over the other. Never.
For more clarification, when Allah told his Messenger, the Prophet and the Greatest human being in the Qur’an, in the Holy Qur’an: “So remind, [O Muhammad]; you are only a reminder. You are not over them a controller.” Allah said to the Prophet that his role is to advise only! Nothing else! Not dominance, not control, not a guardian of people! …
“To be witnesses over people” has the same meaning that God told the Prophet which is to be an advisor, wise, and give advice to people, not more. The greatest thing that came in Islam is human dignity, which opposes the idea that some human being like me can be a guardian or I become inferior to him because he is a Muslim and I am Christian for example. Or he is better than me? Or he is more religious than me? Who makes him better than me? If he is better than me to God then it is between him and God! …
What kind of government does Egypt need in your opinion? One with a strong president (such as France, USA) or one in which the parliament has a stronger role?
I support the existence of a president who has specialties, strong specialties, and I support the mixed parliamentary-presidential system, not only the parliamentary system because in the parliamentary system there has to be various parties which we do not have now. Which means three or four parties competing and that is not here.
What should be the role of the President and Parliament in overseeing the budget of the army? Would the army and police take orders from the President to maintain internal security?
Everything…the army is one of the power tools like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is why the parliament should observe all these power tools whether it is the army, foreign affairs, police, etc.
The army is not above the power, it is a tool. But how we go with this with the parliament budget? These are details. It can be through a committee, like the committee of defense and national security, media committee, etc… These are details, but everything should be under the knowledge of the parliament. That is how it is done in the democratic respectful countries.
How should Article 2 of the constitution function in your opinion? Especially since Article 2 was used in verdicts in courts where it concerns religious conversions.
Freedom of Belief in the Azhar document is not related to faith switching. Article 2 does not contradict with the Freedom of Belief. Islamic Sharia has been there in the constitution since 1971 and the Egyptian people, including Christian brothers, approve of it. …
It is settled that the legislation is done through the parliament and there is no other body that can legislate except the parliament. Legislation is done under the observance of the Constitutional Court and the role of clerics—Christian and Muslim, is only to advise and give opinions and not to dominate, to legislate, or to monitor the legislation.
What percentage of Egyptians is Christian and would you make public the figures of the number of Christians from the ID cards?
I am not occupied with the number of Christians or the number of Muslims, because in a nation that has citizenship these matters are not important. Publishing information as information regardless of the way it is used.
Wrong or right, it is the right for any citizen to obtain the information they need. It is not acceptable to hide any information from citizens. As for misusing this information to hurt the interest of the nation, it is another matter.
On May 16, 2011, you stated that you support full rights of conversion to any religion, saying the state should monitor this and not Church or Azhar. How would you guarantee that conversions would be fully voluntary and how transparent would state monitoring be?
I did not say “supervise” I said “enable” the state to protect the Freedom of Religion. It is not acceptable that if a Christian wants to convert to Islam, we ask the church and vice versa. It is a personal right. That is why the Azhar document that was signed by the Azhar, Pope Shenouda, Azhar’s Grand Shaykh, political party leaders, and myself is for the Freedom of Faith. It is not the role of the church, the Azhar or the state to supervise it.
What is your stance on the proposed unified law on building places of worship?
I am against these laws. People have a right to build places of worship. I am only with laws to regulate the building of places of worship like any other building, for instance a house, only to ensure that the building meet the technical requirements.
Egyptians do not need churches or mosques, they need farms, scientific research centers, colleges, factories, houses; but churches and mosques are not needed. None of the Muslims or Christians complained that they do not have a place of worship. These matters are unnecessary. The interference of the state in these matters is the reason of all the tension.
Read the full transcript at Arab West Report, here.
Read an article about this interview at Christianity Today, here.
The Muslim Brotherhood set Egyptian politics ablaze recently with their decision to nominate their chief financier, Khairat al-Shater, for the presidency. Though he has since been disqualified, they continue to run with their backup candidate, Mohamed Morsy. All political groups recognize the right of the group to do so but many have criticized them harshly, recalling their promise from early in the revolution.
The Brotherhood assured both revolutionary forces and Western observers they had no intentions for the presidency, anxious to calm fears of an Islamist takeover. They even expelled a prominent member, Abdel Munim Abul Futuh, who declared his candidacy early on.
MB Spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan explained to me this promise was necessitated by fear the West would extinguish the revolutionary movement. Now the reversal is necessary to protect the revolution from former regime members seeking the presidency.
Perhaps this political analysis is reasonable, but the Brotherhood are not simply politicians; they are also Muslims. An anxious West expects men of religion to keep their promises.
Pressed on this question, Ghozlan was quick to answer.
‘If you want religious justification, the Prophet said: “If someone swears by his right hand, saying, ‘By God I will do this or that…’, but then sees something better than it, he may atone for his right hand, and do that which is better.”
‘There is a difference between matters of principle and political decisions. Politics is firstly concerned with the general benefit.’
Yet as the Brotherhood defines this benefit in accordance with their own, they risk confirming fears the group cannot be trusted, which some in the West extend to Muslims in general.
I inquired of scholars of three different Islamic trends to test Ghozlan’s interpretation. All three confirm the message of the tradition, though they differ in application.
Mohamed Omar Abdel Rahman
Mohamed Omar Abdel Rahman is a veteran jihadist who fought in Afghanistan. He is also the son of Omar Abdel Rahman, better known as the Blind Sheikh, currently serving a life sentence in the United States for plotting the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.
He contrasts two examples,
‘There is a difference between a pact and a promise. A pact is an agreement between two parties and cannot be changed without common agreement, as in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.
‘This tradition of Mohamed refers to a promise and applies only to one’s self. So this can be changed if something better emerges or if circumstances change, which the Brotherhood clearly believes has happened.’
Osama al-Qusi
Osama al-Qusi is a Salafi scholar, trained under Wahhabi thought in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He is controversial in Egypt, however, for his oft-criticized liberal interpretations.
He believes Ghozlan is misusing Mohamed’s words.
‘There is a big difference in what I say between me and God, which is the meaning of this tradition, and what I say to other people.
‘This is a religious mistake, no matter how politically justifiable it might be.’
Abdel Muti al-Bayyoumi is a member of the Islamic Research Academy and a traditional Azhar scholar. He and his institution represent mainstream Muslim thought throughout the Sunni world.
Like Abdel Rahman, he clarifies as to the nature of the Brotherhood’s commitment. ‘This tradition does not apply because they did not swear to God but only made a promise.
‘In terms of a promise the right to change it depends on their intention; if it was good it is acceptable.
‘The matter is between them and God, but they have to offer their justification, which if good should be accepted.’
Yet Bayyoumi, like many in Egypt, find neither their intention nor their justification acceptable.
‘It appears to me they want to consolidate power. They are aiming for the presidency, the parliament, the constitution, and who knows what else.’
While a man’s word should be his bond, most admit honest circumstances can free one from a pledge. For many in the West, though, religion in politics risks staining the former and manipulating the latter.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, believes Islam and politics to be compatible, even inseparable.
How they navigate the quagmire will affect not only their own political fortunes, but also the greater Western perception of Islam.
This article was originally published at Lapido Media.
The condition of Egypt is quietly very concerning these days. I say quietly for two reasons. First, in terms of the Western audience, most is slipping under the radar. Second, in terms of Egypt, the nation waits for presidential elections, and the areas of concern are easily ignored if no attention is paid to news headlines and their fascination with politics.
Yet it is in the realm of politics that power is often determined. Often, I say, because once again this struggle has been taken into the street.
Reminiscent of clashes prior to the legislative elections, eleven people at least were killed recently while demonstrating against the military council. Still, the odd quiet continues as these protests are near the Ministry of Defense in Abbasiyya, not in the iconic Tahrir Square.
Furthermore, they are characterized as ‘Salafi’ protests, as the initial gathering was by supporters of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail. The long-bearded presidential candidate was barred from competing at the last moment when it was determined his mother held American nationality. Current law requires candidates and their parents to hold Egyptian nationality alone.
Abu Ismail claimed fraud and conspiracy, and his followers took first to Tahrir, and then to Abbasiyya. There, they had been joined by many of traditional revolutionary spirit, looking to end military rule completely. The size of the sit-in was substantial without being overwhelming. Most in Egypt were just ignoring it.
But nothing in Egypt can be simple or straightforward. Repeatedly over the last week ‘thugs’ attacked the sit-in around midnight through the hours until dawn. As usual, the thugs are not identifiable with any particular party, but most assume some connection with either the military council or the old regime elements still clinging to their positions.
Yet this has been seen before, and the pattern is predictable. The best way to escalate a protest is to attack it. True to form, protestors have been increasing since then, and political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are calling for massive protests tomorrow on Friday.
In past writing I have sought to dive into all of the different conspiracy theories to try to make sense of the senseless violence and loss of life. Perhaps reflective of the odd quiet is that my mind is boggled sufficiently after fifteen months of conspiracy that I am unable to do so and reluctant to try. Instead, the task requires description of the politics preceding the street fighting.
For months, the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood has escalated its rhetoric against both the ruling government cabinet and the military council which stands behind it. Both prior to and following the disqualification of their own primary candidate for president – Khairat al-Shater – the MB has called for this cabinet to be sacked. In its place they ask to form the government themselves, as they reflect the majority will of the people in parliament.
The military council has refused, as is appropriate, even according to previous MB logic. During the run-up to parliamentary elections many liberal and revolutionary forces objected to the roadmap laid out by the military council. Rightly, the MB insisted on the ‘will of the people’ as represented in the results of the March popular referendum, which endorsed the military roadmap.
Yet this roadmap also made it clear the parliament had limited responsibilities which do not include executive authority. The MB recognizes this, but now translates the ‘will of the people’ into parliament composition, in which they are chief. The MB speaker of parliament took the unilateral step of suspending parliament activity as a pressure tool – since they cannot sack the cabinet themselves – and this was without any consensus from the larger body. It is not clear if he even called a full vote.
The Muslim Brotherhood is running a candidate for president, but he was the backup to al-Shater, and does not appear to enjoy wide popularity. The race – barring more surprises – has shaped into a choice between a former MB member, Abdel Munim Abul Futuh, and a former member of Mubarak’s cabinet, Amr Moussa.
Abul Futuh was expelled from the MB when he early on declared his intention to run for president while the group denied ambition to the post. He is an Islamist, but within this spectrum he is widely credited as a liberal.
Moussa, meanwhile, does not suffer unduly from the stain of Mubarak’s legacy as he enjoyed a lengthy tenure in the Arab League, away from the running, and corruption, of government. At the same time, due to his connections with government he benefits from the desire on the street to see a return to stability and is a somewhat anti-revolutionary figure, as opposed to the necessity of reform.
Some conspiracies say Abul Futuh is the secret MB candidate, and that his expulsion is theater. Others say Moussa is the candidate of the old regime, with the military seeking its re-formation through him.
And then there are the conspiracies which abound over the recent violence. Do some powers not want the issue of power decided in presidential elections? Is this the last final push before executive authority – of any stripe – is reasserted?
If so, is it from the frustrated youth who have seen their precious revolution mangled in the halls of politics?
Is it from the frustrated Salafis who have seen their populist candidate barred on the slightest of violations, if not on fraud altogether?
Is it from the frustrated Muslim Brotherhood, who also had a candidate barred and find themselves trapped in a powerless parliament?
Is it from the frustrated old regime, which finds itself on its last legs and is desperately trying to discredit the revolution and its democratic transition?
Is it from the frustrated military council, which desires to hold on to its privileges – if not its rule – while presidential frontrunners cannot necessarily be trusted to play along with it?
It is best, fitting with the lethal quiet, to put aside the conspiracies and simply say yes to all of the above, to whatever degree. There is a deep conflict over power playing out its final acts. This struggle has been rumbling ever since the revolution succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak but failing to decisively result in a change of system. Each actor has a role. As it may not result in one winner-take-all, each is seeking their biggest slice of the pie.
Given there are no deep patterns of democratic succession, it is unsurprising the conflict spills out into other means, even violence.
Yet it is the violence that is most concerning. Weapons have proliferated. Militant attacks occur in the Sinai. Suspicious fires – literal flames – have broken out across Egypt. While they may simply be the work of coincidence, the question of who is ‘burning Egypt’ has been a popular query, even if a manipulated one.
So, eleven Egyptians are dead in Abbasiyya, added to the post-revolutionary toll. Perhaps on Friday their numbers will swell further. Is more violence coming, or was the violence simply a means to increase the crowds?
Last time there was such violence, in November at Mohamed Mahmoud Street near Tahrir, it brought about a change in government as the cabinet was sacked. If the conspiracy which posits a deal between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military/old regime is in play, will we see the same soon?
Or, as a leftist presidential candidate with little chance of victory has interpreted this deal, will it result in a military coup? Recall, these protests are not in Tahrir; Abbasiyya hosts the military headquarters.
Perhaps one day Egypt will settle. Perhaps the positive social forces unleashed in the revolution will eventually coalesce into open and transparent governance.
These days are not now. It is likely Egypt must suffer a little while longer. There are three weeks remaining until presidential elections.
Perhaps, only perhaps, these will signal the end of transitional troubles.
Salafi politics has taken Egypt by storm. This has surprised many commentators who underestimated their base of thought and non-political nature. For others, it has been a validation of years of Salafi work in mosques and surrounding communities to preach Islam and help the poor.
As an aid to understanding this phenomenon, and in effort to understand it myself, this text will function as an inverted pyramid. It will start with broad strokes concerning the Salafi coalition in Egypt – the Nour Party, focus on one member in particular – the Asala Party, demonstrate their base in a typical neighborhood – Warraq, and then feature one member in particular – Essam al-Sharif. Appreciation is given for his help in gathering the story which follows.
For a historical background to Salafism in Egypt, click here for a previous post. Though lines overlap, Salafis can be distinguished from Muslim Brothers and Islamic revolutionaries based on methodology, rather than thought. All three groups desire some sort of an Islamic state in which sharia law is the basis of governance. After a history of struggle against the state, the Muslim Brotherhood foreswore violence and sought to transform society while seeking entrance into the political arena. Believing the Brotherhood to have betrayed the jihadist struggle, revolutionary groups such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiya continued to agitate against the state, seeking its overthrow.
Salafis, meanwhile, are understood to be quietist. They eschewed political participation, with some, perhaps many, declaring it to be heretical to Islamic law. At the same time their theology called for obedience to a Muslim ruler. Unlike many in the revolutionary groups, Salafis accepted the broad, liberal, and traditional interpretation of ‘Muslim ruler’, accepting Mubarak as having been given by God.
Therefore, while the state pounded revolutionary Islamic groups out of existence in the 1990s and early 2000s, and placed countless political obstacles and jail terms in the path of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak generally allowed Salafis free reign to propagate their religious interpretations. While strict limits were enforced, Salafi preaching proliferated in the mosques of lower class areas as well as on popular satellite television channels. Rumors are rife concerning extensive financial support from conservative Gulf nations, but the result was the emergence – below the attention of middle class society and politics – of an authentic Egyptian Salafi movement.
Conventional wisdom states given their unique situation in the Egyptian scene, Salafis did not join the revolution of January 25. By and large this is true; many of their leaders declared such activity as religiously haram. Yet many Salafis did participate. This is the testimony of Hani Fawzi, a political activist from Helwan and party leader for the Salafi Asala Party in Nasr City, Cairo. He joined the demonstrations on January 28, as did a few of his favored Salafi sheikhs, such as Nashat Ahmad, Hassan Abu al-Ishbal, Fawzi al-Sayyid, and lastly Mohamed Abdel Maqsoud Afifi, who will be mentioned later.
Nevertheless, upon the success of the revolution and the opening of the political scene, most were surprised to see the enthusiastic participation of newly formed Salafi parties. This was accompanied by much internal discord. Some continued to criticize political participation, and those who formed parties witnessed several divisions and splits. In the end, two main groupings emerged.
The first and largest issued from Alexandria, understood to be the greatest base of Salafi strength. Leaders there created the Nour (Light) Party. Meanwhile in Cairo, the Asala (Origin) Party was formed. Other parties also emerged, but did not come to national prominence. Nour and Asala were not true rivals, however. One Salafi stated the reason to have more than one party was pragmatic. If any difficulties were encountered by one party – political, legal, administrative – the other one could assure representation.
Over the summer Egypt’s political powers negotiated alliances as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party seized the place of initiative. They created the ‘Democratic Alliance’, seeking as broad a coalition as possible. The historic liberal party, the Wafd, joined them, as did the newly created Salafi entities. Newer liberal parties rejected the central place of the Brotherhood and doubted their democratic credentials. The Free Egyptians and the Social Democratic Party allied instead with the youth revolutionary parties, setting up a liberal vs. Islamist electoral battle.
Yet further splintering emerged. The revolutionary parties split from what became known as the Egyptian Bloc, largely over issues of representation and nomination of members. Meanwhile, the Wafd Party decided the Brotherhood-dominated Democratic Alliance did not fit with its liberal heritage, and decided to go it alone in elections.
The surprise came when the Salafis later split from the Brotherhood, although the reason is similar to that which dissolved the Egyptian Bloc. Egypt’s electoral system created a two-thirds ‘party list’ and a one-third ‘individual’ competition for seats. In the party list system, a slate of candidates would be presented, to be voted on as a whole. The number of candidates elected would correspond to the percentage of the vote captured by the list within a particular district. For individual seats, only one person could be nominated and receive support from the coalition.
In the Egyptian Bloc, youthful revolutionaries and established middle-class professionals vied for positioning at the top of the list, and for nomination in individual elections. When the youth felt they were being marginalized, they formed their own coalition. It should be mentioned additionally that leftist-liberal orientation played a role in their division, though it did not take down the alliance. The remaining Free Egyptian Party (right of center economically) and Social Democratic Party (left of center) held together in support of a liberal political system, and perhaps in opposition to Islamist trends.
The story is similar for the Democratic Alliance. The largely middle-class and politically established Muslim Brotherhood clashed with the lower-class and populist Salafis over representation in the coalition. It should be mentioned additionally that moderate-conservative orientation also played a role. Yet rather than this designation, it might be more true to label the conflict as pragmatic versus idealistic. In any case, the Salafi parties left and created a coalition under the name of their dominant partner, the Nour Party.
This coalition included the Reform and Development Party, created since the revolution by al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, the former Islamic revolutionaries. After being greatly weakened by the state, the group controversially foreswore violence in the late 1990s. Laboring internally over their identity and purpose, al-Jama’a maintained a base of support in Upper Egypt, and allied with the Salafis during the elections.
The other partner with Nour is the aforementioned Asala Party, to which the rest of this essay will turn. This largely geographical alliance – Alexandria, Cairo, Upper Egypt – gave the Salafis a national base of support, allowing each partner to draw from their positions of strength. The result has been a solid 25% of the national vote. The Muslim Brotherhood drew support from many Egyptians for its role as major opposition party to Mubarak, as well as a lack of alternatives, and not necessarily from its Islamist politics. Salafis, meanwhile, drew only from their base and their religious-identity based campaign strategy, suggesting their representation does indeed encompass one in four Egyptians.
Yet before moving on in complete acceptance of this fact, it is suspected by many the Salafis also received the benefit of official fraud. If this accusation is true, it does not necessarily imply their complicity. Rather, it is maintained the ‘old regime’ remnants in the state wish to prop up the Salafis for one of two reasons. First, given their political acquiescence to the stability of order, otherwise non-Salafi political apparatchiks and business interests believe they can rule through the Salafis and maintain a Mubarak-style regime. They would allow Salafis to institute a more conservative social order, but themselves exist outside of its reach. The assumed political naiveté of Salafis would also allow the same level of corruption in administration and policing.
The second reason proposed for state-sponsorship of the Salafis is that they are meant as a counter-balance to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is maintained the Brotherhood could not be denied leadership in the post-revolutionary order, but they are pragmatic enough to play political games. Mubarak scared the West by saying support me, or face the Brotherhood. Old regime members can now make back-door deals with the pro-business Brotherhood to say, support us, or face the Salafis. Meanwhile, to keep the Brotherhood honest, the old regime can threaten them with the populist Salafis, who can ‘out-Islam them’ if push comes to shove, especially if the state greases the wheels of low-level electoral fraud. Either way, it is a dangerous game, but many liberals believe it is being played, if only from sour grapes.
Shifting focus to the Asala Party in particular, it is interesting to note it was not the first Salafi Party formed in Cairo. This honor goes to the Fadila (Virtue) Party. According to reports, the co-founder of the Fadila Party, Khaled al-Said, had disagreements with elected chairman Adel Abdel Maqsoud Afifi, resulting in the parting of their ways. The latter then went on to found the Asala Party.
Afifi had been a general in the police force and the director of the Passports and Immigration Control section of the Interior Ministry. He is also noteworthy for being the brother of the celebrated Salafi television preacher Mohamed Abdel Maqsoud Afifi, who also served as a government chemist. His Egyptian ministry is based in Shubra, a neighborhood in the north of Cairo.
Afifi was elected president of the party, which he co-founded with Ehab Shiha, an engineer who owns a mid-level building company. Shiha is vice-president of the party, along with Mamdouh Ismail, a lawyer renowned for handing the defense of Islamist clients, especially from al-Jama’a al-Islamiya.
Subtitle: A Contemporary Vision of Original Principles
The Asala Party literature declares it to possess ‘a contemporary vision of original principles’. This vision consists of six founding principles which influence eight goals in particular.
Founding Principles
Islamic sharia law is the principle source for legislation, which guarantees justice for all denominations of the people.
The national benefit will be promoted through the search for professionals of high capability and sincerity to work in government.
The Egyptian people have the right to personal freedom of expression, and the Egyptian citizens must have their respect and dignity protected.
The Egyptian people have the right to chose their representatives in both legislative councils and executive bodies.
Elected representatives are chosen by the people to express their viewpoints, not to be considered better than them.
The ruling authorities – president of the republic and the cabinet ministers – are employees who work for the good of the people, who have the right to question, hold accountable, and judge them if they perform poorly.
Party Goals
Intellectual, social, and moral development through purifying souls and the elevation of traditional values drawn from Islamic sharia law.
Complete economic renaissance in all sectors of the state resulting in an increase in GDP through ideal use of national resources.
Just distribution of wealth and lessening the class divisions to improve the social situation of the general Egyptian people.
Preserving the dignity of the Egyptian citizen, whether inside or outside of Egypt, without looking to his social position, as the simple citizen is the primary member of society.
Complete improvement in social services necessary for the public, including educational, health, and security.
Establishing the foundation of justice and equality between citizens in their rights and the rule of law, through implementing Article Two of the constitution to ensure the regulations of Islamic sharia are the true and veritable primary source of legislation.
Crafting strong relations with neighboring countries, especially of the Nile Basin to preserve the interests of Egypt both domestically and internationally.
The return of Egypt to her position of leadership in the region, in Africa, and among Islamic nations, as deserving of her history, civilization, and the potential of her great people.
The Asala Party then went about the work of building party infrastructure. They chose Essam al-Sharif as party secretary for Warraq, a neighborhood in north-west Cairo. Warraq is a mixed industrial-agricultural area, lower class, with Christians populating in general accordance to their national percentage. There are several churches, one of which is alleged to have received an appearance of the Virgin Mary in December 2009. The name of the area is derived from the Arabic for ‘maker of paper’. As such, it hosted papyrus manufacture from ancient days as well as the first modern printing press in Egypt. It is also well known for production of women’s Islamic dress.
During elections, Warraq constituted a district along with the neighboring areas of Awseem and Manashi. The district was allotted ten seats for party-list competition. The Muslim Brotherhood backed Freedom and Justice Party captured 40% of the vote, while the Nour Party alliance received 30%, capturing three seats. Two of these three – Adel Azayzi and Abu Khadra – are from the Nour Party proper, while the third – Nazzar Ghurab – represented the Reform and Development Party of al-Jama’a al-Islamiya. The Asala Party did not field a candidate in this district, but campaigned for its partners all the same.
The campaign for individual candidates followed national law to vote for one seat for ‘professionals’, and another for ‘workers/farmers’. This peculiarity is a holdover from Nasser-era elections designed to assure better representation for the working class in his socialist system. Over a hundred candidates campaigned, but only a few had enough prominence to secure victory.
One major issue for parties was the dominance of Mubarak’s National Party in all constituencies of Egypt. This did not concern the professionals’ seat, in which Mahmoud Amer of the Freedom and Justice Party defeated Emad al-Halabi from Nour in the run-off election. This was a friendly competition in which the two candidates shook hands after the final result was declared. On the street however, the FJP candidate received the vote of a Salafi partisan, angering some within Asala. Many commentators expect a replication in the years to come. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis are ideologically similar, yet competition often brings out the worst in men, even among friends.
Yet the problems of candidacy with the old regime National Party complicated the workers’/farmers’ election. Newer parties were under pressure not to nominate any Mubarak era figures, but this eliminated so many potential candidates. In the end, both the FJP and the Nour Party selected individuals, but their applications were rejected legally for not meeting worker/farmer qualifications. As such, Islamist forces failed to feature a candidate for this Warraq slot.
Even so, they represented a major voting constituency, desired by other candidates. In the initial election neither the FJP nor the Salafis endorsed a candidate. The run-off resulted in the easy victory of Mustafa Sulman, an independent candidate, over Yusuf Khalid of the Egyptian Bloc. Sharif explained both candidates had ties to the National Party, though neither occupied significant leadership. To play in politics under Mubarak meant getting your hands dirty in the party; Sharif believed Khalid’s hands were dirtier. Islamists threw their weight behind Sulman in the run-off, which was decisive.
One of the more prominent campaign tactics of the Nour Party coalition was widely criticized by other parties. Outside the party headquarters of Asala a pickup truck would arrive several times weekly, stocked with gas bottles. These are needed by the majority of residents as the state does not provide independent gas lines into each home. Due to a purported shortage in supply the black market drove up rates, yet the Asala Party sold each at the designated government price. It was assumed there was either money from the Gulf funding this program, or else government corruption to facilitate it.
Sharif explained there was indeed corruption, but that the Asala Party was combating it. The offices of the local governor would authorize certain people as agents, sell them bottles for 3LE ($0.50 US), and allow them to resell at 5LE ($0.80 US). Instead, due to shortages, bottles were being sold for as much as 20-25LE ($3.25 – $4 US). In many parts of Egypt there were protests over these shortages, with the poor bearing the brunt of others’ profit.
The Nour Party coalition went to the governor and threatened to bring him up on charges of corruption if this process did not cease. They then arranged directly with the agent at the point of loading, paying him his due price, and directing the pick-up truck to party neighborhoods in each district. There, to gathered crowds, party coordinators would sell the bottles at price, plus 1LE markup for transportation. According to Sharif, there was neither profit nor expense for the party. There was, however, great popular acclaim. When one recipient entered the party offices and asked who to vote for, Sharif stated (at least in the presence of the author), ‘Whoever you want.’ Upon insistence, he said the Nour Party is good. Asked about the Brotherhood, he said they were good also.
This program could have been done by any party, Sharif explained, but the success of the Salafis stems from their connection to the people. Sharif is a son of Warraq; he is a local businessman who owns a coffee bean shop. He is not wealthy, but is able to travel to Sudan on business to import supplies. Furthermore, he works for the Asala Party on a volunteer basis. He believes in his principles, and sacrifices for them.
As an example of sacrifice, connection to the people, but not fanaticism to the party, Sharif offered his intervention on behalf of his Christian neighbor. Shadia Bushra is a 45 year old widow, living in an apartment complex owned by her extended family. When her aunt decided to move to a more affluent quarter, she attempted to sell the building. Shadia, however, refused to leave. She was paying 10LE ($1.80 US) monthly rent for years, and a now grandfathered housing law dictated the freezing of the original rental contract. If Shadia moved she would have to find a new apartment at current market prices, which would overwhelm her and her three children. Shadia earned around 300LE ($55 US) per month working in a local nursery, and received a 120LE ($20 US) monthly stipend from the government as a widow.
Shadia’s aunt could have sold the building without forcing the move, but this would have resulted in a lower sale price, as the new owner would be legally obligated to honor the original rental agreement. Shadia, however, had long lost the original contract, and her aunt decided to take her to court.
Having been neighbors for many years, Sharif helped Shadia when the priest in the local church took the side of the wealthy relatives. He went with her multiple times to the court, and bore witness she was a long standing resident of the apartment. The judge ruled in her favor, and she is now the sole resident in an empty apartment building.
Shadia asked Sherif if he would have helped her had the litigant been a Muslim. Sherif answered he only became involved because she bore the side of right, and was acting on behalf of a neighbor. Shadia wound up voting for the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, following the general word on the street. She gave no indication Sherif influenced her to vote in any direction.
Egypt is learning the ways of democracy, yet within a historic struggle for power. Part of the acclaim of Islamist parties is they represent a departure from the ways of corruption in the former regime, bound, as they are, by the moral strictures of Islam. Whether they will prove incorruptible is subject to much doubt, and though Sharif’s explanation of the gas bottle campaigning is reasonable, it also seems to skirt the line of the acceptable.
Yet Sharif displays a magnanimity and sincerity bearing well on his party. Its principles and goals may be another matter, requiring further analysis. Whether or not an open-minded, reasonable personality like Sharif is representative of his party is yet another question. To what degree are Salafis other-rejecting extremists, and to what degree are they simply portrayed this way in liberal propaganda, which has rarely descended to learn from or benefit the street?
Answers to these questions will require the wisdom of the years to come, yet requires immediate action in electoral decisions. Salafis are part and parcel of Egypt; their place is demanded in representation. How Egyptians decide – or are manipulated – is subject to debate; this small window into their world is offered simply as a means to understanding.
The term ‘Islamo-Fascism’ has been in vogue for sometime among those who dismiss Islam as a political system, especially on the American political right. For the most part I have never paid attention to their arguments, thinking they were simply a means of discrediting Islam-as-religion with tenuous links to the hated Nazis.
Maybe some, even many, use the term this way. Yet there may be more of a connection to fascism-as-ideology than is properly recognized. Certainly I did not consider this before, due to the over-connection of fascism with the Nazis.
I picked up on this possibility reading a book published in the mid-80s, titled ‘Religious Strife in Egypt: Crisis and Ideological Conflict in the Seventies’. It approaches religious tension from the perspective of social and labor transition within Egypt’s political system. Only a small section addresses the relationship between Islamist groups and fascist ideology, but it was academic, not populist discourse.
The basic idea summarizes fascism as the economic rule of the petty bourgeoisie, as opposed to the wealthy, the lower class, or the administrative technocrats. In order to maintain and maximize their position in society, they must rely on the power of the state. Otherwise, the wealth of the upper class or the populism of the lower class might undue them.
Other definitions contain different nuances, but the following analysis will rely on the book in question, which describes other aspects of fascism as:
Intense nationalism
Militarism
Elitism and chauvinism
Emphasis on the role of the family
Focus on youth and their regimentation
Revolt against ideologies
The book was written in the 80s, and political Islamism has changed, or may have changed. Yet it is intriguing to measure up how today’s candidates – Muslim Brothers and Salafis – fit this criteria.
In terms of economic class, the Brotherhood fits the bill as they are generally understood. While some members are wealthy, most come from the educated middle class which was starved out of real social and political participation during the Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak eras. The Salafis, meanwhile, are considered lower class. They would not immediately fit this key fascist indicator.
As for the other bullet points:
Intense nationalism: Both can qualify, especially if nationalism is tweaked to represent the Islamic umma. The MB has toned this down since the revolution, but it is in their blood. Even if it means Egypt alone, both MB and Salafis preach their Islamism is best for the nation.
Militarism: Both can qualify, especially if anti-Israel agitation is allowed. There is much rhetoric of liberating Jerusalem, for example. But while it can be argued this aspect is toned down also, it is more apparent true militarism is not a significant characteristic of either movement. It was so for the MB, but they have long adopted more malleable tendencies.
Elitism and chauvinism: I would wish to pause on chauvinism lest I make the same mistake I did about fascism. If it is akin to ‘a woman has her place’, then it fits both groups, though the MB is far more ‘liberated’ than the Salafis. As for elitism, there is a palpable MB tendency to look down on and criticize the Salafis, even though there are close ideological links.
Emphasis on the role of the family: Dead-on, for both. Earlier this year a MB figure urged MB members to marry only in their group (reflecting on elitism as well). Furthermore, the family unit is preached as the basic organizational principle in society, from which Islam takes root in the community.
Focus on youth and their regimentation: For the MB this has always been a characteristic, as the group is highly disciplined and draws members especially among youth with leadership skills. The Salafis are more fuzzy and do not tend to have organizational hierarchies. Theirs is an ideological affiliation, centered around charismatic preachers.
Revolt against ideologies: Just above the Salafis were shown not to qualify here, but the MB certainly does. While maintaining a strong commitment to political Islamism as a concept – and with it sharia law – there is not much more in the way of definition. This could change if the group is forced to govern, but they have shown a strong preference for flexibility in ideas. Especially in the 70s they turned away from strong ideologues who wound up in other organizations, many of which were violent.
To summarize, then, there is a legitimacy to discuss Islamo-Fascism. It is not at all clear that this is necessarily true of political Islam as an idea, but a good number of the historical circumstances of the Muslim Brotherhood have affinity. Whether or not it is fair to say this of the current Muslim Brotherhood is another question, as so much is up in the air. Do they mean their words, or are they a means to power before true colors are revealed? Who can say? Their books betray them, but many of their words betray their books.
They could well be on their way to becoming the equivalent of Europe’s Christian Democrats.
While such an outcome is more likely than them becoming Europe’s Nazis, it is far too early to pass judgment on either account.
In Egypt, Easter is celebrated today according to the Orthodox calendar. It is a rather strange holiday as it sets off a bit of schizophrenia in the country. Unlike Christmas, which is a national holiday, Easter is a regular day.
Except it isn’t. Christians are allowed the day off, and many Muslims take it also. The Monday following Easter is a national holiday, called Shem al-Naseem (Smelling the Breeze), which is a social holiday going back to the Pharaonic age in celebration of Spring.
The government grants many holidays, both national and religious, and as Muslims and Christians together recognize the prophet Jesus, Coptic Christmas is designated officially. There is little protest of this fact, save for some Salafis who also oppose recognition of Muhammad’s birthday. For Muslims of this ilk, the only proper holidays are designated by Islam – the end of Ramadan and the sacrifice of Ishmael – and does not include the honoring of a mere man, no matter his prophetic status.
Yet whereas Christmas enjoys wide acceptance, Easter is trickier. On religious holidays Muslims and Christians exchange phone calls, wishing friends a joyous celebration. Can Muslims do so in honor of the resurrection of Christ?
Islam holds that Jesus was not crucified but rather ascended directly into heaven. Therefore, he cannot have been resurrected from the dead, as he never died.
Such a denial undoes Christianity, but it need not undo social pleasantries. Many Muslims wish Christians well on the occasion of this feast. The aforementioned Salafis do not, nor on Christmas, but maintain this is only due to religious doctrine. They argue instead we should greet our Christian neighbors and treat them well on every occasion.
This does not hold too much weight with Christians, who greet Muslim friends despite non-belief in Islam. Regardless, it is not as if this issue is tearing Egypt at the seams. Photos like the one below demonstrate the general spirit seen among many Egyptians.
Translation: the Pharmacy of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs Wishes Brother Copts Happy Holidays on the Occasion of the Glorious Resurrection Feast (Easter)
This sign was placed on the wall of the church in Kozzika, which serves as diocesan headquarters for the Orthodox of Maadi. The pharmacy in question may simply be seeking good business, but in offering Easter wishes in particular it makes a social statement.
The owner of this pharmacy has always evaded the question of his political allegiance with me, but his location is within the complex of a mosque which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the days after the revolution he hosted an area wide meeting to esteem national unity, attended by priests of the church, local religious leaders, and representatives of the ruling military establishment.
It would be wrong to say that such public Easter greetings are seen everywhere in Egypt, but they are not uncommon outside of many churches.
One reason why such wisdom is found socially is due to the wisdom of Pope Shenouda. Former President Mubarak established Christmas as an official holiday, and was pleased especially with the Christian response.
Following this decision Mubarak approached Pope Shenouda about designating Easter likewise. Pope Shenouda encouraged him not to, recognizing the majority of the nation did not accept the resurrection of Jesus. Making such a statement on behalf of the state would cause unnecessary social strife and likely a public backlash.
Such an anecdote, whether true or apocryphal, provides a glimpse into the nature of Egyptian society. The state is neither secular nor religious, but maintains an odd balance between the two. Of course, the nature of the state is under deep debate following the revolution, and both fear and hope abound as to the outcome.
Yet the reality of Egyptian society is seen well through the common wisdom displayed by the pharmacist and many others. Despite religious distinctions Egyptians across the nation offer good wishes to their friends and neighbors, even on Easter.
Unfortunately, this reality is also undergoing potential redefinition, as society fractures into different identities and isolated communities. One reason the Salafi refusal to greet Copts on their holidays does not cause much social disruption is that so few Salafis and Copts have a relationship to begin with.
If the Egyptian revolution can be made akin to the Triumphal Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem, when the crowds shouted in triumph and celebration, these current days may well represent the caustic debates while in Jerusalem, if not his outright death and time in the tomb.
Is a resurrection coming for Egypt? On this holiest of holidays, Egyptian Christians must maintain their hope. Yet more alike to Mary Magdalene and her female companions, they must confront their grief and visit the tomb – perhaps akin to visiting their Islamist nemesis which they believe has buried their Messiah of a civil state?
Parallels must not be stretched too far, but the Gospel resurrection was first experienced at the tomb. Might Egypt’s be as well? Jesus’ resurrection was entirely a surprise, and his form completely different from that of their familiar companion.
What form will Egyptian resurrection take? What surprises are in store? Will Egyptian Christians remain cowered in the Upper Room? Will the resurrected Egypt still appear to them there?
Or will the women be the herald of the new reality? They upon whom all social relationships depend may hold the secret to this resurrection. Women will always greet their friends.
Yet it was men and women together who carried the news of resurrection abroad to all the land. Egypt’s resurrection must be similar. Copts, Salafis, Muslim Brothers, secularists – solutions must be found and proclaimed together.
For Egyptian Christians, will they approach them, even after the loss of their hope? Resurrection can only follow desperation and defeat. Will they trust their Savior? Will they trust their fellow citizens?
Egypt grows more interesting by the day. The Muslim Brotherhood enters the presidential fray despite earlier assurances otherwise. A Salafi candidate teeters on the brink of disqualification on the technicality his mother may have obtained US citizenship late in her life. Yet all is trumped by the candidacy of Mubarak’s crisis-appointed vice president and long time head of the intelligence service.
All revolutionary forces loudly decry the latter, seeing in him the rebuilding of the old regime. Islamist forces took to the streets against him and filled Tahrir Square. Non-Islamists, however, stayed away, as transition frictions have sullied the relationships of original allies. They call for a protest next week.
May all end peacefully, God. Large scale protests have been infrequent recently, largely because so many have ended in violence.
There are fears for this one, as Salafi supporters of their candidate have remained in the square demanding an answer on his eligibility. Rumors abound a decision is pending.
Fill their hearts with righteousness, God, and protect them if disappointed. Protect them from the danger of their own anger; from the ill application of searching for justice. Protect them from any who would wish to pin such violence upon them and tarnish their image.
So much is confusing, God. May truth prevail.
Even the candidacies of the Brotherhood and Mubarak’s VP are questioned. Of the former, a criminal sentence of questionable validity could disqualify him, though a pardon was recently issued. Of the latter, Parliament passed a law of questionable validity to bar him and others from running.
Yet whereas the revolutionary camps’ divisions are hardening, may this not poison the people. May this rally bring blessing to Egypt, and may the following one do likewise. Subject all soon to the crucible of elections, that popular will be properly gauged.
May this be true even if the candidacy of the VP becomes a referendum on the election itself. Give Egyptians wisdom to make the choice best for their nation, resisting all competing manipulations. Honor their common sense and good nature.
For these and other candidates, God, test their hearts and establish the truest eligibility. May this be in terms of your values, not of rules and regulations. Honor the law, and help Egyptians to craft it accordingly. But give them a man after your own heart, one who will govern wisely, justly, and humbly.
Bless Egypt, God. Hold her steady as the tremors of transition unbalance many. Bring her through this period and establish her as a rock upon which your grace and mercy take hold. They have already enabled so much, including these controversies.
Jayson Casper 