Tag: Islamism

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Early History of Islamism in Egypt

(L) Hassan al-Banna, (R) Sayyid Qutb

Egyptian presidential campaigns have entered the mudslinging stage. Ahmed Shafiq has been on the defensive since his entry into the race, in which he is accused of being a member of the former regime and seeking to reconstitute it. He has also faced charges of financial corruption during his time as Minister of Civil Aviation.

In recent days he has hit back, especially against the Muslim Brotherhood. He has accused them of working with Qatar to sell/lease the Suez Canal to the Gulf state, and working with Mubarak to make secret deals in exchange for a proportion of parliament seats. In terms of the revolution he said they are the often-touted third party who killed protestors and burned police stations.

As best I can follow, no conclusive evidence has been issued to support his charges. Yet the political climate reminded me of a project I have been working on to establish a chronology of Islamism in Egypt since the dawn of the Muslim Brotherhood. The following list is disputed in points, and is compiled from a book entitled ‘Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics’, by Barry Rubin. It outlines moments in history where Islamists have been violent, and others where they have shied away.

Shafiq asserts we are now in another violent period. I have significant doubts, but as with all things revolutionary, anything is possible, even plausible.

  • 1929 – Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banna
  • 1930-39 – MB grows to tens of thousands of members, including in police, army, and government institutions, and includes a Secret Organization for militant activity and terrorism
  • 1948 – MB raises funds, buys weapons, runs training camps, and sends volunteers to Palestine
  • 1948 – Egypt’s government dissolves the MB using emergency law from Palestine war
  • 1949, February – MB member shoots Prime Minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi, regime retaliates by assassinating Hassan al-Banna
  • 1951 – MB supplies many fighters during the Suez Canal crisis, links with Free Officers in the army including Anwar Sadat
  • 1952, July – Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrows monarchy during revolution/coup d’etat
  • 1952 – Sayyid Qutb returns from America horrified at its society, becomes a leader in the MB and was involved in meetings with Nasser
  • 1952-54 – al-Banna’s successor Hassan al-Hudaybi works as a reformist to prevent consolidation of Nasser’s power, while Qutb plays hardball and promotes seizing power
  • 1954, August – al-Hudaybi opposes Nasser’s treaty with the British over the Suez Canal and is arrested
  • 1954, October – MB member (allegedly) opens fire on Nasser; he survives and takes over as head of state, 6000 arrested as organization is outlawed
  • 1954 – Qutb arrested and sentenced to 25 years in prison, after he developed theory of jahiliyya­, which describes Egyptian society as non-Islamic
  • 1954-64 – Nasser establishes Muslim credentials as mosque building flourishes, Islamic radio is established, the Azhar is incorporated into the state and modernized, and religion is made a compulsory subject in schools
  • 1961 – Nasser undermines Azhar authority and introduces new, non-religious faculties
  • 1964 – Nasser frees MB members in prison in an effort to counter Egyptian Marxists
  • 1965, August – Nasser accuses MB of assassination plot, 27,000 arrested, 26 tortured to death, Qutb, Yusuf Hawash, and Abdel Fattah Ismail hanged
  • 1967 – Egypt suffers humiliating defeat against Israel, undermining Nasser’s legacy and legitimacy
  • 1970-85 – Government supported mosques double their religious programs, with triple student enrollment
  • 1970, October – Anwar Sadat becomes president
  • 1970 – First Islamist association founded in Qasr al-Aini Hospital among doctors and interns who treated Islamists released from prison
  • 1971, May – Sadat purges socialists and frees MB prisoners to combat them, including al-Hudaybi and future leader al-Tilimsani
  • 1971 – MB works with Sadat on new constitution making ‘the principles of the Islamic sharia a principle source of legislation’, but complain it does not make it the sole source of authority
  • 1971 – Shukri Mustafa breaks with the MB following his release from prison, sets up Takfir wa Higra
  • 1971-77 – MB cooperates with Sadat and his ‘Corrective Revolution’, until splitting over his peace initiative with Israel
  • 1973 – al-Tilimsani becomes Supreme Guide of the MB, was a close associate of al-Banna
  • 1974, April – Islamic Liberation Organization, led by Salah Sariyya (a Palestinian) fails in coup d’etat at the Military Technical Academy in Heliopolis, 92 people indicted, including 18 cadets; 30 officers and 100+ soldiers discharged for sympathy
  • 1975, July – Sadat issues full pardon to MB members still in prison
  • 1976 – Sadat creates Arab Socialist Union to open up political life, MB supports him during parliamentary elections; wins right to publish al-Da’wa journal
  • 1977, January – riots breakout over Sadat’s policy to trim food subsidies, MB mocks government for blaming the communists
  • 1977, July – Takfir wa Higra kidnaps and murders former Endowments and Azhar minister Husain al-Dhahabi, who criticized their idea of jahiliyya and isolation from society in preparation for violent overthrow of the government
  • 1978, March – Takfir wa Higra leader Shukri Mustafa hanged with four others, many imprisoned
  • 1978, September – Sadat crafts Camp David Accords with Israel
  • 1978, December – Parliament forms committee to study if current laws comply with sharia
  • 1979, March – Egypt signs peace treaty with Israel, MB opposes it and Camp David harshly, but al-Tilimsani calls on Arab League not to ostracize Sadat
  • 1979, June – Sadat suspends publication of MB’s al-Da’wa journal
  • 1979, July – Sadat accuses al-Hudaybi’s successor Omar al-Tilimsani of trying to overthrow regime
  • 1979 – Islamist independent candidates Sheikh Salah Abu Ismail and Hassan al-Gamal elected to parliament
  • 1979 – Sadat cracks down on Islamic associations, especially in universities, arresting many and limiting freedom of association, criticizing them for Muslim-Christian clashes
  • 1979 – Asyut Islamic association succeeds in forcing university to segregate students by gender
  • 1980 – Army publishes religious magazine for soldiers to keep them from radicalism, increases mosque construction on bases; government publishes two religious magazines, al-Liwa’ al-Islami and al-Urwa al-Wuthqa
  • 1981, June – Muslim-Coptic riots in Zawiya al-Hamra, Cairo; al-Da’wa accuses Copts of slandering Islam and gathering arms to kill Muslims
  • 1981, September – Popular preacher Abdel Hamid Kishk accuses Sadat of betraying Islamic principles, following his sermon Muslims exit and attack neighboring church
  • 1981, September – Sadat arrests 1500 activists, 90% of whom are Islamists, including al-Tilimsani, MB spokesmen Saleh Ashmawi and Mohamad Abdel Qudus, as well as Kishk; also arrests Copts and secular activists; government assumes control over 40,000 privately owned mosques
  • 1981, September – Among the above Sadat arrests brother of Khalid al-Islamboli who was a member of an Asyut Islamic association
  • 1981, October – Sadat assassinated by Khalid al-Islamboli of al-Jihad
  • 1981, November – al-Tilimsani denies the MB ever used violence or terrorism
  • 1982, March – Investigation into Sadat assassination sentences al-Jihad leader Mohamed Abdel Salam Farag (author of ‘The Neglected Duty’ about jihad) to death with four others, five given life imprisonment, twelve long sentences, but Omar Abdel Rahman acquitted, though he authorized the assassination with a fatwa
  • 1982 – al-Tilimsani suggests violent Islamic groups were set up by the government to counter the MB
  • 1982 – Government sends Azhar and MB clerics into the prisons to instruct extremists about proper Islam, program mostly publicity and false reform
  • 1982 – Parliament committee finishes work finding most laws already comply with sharia, the rest should be reformed gradually
  • 1984 – al-Tilimsani secures MB-Wafd Party partnership with Fuad Sirag Eddin to elect MB members through Wafd’s legal structure, wins 15% of the vote with eight seats for MB
  • 1985, February – After Mubarak permits resumption of Islamic associations’ work, Egyptian University Student Federation reestablished
  • 1985 – Wave of bumper stickers spread through Cairo bearing Islamic slogans
  • 1985, June – Hafez Salama, popular war hero, tries to launch a demonstration from his mosque in Abbasiyya, Cairo in support of sharia law, relents, re-launches later, is removed from his pulpit and arrested; MB did not support his efforts
  • 1986, April – Four officers and 29 people arrested for stealing ammunition in a plot to take over the government, linked to al-Jihad
  • 1985, May – Parliament defeats law authorizing sharia as the law of the land
  • 1986, May – al-Tilimsani dies and is succeeded by Mohamed Abu al-Nasr
  • 1986, October – Police foil an armed effort to takeover an Alexandria radio station
  • 1986 – MB breaks with Wafd over internal power struggle, joins with Liberal Party instead; Salah Abu Ismail becomes vice-president and party drops support for Camp David
  • 1986 – Security forces arrest 2500 Islamic radicals, MB raises no protest
  • 1987 – Jihadist group Survivors from Hellfire fail to assassinate al-Musawwar magazine editor Makram Mohamed Ahmed and former interior minister Nabawi Ismail
  • 1987 – Mohamed Abu al-Nasr revises MB history claiming the regime made them out to be violent promoting myths of their earlier insurrection, though he took MB oath fifty years earlier on a Qur’an and a gun
  • 1987, April – Islamist Alliance wins 17% of seats in parliamentary elections with 36 seats to MB
  • 1987, July – MB agreed with ruling NDP to support Mubarak’s bid for second six-year term
  • 1987, Members of Islamic associations sweep student elections at all faculties in Cairo University
  • 1987, MB electoral program calls for ending military cooperation with the United States, but favors Western ‘People of the Book’ over Soviet Russia

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Islamo-Fascism

The term ‘Islamo-Fascism’ has been in vogue for sometime among those who dismiss Islam as a political system, especially on the American political right. For the most part I have never paid attention to their arguments, thinking they were simply a means of discrediting Islam-as-religion with tenuous links to the hated Nazis.

Maybe some, even many, use the term this way. Yet there may be more of a connection to fascism-as-ideology than is properly recognized. Certainly I did not consider this before, due to the over-connection of fascism with the Nazis.

I picked up on this possibility reading a book published in the mid-80s, titled ‘Religious Strife in Egypt: Crisis and Ideological Conflict in the Seventies’. It approaches religious tension from the perspective of social and labor transition within Egypt’s political system. Only a small section addresses the relationship between Islamist groups and fascist ideology, but it was academic, not populist discourse.

The basic idea summarizes fascism as the economic rule of the petty bourgeoisie, as opposed to the wealthy, the lower class, or the administrative technocrats. In order to maintain and maximize their position in society, they must rely on the power of the state. Otherwise, the wealth of the upper class or the populism of the lower class might undue them.

Other definitions contain different nuances, but the following analysis will rely on the book in question, which describes other aspects of fascism as:

  • Intense nationalism
  • Militarism
  • Elitism and chauvinism
  • Emphasis on the role of the family
  • Focus on youth and their regimentation
  • Revolt against ideologies

The book was written in the 80s, and political Islamism has changed, or may have changed. Yet it is intriguing to measure up how today’s candidates – Muslim Brothers and Salafis – fit this criteria.

In terms of economic class, the Brotherhood fits the bill as they are generally understood. While some members are wealthy, most come from the educated middle class which was starved out of real social and political participation during the Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak eras. The Salafis, meanwhile, are considered lower class. They would not immediately fit this key fascist indicator.

As for the other bullet points:

  • Intense nationalism: Both can qualify, especially if nationalism is tweaked to represent the Islamic umma. The MB has toned this down since the revolution, but it is in their blood. Even if it means Egypt alone, both MB and Salafis preach their Islamism is best for the nation.
  • Militarism: Both can qualify, especially if anti-Israel agitation is allowed. There is much rhetoric of liberating Jerusalem, for example. But while it can be argued this aspect is toned down also, it is more apparent true militarism is not a significant characteristic of either movement. It was so for the MB, but they have long adopted more malleable tendencies.
  • Elitism and chauvinism: I would wish to pause on chauvinism lest I make the same mistake I did about fascism. If it is akin to ‘a woman has her place’, then it fits both groups, though the MB is far more ‘liberated’ than the Salafis. As for elitism, there is a palpable MB tendency to look down on and criticize the Salafis, even though there are close ideological links.
  • Emphasis on the role of the family: Dead-on, for both. Earlier this year a MB figure urged MB members to marry only in their group (reflecting on elitism as well). Furthermore, the family unit is preached as the basic organizational principle in society, from which Islam takes root in the community.
  • Focus on youth and their regimentation: For the MB this has always been a characteristic, as the group is highly disciplined and draws members especially among youth with leadership skills. The Salafis are more fuzzy and do not tend to have organizational hierarchies. Theirs is an ideological affiliation, centered around charismatic preachers.
  • Revolt against ideologies: Just above the Salafis were shown not to qualify here, but the MB certainly does. While maintaining a strong commitment to political Islamism as a concept – and with it sharia law – there is not much more in the way of definition. This could change if the group is forced to govern, but they have shown a strong preference for flexibility in ideas. Especially in the 70s they turned away from strong ideologues who wound up in other organizations, many of which were violent.

To summarize, then, there is a legitimacy to discuss Islamo-Fascism. It is not at all clear that this is necessarily true of political Islam as an idea, but a good number of the historical circumstances of the Muslim Brotherhood have affinity. Whether or not it is fair to say this of the current Muslim Brotherhood is another question, as so much is up in the air. Do they mean their words, or are they a means to power before true colors are revealed? Who can say? Their books betray them, but many of their words betray their books.

They could well be on their way to becoming the equivalent of Europe’s Christian Democrats.

While such an outcome is more likely than them becoming Europe’s Nazis, it is far too early to pass judgment on either account.

 

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Church, State, and Revolution in Egypt

His Holiness Pope Shenouda III, Pope of the Co...
Pope Shenouda, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church

Many Christians in America are keen on emphasizing that the ‘separation of church and state’ is found nowhere in the constitution. Rather, they state, it was from the personal letters of Thomas Jefferson – his guiding opinion, of course, but never adopted in America’s founding documents.

This is true. The constitution guarantees freedom of religion for the individual, while also keeping government from imposing a religious test for any public office. Many Christians, however, find that the modern interpretation of these clauses – read through Jefferson – squeeze religion from public life.

They don’t know how good they have it.

Coptic Christians in Egypt are currently caught between two relatively good systems. The modern secular state, as in America, allows personal freedoms and independence of religious institutions. This was somewhat the promise of Mubarak, but never really arrived. Especially in light of the Arab Spring, many Copts look to the west and hope for the implementation of such enlightened policy.

Yet on the other hand, also driven by the Arab Spring, is the understanding that Islam-as-state protects a subservient church. This also is enlightened, and for many centuries Christians lived comfortably under the caliphate, participating in society, economy, and government. There were abuses in history, and it is not the equivalent of modern citizenship. Yet many Copts are fearful of such a return, while Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis are head-over-heels trying to assure them their fears are baseless.

Unfortunately, Mubarak muddled between the two.

While the church was officially independent, it was not free. Relations between the president and the pope were conducted along the lines of the old caliphal system. No jizia was paid, but in exchange for guaranteeing the subservience of the Christian community, the pope received a direct line to the leader and relative freedom of internal rule. If Christians got out of line, though, or if it was necessary to hold them in line, a measure of sectarian strife was allowed. Some say it was even encouraged, if not promoted.

A few days ago I posted about a controversy in the church, which erupted during Christmas celebrations. With the massacre at Maspero in the background, Pope Shenouda welcomed the military council, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood. The church has regularly welcomed representatives of the state, which in the past have been members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party.

This year, it is members of the military council, and of the triumphant Islamist powers. Though the faces have changed, the pope was following a protocol long established.

Revolutions, however, disrupt protocol. Many young Copts invested themselves heavily in the revolution, seeking greater freedom for society at large. Instead, at Christmas, they find the pope continuing the same pattern. The military, they believe, killed demonstrating Copts at Maspero, and no one has been held accountable. The Muslim Brotherhood is an open question; will they simply continue politics-as-usual, with a democratic face?

If these young Copts desire freedom throughout the society, they desire it on the part of the church as well. It was humiliating, or else cowardly and insulting, to see the pope receive those who shed Coptic blood, as well as Islamists who seem very comfortable with the military.

They want the pope to be revolutionary. They want him to refuse greetings until justice is met. To a large degree, they want a western version of freedom of religion.

They are not alone. Many Egyptians desire this, including many Muslims. The question is: Is it best for the church?

The pope is a man of tradition, and old men are set in their ways. He is also a fountain of wisdom, and he knows his society. He believes the church is safest under the protection of the state.

Is he wrong? Maybe. Jesus was a revolutionary, though of a different kind. But he was willing to sacrifice himself for what was right. If the church challenges the state – currently constituted as the military council – it might rally both Christians and Muslims to continue the revolution until military rule is abolished. Then, with governance in the hands of civilians, even an Islamist parliament would be free to … well, what would it do?

Or, if the church challenged the state, the state might hit back. Would Muslims rally behind it? If so, would they be strong enough? Or would this only push them deeper into Islamism, seeing Coptic comeuppance, ‘those ungrateful Christians’?

One might pragmatically say the church should stay by the side of the military against the Islamists, as under Mubarak. Activists, and most Copts, would now say that Mubarak did not work out so well for them. They were certainly very critical of him before the revolution. But will Islamists be worse?

Pope Shenouda is probably not making bets for one side or the other. In all likelihood, he is simply following protocol. He is not promoting the military council or the Muslim Brotherhood. He is acknowledging their place in the governance of Egypt.

History is riddled with examples of minorities who backed the wrong side. If Pope Shenouda is licking the boots of the powers-that-be, this is beneath the dignity of his position – indeed of any Christian, or of any individual human being. But if he were to thumb his nose, this also is a threat to dignity, and more.

Perhaps unfortunately, revolutions demand one choose a side. This puts Christians in a very difficult position. On the one hand, their religion encourages them to sacrifice themselves for others, for truth, and for the cause of justice. On the other, it encourages fealty to the ruling powers, with prayers offered on their behalf. How, then, should a first loyalty to God drive a Christian in Egypt today? How should it drive the pope?

Perhaps Pope Shenouda leans a bit too much in deference to the state. This is certainly the activists’ charge. Yet it must also be noted this criticism is leveled from the perspective of a western system of religious freedom, or at least from the longing thereof.

It may well be Egypt is moving back to an official caliphal system, where the pope represents his community. Or perhaps the mixed-Mubarak system will stay in place. The future could be very bad, or it might not be bad at all. Activists must continue to labor for what they believe in, and convince others of the same. The pope must be given room to do the same. Indeed, his conduct now may be guaranteeing activists their relative freedom of operation.

Americans, imagining themselves in the middle of all of it, might wish for a little more Jefferson.

 

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Sympathy for Islamists

Translation: Against Torture

While Egypt is currently soul searching about its coming political identity, with Islamist governance among the many possible democratic choices, it is good to remember the suffering endured by these groups over the past several decades. The following excerpts are not meant to offer support for the Islamist cause, nor to deny that numbers of Islamists engaged in terrorist or violent revolutionary activity. Rather, it is an attempt to highlight the humanity of these individuals, especially in reference to the operations of state which dehumanized them.

The first selection concerns Kamal Habib, an active Egyptian jihadist from the 1970s. The excerpt comes from ‘Journey of the Jihadist’, by Fawaz Gerges. When asked, “Isn’t jihad by its very nature revolutionary rather than peaceful?” he replied:

We did not fire the first round in this battle. The rulers had closed all avenues for a peaceful transfer of power. We had no choice but to take up arms to raise Islam’s banner. The fight was imposed on us.

… Some of us arrived at different conclusions as to what could and should be done to resist aggression against our Islamic identity. The prison years also radicalized [the youth] and set them on another violent journey. The torture left deep physical and psychological scars on jihadists and fueled their thirst for vengeance.

Look at my hands – still spotted with the scars from cigarette burns nineteen years later. For days on end we were brutalized – our faces bloodied, our bodies broken with electrical shocks and other devices. The torturers aimed at breaking our souls and brainwashing us. They wanted to humiliate us and force us to betray the closest members of our cells. I spent sleepless nights listening to the screams of young men echoing from the torture chambers.

A degrading, dehumanizing experience. I cannot convey to you the rage felt by [the youth] who were tortured after Sadat’s assassination. Some left the prisons and the country determined to exact revenge on their tormentors and torturers. The authorities’ brutal methods nourished fanaticism and sowed the seeds for more violence and bloodshed.

Since the revolution, Kamal Habib is still prominent among his group, Islamic Jihad, which has abandoned violence and is seeking to form a political party. Among his recent statements has been a call to eliminate all foreign universities in Egypt, since they work against the development of Islamic thought.

The second selection is more recent, concerning the case of Adel Futuh Ali al-Gazzar, who was arrested following his return to Egypt after having been interred at Guantanamo Bay. The excerpt comes from al-Masry al-Youm, an Egyptian daily newspaper with an online English component.

Gazzar was picked up by US forces while working for the Red Crescent [the equivalent of the Red Cross in Islamic countries] in Afghanistan. He was transferred to a US prison facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, and other forms of torture, according to Reprieve, a UK advocacy group for prisoners’ rights. During this time, Gazzar lost his leg, which had been injured in a US bombing raid, due to lack of medical treatment.

He was then sent to the United States’ Guantanamo prison for terrorism suspects where he was held incommunicado for nine years. The Guantanamo bay prison camp has been widely condemned by US and international human rights organizations.

In 2010 the US government cleared Gazzar of the charges against him and released him to Slovakia. He was not repatriated to Egypt out of fear that he would be tortured.

According to the article, Gazzar had been convicted by an Egyptian court in absentia in 2001, concerning involvement in a plot to overthrow Mubarak. He was arrested at the airport so that the government would be able to assess his current legal status.

There is a current sentiment which imagines groups like the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy favor in post-revolutionary Egypt because they are best placed to both appeal to the masses on the basis of religion and secure the stability of middle and upper class economic interests. It is true that many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are businessmen of means. It is also true that many in Egypt accuse them of playing with religion in order to make money.

Yet like the Islamists described above, they have also suffered. Even though their political opposition was not violent, many, if not most, have spent time in prison. As such, an understandable premise is that Islamists have not accepted the fact of their oppression simply to make money. This would suggest that the above sentiment is wrong. It would suggest they have their eyes on full transformation of society, which would include a reshaping of the political system, with themselves, and those of like mind, the principle shapers.

If this interpretation would turn pragmatic and callous, it might suggest that such severe repression was necessary to keep their vision from being implemented, and might be necessary still. If it would turn cynical it might suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be trusted when they make promises of sharing power; this could be a temporary measure in preparation for their ultimate designs. If it were to turn hopeful, it might suggest that having suffered, they would be loathe to inflict others with the same fate, and may indeed craft a system of governance resonant with Egyptian religious realities.

I do not mean to state I have a feel for which of these suggestions is closest to reality. Rather, I hope these portions serve only to lend a level of appreciation for the Islamists of Egypt. By all appearances, though appearances can be deceiving, they have suffered for what they believe in. While the power of conviction may make them dangerous, it also makes them worthy of respect.

Other articles and analysis may suggest ways in which they have manipulated, compromised, and disassembled throughout the years. For these, respect may possibly be withdrawn. Yet no man undergoes torture for only his self-interest. Suffering under conviction makes possible a wide and idealistic following. While this following should not be overestimated, neither should it be dismissed. If they are opposed out of fear, fear will bend before their courage. If they are engaged from appreciation, love is able to trump courage. It will do so in humility, weighing the worth of their convictions. Some may wither, others may remain.

Little else, and certainly not brute power, can challenge such powerful example.