On December 29, 2012, an unknown assailant killed two Egyptians praying in a service building attached to a Coptic Orthodox Church in Misrata, Libya. Located to the west of Tripoli, the attacker threw a homemade bomb into a midnight prayer service of 150 people, injuring two others.
According to Fr. Marcos, the Coptic priest in Misrata, the assailant appeared to have targeted the service, attacking the home rather than the more heavily secured formal church building. He did not have any prior warning of an attack, however, nor any knowledge if his church was targeted because it was a Coptic Orthodox Church in particular.
Fr. Marcos wondered if the attacker may have been confused thinking this prayer service was in celebration of the New Year. Two years earlier in Alexandria a Coptic Orthodox Church was bombed on December 31, 2011, killing 21. This prayer service had been ongoing for a month, however, so the priest offered the possibility of no connection at all.
The churches of Libya, however, are included in the Coptic Orthodox diocese of Beheira in western Egypt. This is the diocese from which the current patriarch, Pope Tawadros II, was elected.
The bombing represents an unfortunate continuation of the sufferings of the Coptic Orthodox Church since the Alexandria bombing. Fr. Marcos noted the two who died were the first Coptic martyrs outside of Egypt in the modern era.
Whoever did this, he assured, represented a very small percentage of people. Libyans, he declared, are good people who do not know religious fanaticism as they have only one religion, Islam. The church had lived in peace in Misrata for a long time.
During the Libyan Revolution at one point the church was hit by a bomb. On other occasions it was strafed by gunfire. None of these events targeted the church, and Fr. Marcos related that no injuries were suffered. The Coptic community gathered together as a community and managed as best they could.
Their management included offering service and grace to others. Soldiers connected to Col. Gaddafi at times demanded shelter in the church. This was freely offered, but with the request that all weapons be left outside. Sometimes this was followed, sometimes not.
Fr. Marcos remarked the Copts of Misrata are praying for their own salvation, the salvation of Libya, and the salvation of the world. They ask God to bring peace and love to their city, even to their enemies who committed this crime.
He remarked his church was a praying church, united in seeking blessing for all people, of which God heard their prayers. He wondered if the attack was orchestrated by the devil in an effort to stop them from praying. If so, he assured, this plan would fail.
May God bless their community, the people of Libya, Copts in Egypt and around the world, and the nations of the Arab Spring. May the upheavals they suffer result in peace, prosperity, and good governance in the near future.
Rarely has a constitution so divided a nation. Protests, both for and against and sometimes violent, have filled the street. Egypt’s Christians, meanwhile, are caught in the middle. Though united against the proposed draft, their responses have varied considerably.
“It was definitely right for Christians to protest,” said Youssef Sidhom, editor-in-chief of the Coptic newspaper Watani and a long time advocate of cooperation with the Islamist administration.
“But this was not a Christian move, it was a liberal Egyptian protest meant to save the civil state.”
Despite his conciliatory position toward the Muslim Brotherhood, Sidhom had warned the day might come to return to the street if Islamists tried to implement a religious agenda. When President Morsi assumed temporary dictatorial powers to push through this constitution, he believed it was time.
“There are many indirect clauses that can lead to an Islamic state, and a few direct ones as well,” he said. Chief among these is Article 219 which makes traditional Islamic jurisprudence the primary source of legislation. Article 4, furthermore, gives a role to unelected Muslim scholars who must be consulted on laws regarding their conformity with shariah.
But it was the Islamist response to these protests which makes Sidhom believe they have shown their true colors.
“They made vicious remarks stating the protests were 60-80 percent Christian,” he said. “This shows they realize the solidarity that exists between liberals, moderate Muslims, and Christians, and they are trying to break it.”
Indeed, in an effort to mobilize votes for the constitution, the official Muslim Brotherhood website featured a story alleging Christians exchanged SMS messages urging a ‘no’ vote because they wanted ‘a Coptic state’. Safwat Hegazi, appointed by Morsi to the National Council for Human Rights and a fixture during his presidential campaign, warned the church that if it threatened Morsi’s legitimacy Muslims will threaten them ‘with blood’.
Hegazi’s remarks were filmed at a Salafi Muslim sit-in protest at Media Production City, where they believe their image is being disfigured in the press.
“In the sharia, which people do not understand correctly, everyone takes their full rights – the woman, the non-Muslim, everyone,” said Ibrahim Eid, an ophthalmologist and the media coordinator of Students for Sharia, present at the protest. Salafis there were peaceful and friendly.
This message came across to Daniel Wahba, a Coptic taxi driver. Idling in the parking lot, Salafis engaged him winsomely.
“Is there anything in the constitution that will hurt us as Christians?” he said. “Won’t we still be able to go to the church and pray?”
But it was the fear associated with general Islamist domination that affected Susie Fayiz, a Coptic housewife. “I didn’t vote,” she said. “They are just going to rig the referendum in their favor anyway.”
Preliminary results show the ‘yes’ vote in the lead with 56 percent, amid accusations of fraud. Half of Egypt’s electorate is scheduled to vote next week.
Thousands of Christians took to the streets to protest, and thousands of Christians went to the polls to vote. In between, ten thousand gathered to go to their knees in prayer.
Fr. Simaan
“We are here tonight to pray for Egypt in all that it is going through, and let us pray with tears,” said Fr. Simaan, a Coptic Orthodox priest serving the city’s garbage collectors. Their expansive cathedral is built into a cave in the Muqattam Mountains east of Cairo.
One year earlier, Fr. Simaan conducted a similar prayer gathering for all of Egypt’s Christian denominations, which drew upwards of 40,000 people. Plans to repeat the expression of unity have been in the works for months, but this meeting was only announced one week earlier, scheduled for two days before the referendum.
If there was any intentionality it did not appear during the rally. From 6pm until 6am the next morning, not once was the referendum mentioned. The general state of Egypt, however, was on everyone’s mind.
“Some of us see demonstrations and conspiracies, but I see Egypt going right. I see great days ahead of us,” said Fr. Andrawus, an Orthodox priest from Damanhour in the Nile Delta.
“Some say this country is being destroyed or being stolen. I say God is coming and he will not be late. This coming year will be the best ever for the church. The heavens will open, the church will be united, and we will be freed from fear and learn to love.”
Love is Fr. Simaan’s great emphasis, and he wishes to tell the world Copts love their nation and their fellow citizens. As Egyptian flags flew everywhere, six different satellite channels carried his exhortation.
“We pray for our brothers, both Christian and Muslim. We pray for our brothers, the Salafis and the Muslim Brothers,” he preached to great applause.
“We pray for them that God will open their hearts and keep them from harm. We are not in a war, we are in prayer.”
The church took no official position on the referendum, other than to encourage people to vote. Many participants, however, freely interpreted the point of these prayers.
“We pray for stability, safety, and a constitution we can all agree on, not one from just one slice of the country,” said Michael Magdy. Others, however, were less specific of divine providence.
“We love Egypt because it is our country, and we love God,” said Amal Samy. “We’re confident he will stand with us and lift this crisis, giving a rescue no one can expect.”
Fr. Simaan does care for a good constitution, but his focus is elsewhere.
“Perhaps the current circumstances are permitted by God as part of his plan,” he said. The Islamists have their sharia and their plans, and God will hold them accountable according to what they have received.
“But he will hold us accountable for how we live with them.”
Protests and prayer have their essential place, but amid the crises of Egypt, perhaps this is the way to peace.
With Egypt possibly on the brink of a new uprising tomorrow, I have not written much having had other projects. Among them, though, is this worthy one – honoring the memory of a good man who passed away recently. Here is the introduction:
With the passing of Dr. Baha Bakri, the world has lost a friend. Among those mourning are the universities of Cairo and Sinai, the Moral Rearmament Association, the Egyptian Green Party, and Arab West Report.
Dr. Baha Bakri was an environmental architect and a professor of urban ecology whose passion for uplifting the human condition was matched only by his devotion to his students. They loved him as a father, receiving even his rebuke as if from a familial hand. He encouraged without distinction, caring little for appearances, personal glory, or financial gain.
Nagwa Raouf, one of his former students, related the following anecdote. When asked one why he did not write to preserve his wisdom for future generations, he replied, ‘If anyone desires this let them proceed. As for me I don’t have time.’
Indeed, he did not.
Please click here to read the rest of the eulogy at Arab West Report.
When the candidates for the Coptic papacy were reduced to five, Bishop Tawadros, along with all the others, gave an interview on Coptic television. The full video, along with English subtitles, can be found here.
I culled the interview for useful nuggets about the pope-to-be’s background and views about church and ministry, and arranged them for an article with Arab West Report. The full text can be found here, excerpts follow below.
Tawadros was born in 1952 in the city of Mansoura. At age five his father, a landscape engineer, moved the family to Sohag for work where they remained for three years before settling in Damanhour. Here, he studied in a Coptic school run by the sister of then-Pope Cyril VI.
Tawadros’ family was very religious; many of his uncles and cousins were or became priests. His mother was originally from the area of St. Dimyana Monastery near Mansoura, and each summer would take her family there to visit. He has two sisters.
‘All our life was related to the church,’ said Tawadros.
Later on in the interview he addressed certain issues. Here is an example.
‘As Egyptians we live with our brothers the Muslims, and it is a priority to keep this unified life,’ he said.
He spoke positively about how Pope Shenouda was called a ‘safety valve’, and then answered this question in light of necessary history.
‘Look at our beautiful diversity: a Pharaohnic obelisk, a Christian steeple, and a Muslim minaret. This is the diversity that Egypt brings to the whole world,’ stated Tawadros.
‘Do our youth know these treasures? We have many common roots, and the media should focus on them.’
It had been stated in the media that Bishop Tawadros was commended as keeping good relations between Muslims and Christians, and with Islamists in particular. Labib questions the last point.
‘You cannot say that he has had good or bad relations with Islamists, as he has no relations at all, he stated.
‘He just has no clashes with anyone. I have no documented information otherwise.’
From the conclusion:
The picture provided of Bishop Tawadros is at best incomplete, but does offer a slice into his personality and upbringing. He is a faithful son of the church. He is quiet, thoughtful, and concerned about its long term internal spiritual growth. He offered few insights into issues of state or relations with Muslims, except for the necessity of mutual esteem and preservation of unity. He grounded this relationship in the diversity of Egyptian history, which in light of current politics can be understood as a nod to its identity.
Further research, of course, is necessary. Certainly Bishop, and soon-to-be Pope Tawadros will offer more than enough insight into his papacy in the days and years to come.
Mid-Sunday morning, after three days of fasting, the Coptic Orthodox Church selected Bishop Tawadros of the Diocese of Baheira to be its 118th patriarch, succeeding Pope Shenouda III, who passed away in March of 2012. Tawadros’ name was drawn from a wax-sealed glass ball by a blindfolded child, supervised by the acting patriarch Bishop Pachomious.
Immediately after holding the paper with Tawadros’ name aloft for all to see, Pachomious then removed the other names from the remaining two balls to prevent allegations of fraud. Muhammad Hassanain Heykal, a prominent journalist, had disputed the selection of Pope Shenouda in 1971, alleging all three ballots bore the same name. Such a claim was not likely, but it resulted in doubts.
Bishop Tawadros was born in 1952 and is a graduate of Alexandria University with a degree in pharmaceutical sciences. In 1997 he was appointed as an auxiliary bishop to serve with Bishop Pachomious, now the acting patriarch. The lot was cast in his favor on his birthday, November 4, 2012.
The above excerpt is from the article I wrote for Arab West Report, reporting on Bishop Tawadros, the selection process, and issues moving forward. Please click here for the full article. Additionally, please click here for analysis from the AWR editor-in-chief Cornelis Hulsman, and here for a first-hand account from the cathedral from the managing director Hany Labib.
As for a brief description of the new pope-to-be, here is another excerpt:
Bishop Tawadros is also appreciated as one who reached out to the youth of his diocese, and kept good relations between local Muslims and Christians. He is also said to have decent relationships with Islamists.
And from the conclusion:
‘Civil society organizations can enter into confrontation with the state, but the church cannot,’ stated Sidhom. ‘Things are stable now, but it will be the time of crisis and sectarian strife that will be the real test.’
But today, and until then, Egypt’s Copts rejoice in a new leader, having asked God to grant them a ‘good shepherd’. Tawadros will need to prove himself, but he receives his position following a selection process esteemed not only clean, but spiritual – in distinction to national politics.
‘The lot lifts the election above politics as if it were for parliament.’ stated Labib. ‘The last choice is for God; this makes Christians very comfortable.’
It is a day of celebration for the Coptic Orthodox Church. May God give wisdom to their new shepherd.
A few days ago I posted an article I wrote for Lapido Media exploring the religious motivation and justification for protesting an insult to Islam. Much of the perspective rested on the answers of Abdel Rahman al-Barr, a member of the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood and a specialist in the Islamic sharia.
Due to the events al-Barr was unavailable for a face-to-face interview, but graciously provided his time in answering my written questions. For deeper understanding of the subject treated in the article, here is the transcript in full:
A popular chant during the protest was: ‘With our souls and our blood we will redeem you, oh Islam!’ What does ‘blood’ imply, and how will it ‘redeem’ Islam?
This phrase means the speaker is ready to give his life for the sake of his religion, willing that his blood may flow in its defense. If it becomes necessary he will enter a military confrontation to defend Islam even if he must face being killed or martyred in the path of God.
The film was clearly offensive to Islam. But what does Islam teach about defending the religion against insult? Even if peaceful, why are such demonstrations religiously necessary?
Religion is one of the sanctities that man will protect and defend with all he has, even if this leads to giving his life. In the case of this offensive film it is necessary to announce refusal, condemnation, and anger with the most powerful expressions. We request the government with allowed this film to appear – that is, the United States of America – to prevent [its showing] and to hold those who made it accountable, as they have instigated hatred and incited animosity between peoples. Expressing this refusal is a religious obligation, because Islam requires the Muslim to reject error and seek to change it with his hand, if he is able. If he cannot he must reject it with his tongue, and demonstrations are one of the ways to do so.
During the demonstrations, some called the Copts of the Diaspora, especially those involved in the film, ‘dogs’ and ‘pigs’. What does Islam teach about the use of insults against those who insult it?
Those who use such phrases are likely from the common people – not scholars – who were pushed by their anger from the enormity of the crime. But Islamic teachings call for the use of good phrases which do not insult. God the exalted said in the Qur’an: ‘Speak well to people’, ‘Say to those who worship me, “Speak what is good”’, ‘Return the evil with that which is good’, and ‘Return what is good if there is animosity between you’.
The Qur’an states in al-Nahl, 125: ‘Invite to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in the best manner.’ Even peaceful protests seem to diverge from this, and open the door for many to express anger poorly. How do demonstrations, though politically legal, help shape an Islamic morality? How should anger be expressed in Islam?
We must know that free demonstrations are a new experience for our people, as the repressive regimes dealt with them extremely harshly, to not allow them. Because of this, until now the culture of demonstration remains disfigured for many. Maybe this will improve in the future, but the careful observer will note that demonstrations organized by the Muslim Brotherhood are better disciplined even in the slogans and phrases used. This is because Islamic morality is moderate in both satisfaction and anger. Powerful expressions of anger must respect justice and avoid triviality. The Qur’an says: ‘God does not like the public mention of evil except by one who has been wronged’. So if a man is oppressed he may use forceful phrases to express this oppression, but without triviality or debasement.
Almost no Americans had ever heard of this film until Egypt began to demonstrate against it. To what degree to Muslim religious leaders bear fault for the excesses of these protests, as the Brotherhood called originally for escalation?
Religious scholars are not the ones who began the incitement, and they had no means to prevent it. Those who incited people were some activists who knew of it from the internet, and from here the common people began talking about it. It is natural the scholars could not stay silent in the face of this rejected crime. Personally, if it was in my power I would not have given this subject any importance because it is a vile work. Its producers do not posses human decency or creative value, and the film has no artistic merit. But the new media in its modern form diffuses the insignificant to work up the people – this is what happened with this vile film lacking creative value. Of course, the expansive publication via media had the largest influence on the common people, stirring them up and giving attention to this insulting film.
Thanks to Amr al-Masry for translating the questions into Arabic; any errors in translating the answers are my own, with graciousness asked specifically for the verses from the Qur’an.
The fatwa is commonly known in the West as a death sentence. Among Muslims, the fatwa can be among the most powerful tools of Islamic populism. On a third front, the fatwa is simply a bureaucratic function. Which definition encompasses reality?
Since the dawn of Islam the scholar has had a place of prominence, celebrated for his command of the Quran, the traditions, and mastery of the sharia. For this reason, the state has always wanted to remain on good terms with the scholars, and if possible, to co-opt or institutionalize them.
What makes a scholar? There is a threshold of necessary knowledge, without which any claimant would be exposed as a fraud. But scholars must also be linked to networks, or else they would simply sit at home issuing fatwas to themselves. It is these networks which are under redefinition in Egypt and much of the Arab world today.
For example, the Muslim Brotherhood has a mufti – the Arabic term for one who gives a fatwa. Is he legitimate? What about each and every Salafi preacher around whom the people congregate? If someone appears on television, is he fit to issue a fatwa?
Conversely, though the state conveys legitimacy on many aspects of society, does it also pertain to religious life? Islamic societies have historically treaded carefully here, wary of the corrupting possibility of power but keen to preserve the stability of the nation.
For centuries, in Egypt especially but also throughout the Sunni Muslim world, the Azhar established itself as the pinnacle of Islamic scholarship. Its graduates secured both popular and institutional credibility. Yet in 1961 President Nasser brought the prestigious university under state control.
The process to diversify – and perhaps dilute – the influence of the scholars was already long underway, however. In the 19th Century under British occupation the Dar al-Ifta’ was created to issue official fatwas. The institution survived the 1952 revolution and was used at times thereafter to obtain favorable rulings for controversial state policies.
As both Sheikh al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti are positions appointed by the president, many have criticized the venerable bodies as being little more than mouthpieces for the ruling regime. It has not been uncommon, however, for many criticisms to issue from scholars of either dubious representation or extremist trends. Is not the state the societal organ best fit to establish proper regulations and qualifications?
Ibrahim Nagm
Though not a justification, Dr. Ibrahim Nagm explains the functions of Dar al-Ifta’. Serving as senior advisor to the Grand Mufti, he seeks to make understandable the concept of ‘fatwa’, which has been sensationalized due to what he would say is its frequent misuse.
Nagm defines a fatwa as ‘non-binding religious advice given by a qualified scholar in response to a question asked by a member of the public’. He then proceeds to unpack the meaning of each key phrase.
Non-binding: A fatwa carried no legal authority or compulsion of implementation. This invalidates the popular idea that a fatwa is a summons to kill a particular individual, for example.
Qualified: Though anyone can give their religious opinion, only a certified scholar is permitted to issue a fatwa. Dar al-Ifta’ insists upon deep Islamic scholarship from a respectable university (such as al-Azhar), and then provides three additional years of training before accrediting anyone.
Question: A fatwa must be spontaneous, issued in response to a real life issue submitted by the public. It cannot be internally generated according to policy. Every day the Dar al-Ifta’ receives +500 personal fatwa requests and +2000 by phone in up to nine languages from around the world.
To handle these requests, the Dar al-Ifta’ has about 50 accredited scholars working in its administration, with an additional 50 scattered throughout Egypt.
Each fatwa issued conforms to the basic methodology of Islamic scholarship, which Nagm outlined as the following:
1) Consult the Islamic sources: These include the Quran, the sunna, and the legacy of Islamic scholarship. Look for precedents and consider their application.
2) Understand the person and the issue: Fatwas are expected to apply differently according to circumstances. The legal texts are incomplete without full knowledge of the problem.
3) Issue the fatwa: To be done in a manner bridging tradition and reality.
As an example, Nagm described a request for a fatwa to see if it was permitted for a particular man to take a second wife. After consulting the sources, the indications were yes – it is permitted for a Muslim to marry up to four wives.
Yet after consulting the situation, the person requesting the fatwa was discovered to be residing in a non-Muslim nation which forbids polygamy. Bridging between the tradition and the reality, Dar al-Ifta’ issued a fatwa instructing the requester to submit to the laws of the country he lived in, and not marry again.
In another example a farmer requested a fatwa to permit or forbid the use of certain chemicals in the fertilization process. Nagm indicated clearly this was a matter beyond the competence of the institution. They referred the question to scientific specialists, who indicated the mentioned chemicals were harmful. Armed with this knowledge, it was a simple matter to issue the fatwa forbidding their use.
Returning to the question of Islamic legitimacy, Nagm does not answer the question, but does paint Dar al-Ifta’ as a thoroughly bureaucratic institution. Its methods are sound, but reflect the dry, thorough work of professionalism.
Professionalism is good, of course, but Nagm frequently contrasted it to academia, which is not enough. It is not scholarship that makes a mufti, but training.
Of course, training is also good. Nagm commented that Osama bin Laden was an engineer, and Ayman al-Zawahiri was a doctor. No matter how substantial their personal study of Islamic jurisprudence, they are not part of a credible, established network.
In terms of establishment, this is certain. But credibility is in the eye of the beholder. Dar al-Ifta’ walks the fine line between professional accountability and state submission. Yet this is no different from the family of Islamic scholars throughout history who have navigated the same challenge.
After all, though scholarship is immensely valuable, it puts no food on the table. It must market its knowledge somewhere. The public trusts the scholar, while marketing, to remain faithful ultimately to God.
Throughout Egypt the justice system is known to be very slow. Though it has a long and respectable history, as the population exploded and litigation increased, many turn to non-traditional methods to avoid spending a year or more in court.
Sometimes, a non-traditional method can be thuggery. A landlord, for example, might expel by force a legal tenant and deal with the consequences later – whenever the court gets around to hearing the case.
Sometimes, a non-traditional method can be arbitration. Egypt, mindful of the slowness of its judiciary, has established a limited number of licensed arbiters, especially for commercial and business disputes.
Yet for many, especially in Upper Egypt, the non-traditional method of choice is the reconciliation session. Completely outside the law, two aggrieved parties turn to a respected man of the community, and set their dispute before him.
Reconciliation sessions have a deserved bad reputation, especially as pertains to sectarian conflicts. Rather than ruling by law, the police enforce calm in an enflamed village, and then Muslim sheikhs and Christian priests sit together to ‘reconcile’ their people. Perhaps a local dispute – where a Christian may very well be at fault – escalates and a Muslim mob distributes group punishment by burning shops and homes.
If the judiciary in Egypt is slow, the law is weak. The efficient solution is to engage the sheikhs and priests to determine monetary compensation for the Christians and then make a public display of reconciliation. Valuable as this may be, too often it covers over smoldering resentment and rarely punishes wrongdoers.
Yet far more frequent in occurrence are the ordinary instances of two parties settling their grievance amicably. This does not always mean a happy ending, nor is it free of questionable rulings. But where a flawed legal system is the norm, it works.
I encountered two examples recently which help give perspective. These examples hear from only one side, and both involve Christians exclusively. At the very least, they indicate how Christians are not simply the victims of reconciliation sessions, as often portrayed in the media. On the contrary, they are willing participants mirroring exactly their Muslim neighbors.
In the first example, a Christian family consisting of three adult brothers suffered tragedy when the third brother died young. That he also died unmarried added conflict to the tragedy.
What to do with his share of the family inheritance? To whom should he leave it? If the simple answer is to divide it equally, the equation is complicated by the fact he lived with one of the brothers as a semi-dependent.
Yet the other brother stated he paid ‘rent’ to the first brother to help offset costs. In the end, they took their problem to the church. The two priests of the village convened, heard the stories, and pronounced a simple 50-50 division between the surviving brothers. All were satisfied, and life carried on.
In the second example the dispute involved the church – that is, the priests themselves. The family of the priest in question inherited a large tract of land, complete with ownership papers establishing their right. Further distant relatives, however, received no share but believed they were entitled. Yet as the church was complicated in the conflict, the petitioning family decided to go to a Muslim village sheikh.
This particular Muslim sheikh is very well respected as a non-traditional ‘reconciler’ in the village, by both Muslims and Christians. He is said to deal according to the right, and not by religion or benefit. Yet he also draws a fee for his services; it is not simply a service provided. His authority comes only from village reputation. He has no license from the government.
This fee can reach up to several hundred dollars, and is traditionally paid by the disputant who first appeals to arbitration, win or lose. Trusting the judgment of the sheikh, who has been known by both parties since childhood, the landowning family agreed.
In the end, the sheikh ruled for the landowners – their names were on the legal documentation; it was a simple case. But in doing so the sheikh put himself in a quandary. The landless family was poor; they had no means to pay his fee unless they won the judgment.
In saying so, care here must be taken since the sheikh’s perspective is not known. Yet it is said of him he was on watch for any impropriety on the part of the landowners, so as to extract from them a fee for ‘contempt’.
Apparently, the landowner believed the sheikh was listening too favorably to the complainant’s cause, and not letting him speak. At one point he interrupted angrily, ‘Shut up, sheikh!’
With this highly culturally insensitive remark, the sheikh fined the landowner the several hundred dollars which should have been his fee from the original litigant. Whether or not this swayed his understanding of the case, he then ruled according to what appears to be justice.
Of course, the winning Christian family finds this an example of injustice, but once the non-traditional reconciliation session is begun, its judgments are final.
It is reported the sheikh has spoken privately to other members of the family, saying he will return the fee if the insulting party simply apologizes, or even has his landowning relative do so for him. Both refuse.
These examples are not complete pictures of non-traditional justice in Upper Egypt. They do not include the issues of vendetta, honor killings, or the messy intersection of these with sectarian conflict.
What they provide instead is a picture of the normalcy and unremarkable nature of Christian participation in reconciliation sessions. It is not simply the headline-making instances of miscarriage of justice that characterize the practice.
Swift justice and rule of law would be better. In their absence, however, non-traditional methods work reasonably well.
‘Should we sacrifice evangelism for coexistence, or coexistence for evangelism? This debate will concern us for the next several years.’
This quote from Rev. Andrea Zaki ended a presentation by the Evangelical Theological Seminary of Cairo. Founded in 1863 by American Presbyterian missionaries, preaching the Gospel has been a core component of the Coptic evangelical identity since its inception.
Perhaps this is not appreciated by the Western evangelical church. The common perception is that Muslim dominance over Egypt has prevented Christian witness. They see a church shrinking, not growing. On the contrary, the assumption is the church has abandoned evangelism in order to survive. The Western church is sympathetic, but wonders if in forsaking the Great Commission to preach the Gospel to all peoples, Egyptian Christianity is doomed to wither away.
In the choice above, many in the Western church see settling for coexistence is a death warrant for Christian vitality. Better the sacrifice of martyrdom than the slow and steady decline of accommodation. Most Western evangelicals do note the juxtaposition of this thought with the reality of their religious freedom.
Atef Gendy
Dr. Atef Gendy would protest the false choice of evangelism or coexistence. As president of the seminary, he oversees that both are taught. The Missions Department of ETSC has courses in dialogue and in evangelism.
‘We have adopted the holistic approach,’ says Gendy. ‘We encourage dialogue, we preach the Gospel through ethics, service, and ministry, but we also support direct evangelism.’
Yet he noted that dialogue was absolutely necessary, given the social reality in Egypt. A seminary professor polled both Muslims and Christians concerning values. The three worst sins in descending order ranked: 3) Killing someone, 2) Changing religion, 1) Committing adultery.
Such an order does not bode well for the convert, let alone the evangelist.
Therefore, Gendy takes pride in the good relations the seminary enjoys with Muslim leaders, especially the Azhar, the pinnacle of Islamic learning in the Sunni Muslim world. They not only frequently attend interreligious dialogue meetings, they also cooperate practically.
‘We try to develop the religious speech of both Christian and Muslim leaders. We emphasize a shift away from simple ritual and surface issues to focus on ethics and transformation.’
Gendy celebrates much which took place during the Egyptian revolution, but also is worried about increased restrictions on freedom in an Islamic context. Yet for this he emphasizes the strategic decision the seminary has taken in theological education.
‘We must recall our theology in incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection. This is to challenge our leaders to empower the church. Why should Christians emigrate? Maybe we will suffer – along with many Muslims – but this is only a precursor to our resurrection!’
Within any potential suffering, love must push Egyptian Christians to stand by their Muslim neighbors, but love in the evangelical understanding implies more than just solidarity.
‘We must testify, amidst all sensitivities. But we must also show our love through service.’
In Egypt, the future is unknown, but this is fitting with evangelism, whose outcome is also unknown. Gendy’s hope is in God in both cases. Whether or not the church is declining, he knows his duty as an evangelical Christian.
‘We do not have the responsibility to convert anyone, this is for God. We only must witness to our faith.’
Perhaps he, along with Egypt’s Christians might add, ‘and coexist at the same time’. Over the next several years this will be the vital challenge facing the church.
This article was originally published on August 3, 2012 in Idea Magazine.
At an open fast-breaking meal outside the sit-in protest for Omar Abdel Rahman at the US Embassy, Hassan Khalifa shed tears of joy as he concluded his ten minute speech.
‘I apologize for going long, but forgive me, it has been nineteen years that I have been in prison,’ he said.
On June 21 President Mohamed Morsy issued a pardon for 572 prisoners convicted in military trials. Of these, 25 were members of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya or Islamic Jihad, groups still designated as ‘terrorist’ by the United States. Hassan Khalifa, now in a wheelchair, had been sentenced to death.
‘I praise God; I have never stopped speaking on behalf of al-Jama’a my entire life,’ he said, before switching to intercede for the Blind Sheikh.
‘Omar Abdel Rahman’s only crime was that he was the greatest one in worshipping God. He never ascribed to Islam anything that did not belong to it.’
Essam Derbala, who fifteen years ago led al-Jama’a in its Non-Violent Initiative to unilaterally give up terrorist techniques, presented Khalifa and others with a commemorative Qur’an.
Embraced in freedom
Others honored included:
Ahmed Abdel Qadir
Amr Gharib
Abdel Hamid al-Aqrab
Sheikh Abu al-Ai’ila
Ahmed Hammam
Atef Moussa
Attia Abdel Sami’
Mohamed al-Fouly
Hussein Fayed
Shawki Salama
Mohamed Yousry
Each of these warrants further investigation as to their crimes. I hope after further investigation to describe if these individuals were directly involved in terrorist activity and efforts to overthrow the government. Large numbers of al-Jama’a members and sympathizers were imprisoned upon association with the group, or even to pressure family members more deeply involved.
Essam Derbala
‘The United States has to stand with the people of the revolution and its demands, which include the release of Omar Abdel Rahman,’ said Essam Derbala. ‘Al-Jama’a will continue to exert all effort to obtain his freedom.’
Abdullah Omar Abdel Rahman (L), with brother Mohamed
Abdullah Omar Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheikh’s son, added, ‘We congratulate the members of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya who were released from prison. May God reward you for what you have endured.’
Abdel Rahman also relayed the testimony he received from Ahmed Raghib, the deputy minister for Egyptian affairs abroad in the Foreign Minister. Raghib told him Omar Abdel Rahman’s file was complete, awaiting only the signature of the military council or President Morsy. Once authorized, he said the Blind Sheikh would be back in Egypt ‘within hours’.
Mohamed al-Saghir
Mohamed al-Saghir, an Azhar sheikh and member of al-Jama’a’s Building and Development Party, added, ‘We tell the US administration, if you want to turn a new page with the Egyptian people, let us see your good intentions and release Omar Abdel Rahman.’
‘He was in solitary confinement for 19 years, but did nothing except call people to God.’
Abdel Akhir Hammad
Abdel Akhir Hammad is an Islamic legal scholar for al-Jama’a, and interceded for the Blind Sheikh as well.
‘They lie when they say he is responsible for the explosion of the World Trade Center in 1993; they are the first to know he is innocent.
‘We are not weaker than the government of Yemen which was able to secure the return of Mohamed al-Muayyid back to their country, from an American prison.
‘I call on Morsy to fulfill what he promised and pressure that oppressive nation which claims it defends human rights.’
Nageh Ibrahim
Nageh Ibrahim is another long-term leader of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. Along with Derbala and others he shaped the group’s Non-Violent Initiative.
‘We never expected a president who was part of the Islamist movement, but that day has come,’ he said.
‘From the first days of our initiative we have been waiting patiently for some of these people to be released.
‘But their release will not make us forget Omar Abdel Rahman.’
Nasr Abdel Salam
Nasr Abdel Salam is president of al-Jama’a’s Building and Development Party. He focused his words for prayer on the Blind Sheikh’s behalf, especially in the month of Ramadan.
‘God works with us as we work with him,’ he said. ‘So we must aid the right and God will aid us.
‘Let us return to God and ask him to support Muslims everywhere and free Omar Abdel Rahman from prison.’
As God is sovereign in all affairs, may he honor justice, have mercy, and bless those dedicated honestly to their cause.
Translation: Bread, Freedom, Social Justice; a Constitution for All Egyptians for the Sake of Egypt; No to the Constituent Assembly
The call went out in the media, Facebook, and by text message: The Maspero Youth Union summons Copts for a mass demonstration at the cathedral to demand the church withdraw from the constituent assembly. In the end, twenty people came. Most were members of the Maspero leadership.
The constituent assembly consists of 100 members chosen by the now dissolved parliament to write the constitution. It represents the second effort, after the first assembly was itself dissolved by the courts for appointing parliamentarians and failing to properly represent the full spectrum of Egyptian society. Many believe the second assembly fails similarly, though a court decision has been postponed.
While the assembly exists in limbo it is continuing its work, along with its delegates chosen by Egypt’s churches. Many liberal politicians have withdrawn in protest of Islamist domination, but unlike the first assembly, the church has not yet followed. The Maspero Youth Union demands they do.
From a Coptic and liberal perspective there are worrying signs. The current wording of the draft keeps the word ‘principles’ concerning Islamic sharia as the main source of legislation. Yet it also designates a religious authority – the Azhar – to define what ‘principles’ means. Though the Azhar is currently understood as a moderate Islamic bulwark, the current wording places religious scholars above elected legislators in crafting law. Furthermore, the Azhar is subject to change in membership; it may not always be moderate.
Furthermore, the current draft defines Egypt as a ‘consultative’ state, alongside other modifiers such as democratic, constitutional, and modern. ‘Consultative’ is not clearly defined, but is derived from an Islamic concept in which people advise the ruler. It may be benign, but was insisted upon by Salafi groups who also argued against inclusion of the modifier ‘civil’.
Additionally, Egypt as a country is defined as ‘part of the Arabic and Islamic nation and tied to the African continent’. The previous constitution labeled Egypt an Arab republic, and mentioning Africa is perhaps a useful recognition in comparison to the neglect of the Mubarak regime. Yet whereas Islam had previously been designated the state religion, labeling Egypt as part of a larger Islamic entity opens possibilities toward wider integration. It certainly tightens the identity of the nation along a particular religious expression.
Perhaps the church has not yet withdrawn its representatives due to the draft inclusion of another phrase: ‘Christians and Jews shall resort to legislation derived from their own religions.’ Though many argue the current constitutional reference to sharia law already grants Christians and Jews this right, others say it is necessary to codify the principle. Is it possible the church has agreed to the other phrasings in exchange for this right of independence vis-à-vis the state?
The Islamist leanings in the initial draft compelled the Maspero Youth Union to pressure the church to withdraw from the constituent assembly. They called for a protest at noon on Friday, following the church service held in the cathedral.
That only twenty people came is an indication in search of an explanation. The Union formed following attacks on churches in the initial months following Mubarak’s resignation. At their height they mobilized thousands to protest the destruction of a church in Upper Egypt, which led tragically to the Maspero massacre at the hands of the military. Since then they have had little public presence, though their spokesmen have continued to comment in the media.
Could high noon heat have kept protestors away? Are the issues in the assembly insufficiently known to the general Coptic community? Is the protest premature? Does a pending court ruling on the assembly’s dissolution persuade most that street politics is unnecessary?
It is uncertain. The result, however, suggests the Union has lost a great deal of its popular legitimacy and mobilizing ability. Anonymous critics present at the demonstration suggested the church was even using the Union in search of provide popular cover for their desire to withdraw, though perhaps all did not know this. If true, and if the Union was playing a requested role, the call for a protest rings hollow. Might the common Copt have noted a lack of authenticity?
In the end, the protest was rather inauthentic. Organizers did their best to shout slogans for the few cameras and assembled media, but there was no audience to rally.
Mina Thabit
‘We came to express our objection to the church continuing in this assembly,’ said Mina Thabit, a founding member of the Maspero Youth Union. ‘These are religious representatives for the church, and do not politically represent the Copts.
‘They do not have the wisdom or experience to deal with this situation. The constitution will wind up being far from the principles of human rights, and represent racism, ethnicity, and discrimination between people.’
Indeed, these are worrying concerns. It is too bad no one came to share them with.
Sameh Makram Ebeid handed me his business card with the words, ‘I hope I get to use this again.’ Underneath his name it spelled out ‘Member of Parliament’. He took it back momentarily and penciled in an additional word in Arabic: ‘Dissolved’.
‘I don’t have the right to disagree with a court ruling. We were never MPs; this is what the court said. But I will run again for parliament and make a fight for my district.’
Ebeid is one of two elected Coptic parliamentarians, and won his seat from the Red Sea district under the banner of the Egyptian Bloc. The choice of the Red Sea was personal – he owns a home there and likes the region – but also political. Ebeid estimates 75% of governorate residents hail from Qena in Upper Egypt, which is his family home.
The choice of the Egyptian Bloc as a liberal coalition was natural, as Egyptian politics post-revolution evolved into a secular-Islamist confrontation.
The Bloc is a coalition consisting of the Free Egyptian Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and the Tagammu’ Party. Under Egyptian law, however, Ebeid does not have to belong to any of these parties. Though his official parliament membership papers list him as a member of the Bloc he ran with them as an independent candidate.
Perhaps this is fitting. Ebeid hails from the historic Egyptian family associated with the Wafd Party in opposition to British colonialism. Saad Zaghloul, a Muslim, and Makram Ebeid, a Copt and Ebeid’s ancestor, contributed to the founding of modern Egyptian politics along nationalist lines without any religious distinction. The party’s logo depicts both the Christian cross and the Muslim crescent.
‘The Wafd is the secular party of Egypt.’
Ebeid had previously served as the Wafd Party’s assistant secretary general and member of the political bureau, but resigned during the chairmanship of Sayyid el-Badawi, who won party elections in 2010.
‘He became very autocratic and wanted to run the party the way he wanted. He was vengeful against everyone who was there before him. He never represented the true Wafd Party which I belonged to.’
Ebeid’s major source of contention was Badawi’s cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood. He brought on prominent Islamist Suad Salah, and sought to place her on the religion and human rights committee. Compromises such as these turned the Wafd, he said, into a typical ‘wishy-washy’ party.
After the revolution Badawi entered the Wafd into a coalition with the Brotherhood, though they withdrew at the last minute.
Badawi’s election was ‘clean’, states Ebeid, but like the parliamentary and presidential elections, this does not mean they were not manipulated.
‘The elections were not rigged but the road to the ballot was unfair; if you promise people heaven or buy their votes, this is not fair.’
Ebeid is critical of the electoral machinery of the Muslim Brotherhood which distributed food packages in poor areas before elections. Similarly, many Salafi sheikhs stated voting for Islamists was part of obeying God’s will.
Yet Ebeid testifies that in his election monitoring he did not discover fraud; certainly not in comparison to past elections. For this he puts no stock in the conspiracies which say Ahmed Shafiq was the actual winner of presidential elections over Mohamed Morsy.
‘As long as Shafiq did not contest the election, I have to accept it as correct.
‘If he knew the elections were rigged and he did not voice this, it is treason and he should be court-martialed.
‘There were 13,000 polling stations; did he not have this many volunteers to count the vote as the Brotherhood did?’
Even so, Ebeid took issue with the recent visit of Hillary Clinton to Egypt. His critique was not about clandestine US support for the Brotherhood, as many liberals and Copts advanced. On the contrary, in coming to Egypt the secretary of state was just doing her job.
‘I don’t see any reason why Clinton should not visit the president of Egypt; these are the true forces of Egypt. Did they push SCAF to accept Morsy? I don’t know and nobody knows. But it is actually her job and duty to come.
‘I think we should meet with the Americans and tell them what we think right to their face.’
As a politician Ebeid has the right to be frank. His criticism of Clinton, conversely, is in her conduct as a diplomat.
‘There has been a lack of tact on the part of Clinton and her team.’
The failure in tact concerned the nature of her visits to political forces. It was right for her to meet Morsy and the Brotherhood, Ebeid believed. It was right for her to meet with Salafis. It was right for her to meet with the military. But it was not right for her to meet with ‘Copts’.
‘You should not meet with the Copts as Copts, but as part of the liberal movement, as the third way between military and Islamist, and bring in non-Christians.
‘If you start segregating the country you’re making a big mistake.
‘She wanted to meet with individual politicians, but they were all Christians.’
For this reason, Ebeid believes it was correct for liberal and Coptic forces to boycott the meeting with Clinton. He himself did not receive an invitation, but he supported the decision of those who did.
As for the current political situation in Egypt, especially on President Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood, Ebeid is critical as well.
‘There is no such thing as the Freedom and Justice Party. They call themselves the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the real force.
‘So far I have not seen Morsy act as the president of Egypt. We have to see if he will elevate himself above parties to be the president of all Egypt. I hope he will do this.
‘The Brothers have a special agenda and we have a different agenda. If he is representing the Brotherhood then he is not my president, he’s the president of the Muslim Brotherhood. He should be the president of everyone.’
Though Morsy is not directly involved in the crucial issue of the constitution, Ebeid witnesses the Brotherhood special agenda here especially.
‘The constituent assembly [which will write the constitution] was a trick. It was agreed to be a 50-50 Islamist-secular split, but they did not go into the details about parties or people.
‘The Wasat Party and the Reform and Development Party of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya are Islamist parties, are they not? They must be counted as part of the Islamists. But what the Brotherhood is saying is that we never said it, we said 50% for MB and Salafis. As the Americans say, the devil is in the details.’
Ebeid’s criticism is not just of the Brotherhood, but of the process itself.
‘The whole process was flawed. We should have gone through the list person by person; defining by position means nothing. We could stipulate the selection of a judge of a court, but if he is an Islamist this makes the difference.’
As media reports the progress the constituent assembly makes on the constitution, Ebeid prefers not to comment on details until he sees an official text. Yet he is not reticent to make his views known on certain issues.
‘The first three articles are most important as they define the identity of Egypt. What are we, a secular country or an Islamic country?
‘What does the word shura [‘consultative’, proposed by Islamists as part of the definition of the state] mean? It has been debated for the last fourteen centuries. Putting the word there is not just semantics, it means something.
‘As for the right of Christians and Jews to refer to their own sharia: What about non-believers, what if we have an Egyptian Buddhist?
‘We should have a presidential system for the first two terms, and then move into a semi-presidential like the French. We’re not ready for a semi-presidential system yet.’
Within the debate of these issues, Ebeid was careful never to assert, or even speculate, secret deal-making between political powers. The accusation that someone was an agent of America, for example, has been a political tactic for the last thirty or forty years, he stated. He wanted nothing to do with this pattern.
Yet there was one area where he opened the door just a little. It is the crucial error which resulted in the muddled transition Egypt is experiencing.
‘If there was a deal, the deal that harmed Egypt was made in March of last year in the national referendum. This reversed everything, putting parliament first, then president, then constitution.
‘Deal, negotiation, agreement, whatever; this is what destroyed the whole eighteen month process.
‘The whole thing is a series of errors, whether intentional errors or a lack of knowledge I’m not sure.’
Traditionally, it is the Copts who look to America for support of their minority rights. With the Muslim Brotherhood now in the presidency, though not in full power, some Copts wonder if the United States is switching sides.
The statement of ‘looking to America’ should not be taken as normative. The Orthodox Church and most leaders of influence insist on Egyptian solutions to Egyptian problems. They believe an appeal to the West would brand Copts as traitors in their own land. Average Copts, however, often state a sentiment of longing for America – either for pressure on Cairo or as an escape through emigration.
Amid frequent meetings between Islamists and members of the US administration, however, some Copts believe Washington’s interests are beginning to trump its commitment to human rights.
Bishoy Tamry
‘We believe there is an alliance between the Obama administration and the Muslim Brotherhood,’ stated Bishoy Tamry, a member of the political bureau of the Maspero Youth Union, a mostly Coptic revolutionary group formed after attacks on Egyptian churches. ‘This alliance is to support fascism in the Middle East.
‘The US thinks the Muslim Brotherhood will protect their interests in the region, but this will be over our bodies as minorities.’
The revolutionary character of the Maspero Youth Union plays a role in seeing the United States making a deal with the devil.
‘We knew the next president must have US support,’ Tamry continued, ‘because the military council rules Egypt and the US pays the military council.’
Most of the United State’s foreign aid to Egypt is in the form of military support, with smaller percentages given to economic and civil society development.
A few hundred people gathered at the US Embassy in Cairo to protest the visit of Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State. Early chants at the demonstration included, ‘The people and the army are one hand’, but these were silenced by Maspero Youth Union leaders. Tamry explained their group called for an open protest, and some attendees see the military council as the best means to limit or even depose Islamist rule.
One such group is the supporters of Egyptian television presenter Tawfiq Okasha, somewhat comparable to America’s Glenn Beck. These are strong supporters of the military council and clashed briefly with assembled protestors when they arrived, according to Ramy Kamel, an independent Coptic activist helping organize the demonstration. This drove the protest ten minutes south to the Four Seasons Hotel.
According to Nader Shukry, the media spokesman for the Maspero Youth Union, the United States is looking to preserve its interests after the Arab Spring shook their control of local governments. Yet their eye is not on the region’s good, but on its destruction.
‘[The US] knows Islamist rule will bring ruin to these countries, and the best evidence of this is their previous experience.’
As for proof of this alliance, it is found in their frequent meetings.
‘We see evidence in the pre-election visits of US representatives to the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters,’ said Tamry. ‘If the US was looking simply to political representatives it would have visited their Freedom and Justice Party.’
Others see this reasoning as absurd.
‘The United States has relations with every nation in the world,’ said Raed Sharqawi, an investigative journalist present at the demonstration.
‘The United States is also the shield for the Copts, and always will be. This protest is foolish.’
During Clinton’s visit she asked President Morsy to ‘assert the full authority of his position’. The president is currently engaged in a struggle with the military council over the dissolution of parliament. His party, the FJP is also pushing him to confront the military over its supplementary constitutional declaration to preserve some of its powers until a new constitution is written. Clinton did state the details of the transition should be left to the Egyptian people to determine, but urged the military return to its role of protecting the borders.
It is an open and contested question if the military is seeking to preserve its power and resist the revolution, or if it is defending democracy against a premature Islamist takeover of all institutions of government.
Nevertheless, whether the demonstrations against Clinton are foolish or astute, it is a dramatic step for a segment of the Coptic community to turn against the United States so publicly.
Translation: No to the Brotherhood-American Alliance to Interfere in Egyptian Issues. (Pictured: Hillary Clinton and MB General Guide Mohamed Badie)
Note: This is an article from two years ago, never posted on the blog but presented now in memory of Dr. Ahmad al-Sayih, the primary subject. Last week was the year anniversary of his death. He was a good man.
On February 18, 2010 the Jaffa Center hosted a forum entitled, “The Fatimid State: Protecting the Holy Places of Mecca and Jerusalem”. The Jaffa Center is directed by Dr. Rifaat Ahmad, who was previously interviewed concerning the practice of reconciliation sessions in Egyptian society. He is concerned with combating the spread of Wahhabi thought in Egypt, as is one of the main contributors to the forum, Sheikh Ahmad al-Sayih, who was previously interviewed about Nag Hamadi. Upon receiving kind invitations from both gentlemen to attend the forum, I accepted in hope of strengthening relationships and seeing each in a natural environment.
Ten presenters participated in the forum, each one associated with the Jaffa Center, which aids in their research. The Libyan owned, Egyptian based satellite television channel, al-Sa’a, broadcast the proceedings. Dr. Ahmad served as moderator, and each researcher had ten minutes to present his study. Though topics varied, most presentations focused on the political relations at the time, both internal and external. Fatimid Egypt was described as a strong military and economic state, founded upon scientific inquiry, and welcoming of other religious viewpoints. The leadership of the state was composed of Shi’a Muslims originally from Tunisia, but ruled over a predominantly Sunni Muslim majority. They created al-Azhar University as a tool to promote Shi’a thought, but made little effort, it was claimed, to transform the religious loyalties of the people. Most senior military officials, in fact, were Sunni Muslims loyal to the Shi’a state. Together, they resisted the Crusader’s efforts to reclaim the Holy Land.
Sheikh Ahmad developed this line of thought in his presentation, celebrating the Fatimids for opposing the spirit of denominationalism. Instead, they promoted humanist thinking of the highest degree, espousing tolerance, dialogue, and moral consciousness throughout their territory. They combined respect for scripture with an open minded commitment to reason, welcoming Christian participation in their cause. Sheikh Ahmad highlighted that the Fatimids constructed five churches for the Christian community in Cairo, churches which remain standing to this day. These are in the area of Zuwaila bil-Jamaliyya, near the mosque of al-Hussain.
Sheikh Ahmad proceeded from the historical model to extend pronouncements about the needs of Muslims in the contemporary world. Modern Islamic thought and practice, he declared, are in great need of rediscovery of these sublime principles from the Fatimid era. The denominational spirit is alive today, dividing Muslims and other religious adherents alike. This fanaticism kills both religious and humanistic values, as well as a closed mind which is not fitting for Islamic civilization. It leads some, in fact, to imagine that Islamic civilization built itself upon religious values alone. This is nonsense, Sheikh Ahmad declared, there is no civilization but that which has taken and developed ideas and structure from that which existed before it. This is why, he concluded, modern civilizations must respect and cooperate together. None stands independent; all and mutually benefit through the exchange of culture, ideas, and viewpoints.
I am not a scholar of the period, but the presentations surprised me in two directions. First, my limited knowledge of the Fatimid period was built upon the impression that it was a Shi’a enterprise. Though I had known the population remained loyal throughout its rule to Sunni principles, I had previously only heard negative words spoken of this state. Perhaps this is not unexpected given my residences in Sunni nations alone, but most Muslims with whom I conversed dismissed the Fatimids as a historical exception, finally put right by the Sunni champion Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, known as Saladin in the West. It was strangely disorientating to hear such positive words uttered on their behalf.
The second surprise was the depth of such thoughts, compared to a particular feature of history which I have heard, but do not know well. The researchers were unanimous in proclaiming the tolerance of the Fatimid state, but it had been my impression that this was the period in which the Copts of Egypt were treated most harshly. While this requires more and thorough research on my part, I had heard this was the era in which the then still majority Christian population, along with the Jews, were forced to wear their distinctive clothing and mount only inferior donkeys for their transport. Many have understood these developments not to be intrinsic to Islam itself but reactions to Crusading Christian pressures which unbalanced internal religious relationships. It seemed, however, from the testimony that these persecutions took place under the reign of Caliph Hakim bil Amr Allah, who described as being an oddity having a personality which constantly changed his opinions and policies. It was said he later succumbed to insanity. As mentioned, these surprises came only from impressions, and impressions are unstable ground for the study of history. I was glad to have received another dimension to my understanding.
Though the study and discussion of history is enjoyable, it was not the purpose for which I attended the forum. Instead I had hoped to develop the relationship with two gentlemen with whom we have been growing in dialogue and cooperation. I had also wished to witness if the call to peace and tolerance from our private meetings would be given with the same enthusiasm in a public setting. Though I did not doubt the sincerity of the earlier testimony of either, I was pleased to see the same enthusiasm expressed amidst a group of their peers. May we all with such consistency both speak and live our convictions.
A friend of mine asked me the other day what I think of this quote from the Economist:
‘The best way to tame the Islamists, as Turkey’s experience shows, is to deny them the moral high ground to which repression elevates them, and condemn them instead to the responsibilities and compromises of day-to-day government.’
For a while now, even reflecting on the situation in Palestine where the West helped overturn election results bringing Hamas to power, I have had sympathy with this viewpoint. But there are a few other nuances to highlight.
As concerns ‘condemned to rule’, we should not start by saying that governance is a curse. On the contrary, it is a privilege, a trust. That Islamists have this now is their opportunity, even if the thrust of the quote is true.
As concerns ‘tame’, it must be distinguished from another sentiment often lying underneath such analysis. Many would substitute subconsciously the word ‘defeat’.
The capriciousness of government will keep Islamists from extremism – this is how they are tamed. But it has also lessened their popularity, as they do lose the moral high ground. Many find the military has yielded power to Islamists first in parliament to give them opportunity to discredit themselves. That they now have the presidency is only further rope with which to hang themselves.
So if the author of the quote is quietly hoping for such an outcome, there is another sense in which being in power is not ‘condemnation’ – it is their opportunity to cement themselves in the system.
While on the one hand it is fine and good for Islamists to gain credibility as a political player, it is also widely suspected the Brotherhood will use its opportunity to infiltrate the system and get their people in every nook and cranny.
Then, even if ‘defeated’ at some stage in the political process, having been yielded governance even for a spell, it will have advanced their overall cause. I have no evidence other than anti-Brotherhood testimony this is their plan, but the testimony is ample and often specific.
Finally, taking Turkey as an example – the Islamists might just do well in terms of governance, and then they win.
This is a good outcome for Egypt, of course, as Turkey is an example of improved economy and civil society. But Turkey is also not the best example. From what I understand, Turkey is among the worst nations in terms of freedom of the press.
While Islamists might keep winning free elections there, and by extension in Egypt, questions exist as to how they may be softly manipulating society. This is very different from the hard corruption of a dictator, but is less than free and open democracy in a transparent system.
Finally, it should be stated that Islamism is different from the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamism in general simply represents the idea that religion should play a definitive role in shaping the political system. The Brotherhood is an organization dedicated to this goal, which may or may not be acting honestly for the good of society independent of itself. It is quite possible to be an Islamist outside the structure of the Brotherhood.
In any case, these are more questions to explore than convictions I possess. As to the overall aptness of the quote above, if these points are taken into consideration, I think it is on the whole correct.
Despite the muddled political scene, street violence, and general unpredictability facing Egypt, most still see the upcoming presidential elections as the lynchpin of the nation’s democratic transition. As such, there is anticipation and hopeful expectation.
But there is a side of political campaigning which on a minor level does Egypt a disservice, and a good example is visible right outside our home.
Following the revolution Egypt was awash in patriotism and love of nation. It was a euphoric moment; up until this time the sense of Egypt-ness was a declining factor in personal identity and many yearned for the chance to live abroad. Suddenly, all was right with the world again. ‘Raise your head high, you’re an Egyptian!” was one of the most popular revolutionary chants.
Our neighbors expressed their national pride by painting a several feet long Egyptian flag across their front wall. For months, even as the revolution (d)evolved into politics, the flag beaconed the new Egypt and made us smile when we left the house.
Then one day, Salim al-Awa appeared. Rather, the picture of his spectacled face.
Salim al-Awa is a prominent Islamist thinker. Before the revolution he generated controversy by intimating Copts were storing weapons in their churches and monasteries. He later retracted and claimed misstatement, but the suspicion/rumor/slander was widespread even without his contribution. It, among other factors, played a role in inciting the attack on and burning of churches in Imbaba from May of last year.
Interestingly, al-Awa is also a proponent of inter-Islamic reconciliation between Sunnis and Shia. This has generated further controversy in Egypt, especially among Salafis who reject Shiism as ‘innovation’ if not outright heresy.
These are anecdotes, and they are minor ones. They are fitting for a minor candidate who does not stand much chance in the elections.
Even so, his posters are plastered everywhere, including the painted flag on our neighbor’s wall.
Then one day not long after, nearly every poster was torn down. Unfortunately, the sticker-back left an even uglier scene behind.
The defacing of candidate posters is almost as common as their ubiquity on walls across the country. In ancient Egypt, a disgraced Pharaoh would have his face removed from the hieroglyphics etched in his honor. After the revolution, a disgraced Mubarak had his name removed from schools, libraries, and the Cairo metro system.
Now, the disgracing begins before a misstep is even made. Perhaps Salim al-Awa is a flawed candidate, but he deserves the courtesy of unimpeded candidacy. Yet his image, as those of other candidates, tends to last only a few days to a few weeks before someone disfigures it.
Of course, it was his supporters who disfigured the Egyptian flag in the first place.
Democracy at its best is a culture, not simply a system. While the values of culture may disintegrate – see similar examples from the West – they also take time to build. This does not lend credence to the cries of Mubarak’s officials that Egypt was not ‘ready for democracy’. It simply means that Egypt is undergoing a new experiment, as America did over two centuries ago, stumbling and bumbling along the way.
As with all experiments, the outcome is unknown. This pertains not only to the choice of president, but the success, viability, and permanence of the new system. Perhaps this applies to American democracy as well.
In the meanwhile, posters are torn, flags are covered, and Egypt… Egypt remains. She is among the unique nations of the world that has staying power beyond a system. Millennia of history engrain not only a culture, but a civilization.
All the same, she can still be defaced. May conduct in these elections not leave a permanent scar.
Note: This article was originally published at Aslan Media.
This third and final article on Sheikh Osama al-Qusi focuses on a matter closest to his heart and specialization of study: The sunna of Muhammad, that is, what he said and did outside the recorded testimony of the Qur’an. Whereas article one provided his life history in pursuit of this knowledge, and article two pertained to its implications for Egypt and its governance following the Arab Spring, this article is an introduction to the study itself – ilm al-hadith (the study of tradition) – especially in their proper determination. In technical parlance this is called ilm al-jarh wa al-ta’deel, roughly translated as the science of criticizing and praising.
There are thousands upon thousands of historical records which state Muhammad said or did this or that. How is anyone to know if these collections are accurate or invented? Muslims themselves admit great swaths of these testimonies are not trustworthy, or are at least subject to significant doubt. Long before modern academic criticism informed Biblical study, Muslims developed means to judge their religious sources.
Though the Qur’an was sacrosanct – and remains so – scholars insisted the sunna of the prophet be examined closely. Many recognize, as al-Qusi stated, that the Qur’an is dependent upon the sunna for the elucidation of its meanings. Yet while the Qur’an was a collected and established document early in Islamic history, the sunna were simply scattered recollections from Muhammad’s companions. Their accuracy was of paramount importance in determining Islamic morality and jurisprudence.
As one tradition records, Muhammad said his community would divide into seventy-three groups; the only one to avoiding hellfire is the one that takes up what he and his companions did. These are those who follow the sunna – that is, Sunnis – and perhaps more specifically, Salafis, those who follow the ‘pious ancestors’.
This text will present the views of Sheikh Osama al-Qusi, first providing the history of sunna collection, then some of its technical aspects. It will also describe some of those who fault this technique, ending with why Sunnis represent a middle way among all those who criticize it from various directions.
History
Sheikh al-Qusi compared the beginnings of sunna collection to the process of assembling the Qur’an. Following the wars of apostasy which cemented his political authority, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, recognized many of those who had memorized the Qur’an were now dead. He ordered Zayd ibn Thabit to consult all authorities and collect all fragments, from which the Qur’an should become a recognized written text. The third caliph Uthman ibn Uffan then standardized this work further, creating six copies to be mailed to each corner of the empire, and then burned all others.
Somewhat in contrast, as opposed to the centralization of the Qur’an the sunna proliferated in fragments and collections. The second caliph Oman ibn al-Khattab began the process of gathering these testimonies and written fragments about Muhammad, but the effort began in earnest with a caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, Omar ibn Abdel Aziz, in 99 AH. Now considered by some Muslims as a ‘rightly guided’ caliph alongside the first four, Omar used his short two and a half year reign to collect all extant sources.
Omar authorized Ali Mayni to supervise this work, and he relied principally upon two other scholars, al-Zuhri and Abu Bakr ibn Hazm. The work was difficult as by this time the empire had grown significantly, with a corresponding scattering of scholars. Nevertheless, after Omar’s death in 101 AH Imam Malik ibn Anas produced the first collection of traditions, entitled al-Muwatta (The Approved).
Building on this work, the widely respected al-Muslim (d. 875 AD) and al-Bukhari (d. 870 AD) produced their collections of traditions, and were followed by al-Tirmidhi (d. 892 AD), ibn Maja (d. 887 AD), al-Nisa’i (d. 915 AD), and abu Dawud (d. 889 AD), all in the 3rd Century of Islam. These six collections are still considered ‘canonical’ by Sunni Muslims to this day.
Yet these collections also establish the necessity of tradition evaluation. al-Muslim’s and al-Bukhari’s works are distinguished over their contemporaries as they only record those traditions deemed reliable. Others simply recorded all the traditions they found, and in other works, al-Bukhari did the same. His three part work, al-Tarikh al-Kabir, al-Saghir, and al-Wasat (The Large, Small, and Medium History) includes traditions considered less than reliably demonstrated. Further influential collections were assembled by ibn Hiban (d. 965 AD) and ibn Khuzayma (d. 923 AD).
Technical Aspects
Each of these scholars engaged the evaluation of traditions at various levels, yet the process of jarh wa ta’deel was not fully standardized until the 5th Century AH, when it assumed the form which continues today. Every tradition is evaluated on its two parts, the matn (body or content) and the isnad (ascription or chain of authorities). The matn is the meat of the tradition, describing what Muhammad and his companions said or did in a certain circumstance. The isnad is its guarantee, describing how the recorder of the tradition heard it from so-and-so, who heard it from…, and so on, until the chain reaches back to the one who witnessed it directly.
Within jarh wa ta’deel, jarh concerns itself with the matn, to evaluate if the content of the tradition is consistent with greater Islamic history and teaching. Yet more important is ta’deel, to determine the trustworthiness of each person mentioned in the isnad. ‘Adalah (justice) relates to whether or not he was a moral person in his conduct, while dabt (certification) relates to his power of memory. That is, does each mentioned authority possess both the faculty to record accurately what he heard, and the character to pass it on unadulterated? If so, the text of the matn is generally accepted, which can create interesting dilemmas, as will be presented below.
The result of this process divides traditions into categories. Sahih (sound), hasn (good), da’eef (weak), munkar (denounced), and mawdu’ (fabricated) are the standard listings. The collections of al-Muslim and al-Bukhari are named sahih, reflecting their diligent work to include only those traditions which passed the test. Generally speaking, there is no need to review all the historic material again, since this was accomplished thoroughly by the early scholars and finalized by the 5th Century AH. Nevertheless, the refinement process continues, and Sheikh ibn al-Albani of Saudi Arabia was one of the most preeminent modern specialists in ilm al-hadith, the science of traditions.
Contrary Views
As has been done with academic criticism in Christianity, modern scholars, especially but not exclusively Western, have begun to examine Islamic sources to probe their reliability. While some take aim at the Qur’an itself, the traditions are an especially fertile field, with many scholars convinced most emerged not from the time of Muhammad, but from within the dynastic theological and political struggles of the growing empire.
Among non-Western scholars, the Egyptian Mahmoud Abu Raya takes on the reputation of one of the companions of Muhammad, Abu Hurayra, calling him the ‘sheikh of porridge’ for selling invented traditions to the Umayyad dynasty. Sheikh al-Qusi is untroubled by these allegations, finding them simply to be recycled charges from earlier Islamic eras. He then proceeded to describe them.
One of the chief dangers is assaulting the reputation of Muhammad’s companions – who represent the sources of most traditions – is that this threatens to rebound upon the Qur’an itself. It is the companions who memorized the Qur’an and were the source of authority when the authoritative copies were issued. If their character is in question, if they freely invented tales of traditions, may they have done the same with the Qur’an? Moreover, the Qur’an states that God specifically chose the companions of Muhammad; to cast doubt upon them, therefore, is to cast doubt upon God.
This is the chief danger of the Shia sect of Islam, which rejects the first three caliphs in favor of the fourth, Ali, who they believe to have been Muhammad’s choice for succession. They find many of the companions to have been complicit in the scheming which kept Ali from power, and instead favor only the relatives of Muhammad, believing them to be the heirs and rightful leaders of Islam.
Another early critic of the sunna were a philosophical group called the Mu’tazila. They represented the school of reason in Islam, and rejected all traditions in which reason contradicted with the matn. But in matters of faith, reason only goes so far, al-Qusi asserted. Reason is important, but where a contradiction appears, it is usually our own faculties which are deficient.
A modern example concerns a tradition in which Muhammad asserts that only God knows what is in the womb of a pregnant woman. With the advent of ultrasound technology, however, some Muslims rejected the advancement as a charade since it contradicted this saying. This is not right, believes al-Qusi, since only minor reflection is needed to allow science and tradition to find common ground.
A modern equivalent of the Mu’tazila is known as the Qur’aniyuun (Qur’anists), who dismiss the traditions entirely and rely upon the Qur’an alone. Yet they fail to realize Islam is far more than the Qur’an; by excluding the sunna much is lost. Some members of this school pray only three times a day, for example, as the familiar five is related in the traditions, not the Qur’an. In essence, they are substituting modern wisdom for the toils of centuries of scholars, creating for themselves a new ilm al-hadith, where the work has already been done. Every tradition has its isnad, and every character therein has been tested.
The Middle Way
Sunnism, therefore, stands in the center of divergent extreme positions. To make his point, however, Sheikh al-Qusi introduced an Islamic sect which was powerful in history but today is nearly non-existent. The Khawarij (Outsiders) were Muslims completely dedicated to the new religion, fanatical in their interpretation, and partisan to the companions of Muhammad.
Their loyalty to the early caliphs led to a corresponding rejection of the relatives of Muhammad, whom they viewed as seeking to make Islam a family heritage. The Shia, as mentioned before, supported the family and disparaged many companions. Eventually, Sunnism developed a middle position, honoring all early Muslim pioneers, from among the companions and the family, and forbid the practice of speaking against them. After all, as the Qur’an stated, these were chosen by God.
Similarly, Sunnism developed a middle position between the strict literalism of the Khawarij, present among some Salafis today, and the strict elevation of reason by the Mu’tazila, adopted by many critics of Islamic traditions. For Sunnis, reason is an important part of faith, but it should not triumph over revelation, which comes from a reason far greater than that of man.
Conclusion
As insightful as this conversation was, it did not treat the most important issue – reliability of the traditions. Perhaps this was inevitable, as it requires scholarship yet beyond the interviewer. Familiarity is demanded not only of ilm al-hadith, but also its modern academic critique. Sheikh al-Qusi provided another building block from which to attain to such knowledge, but though he asserted the historical soundness of jarh wa ta’deel concerning the traditions, he did not demonstrate it.
Should these lessons be learned in the future, they will be provided for the benefit of readership. For now, however, the value lies in comprehending not only the nature and disputes surrounding Islamic traditions, but also the presence of established guidelines in navigating them. This is the domain of Sheikh Osama al-Qusi and many others, receiving a lifetime of study. Such pursuit and dedication is worthy of respect. Whether or not it deserves credence is a matter of evidence and perspective, requiring more than this simple text.
Sheikh Osama al-Qusi is a Salafi Muslim scholar in Egypt who has won a level of notoriety since the revolution. Prior to January 25, 2011, Salafis were a largely unknown and mostly silent religious trend in Egypt, with strength concentrated in Alexandria. Their theology encourages absolute submission to the ruling leader, while encouraging devout imitation of the early Islamic lifestyle. As such, they were marginal, though through the influence of Gulf-promoted satellite television their numbers increased steadily.
After the revolution Salafis exploded on the scene urging a now democratic Egypt to construct itself as an Islamic state. Though democracy was traditionally a rejected concept theologically, pragmatic Salafis urged political participation to reorient a Muslim Egypt on the proper path. A number of their scholars became household names, most notably Mohamed Hassan and Safwat Hegazi, who became media figures and were encouraged by the ruling military council to intercede in sectarian conflict. Public reaction to Salafism has largely been negative, fearing the austere vision of Islam they promote, likening it to Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia. Yet the strength of their numbers is undeniable, though it is not at all certain they can translate this into political victory.
Osama al-Qusi’s moderate celebrity has not come by riding this wave, but by criticizing it. While truly a Salafi, he finds the political machinations of his group, and other Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to be a severe departure from the Salafi spirit. Furthermore, he finds that in seeking to force implementation of an ancient paradigm Muslims risk running afoul not only of domestic and international realities, but also of the Prophet Muhammad himself.
In the interview that follows Osama al-Qusi discusses these matters, as well as sheds light on diverse controversies such as violating Ramadan, converting from Islam, and brushing your teeth. He gives judgment not only on the proper source of law in modern Egypt, but also on whether or not the traditional Salafi dress and beard is mandatory for Muslims. For all of his opinions Osama al-Qusi has been sharply criticized by other Salafi figures. Yet in his own mind he remains convinced of his affiliation, and hopes his influential and historic school may be conformed to reality and modernity. Read on for yourself to judge between them:
JC: I understand that Salafism, in its basic understanding, is an imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, the Followers of these Companions, and then the Followers of the Followers, stretching three generations. Is this correct?
OQ: Yes, Imam Malik ibn Anas, who was of the third generation and founded one of the four major legal schools in Sunni Islam, stated that nothing is useful for the latest Muslims, except that which was useful for the first Muslims.
In Islam, it is understood that all the prophets completed one another, bringing one message. As such, the doctrines of Islam do not change from one generation to another, and similarly, neither do its values or principles.
One of the issues between me and others lies in the fact that I understand Salafism to be a religion, while others make it out to be politics. But Islam in itself is not economic, nor physical, nor medical, though its values and principles inform all of these areas.
There is no such thing as ‘athletic Islam’, for example. But in any sport there is a referee, who must preside over the game according to the rules therein. Islam’s values and principles do not set the rules of the game, but they do set the attitude of the referee, who keeps all in line.
JC: But many Muslims maintain that everything is Islamic, and should be governed by religion.
OQ: This is a new idea in Islam. It comes from Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, and Mawdudi of Pakistan, who were reacting to the fall of the Islamic Caliphate, and who wished to restore it politically. But Salafism is not politics; it is doctrine, principles, and morality. It is not the details of life; it is the purposes and not the means. The means of life change from one generation to another.
JC: Why then do you maintain a long beard?
OQ: In some of the hadith, Muhammad stated that men should grow their beards, which puts this in the category of religion, as a command. It is also mentioned that earlier prophets had beards, but furthermore, it is part of nature. God did not give men their beards for nothing, and it is not fitting for men to resemble women, or vice versa. We should preserve the natural order as God created it.
The fact of God’s direct commands also applies to the hadd punishments of Islam, which are corporal in nature, such as cutting off the hand of a thief. Even so, I differ from many Muslims. Islamists say these punishments should be applied without distinction, while liberals say they were for a time and that we can change the punishment while keeping the principle. I am with neither group. God commanded these punishments just like he commanded men to pray; we cannot change his instructions. But at the same time, his instructions come with many distinctions that moderate its application.
In such a manner, God’s commands are not found in other parts of life such as business, agriculture, or others. There are few proscriptions here, if any. We must figure these out on our own, in light of Islamic principles.
JC: So you keep your beard like most Salafis, but you do not dress like them. What makes the difference?
OQ: Yes, the hadith records that Muhammad wore a long white robe, but it does not record that he commanded others to do so. He simply did this because he received it from his parents, and there is no reason to necessarily dress this way from generation to generation.
JC: Is this similar to the siwak (a traditional wooden shard used to clean teeth)? It was also used before Muhammad.
OQ: In Islam there are five categories of action. There is wajib (duty), mustahib (desired), mubah (allowed), makruh (detested), and muharram (forbidden). Most scholars put the beard and the siwak in the category of ‘desired’. He ordered them to use the instrument they found around them, and today we have other instruments. The principle is to clean your teeth.
Interestingly, if you look to areas where the siwak is found naturally, such as Yemen and Sudan, you notice that the people have very healthy teeth. This is in contrast to Egypt, for example, where it is not found.
JC: But if the instrument of siwak can change, why with hadd punishments must you keep the means of cutting off hands?
OQ: The problem with Islamists is not the means of punishment, but the application. For example, there is a hadith that states the thief’s hand is not cut off unless he steals a certain amount. There are other stipulations as well.
In Islam there are only about five or so specific hadd punishments, while there is a broader category called ta’zeer (reprimand). In this category the punishment is left for man to determine, but with hadd, as mentioned, it comes from God’s direct command. In terms of the means of cutting off a hand, however, this can change from generation to generation. It used to be with a sword, but there is no reason it couldn’t be by laser, for example, to provide a cleaner, more sanitary cut.
Some Islamists, though, say we have to apply the hadd punishments now, but this is not fitting, especially as there is so much poverty. During the time of Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab there was a harsh famine, and he made the decision to suspend the hadd punishment of cutting of hands. As such, we should wait until the economic situation stabilizes, because then, if someone steals, he truly is a criminal, deserving of his punishment.
Unfortunately, there is not much flexibility in many Islamists. Yet if we look at the life of Muhammad we see he lived through many different stages of life. Taking note, this provides flexibility in our understanding of the Qur’an and sunna. Many Islamists, however, take the final stage of Muhammad’s life, when he entered Mecca as a conqueror and governed as its ruler, and believe this period to abrogate his other teachings and behaviors.
Yes, there is abrogation in Islam, but not of this manner, it comes in much more specific forms. In terms of his life, we should see how he behaved differently depending on his different circumstances, and learn from what he did. No, we cannot compare our situations exactly to his, but we can notice that when he was weak, he acted in one manner, and when he became strong, he changed his manner accordingly.
An example that may guide Egypt today is when Muhammad first returned to Mecca as a pilgrim, with many followers, aiming to do the umra. The leadership of Mecca denied them, and many wanted to fight, but Muhammad instead secured the Treaty of Hudaybiya with Meccan leadership. According to the treaty he decided to leave, but would have the right to return as a pilgrim in one year’s time. Upon fulfillment, Muhammad and the Muslims conducted their pilgrimage rites marching around the Ka’aba, even though it was full of idols. Though these were anathema to the Islamic religion, he did not destroy them, since he had no authority to do so.
Today, many Islamists want to apply the hadd punishments, but they do not consider if Egypt possesses the authority to do so. Islam may command certain matters, but it is not always possible to do everything we should in every time and place.
For example, what if we apply the hadd punishments, but then the United States declares this is against human rights, and cuts off their grain supply? In Islam, we must always consider the overall interest. Can we apply the laws we want? Maybe, and maybe not – the world has become as one village. We must evaluate based on what is possible, with its consequences and benefits. All this must be weighed in light of Islamic values and principles.
JC: Understood. But is not this reasoning similar to certain Islamists who delay the path to power, but desire it in the end?
OQ: Islamists believe the Islam must result in the creation of a state, for governance. I do not. Yes, you are right, there are aspects of what we can accomplish now, and what we cannot. But Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis – believe that they are the ones who should rise to power.
There are two things to take into consideration: Egypt, and the Islamic state, which represents the Islamic religion, all Muslims, and does not currently exist.
The Vatican is a Catholic state, and it is the only polity that can speak on behalf of Catholics, since there is no other pope. The Islamic caliph, however, is a civil and administrative position, not a religious one. He is not a man of religion, but of politics. He speaks on behalf of Muslims, representing them. Some institutions of the state are religious, like the Azhar, and need to have a Muslim presiding over them. But Egypt is not an Islamic state, so it does not need a Muslim administrative head.
JC: But should it become an Islamic state?
OQ: In Egypt there exist both Muslims and Christians, and each one must govern their own institutions. The administrative head must allow for both to do so. Egypt does not need to become a religious state, though this does not prevent religion from having its share in the state, especially in the religious laws that govern personal status.
JC: But do not some of these laws, especially the hadd punishments, require a Muslim to implement them, since a Christian might not?
OQ: The problem is that Islamists think the whole state must become religious, with them the ones to rule it. In their conception the Christians are our ‘guests’, not citizens.
JC: But ‘ahl al-dhimma’ (the concept of Jews and Christians being a protected minority in an Islamic country) is not a horrible concept…
OC: In the Islamic state, this is correct. But we are speaking about Egypt.
Today, Muslims have been constituted into many peoples and states, which is from the wisdom of God, who created different groups of people so as to get to know each other.
JC: But should not the man of religion look to the ideal, and seek to implement it as much as possible?
OQ: Yes, but the ideal is a state that encompasses all Muslims. This is not Egypt, and does not exist.
It could be that in the future the Islamic states will unite as did the European states, and the president or caliph of that state will implement the hadd punishments in a moderate way. The problem is that people think Islam is politics. No, it is religion.
JC: But is it also governance?
OQ: No, not for me. Governance is a non-religious task.
We should craft our state based on Islamic principles, but the sharia does not have the details to say what we should do in this situation, or that situation. Its unchangeable aspects, such as the details of a marriage contract, are few.
If there is an Islamic state, the leader has the right to represent the Muslim people – all of them – but this does not exist. Even if it did, it would not apply Islamic laws on its non-Muslim people. The Qur’an states that Christians should judge themselves by what their book contains.
JC: But Egypt now has an opportunity to craft its state as it wishes. Why not craft an Islamic state?
OQ: Egypt is a Muslim state; it is not an Islamic state. I do not accept anyone manipulating religion or making a business out of it. Egypt used to be part of an Islamic state, but it itself is not an Islamic state. The president of Egypt must speak on behalf of both Muslims and Christians.
JC: But what if Egypt merges with Libya…
OQ: No, it will still not speak for all Muslims in the world.
JC: But what if it gradually unites them all?
OQ: This is a good idea, and it is what I call for. Even so, it will not prevent any religious groups from practicing their religion within it.
But for now, the president of Egypt does not have to be a Muslim, or a male. These were requirements of the caliphate, but not of the Egyptian state, which is a political and administrative institution. The best person should govern.
Unfortunately, Islamists live in the past, but the past will not return along the same means as before; times have changed. If there is to be a caliphate, it must come by new means. In fact, there will be a caliphate, for Muhammad stated there would be a caliphate at the end of the world. At that time he predicted several stages the caliphate would enter – becoming like a possession handed from father to son, as in the Umayyad period, and then would become corrupted and fawn after the wisdom of the world, as in the Abbasid period.
But how will the new caliphate come? There are many possible means. Perhaps one by one, or through the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But it will not come through the use of armies, as in the previous ages. But when it happens, then the state will be Islamic and the caliph must be Muslim, since he will represent all Muslims politically. In this situation, it will be the role of the state to protect religion, to keep it from growing weak.
But returning to Egypt, take note again that Islam is a practical religion. It is not practical for Egypt to be an Islamic state. Why? Because most of us reject a religious state.
Even many Muslim Brothers and Salafis reject the Iranian model of a religious state, for example, preferring the Turkish model. But there is also the Gaza model, and even the Hizbollah model, which is an armed entity within a state. I am not afraid if some religious trends take over government, since they will be governed by the realities of the international situation.
Can any of these models be enacted in Egypt? Reality will dictate. Perhaps the Turkish model, since it has been successful, and has been enacted in stages. But it is not as if the Turks love Islam; no, before they hated religion, thinking it was the source of backwardness and ignorance. But as their situation stabilized and their economy developed, the people became happy.
So it could be in Egypt, but whoever rules will have to deal with international realities, even if someone here or there calls for ‘ahl al-dhimma’. But no, the future of Egypt will be one of citizenship, which itself accords well with Islamic teaching. The word ‘dhimma’ comes from one with whom you have made an agreement or contract for protection, as seen in the Compact of Medina, where Muhammad first ruled over a polity of Muslims, pagans, and Jews. The concept of citizenship can be seen in his example, should it need to be justified religiously.
JC: Is this reasoning similar to that of al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdo, who sought to modernize Islam by finding modern concepts within Islam’s ancient texts?
OQ: Yes. These were good students of the Islamic school of reason, but at times they treated verses of the Qur’an as if they clashed with reason, and so sought a different explanation. I disagree; we must accept verses that our reason does not understand, and hope that someday we will. Rejection is out of the question.
In this aspect sometimes the school of reason resembles the Mu’tazila of old (an early Islamic philosophical school) who went as far as to reject even certain parts of Islamic doctrine. It is not correct to raise divisions between reason and revelation. Instead, Muslims should return to the trusted path of Salafism.
JC: Very good. But let’s return to the main subject.
OQ: Yes, that’s right. Despite all that we are saying, I believe most Islamic currents, even the extremist ones, are adjusting to the times. If they do not learn from their texts, they will learn from reality.
What I do not want to see from an Egyptian state is any law issued from parliament that goes against Islam or Christianity.
JC: But wait, who will determine this?
OQ: The parliament itself will. It is made up of Muslims and Christians. In parliament there exist many committees for different subjects – agriculture, trade. There should also be a religion committee for which members can refer to in questions of religion. I’m sure President Obama is not an expert in economic policy, but he has advisors on whom he leans for support. It should be the same way with our legislators, but ultimately, the decision only comes down to them.
JC: So what if I want to eat publically during Ramadan? Can I do that, even if I am a Muslim?
OQ: Well, let us look to the parliament; they have the authority to craft laws. Maybe they will decide to close restaurants during Ramadan. Maybe they will leave them open for Christians or tourists. Regardless, it is up to the people to decide through the parliament.
Even if there were to be groups on the street (such as exist in Saudi Arabia, religious police), their function would be to advise people to respect the values of others. Their function could not be through law. There are no details in the sharia about what to do with restaurants in Ramadan, or what to do if people eat in the streets.
JC: Shall we take an even more controversial topic, then? What about the freedom of a Muslim to change his religion, or to deny Islam?
OQ: There are certainly references in the hadith that prohibit conversion from Islam, even to the point of proscribing death. But unlike the cutting off of hands, this is not found in the Qur’an. The key question is if there is anything that establishes the prohibition of leaving the faith as absolute, or relative to its time.
The Qur’an describes a time when people were entering Islam but then leaving it quickly. This was done in an inappropriate manner, and may have even been instigating trouble. It would require more research to see if the hadith about killing an apostate are connected to this text. If so, it would have been to put a halt to this process, saying, ok, religion is not a game, make your decision and choose.
So I expect, without being sure, that this hadith came for certain reasons at a certain time. This would accord with the fact that there are other verses which guarantee the freedom of choice in religion.
In this and in many other issues, scholars consider context and previous understandings of the text. This demonstrates that the jurisprudence of Islam is very flexible.
A good example is of Imam Shafa’i, a founder of one of the four main Sunni Islamic legal schools. He lived a long time in Iraq and issued many legal rulings. Yet when he came to Egypt he issued different rulings on the same questions. This shows he adapted his decisions to the environment he was in. These differences are part of the intellectual wealth of Islam.
So, I agree completely with freedom of religion. It is fitting for this time, it is fitting internationally, and fitting in Egypt also. But, if someone is playing with religion, like as in the Qur’an account I mentioned, he is akin to acting like a spy, and should be so treated. But we cannot generalize this special case on freedom of religion in general.
JC: Thank you Sheikh Osama. In respect of the time perhaps that will be sufficient for today. But I look forward to speaking with you again soon.
One must be cautious when writing about religious leaders, as they have mastered the art of speaking to an audience. Humans have a penchant for self-deception and self-justification; when mixed with religious language manipulation is easily manufactured, even if unintentionally advanced. People who seek to represent God may be the best of all possible men; they may also be among the most devilish.
With this caveat I would like to introduce a man with a remarkable history, Sheikh Osama al-Qusi. There is a third category of religious leader, that of the innocent. With a heart given to the study of God, such a man may be naïve in the ways of the world. It is in this light I experienced Sheikh al-Qusi, following the lead of his testimony. The proper rendering of his life may be possible through further experience, but is known ultimately only to God.
Sheikh al-Qusi was born in 1954 in Cairo, after his father moved from their family home in Qusa, from which his name is derived, a village thirty kilometers outside of Luxor. He enrolled in the faculty of medicine at Ain Shams University, but instead of diligently pursuing his studies, he became attracted to the religious life of the campus.
These were the 1970s, and Egypt was undergoing a religious indoctrination following the ascent of Anwar al-Sadat to the presidency. In an effort to solidify his policy to open up Egypt to Western capitalism, he appealed to religion to counter the socialist ideology of his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat gave wide space for Islamists to operate, and one of their chief fields was the university campus. Osama al-Qusi was swept up in their enthusiasm.
He had never seen this type of Muslim before, one so dedicated and public in his faith. Their claim of persecution added to their aura, as many spoke of previous imprisonments under Nasser. Furthermore, as some of their literature remained banned, the nature of a young man almost always makes the forbidden attractive. The works of Sayyid Qutb were handwritten on notes of paper and passed around campus. His sermons on cassette tape were distributed likewise. Osama al-Qusi began to be radicalized, without even knowing it.
Sheikh al-Qusi makes the case that to him at this time, these campus evangelists were simply Muslims, albeit abnormally active in their faith. He later learned that they belonged to ‘groups’, and these groups were many. Among them was the Muslim Brotherhood, but to these were added others like Islamic Jihad and other more militant associations, but all of which were political. In time he began to sense something not quite right, especially given the multiplicity of groups. If all of these claimed to be Muslims, dedicated more than the average Egyptian, which group represented Islam correctly?
By now Osama al-Qusi had lost almost all interest in medicine, wishing to discover correct religion. In 1978 he decided to take the umra pilgrimage to Mecca, but instead of staying the permitted two weeks or so, overstayed his visa and studied Islam. This was not in any of the approved universities, however; rather, he moved from mosque to mosque under individual Islamic scholars. He lived the simplest of lives, working odd jobs just to make enough money to survive. He poured himself into the study of Islamic texts, especially the hadith, and eventually found himself in the company of a certain group of students, likewise dedicated.
By this time Osama al-Qusi came to believe that all groupings of Muslims were of deviant Islamic practice. He became convinced that Islam was practiced best in devout imitation of Muhammad and his early companions, the followers of these companions, and those who came after them. These three generations of Muslims knew Islam best, recorded the traditions as found in the hadith, and crafted the sharia law schools still foundational today. This is the core belief of what is known as Salafism, though in Saudi Arabia, it is interpreted largely through a Wahabist lens.
The students surrounding al-Qusi, however, had a different lens. These were influenced by the idea of the coming mehdi, a messiah-like figure who would appear at the end of the world. They were led by a man named Juhayman al-Utaybi, who would later lead his group to storm the Ka’aba of Mecca, the holy sanctuary visited by millions of Muslims each year. In 1979 his siege was violently put down, though not before shaking the Muslim world through this provocative action.
Osama al-Qusi was not among them, and states he knew nothing of their political/eschatological conspiracy. He did study with them of their unique interpretations, and wondered if their faith was too political, or if they had grievances with the House of Saud. In any case, he was expelled from Saudi Arabia a few months before their campaign began.
At that time the students attracted the attention of the authorities, who arrested them en masse. When the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn al-Baz, examined them after a month and a half in prison, he believed them to be harmless, and allowed them to be released. Osama al-Qusi, however, as a foreigner was forced back to Egypt as he had no legal residence permit. His personal teacher, though not a ringleader of the group, was also fingered as a foreigner, having come from Yemen.
This teacher was Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wada’i. Though a foreigner, he did possess a legal residence permit, having enrolled in the Islamic University of Medina obtaining a degree in the science of hadith, and in pursuit of his Masters degree. Upon intervention of Sheikh ibn al-Baz, he was allowed time to complete his Masters, passing with high marks, and then immediately returned to his native country.
Back in Egypt, Osama al-Qusi thought only of returning to his religious studies under the tutelage of Sheikh Muqbil. Yet he desired also to marry, and left for Yemen with his new wife, praising God that he did not wind up involved in the scandal of the Ka’aba. Little did he know he was leaving just in time to avoid another.
Following his marriage his family was disappointed that he was not returning to his medical studies. Osama al-Qusi, however, was still quite extremist in his thought. Though he had learned to dismiss the varieties of Muslim groups as contrary to Islamic teaching, through his uncle his name was passed on as one qualified to join in the band of Abdullah al-Samawi, a lesser influential group dedicated to greater Islamization of society. He listened to the sermons of Abdel Hamid al-Kishk and Hafez Salama, and still considered strongly the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. For Qutb, the concept of a nation was paganism, and the flag of a nation was an idol. Furthermore, given the mixing of sexes university study was impossible, and besides, al-Qusi’s only interest was religion.
During that time female relatives from his wife’s family were approached by two suitors from the army. Osama al-Qusi found them to be pleasant people, but they discussed at length whether or not service in the military was fitting for a Muslim. In the end, he convinced one to discharge, while the other remained. Shortly thereafter, both became his in-laws.
In 1979 Osama al-Qusi left for Yemen, found Sheikh Muqbil, and settled into the very simplistic life of a devoted Islamic student. Sheikh Muqbil had several students, for whom he provided out of his own means. Yemen was a very poor country, and the disciples lived with their teacher in a mud brick compound with a garden. Sheikh Muqbil received a small stipend for his teaching from Saudi Arabia. He and his students also received in kind gifts for teaching the village children. Teaching during the day, learning at night, eating from the garden, Osama al-Qusi, his wife, and all lived in near subsistence.
From 1979 to 1985 Osama al-Qusi remained in Yemen, never once returning to Egypt. He arrived on a student visa, which permitted his stay for one year, but again overstayed due to the joy of his religious learning. In 1981, however, he learned of another reason why it might be best to stay put.
In May of that year President Sadat conducted widespread arrests of his political opponents. Over 1500 people were arrested for being part of what were deemed ‘treasonous’ groups. These came from all sectors of society, and included intellectuals such as Mohamed Hassanain Haykal. The vast majority, though, were Islamists, and Osama al-Qusi was informed his name was on the list, due to his nominal association with Abdullah al-Samawi. The police visited his parents’ home, but they convinced them he was in Yemen. They also urged him to stay, for the time being.
Five months later Osama al-Qusi learned that the sweep was not wide enough. President Sadat was assassinated during a military parade; listening to the news on a simple radio, he was shocked to hear the names of his assailants. Khaled Ahmed Shawki al-Islamboly, the chief assassin, was the husband of his wife’s cousin and the one who remained in the army, while Abdel Hamid Abdel Salam Abdel-Al Ali was the one he convinced to leave.
Osama al-Qusi asked God’s mercy on Sadat, who had now reaped the fruit of his error in letting loose the Islamist current earlier in his presidency. He also praised God that he was kept from involvement in such error.
Meanwhile in Yemen, the group of Sheikh Muqbil began running afoul of the local Muslim Brotherhood. To help ease financial pressures the sheikh tried to gain employment for his students in the nearby universities. This effort, however, was denied administratively by Brotherhood members who occupied key posts. Osama al-Qusi explained that Yemen depends on Saudi Arabia for substantial economic support, and would naturally lean toward the Salafi/Wahabi interpretation of Islam, as opposed to the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, as the Brotherhood does elsewhere, members seek each other out, trying to infiltrate key positions in society. They seek to rule; and this, not for the good of the nation, but for their own good.
Having established themselves in university administration, the Muslim Brotherhood frustrated Sheikh Muqbil’s attempts to establish his students on firm financial footing. Soon thereafter came another opportunity, though far less suitable to the desires of Osama al-Qusi, devoted disciple.
Sheikh Muqbil’s reputation was growing, and from thirty kilometers away came leaders from a nearby village asking for a teacher. Three times Osama al-Qusi refused his sheikh, but in the end he acceded. He knew the challenges Sheikh Muqbil endured in providing for his disciples, but lamented the distance that would be between them. In those days due to Yemen’s poor infrastructure, the thirty kilometers meant an hour and a half journey by car.
During this period Osama al-Qusi finally succeeded in gaining basic financial independence, though through a circuitous route. After getting established in the village Sheikh Muqbil introduced him to the Yemen Minister of Islamic Endowments, who appointed him as village imam and provided him with a salary. Sheikh Muqbil would return on regular visits, but eventually, Sheikh Osama al-Qusi became beloved by the people of his village.
This was fortunate, as the Muslim Brotherhood proceeded to cause more trouble. Though unable to cancel his contract with the ministry, they interfered and forced his transfer to another village, much further away. For Sheikh Osama, he was loathe to be at such distance from his teacher, which would make his itinerant visits impossible. Furthermore, the villagers came to love their sheikh, and did not want him to leave.
Sheikh Osama therefore refused this assignment, which led to the loss of his contract with the ministry. The villagers agreed to provide for their sheikh, but this meant a return to the simple living off the land which he had grown accustomed to on first arrival. Soon thereafter, however, the village mayor was able to make amends. He traveled to visit the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh ibn al-Baz, and arranged for Sheikh Osama to receive a stipend directly from him. It is admitted that the competition between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the mufti’s support.
Sheikh Osama’s life continued so on until 1985. Though he loved his life and learning, the absence from Egypt was especially difficult on his wife. Towards the end her psychological difficulties resulted in the semi-paralysis of half her face. Hoping that the political difficulties in Egypt had subsided, they returned home. Passing through Suez Sheikh Osama was interrogated at the police station, but was allowed to proceed without incident.
He settled with his wife in the Ain Shams area of Cairo, wishing to stay in the path of religion but wishing also to avoid regular employment which might curtail his time. Before too long he agreed with the imam of the nearest mosque to provide evening lessons, and as his reputation spread, he began teaching in more and more locations.
In terms of finance, however, life was more complicated. The situation was stable since he saved most of the money he had earned in Yemen. This he used to begin small projects – he bought a taxi, he bought a microbus, and was a managing partner in a religious publishing house – but none succeeded. Sheikh Osama readily admits he is not a businessman, nor did anyone in his family growing up have any business sense; they were all scholars. He managed as best he could and provided for his family, but there was little money in religion.
Certainly this was true of the religion he espoused. Upon his return to Egypt he sought out others of the Salafi trend, but found even the word ‘Salafi’ was not widely known. Only in Alexandria was there a following, but he found these too closely related to the Muslim Brotherhood. They called themselves Salafis since Sayyid Qutb had used the word, as indeed the Brotherhood does as well. Yet while they claim to be Salafi they also admit they follow the path of the Brotherhood. Sheikh Osama did not find a home with them.
Neither did he find common cause with other Muslim trends in Egypt, and grew increasingly frustrated. By 1996, though he was teaching regularly about Salafism in the mosques of Ain Shams, he felt isolated and alone in society. Everywhere he looked was bid’a – innovation – which went against the practices of the first three generations of Muslims. He feared especially for his children, finding their Islamic education in schools to be insufficient. Eventually he made the decision to withdraw entirely.
With basic savings from his earlier projects Sheikh Osama bought a small farm on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, and purposed to live off the land with his family, homeschooling his children. He maintained his weekend teaching in Ain Shams, but otherwise lived in seclusion. Like all his business enterprises, the farm eventually failed.
It was the family moral failure, however, that brought Sheikh Osama back to his senses. In 1998 his oldest son, at age 13, led the family rebellion against him. ‘Why are we different? Why don’t I go to school? Why don’t I have any friends?’
It was this crisis that helped make Sheikh Osama into the man he is today. He realized he had been living his whole life ‘in the book’. Now, he knew he must live life in light of reality, ‘by the book’. Religion is life, and God’s ways must be known. Yet these ideals cannot sustain life on their own; they must be lived out, taught, and practiced, so that society is transformed to enable life by the ideal. Cursing its failures to reach this goal, however, only lead to extremism.
Sheikh Osama came to realize that as he preached the Salafi way, he must also preach against the extremism practices by so many of his community. Extremism is based on hatred and rejection of the other. Its natural extension is terrorism, which is an attack upon the other, either in word or deed.
Pursuing that path, Sheikh Osama nearly lost his family. Oddly enough, when abandoning the path, he wound up in prison for the second time.
He sold the farm and moved back to Ain Shams, with some funds but needing work. He immediately began teaching in earnest, and associated himself with an effort to build a new mosque in Ain Shams. The land upon which the mosque would be built was zoned agricultural, however, and a resident of the community raised issue against it.
Ain Shams at that time was known as an area deeply ingrained in extremist Islamic thought. He, however, enjoyed a good reputation with the authorities, given that he did not preach against the government. All the same, Egypt was ruled by the emergency law, and once arrested over the illegal mosque construction, he was bound for prison. The policemen responsible apologized, and they even made it possible for him to receive favorable reviews within prison, so that he was able to leave after only two months. He personally was not mistreated, but admits the horrible condition many prisoners endured. Yet upon his release his reputation in the area suffered a minor blow, as he was deemed to have received preferential treatment. He became known in the area, falsely he claims, as belonging to the hated state security apparatus.
Yet among Salafi tendencies his reputation continued to grow, and was about to explode, stumbling upon the best opportunity he had to date. Finally, he could earn money through religion.
Proving the corruption endemic to Egypt, the ‘agricultural’ land purposed for the mosque was eventually turned into a Suzanne Mubarak Public Library. He, however, became established at another mosque, becoming its imam. There was no salary from the Ministry of Islamic Endowments, however, as the Mohamedian Guidance Mosque, as it was named, was not registered.
Today, after lengthy and ongoing campaigns, the Ministry of Islamic Endowments claims 95% of all Egyptian mosques are registered and under its supervision. This has been done in response to extremism, which has issued so frequently from small community mosques beyond the reach of the more moderate government license. Sheikh al-Qusi’s mosque remains unregistered, but the government gave greater space to Salafi mosques, as they tended to be nonpolitical, not threatening the legitimacy of the state.
Yet this mosque, through Sheikh al-Qusi, began to attract several foreign Muslims. One of these was a Canadian of Jamaican descent, who invited Sheikh Osama to preach for one week at an Islamic conference in his home country. He did, and as fame often leads to fame, he began to receive further invitations, including in the US, Europe, and the UK. It was not unusual for him to receive $1000 for a week of work. From 1998-2001, he made over forty such trips.
2001, of course, is the year of September 11, and though Sheikh al-Qusi does not believe his name to be on any blacklists, he deemed it wise to cease his international travel. This decision was confirmed as he watched numbers of Muslims held in detention in Guantanamo Bay, and furthermore when he learned that the ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, attended one of the mosques in Britain at which he had delivered lectures. Since 2001, Sheikh Osama has remained in Egypt.
Also, in 2001, his teacher Sheikh Muqbil passed away. Today, Sheikh Muqbil is considered the founders of one of the most influential Salafi schools in the world, located in Dammaj, Yemen, not far from the Saudi border. Sheikh Muqbil studied directly under Sheikh Mohamed ibn al-Uthaymeen, and attended lectures of Sheikh ibn al-Baz and Sheikh al-Albani. These three are considered the chief Salafi scholars of contemporary Islam.
Sheikh Muqbil has been clear in rejecting political Islam such as of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as terrorism, such as adopted by al-Qaeda. He did receive envoys from Osama bin Laden, seeking his help in contacting the tribal leaders of Yemen to purchase weapons and spread influence. He rejected them, however, and told them never to visit him again, labeling bin Laden as the head of all religious ignorance. Nevertheless, several detainees in Guantanamo Bay are held specifically due to their association with Sheikh Muqbil, who was deemed to be a supporter of the Taliban and armed jihad.
Sheikh Osama, meanwhile, needed to find another source of income. From 2001-2005, he relied on donations from wealthy Egyptian businessmen who supported his Salafi preaching. Eventually, however, he found that the reception of money often brought along with it additional pressures. On one occasion a businessman offered to build Sheikh Osama a mosque, provided that he would always come and give lessons. This was easy to agree with, as he regularly provided lessons in his itinerant ministry. Sheikh Osama enjoyed the support of this businessman for a good while, up until the interference of state security demanded he stop moving about and remain in one mosque only. The businessman felt betrayed, but Sheikh Osama argued there was nothing he could do. Their relationship deteriorated thereafter.
Such experiences convinced Sheikh Osama to once more seek to rely on himself for income. Re-entering the world more and more, he decided to return to university to complete his medical studies and in 2008 received his degree. He is now a medical practitioner, though he does not make much money from this field. Instead, he offers free medical care from his mosque two days a week, and hopes this may develop eventually a separate paid clientele.
He has also begun studying for a psychology degree, but closer to his heart is his religious education – now pursued through the High Institute of Islamic Studies run by the Ministry of Higher Education. Upon graduation he will receive a diploma, which will be the first official certificate in religion he has ever possessed.
Sheikh Osama has currently become newsworthy for the promotion of his relatively liberal Salafi viewpoints. While many Islamists are calling for an Islamic state, Sheikh Osama believes that anyone, even a Copt, should be able to become president, as it is an administrative position, not a spiritual one. Though he maintains the long beard characteristic of Salafis, he now feels free to wear contemporary clothing, eschewing the long, white robe donned by most of his co-religionists. He speaks frequently on Arabic satellite news programs, though apart from al-Arabiya and ART, who gave him $100, they do not pay anything.
The big money in religion comes from traditional Salafi satellite programming, such as al-Rahma and al-Nas, from which Egypt’s major Salafi preachers have become known. Sheikh Osama has no place here, however, as his line of thought differs considerably from what he believes to be the extremism of these contemporaries.
Sheikh Osama now lives in a comfortable though not luxurious apartment in Nasr City, a middle-to-upper class neighborhood of Cairo, not far from one of the largest malls in Egypt, City Stars. He continues to follow the way of religion, but has done well enough with his money earned to carve out an existence honorable to his family. In all interactions with him, he appears to be an honorable man.
At the same time, so many questions surround him. How is it possible to have been in association with so many violent, extremist individuals, and yet maintain innocence about knowing their true intentions?
Sheikh Osama does admit his previous extremism, reformed gradually over many years. Yet could he possibly have been ignorant of all he professes? Furthermore, though he was completely open about the sources of his money at each stage in his life, short of opening up his checkbook, can it be believed he provided for his family over the past thirty years on failed businesses, in addition to greater sums earned in Yemen and through his travels?
Currently, what is to be made of Sheikh Osama’s Salafi liberalism? Is it a conscious decision in light of Egypt’s changing times? Or could it be an effort to put a modern, acceptable face on a still ultraconservative ideology? Or, by the hard edge of experience and reality has he truly experienced a personal reformation?
It is impossible to say at this point in my relationship with him, which has been thoroughly enjoyed. I currently lean toward the sincerity of his testimony, which was shared with openness and humility. Above all, he struck me as kind.
This text is not the place to examine the Salafi question, its impact on Egypt, or its stance toward Christians. It is not to examine if wholesale reform can come to the movement, if this is necessary, or how it is to be achieved. Perhaps some of these topics will be addressed through subsequent interviews.
One thing that was remarkable from Sheikh Osama’s testimony, however, was the impact of family. The anecdote of his own was given above, and the share it had in moving him away from extremism. Yet he also mentioned his father and mother, with their Upper Egyptian values of acceptance and morality. However much he was indoctrinated in extremist theology, and however much he espouses Salafism today, he notes he was inoculated against violence through proper, traditional upbringing.
Societies are liable to change, for better or for worse. There is a sentiment current in Egypt these days that may tend to give rise to extremism, in any number of directions. The best antidote to protect Egypt may simply be to be Egyptian. These remain the vast majority; may all ongoing political developments give rise to their great voice. May they be the ones to govern Egypt.
Click here for an interview with al-Qusi: On the Caliphate, Conversion, and Brushing your Teeth, and here for his explanation on the science of Islamic traditions.
Back in February I had the opportunity to participate in an Arab West Report interview with Abdel Munim Abul Futuh, a presidential candidate who was formerly part of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the time he was one of many. Though several candidates are still running, he and Amr Moussa, long time secretary of the Arab League, are considered the two frontrunners.
The interview was prepared by all but conducted by AWR Editor-in-Chief Cornelis Hulsman. The following are selections which I found most interesting. Please click here for the full transcript at AWR.
Egypt is currently deeply divided, including Islamists and liberals in the sense that many Islamists and Liberals primarily operate in their own circles. This also applies to many Christians. How would you be able to unite all Egyptians, regardless of their background, to rebuild the country?
First of all, your words that Egypt is divided are not right. Egypt has pluralism, but is not divided and the basis of pluralism in Egypt is political, not sectarian or religious, like many other countries. …
The Christian brothers after the Revolution left the “ghetto” [he means that they came out of their isolation] they were in before the Revolution. They became present in the Egyptian community, participating in political parties; they are present in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and other parties, doing their work. Christians went from protesting inside the church to protesting in their community, the community of all.
The nation belongs to all Egyptians, whether they are Christians or Muslims, men or women, Islamists or they have Islamic, leftist, or liberal ideologies. This is the state of our community: I believe it is a positive and a vibrant state and does not engender any division—this expression is not accurate.
When I go in circles of course these people who are crossing the boundaries are definitely there, but there are many who are not and who are afraid and they lock themselves up in their community. How would you unify them? How would you be a president for all?
The most important trait he should have is seeking and achieving the independence of the nation, meaning that the strategic decisions of the presidency seeks the interest of Egypt only, not the interest of a specific political party, or any foreign body; the interest of only Egypt and the Egyptians. This, in itself, will unify Egyptians because it means that the icon that brings them together and whom they elected to be their leader, is seeking to protect their interests.
The second most important trait is that this president is reconciled with religion. Egyptian people, Christians and Muslims, are religious from the time of Pharaohs; they are a religious people, they love religion. We do not have extremist secularism in Egypt as there is in Tunis or Turkey, which is why it cannot be imagined that a president who is against religion or who is secular will rule Egypt. There is no way the Egyptian people are going to elect him.
The third important thing is that this president seek to deepen the meaning of citizenship, so that citizens may feel that they are equal before the law and that the basis for any Egyptian to apply for any position is his qualifications not his gender, faith, or political orientation. …
The fourth trait: When there is justice with the presence of a real independent judiciary, it will make the citizens, whose rights were violated by any means, to refer to the judiciary to take their rights. Then the nation will be independent and will grow and develop.
You mentioned on October 2, 2011 that you would appoint a Coptic vice president if you win the election and then the caliphate was mentioned. What are your thoughts on the caliphate?
What is the caliphate? Caliphate is not a religious term, in all cases it is not a religious matter, it expresses the cooperation and unity of the Islamic countries, represented by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). That is it. But some of the ultra-conservative Islamists lent certain incorrect meanings.
In addition, we are not thinking about these matters now: Neither the unity of the Islamic world nor alliance, because we are occupied now with reforming the nation. What is the value of a unified world when it is ruled by dictators, corrupted, and diverted people? Of course it has no value.
Consequently, we are occupied with building our nation, not unity, unity with who? [laughing] Weak nation ruled by tyranny and corruption for 60 years! It is better to reform it and strengthen it before even thinking about cooperating with others.
According to Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, God has given Muslims the right of sovereignty and hegemony, what does this mean?
What is Hassan al-Banna saying? Is this book written by Hassan al-Banna? Ah yes, “Who are We and What do We Want”. That is not the meaning of the verse and when God says “…you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you.”
If he interprets, “You will be witnesses over the people” as, “You will be guardians over the people” and dominance too, that is not true. Yes of course, if he wrote that text… I do not know where that text came from. Even if that text is of Hassan al-Banna or even Ahmad Bin Hanbal, that text is unacceptable because God in the Holy Qur’annever appoints a person to be a guardian over the other. Never.
For more clarification, when Allah told his Messenger, the Prophet and the Greatest human being in the Qur’an, in the Holy Qur’an: “So remind, [O Muhammad]; you are only a reminder. You are not over them a controller.” Allah said to the Prophet that his role is to advise only! Nothing else! Not dominance, not control, not a guardian of people! …
“To be witnesses over people” has the same meaning that God told the Prophet which is to be an advisor, wise, and give advice to people, not more. The greatest thing that came in Islam is human dignity, which opposes the idea that some human being like me can be a guardian or I become inferior to him because he is a Muslim and I am Christian for example. Or he is better than me? Or he is more religious than me? Who makes him better than me? If he is better than me to God then it is between him and God! …
What kind of government does Egypt need in your opinion? One with a strong president (such as France, USA) or one in which the parliament has a stronger role?
I support the existence of a president who has specialties, strong specialties, and I support the mixed parliamentary-presidential system, not only the parliamentary system because in the parliamentary system there has to be various parties which we do not have now. Which means three or four parties competing and that is not here.
What should be the role of the President and Parliament in overseeing the budget of the army? Would the army and police take orders from the President to maintain internal security?
Everything…the army is one of the power tools like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is why the parliament should observe all these power tools whether it is the army, foreign affairs, police, etc.
The army is not above the power, it is a tool. But how we go with this with the parliament budget? These are details. It can be through a committee, like the committee of defense and national security, media committee, etc… These are details, but everything should be under the knowledge of the parliament. That is how it is done in the democratic respectful countries.
How should Article 2 of the constitution function in your opinion? Especially since Article 2 was used in verdicts in courts where it concerns religious conversions.
Freedom of Belief in the Azhar document is not related to faith switching. Article 2 does not contradict with the Freedom of Belief. Islamic Sharia has been there in the constitution since 1971 and the Egyptian people, including Christian brothers, approve of it. …
It is settled that the legislation is done through the parliament and there is no other body that can legislate except the parliament. Legislation is done under the observance of the Constitutional Court and the role of clerics—Christian and Muslim, is only to advise and give opinions and not to dominate, to legislate, or to monitor the legislation.
What percentage of Egyptians is Christian and would you make public the figures of the number of Christians from the ID cards?
I am not occupied with the number of Christians or the number of Muslims, because in a nation that has citizenship these matters are not important. Publishing information as information regardless of the way it is used.
Wrong or right, it is the right for any citizen to obtain the information they need. It is not acceptable to hide any information from citizens. As for misusing this information to hurt the interest of the nation, it is another matter.
On May 16, 2011, you stated that you support full rights of conversion to any religion, saying the state should monitor this and not Church or Azhar. How would you guarantee that conversions would be fully voluntary and how transparent would state monitoring be?
I did not say “supervise” I said “enable” the state to protect the Freedom of Religion. It is not acceptable that if a Christian wants to convert to Islam, we ask the church and vice versa. It is a personal right. That is why the Azhar document that was signed by the Azhar, Pope Shenouda, Azhar’s Grand Shaykh, political party leaders, and myself is for the Freedom of Faith. It is not the role of the church, the Azhar or the state to supervise it.
What is your stance on the proposed unified law on building places of worship?
I am against these laws. People have a right to build places of worship. I am only with laws to regulate the building of places of worship like any other building, for instance a house, only to ensure that the building meet the technical requirements.
Egyptians do not need churches or mosques, they need farms, scientific research centers, colleges, factories, houses; but churches and mosques are not needed. None of the Muslims or Christians complained that they do not have a place of worship. These matters are unnecessary. The interference of the state in these matters is the reason of all the tension.
Read the full transcript at Arab West Report, here.
Read an article about this interview at Christianity Today, here.
Jayson Casper 