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Video Analysis of Maspero: Part Four

For the Introduction, please click here. For Part One, click here. For Part Two, click here. For Part Three, click here.

Media Coverage

Video Twenty-Three: Live Testimony from Injured Soldiers in Maspero (Two minutes)

Early on during the events of Maspero, State TV aired an interview with injured soldiers. It appears that the audio testimony does not match the lips of those speaking, but it is unclear if this is only from a delay in transmission. The news banner reads, ‘Scenes revealing the injured among the armed forces who have been transferred to the medical care room in Maspero.’

0:01        Soldier sitting on hospital bed, coughing

0:20        A man in civilian clothes is pictured lying down on bed, pants sprinkled with what appears to be blood

0:22        He says Christians threw stones gathered from the Maspero building and fired bullets at the soldiers, he went to help an officer and took a tissue and money from his pocket, when a Christian twisted his arm and took the money

0:50        First soldier says his colleague died right next to him, Christians hit them with stones and live gunfire, even though they were there to protect them, they were standing there talking to the Christians and then they attacked us off guard, Christians are ‘sons of dogs’

 

Video Twenty-Four: Revealing the Truth about the Copts on October 9 (Three minutes)

Another State TV feed from the same room showing injured soldiers, this video is a fuller treatment that begins slightly before the previous. It has similar issues with matching audio to soldier’s lips. It appears there are three soldiers in hospital beds. The news banner reads, ‘One martyr and twenty injured after Coptic protestors open fire on them at Maspero.’

0:10        Two soldiers videoed sitting quietly on the ground, they wave the camera away and cover their faces

0:22        As the camera moves, there appears to be a soldier lying in a bed to the left of the soldier described above who was sprinkled in blood

0:23        Camera pans to the left of the soldiers lying on hospital beds, showing a room full of soldiers and doctors

0:31        Some are attending to a soldier sitting in a wheelchair and treating his leg

0:50        This soldier is carried to the hospital bed, is treated by doctors, and sits up coughing to match the beginning of video twenty-three above

1:27        Video cuts and shifts to the soldier sprinkled in blood, same interview as above

2:05        Camera moves to the left to the soldier in a bed next to the one sprinkled in blood, same interview as above

 

Video Twenty-Five: Meeting the Injured Soldiers from the Armed Forces in front of Maspero, Watch what they say about Copts, and a word from Gen. Hamdī Badīn (Three minutes)

This video feed is from al-Hayat TV, a private station, apparently from within the same medical room at the Maspero building. The scene is much calmer as are the statements from injured soldiers, who do not appear to be the same ones speaking earlier.

0:19        Interview with soldier lying on hospital bed with a patch under his left eye; states they were standing at the Maspero building when the other march arrived, which attacked them with rocks, glass, Molotovs, and live ammunition, I tried to help my friend and took him to the 6th floor, but he died

0:55        Interview with another soldier lying in a hospital bed; there were about six hundred people at Maspero, crossing over the street when the march arrived, they joined together and attacked us with rocks and glass, and we had no orders to interact with them, a few soldiers died and we’re in the hospital, but praise God

1:45        Interview with another soldier, with a patch stretching from between his eyes, over his nose, and onto his cheek; says they were standing at Maspero but had orders to withdraw, drove the APCs in circles around the area, but people attacked us with gas and we couldn’t breathe and my eyes started to tear, we got down and then they surrounded us and beat us

2:28        Interview with another soldier on a hospital bed; says they were there protecting the demonstrators but then they came with Molotovs in a truck and began attacking us with machine guns, and I was shot in the back

2:45        Gen. Hamdī Badīn visits the injured soldiers, says what happened was an effort of someone to divide our one nation into Muslim and Christian, or this place and that place, to make us weaker, what each of you have suffered should be considered a medal on your chest

 

Video Twenty-Six: Violent Clashes between Security Forces and Coptic Protestors (Ten minutes)

This video is taken directly from State TV as the events unfolded.  It is an eerie broadcast with long periods of silence. The news banner states, ‘Breaking: Protesting Copts in front of the Maspero Building Block the Cornish Road.’

0:10        Traces the origin of events to the troubles of the church in Marīnāb

0:20        Announcer states there were warning shots from the military police to evacuate the demonstration which developed into acts of rioting

0:50        Says the protestors blocked the Cornish Road completely

1:15        States the protest began peacefully with chants and slogans for their demands but developed quickly into clashes between the demonstrator and the armed forces

1:40        Introduces Emad Gad, a Coptic researcher from the Ahram Center for Strategic Studies

1:50        Gad states what happened is a crime of which Gen. Tantawi and the military council is responsible, for I have seen how the APCs were driving through the crowds and running them over; the demonstrators were not armed, but were run over and shot with live ammunition, whoever did this should be tried and held accountable as a crime against humanity

2:40        In response the announcer says that events developed into clashes and throwing stones and Molotovs after beginning peacefully, Gad replies it developed so because of the army!

3:12        A whisper is heard, but it is inaudible

3:30        A voice whispers ‘Cut, cut’

3:40        Announcer acknowledges Gad’s anger but cuts him off from continuing, thanking him for his comments

3:50        Recaps events in which Coptic demands over Marinab concerning a guesthouse which is alleged to be the Church of St. George, and for a unified law for building houses of worship descended into clashes with the burning of military vehicles

4:50        Period of silence from the announcer

5:08        Begins recapping events again, saying some Copts threw stones at the army and police who were guarding the Maspero Building, the escalation began when they blocked the Cornish Road completely

6:55        Another period of silence

7:15        Announces that several fire trucks have arrived to put out the fires

7:35        Time is shown on screen as 6:55pm, and the news banner changes to ‘Coptic protestors in front of the Maspero Building throw stones at the army and police assigned to guard it’

8:00        Silence continues until the introduction of ‘Alī Jum‘ah, a villager from Marīnāb and eyewitness to the events there

8:25        Jum‘ah is not there, so announcer repeats the basic news story

9:00        Jum‘ah gets reconnected, is asked his opinion about what is taking place, and whether or not Marinab warrants all this escalation

9:20        Jum‘ah answers that Marinab Muslims and Christians are currently living in complete peace and security, we are negotiating things and there is nothing to warrant what is taking place here

9:50        Announcer asks his reaction to what he sees on the screen of throwing rocks at the army and burning vehicles, he answers we live in peace but the video ends before he finishes speaking

 

Video Twenty-Seven: Storming the January 25 TV Channel and Cutting their Broadcast of Covering the Demonstrations (One minute)

This video is taken from the live feed of the January 25 TV station with offices in the Maspero area. It opens with a woman screaming and several voices in the background. It was stated the army entered to search for demonstrators hiding in the offices. As it turns out, they were, but were not found. The video on screen is from an elevated position down onto the empty Cornish, with cars driving through at night. It also says the transmission is ‘live’. The banner states, ‘Gen. Sāmih Sayf al-Yazl, security expert’, presumably the guest at the time the offices were entered.

0:15        Someone says, ‘There is no one here’

0:25        Woman whimpers terrified and continues amidst background chatter

1:05        Silence, until a voice (the woman’s?) says that’s enough everyone, the silence then continues until the end

 

Video Twenty-Eight: The Moment the Headquarters of al-Hurra TV Station were Stormed (Fifteen minutes)

Again, video feed is taken directly from the station’s broadcast, transmitted from the Maspero area. In a similar set-up, the army entered searching for demonstrators. Before the entry al-Hurra had two screens, one of which was a live transmission of events, the other providing the feed from State TV. The announcer maintains his nerve impressively. The news banner reads, ‘Breaking News: Cairo clashes: Injuries suffered in violent confrontations between Coptic demonstrators and security forces

0:17        Live video from al-Hurra cameras switches to generic feed from Cairo streets

0:18        News banner adjusted to read, ‘State TV: Tens injured in confrontations between Coptic demonstrators and security forces’

0:20        Announcer states individuals from the army have entered the studio

0:33        Announcer tells people in studio (presumably army), we are on air, and, I’m Egyptian!

0:43        Announcer raises his voice as tension rises in the studio

0:53        Video feed switches to al-Hurra’s live broadcast only

1:00        Video switches to announcer who states the soldiers are in the studio, raising their weapons, searching for demonstrators

1:20        Tries to calm the situation down and tells the soldiers to search the studio as they wish

2:55        Announcer spent time trying to regain composure and update viewers on proceedings; news banner changes, ‘Individuals from the Egyptian army storm the al-Hurra studio’

3:23        Announcer continues the conversation with the previous telephone guest

3:40        Video feed switches to that of State TV, time shown on bottom as 7:57pm as news scroll begins

4:42        News banner adds the following, ‘…searching for demonstrators’

6:27        News banner now reads, ‘Coptic protestors set fire to Egyptian army vehicles’

6:40        News banner announces, ‘State TV announces the death of a soldier from the army in confrontations with the Copts’

7:05        News banner reads, ‘Tens injured and military vehicles burned in Coptic confrontations with Egyptian security

7:20        News banner reads, ‘Coptic demonstrators in violent confrontations with security forces in front of State TV building’

7:54        Two live feeds restored to the broadcast, al-Hurra’s feed of an onramp with individuals milling about as traffic passes by above

8:12        News banner reads, ‘Heavy gunfire in Coptic demonstrator confrontations with Egyptian security forces

14:14     Phone conversation continues as the news banner recycles the above headlines, then the announcer apologizes saying for security reasons we have to stop, I don’t know if we’re on air or not

14:20     News banner reads, ‘Individuals from the Egyptian army storm the al-Hurra studio’

14:40     Screen goes blank as announcers repeats, we’re on the air?

14:48     Transmission cuts off as the program logo comes on screen, and video ends

 

Video Twenty-Nine: Egyptian Television Inciting Egyptians against the Copts (Three minutes)

Announcer Rasha Magdy has come under fire for her description of events on State TV. This broadcast is from the independent channel OnTV, owned by Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris, which was transmitting the State TV feed.

0:06        News banner reads, ‘Breaking: Coptic protestors throw stones and Molotovs at soldiers from above the October bridge, and burn …’ (rest illegible)

0:15        Praises the Egyptian army for its past accomplishments, and how the people stood with it, stating we should be celebrating this spirit from the days following October 6 (a national holiday commemorating the war which liberated Sinai)

0:25        States the events of Maspero show that everything has changed; what is happening to Egypt? In whose interest is this?

0:55        Announces that as of this moment there are at least three martyrs and twenty injured, all of which are from the army’s soldiers – not from the hand of Israel, or of an enemy, but of a group from the children of this country

1:15        This army stood by the revolution, and protected the revolution, refusing to fire on any Egyptian, it is now being fired upon

1:32        Any group from Egyptian society, no matter what their demands or however legitimate, to build a building or not build a building, does it deserve to burn the nation in its entirety?

2:25        May Egypt fear God, may your area fear God, we have endured a lot

2:37        There appears to be a cut in the video, switching to what appears to be Rasha Magdy now reading the official news briefing, but perhaps it is not a splice, as the video maintains continuity

2:38        Three soldiers killed and thirty injured as Coptic demonstrators gathered in front of the Maspero building fire upon them; eyewitnesses confirm that hundreds of Coptic demonstrators, who blocked the Cornish Road, threw stones and Molotovs on the army and police who were assigned to guard the Maspero building; the army and police are attempting to secure the area and disperse the protestors, mounting iron barriers in front of Maspero and locking all the doors to prevent it from being stormed

3:21        Video switches to a talk show on OnTV in which a guest, George Ishak of the Kifāyah movement, accuses Rasha Magdy of inciting viewers against the Copts, especially when she said, ‘May Egypt fear God’

 

Video Thirty: Surprising Video, for the First Time the State TV Announcer who was Accused of Inciting Against the Copts States on Air the Comedy in Television as Muna al-Shazalī Makes Clear (Fourteen minutes)

Muna al-Shazalī is a talk show host on the channel Dream2. In this episode she hosts a number of prominent Egyptian personalities and conducts a phone interview with Rasha Majdī.

0:37        Magdy states the announcer is the last stage in the operation of news production, there are a number of people who pass on the news, whether written or otherwise, before it reaches me

1:12        I want to confess that what happened was a mistake of the media, it is necessary that if I present one side, I must also present the other, and this did not happen

1:40        In my coverage I said ‘group of people’, not ‘group of Copts’

2:00        That which was written below about the Copts was prepared by the editor, by a certain responsible one

2:20        In response to clarification, Magdy states no one who works in television can take a single step or print any news on the screen without authorization (implied, from the state)

2:40        Yes, there were mistakes, but they were not the mistakes of the editors or the announcers, they were the mistakes of those who manage the matter underneath it all

3:00        We are not newly trained announcers, we know that if you present one side you must present the other

4:53        After restatement from al-Shazalī, Magdy clarifies that the responsible person is in the media production, not the state

5:50        If I go, the problem will remain, it rests with those responsible for media production who leave us lost in our work

6:10        Did you know that this responsible person stated that he is innocent from what was announced? Fine, then state who wrote that news!

6:30        I received the news from MENA (Middle East News Agency, the office news agency of Egypt)

7:10        In answer to a question asking Magdy to demonstrate her innocence from inciting the people, she states, the only thing that I stated in my own words that has been taken as incitement is ‘May Egypt fear God, where are the wise men of Egypt’, but I maintain this statement and it is my right to do so

8:30        In response to words from Emad Gad appreciating what Magdy said, she replies I only stated ‘a group of Egyptians’ since I had no information on what was happening or who was hitting who, I sit in the studio, I have no guests, and I don’t know what happened, when I saw that news was contradictory, I stated ‘a group of people’, when I spoke of the three martyrs from the army, this was the only news that came to me from MENA, and I read it, there was no incitement from me

12:40     After conversation between studio guests, Magdy returns and states she and a number of her colleagues are very frustrated with those who leave the announcer to be responsible for what is stated on the news, don’t blame me when you leave me lost and then say you are the reason for what happened

13:50     Al-Shazalī concludes the phone conversation by stating it is Magdy right to bring a lawsuit against the person who provided her with the news

 

Video Thirty-One: Middle East News Agency Denies what the Announcer Rasha Magdy Said (Eight minutes)

In this video Ali Hassan, deputy editor-in-chief of MENA, is asked by telephone by a talk show host about the comments of Rasha Magdy, in which she laid blame for her broadcast at the feet of his news agency.

3:00        Announcer asks ‘Alī Hassan, about the news banner which stated Coptic protestors set fire to military vehicles and also fired upon the soldiers

3:23        Hassan answers, MENA did not publish this news, nor does it know anything about it, and Rasha Magdy should bring the evidence she has to prove what she said; furthermore, Magdy is known for a poor reputation from the revolution when she announced there were no demonstrators in Tahrir on January 28

 

Video Thirty-Two: Families from Septia Support the Army Against Armed Coptic Demonstrators (Two minutes)

Video footage is from al-Arabia channel, at 1:00 the announcer states that families from Septia have come to support the army, and that the army is present among many civilians. The announcer states ‘this is told to me’, but this is presented in place of charges leveled against State TV claiming it asked ‘honorable citizens’ to go to the street to support the army. I was unable to find video evidence of this though it was reported in many outlets. CIDT managing director Hani Labib stated he watched State TV that evening and heard it announced.

 

Video Thirty-Three: The Program? Bāsim Yūsif: Maspero … Ground of Hypocrisy, Part One (Eleven minutes)

Bāsim Yūsif is a comedic news producer along the lines of John Stewart in the United States on the Daily Show. In this episode he assembles video footage from the media coverage of the event. Of importance here is the footage at 8:45 from State TV in which the announcer makes a correction: ‘Viewers, as a correction to the news we presented recently, one soldier from the armed forces has died a martyr, and not three soldiers, with twenty injured after Coptic protestors fired upon them at the Maspero building’.

Analysis: Taking the statements of the injured soldiers at face value, they provide powerful testimony that Copts were involved in striking the armed forces. It should be noted, though, that none of the soldiers presenting testimony have visible injuries. Regardless of the credibility of their testimony, however, presentation of this footage on State TV could only have had an incendiary effect on events, effectively mobilizing sentiment against the Coptic demonstrators, if not Copts in general – ‘Copts are sons of dogs’. It appears certain that citizens did go to Maspero, though video cannot confirm why.

As for the presentation of Rasha Magdy, in light of her confession afterwards she appears to be innocent of incitement against the Copts. Where it appears she is reading the news, accusation is leveled against the Coptic demonstrators that they killed three soldiers. Her own commentary before this, however, is much more judicious, though still full of shock at what is taking place. Yet she makes clear the official news comes from official sources.

Yet the testimony of ‘Alī Hassan raises more questions. ‘Amr al-Masrī, a journalist in MENA, confirms Hassan’s words, stating that while MENA received word directly from the military council that three soldiers had died, it published no information about Coptic demonstrators being the ones who killed them. If indeed Magdy was reading, then, who gave her that statement?

This makes the later correction all the more confusing. It could be as time passes that corrections are made to increase the number of dead. Yet how is it possible for official news to be mistaken in that two officially martyred soldiers are now alive?

It is impossible to say from video evidence if the entry of the army into the studios of January 25 TV and al-Hurra had any impact on the content of broadcasting. In fact, it has been demonstrated there were protestors hiding out at least in the January 25 offices, justifying the soldiers’ entrance and search. Yet it can be noted that the live video broadcast did change during their presence, and that the news banner underneath became more clear in labeling ‘Coptic demonstrators’ behind the confrontations in a manner consistent with State TV. To note: January 25 TV is understood to be an initiative supported by Islamists, and al-Hurra is understood to be an initiative supported by the United States government.

 

For the Introduction, please click here. For Part One, click here. For Part Two, click here. For Part Three, click here. To read the entire report in pdf, click here.

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Arab West Report Middle East Published Articles

Video Analysis of Maspero: Part Three

For the Introduction, please click here. For Part One, click here. For Part Two, click here.

Scenes of General Chaos

Video Thirteen: The Christians began Attacking the Army, I wish We Focus and See who Steals the APCs and Drives Over the Copts (Three minutes)

Video taken from the State TV feed. It may represent the continuation of scenes described above where the march from Shubrā arrived at Maspero and was met by a cordon of riot police, as the pickup truck appears to be the same. The screen displays the headline, ‘Coptic protestors throw stones at the army and police assigned to protect the Maspero building’.

0:10        Protestors and the pickup truck advance slowly, pushing back the police cordon; clashes are not obvious, neither are the crowds very large, most are simply lingering in the area

0:55        The police cordon has reestablished itself and is not being met with consistent aggression

1:10        One person seems to run at the cordon and attack a policeman, it ends quickly as he retreats

1:33        Scene jumps forward in time, APCs drive on the Nile side of the Cornish but away from any proximity to protestors

2:15        Army police are seen moving away from the area to the north, towards Maspero, as the camera shifts south protestors are seen attacking unmanned army jeeps

2:30        An APC drives along the Cornish between protestors where the attack on the vehicles is ongoing

2:53        Opening footage is replayed again

 

Video Fourteen: Soldiers Strike the Protestors and Break Cars to Cast Blame on the Protestors (Three minutes)

This video continues the scene from video twelve in the APC section, and provides another angle from the ending scene of video ten, in which police are striking at protestors shielding themselves behind parked cars. The video is very dark and unclear, but again depicts well the chaos of the event.

0:05        An APC drives down the road as protestors swing clubs at it

0:15        Another APC advances, slowly enough for a person to run out of its way

0:33        A contingent of riot police charge toward those gathered in the street

0:40        The cameraman moves behind a parked car up against a wall, and a policeman follows striking at him and others with his baton

1:00        Scene of a car with its back windshield smashed out, no one witnessed doing so; women’s voices heard nearby

1:15        Policeman gathered between the cars and the walls, not clear what they are doing

1:40        Voice of one standing by chanting ‘Kyrie Eleison’

1:50        Video goes dark, but sounds heard of smashing in the vicinity of the cars

2:25        Gathering of police around the cars, not clear what they are doing but they do not appear under duress

 

Video Fifteen: Vehicle Carrying Thugs in front of Maspero (One minute)

Video taken from the television feed of al-Arabiya. At the 0:10 second mark the footage shows a pickup truck pull behind an army transport vehicle. Many of those standing around are carrying obvious planks of wood. Those in the truck also seem so armed, but one of the people appears to be carrying a cross. If thugs, they represent a segment among lower classes who engage in mercenary violence, often for political purposes. This phenomenon is well known in Egypt, and accusations exist under Mubarak the state made common use of what in Arabic is termed ‘baltajiyyah’.

 

Video Sixteen: Killing of a Christian during the Events of Maspero (One minute)

This video is filmed from among the protestors during sounds of gunfire. The purported death is not on video, and while the footage is apparently real, the screams at the time of death may have been sliced into earlier footage. It is unclear, but if real suggests the death of a protestor while warning shots, claimed to be blanks, were being fired into the air. If spliced, then the death is still presumably real but the timing and cause is uncertain.

0:10        Familiar chant of ‘Peaceful, peaceful’ as in earlier videos, some motioning protestors forward

0:20        Sound of gunfire in the distance

0:38        Filming gets chaotic and focuses toward the ground

0:41        If spliced, it occurs here

0:42        Woman screaming and presumably shot body filmed lying on the pavement

 

Video Seventeen: Army APCs Break through the Maspero Sit-in, Terrifying Scenes of the Dead (Four minutes)

This video is filmed from within the general chaos, including graphic pictures of slain protestors.

0:05        APC mounts median to change directions, as another one continued down the stretch of road; protestors largely on the sidewalks

0:11        Military transport bus, empty, drives into the median and stops unprompted, driver not pictured; several people seen with wooden planks, clubs

0:30        Pickup truck parked stationary in the street, with several people sitting inside motionless, several holding crosses; was this is vehicle which came in the march?

0:43        Body seen on the ground, then carried by protestors in a blanket; person appears to have been shot in the head

1:12        As people scurry about, a priest is pictured with his back to the camera

1:30        Many people run away from the general scene towards the south, reason unknown

1:39        Scene switches as the video shows footage from another angle; running away continues as an APC drives slowly down the street; cars are seen undamaged parked alongside road, some people carry wooden planks

2:15        Someone is heard screaming from the ground, people gather around as an APC drives quickly back in the other direction, sending people rushing to the sidewalk

2:50        Scene switches again, a priest is seen briefly, from across the street a cheer goes up as it seems people have stormed an APC

3:18        A person walking enters the video, he has a very bloody face; remain scenes are of people milling around

 

Video Eighteen: Events of Maspero, Scenes not Shown Before (Two minutes)

Video footage here was taken from the German TV feed, filming from their elevated offices at Maspero.

0:04        Camera view is from a high position, looking down on a crowd of gathered demonstrators

0:10        A couple people strike the military bus with objects, a man tries to push them away

0:22        Elevated footage of four fires, presumably set to area vehicles

0:25        Altercation between people and riot police, swinging clubs at them, one person swinging a cross

0:33        An APC driving road with protestors on the sides, swerving to avoid something lying in the road

0:38        People surround an open top army vehicle which had crashed into the military bus; the soldier is crouching down inside to hide while people swing clubs at its sides; one person climbs on top and hurls a large stone down upon him as another swats at him with a cross from down below

1:03        Footage of an army vehicle on fire as people linger around it

1:15        Two soldiers jump down from a stalled army vehicle and take off running as people chase; one stumbles and is surrounded by people beating him with sticks

1:28        Another scene of burning vehicles, with a soldier surrounded and accosted by those around

 

Full transcript of the German commentary:

Thomas Stephan is the commentator. Translation provided by Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of Arab West Report.

“The images are from in front of our studio, an escalating demonstration. Demonstrators are armed with sticks and who carry crosses. Coptic Christians protested and are hitting a bus because this probably carried military police. They protect the state television and the Ministry of Information. There are horrible scenes. The military seem helpless in the face of this aggression. Soldiers become victims and are crushed. Their fate: unknown. Military are trying to divide the masses with vehicles. Useless! An open (army) car drives into a burning bus. What is happening here is horrible. Soldiers are falling. No mercy. A man takes a stone and… [on the footage one sees him throwing a stone at the soldier who was  alone and was trying to hide. Someone else tries to beat him with a cross]. Soldiers find no ways to stop the mob. Those who fall into the hands of the mob are screwed. An APC gets stuck in the crowd. Hateful rejoicing is heard. What is the origin of this outbreak of violence?  Is it a response of Copts placed in a second rank status about which they complain so often? Is it from the hate of the military that had just tried to end a Coptic demonstration? The APC is set afire. Soldiers get close [to the burning APC]; the locked up soldier get hope. They run for their lives and are caught, beaten, and trampled upon. Allegedly three soldiers were killed this night, at least 30 were wounded. Smoke and teargas is in the air. Only slowly the military are able to drive the mob away. Cairo is burning this night. Many thought after the revolution that it would improve. But the images of this night, immediately in front of our studio, make people hesitate. There was much hate!”

Comment from Hulsman:  The German TV crew has seen a lot of hate and must have much more footage. The commentary is their interpretation of what they have seen. It is obvious from this footage that the mob was full of anger and hate and used violence against individual defenseless soldiers. Their conclusion that ‘Cairo is burning this night,’ should not be taken literally. It was quiet in Al-Ma‘ādī and other parts of Cairo but at the scene of the clashes it was burning and people, Christians as well as Muslims, were deeply hurt.

 

Video Nineteen: Egyptian Ministry of Health: 24 Dead in Clashes between Copts and the Armed Forces and Police (Two minutes)

This video is directly from the al-Arabiya website as a news story, it shows several scenes of chaos that unfolded.

0:15        A priest attempts to lead a soldier to safety away from angered crowds

0:30        An elevated camera angle, perhaps of the Shubrā demonstration approach to Maspero

0:58        Scene of a vehicle burning on the median of the Cornish

1:30        Soldier jumps down from a vehicle to be met by an angry mob striking at him

1:40        Announcer states Muslims entered into the clashes so as to support the army, warns of the possibility of sectarian sedition in the country

 

Video Twenty: Maspero 9 October 2011, Part Two (Ten minutes)

This video continues the series from video nine, focusing on the aftermath of violence when people were still milling around in the streets though the situation had calmed considerably.

0:30        Gunshot heard as people react terrified, seemingly different sound than earlier warning shots; camera switches to show person lying on ground, perhaps shot, unsure if in sequence

1:10        Calmer scenes, video taken of a man supported by two others, whose foot appears to be broken

1:23        Crowd of people charging down a street under a bridge, as soldiers run away from them

1:45        Another person staggering down the path, hopping, as his foot is bloodied

2:00        Crowd of people marching with raised crosses, chanting the Nicene Creed

2:43        Tear gas fired from police at a distance

3:00        People, some of whom identify as Muslims, call the army ‘infidels’, one is holding a gas mask, shaking it as if he found it or seized it, saying they fired at us and even attacked a priest

4:00        Crowds chanting, ‘The people want the downfall of the field marshal,’ and, ‘Muslim, Christian, one hand,’ and, ‘Fall, fall, military government’

5:00        Group of people pull an injured or dead colleague in a blanket down the street

5:16        Najīb Jabrā’īl, prominent Coptic activist and lawyer, is videoed holding a strip of bullets, as people around him shot the army shot him, and show a bloody leg – he appears otherwise ok

5:45        Another body is carried down the street in a blanket

6:15        A motorbike drives an injured or dead person down the street, whose leg is very bloody from an apparent gunshot wound

6:26        Video shifts to inside the Coptic Hospital, where many bodies were taken; similar or same as videos to be shown and commented on below; emotive music begins to play in background

 

Video Twenty-One: An Egyptian Soldier Brags about Killing a Maspero Protestor with a Bullet (One minute)

As an army transport bus filled with soldiers departs the Maspero area after calm is restored, they are cheered by a crowd of onlookers. One of the solders puts his head out and speaks to the crowd at 0:21. Much of what he says is not understandable, but among his words are, ‘He took a bullet in his chest’. The man appears to be bragging, and an onlooker shakes his hand and calls out, ‘You’re a man!’ The crowd claps enthusiastically.

Video Twenty-Two: Priests Declare the Army to be Infidels and Incite toward Killing Soldiers (One minute)

This video takes the reaction of priests after calm has been restored. They have strong words for what took place, declaring at 0:08, ‘This army is not Egyptian.’ At 0:15 another priest speaks, ‘We are demanding our rights, are these our rights? They are infidels. They are not Egyptians at all. They don’t have any religion.’ At 0:31 the scene shifts to demonstrators calling for the fall of the field marshal.

 

Analysis: These are very disturbing scenes. It is clear that violence escalated very rapidly. It may be that thugs entered the scene and led violence, but while there is little to absolve the majority Christian protestors of responsibility, there is little to directly identify them with blame them, either. What is clear is that many present were attacking soldiers as they found them. It is also clear many seem to be standing around, while smaller numbers commit violence.

The footage apparently depicting a priest seeking to help an injured soldier is given fuller treatment in video nine above, yet the response of the priests at the end is lamentable, if understandable in the heat of them moment. The call of the soldier from the bus may be damning; though he does not say he shot personally, nor who was shot, the implication appears to be an admission of responsibility that he killed a demonstrator. This also could come from the heat of the moment or from self-defense, but it must be understood in light of the official statement afterwards that soldiers were unarmed. Those surrounding the bus are unlikely to have been Copts, and may have been either hired thugs or Muslim residents from nearby areas. If the latter, they came either to defend the army (as explained below), or as curious witnesses to the events unfolding.

 

For the Introduction, please click here. For Part One, click here. For Part Two, click here. To read the full report in pdf, click here.

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Video Analysis of Maspero: Part Two

For the Introduction, click here. For Part One, click here.

The Beginnings of Violence

Video Six: The Coptic Protest in front of Maspero (Five minutes)

This is the best video I could find which seems to locate the outbreak of violence. There are several hundred protestors standing outside the Maspero building, and the camera is elevated and seemingly in front of the building. The Nile Cornish road is open with traffic flowing slowly, but consistently. There are police assembled on the other side of the road. Bambuser, which the service hosting this video, provides a live feed directly from event to internet, and stores it thereafter.

0:22        Following a speaker, the crowd cheers as if a normal moment in a demonstration

1:00        Camera angle widens to show traffic progressing along the Cornish

1:15        The attention of protestors is turned to the north, and they begin clapping excitedly

2:05        Chant leaders tells crowd to ‘welcome’, but the rest of the audio is inaudible

2:25        Chants of ‘Million-man, million-man’ begin among protestors[1]

2:38        It appears some protestors move into the Cornish towards the police

2:45        Attention of protestors turns to the south, and it appears the march from Shubrā has arrived

2:55        It appears another group, carrying a banner, arrives from the north

3:05        A van is able to drive very slowly toward the south, showing one lane of the Cornish still open

3:15        All protestors are turned to the west, facing the river, with raised hands chanting

3:22        It appears the police stationed across the street move forward into the demonstration, causing those in front of them to pull back slightly

3:35        The Cornish is cleared completely, showing that at first protestors filled one lane

3:55        Another contingent of police emerge from the east, apparently from near the Maspero building

4:05        The scene is filled with black clad riot police, which move in tandem to the south

4:18        The sound of gunfire begins, and all fall further back to the east, down a side street, as the police pursue

4:45        Camera flashes back to the Cornish, which has traffic flowing through

5:19        There appears to be another gathering, though unclear, to the south in the corner of the screen

Video Seven: The Army Beginning to Open Fire in Maspero (Two minutes)

This video is taken from inside the gathered crowd at Maspero. It is less clear than the first, but provides another angle on events.

0:15        Traffic is flowing on the Cornish

0:20        Some people apparently move toward the police across the Cornish

0:40        It appears that helmeted riot police stand at attention near the protestors as if making a cordon

1:07        Camera circles behind to show the Maspero building

1:19        Cries go out from the protestors with the sounds of gunfire in the background

Video Eight: Fr. Philopater, a Few Minutes before the Clashes at Maspero (Three minutes)

This video shows the approach of the march from Shubrā, now meeting up with the main protestors. They come from the south, and meet a cordon of police officers which block their way. Small altercations break out, but the video ends before anything conclusive is determined.

0:05        A pickup truck is with the approaching protestors, perhaps the same one as earlier

0:10        Some protestors are moving back away from the direction of the march

0:15        Fr. Philopater appears, waving people forward toward the direction of Maspero, someone yells, ‘Don’t move back, go forward’

0:35        The road opens up, to show a gap between assembled protestors at the front lines and others falling back a bit

0:38        Two cars move against the demonstrators, showing Cornish traffic is still nominally flowing

0:55        Side view of Fr. Philopater, still motioning protestors onward

1:10        Sounds of gunfire, direction indeterminable

1:44        Picture of man wearing purple with a plank of wood, near him is a dissembled banner from which it possibly could have came

2:00        Demonstrators find the path blocked by military police wearing helmets and with riot shields

2:11        Man wearing a white shirt kicks at police shields

2:14        Altercation between demonstrators and police, police swing batons at protestors

2:26        Protestor wearing black throwing something in the direction of the police, behind him one wearing purple does the same

Video Nine: Maspero 9 October 2011, Part One (Eleven minutes)

This video is assembled and edited, but shows a remarkable narrative from within the events beginning with the demonstration at Maspero, showing many of the above scenes (and those afterwards with APCs and general chaos) from a street-level, as-it-was-happening angle.

0:48        View of the protest at the Maspero building, with a closer angle to the front lines at the Cornish near the military police; crowd is engaged, chanting, ‘Raise your head high, you are an Egyptian’

1:00        A raised plank of wood is seen moving forward in the crowd, towards the police, but the camera turns before any outcome, if there was one

1:17        Video shows the protestors have moved into one lane of traffic on the Cornish, but not crossed to the opposite lane; APCs parked, but few soldiers immediately visible

1:22        First sound of gunfire, location unknown, then scene changes

1:25        A bit darker, but traffic still flowing, so this scene must be not long after earlier one ended; several police seen beating a protestor on the ground in the median of the Cornish

1:30        Cameraman runs away toward the south, perspective now appears to be from the side of the march; much gunfire heard

2:20        Chants of ‘Peaceful, peaceful’ emerge from protestors – same location as video from earlier, but from a different angle?

2:30        Protestors lying down in the road in a line, do not appear injured but rather making a passive protest, perhaps

3:10        Military riot policeman charging at demonstrator swinging baton violently at him

3:26        Protestor swings a whip – perhaps his belt – over his head in a threatening manner towards police, then withdraws

3:54        APC appears in motion, plows into the back of an army jeep, pushing people at front of jeep backwards

4:20        Scene in which people stand on APC and throw huge stones down on soldier inside, while others swing at him from outside with clubs, a cross; one of those on top is wearing the white martyr’s robe seen at the beginning of the Shubrā march

4:42        Great care needed here: It appears one in the crowd attacking a passing APC is wearing army fatigues and their standard red cap; he raises his baton nearer to people than the vehicle, but scene switches; he does not appear under duress nor are people attacking him, at 4:50 appears again standing around in middle of scene, and moving at 4:56

4:49        APC drives toward Maspero, appears to ‘jump’ in the street

5:00        As chaos continues, people are seen lying on the street, obviously injured but unsure of nature, though one case seems connected to the APC which just drove past

5:30        Large crowd beating on stalled APC with iron circular clubs – resembling those broken off the wall of the Foreign Ministry fence which I saw from when the sit-in was dispersed a few days earlier

5:45        Second APC speeds alongside it, plowing over many; crushed bodies seen in its wake

6:40        Police chase crowd of people down the Cornish to the south, some appear to jump into the Nile

6:50        Police retreat, people throw rocks at them, policeman throws back a cross

8:50        Priest conveying a soldier to safety as people surround and try to continue to beat him

9:43        Someone strikes at the priest and soldier from behind, not sure who he hits, but priest goes to the ground covering the soldier, crowd surrounds them there without attacking

Analysis: The protest gathering at Maspero appeared to be peaceful, but then something caused an apparent advance toward the military. It may well have been the arrival of the Shubrā demonstration march, but this is not certain. In any case, from the angle of Maspero it does not appear that the demonstrators attacked the police, rather, perhaps responding to provocation or nerves, the police charged into the protest and dismissed it forcefully. From the other direction, it appears the police had no intention to allow the demonstration from Maspero to join the already stationed protest, and cordoned it off. There is evidence of some protestors responding violently, though most people are standing around innocently.

Fr. Philopater is a controversial figure. He speaks clearly that his presence as a priest does not represent church endorsement, yet his status as a priest helps give religious legitimacy to many Coptic participants. His claim to end the procession ‘inside Maspero’ could have only been exaggerated language use for effect, though it is easy to understand its reception as a threat. Later on, as he encouraged the crowd to advance in front of the police cordon, he may have been seeking only to assert the will of the protest to join together. There is no video evidence he encouraged violence in this effort.

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) Driving along the Cornish

Video Ten: Maspero (Two minutes)

This video is taken directly from the television coverage of al-Arabiya. It shows APCs driving through the crowds, apparently seeking to disperse the protest.

0:10        APC driving along a mostly open road, with people throwing objects at it from the side

0:20        The speed of the APC can be gauged at a wider angle, and suddenly it turns 180 degrees, over the dividing median when people are standing; it does not appear anyone is struck

0:35        The APC is obviously swerving through the people, including riot police which evade its path; again, objects appear to be tossed at the vehicle

0:55        Video switches to riot police striking at protestors hiding behind parked cars

Video Eleven: CNN BBC RT: Christians Copts Genocide by Muslim Egyptian Army, Run over them with Army Tanks (One minute)

No timeline is necessary for this video, as it is a loop depicting a scene in which an APC plows through a crowd of people standing unaware, shown earlier. A group of protestors have mounted an APC stalled on the median, and are striking at it with sticks. Those standing around on the road doing nothing are hit by an APC at high speed, running over at least two.

 

Video Twelve: Most Dangerous Video showing Running Over Copts with Jeeps and APCs, and Killing with Army Bullets (Three minutes)

This video is taken from within the crowds as APCs and Army Jeeps were driving through. It demonstrates the chaos of the scene as well as the aggressive behavior of people there.

0:17        As the cameraman walks through the crowds, some begin chanting ‘Peaceful, peaceful’

0:45        An empty stationary military transport bus is being struck by people with different objects

0:55        Shots of gunfire are heard

1:00        The first APC rolls through, only a few feet from the cameraman, a second follows behind; speed of vehicles does not seem overly fast

1:15        A third APC drives across the same stretch of road along the Cornish

2:00        People seen vandalizing a parked army jeep; mix of those holding crosses or signs from the demonstration with those clearly holding clubs, sticks

2:10        Another APC drives through, as people strike at it with clubs and sticks as it goes by

2:25        Army jeep pushing another jeep forward through the crowds, second jeep veers toward the people and nearly runs someone over before stopping short

2:30        People, with both clubs and crosses, run towards the stopped vehicle rapidly as video ends abruptly

Analysis: Different pictures are presented in each video, and unfortunately chronology cannot be determined. It appears the APCs were conducting an organized mission to drive through the protestors in order to disperse them. It also is clear these APCs were met with aggression, though video suggests the drivers also meted out aggression of their own. Certainly the chaos of the scene was overwhelming and it is impossible from this footage to determine, on the one hand, if there was a policy of running over protestors, or on the other hand, if those crushed resulted accidentally from drivers who lost their nerve. Evidence can be marshaled from these videos to support either conclusion.

For the Introduction, click here. For Part One, click here. For the full report in pdf, click here.

[1] This chant emerged during the protests of the revolution, which witnessed massive gatherings in Tahrir Square. It has been repeated since, even in demonstrations significantly less than one million strong.

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Video Analysis of Maspero: Part One

On October 9, 2011 at least twenty-seven people were killed and over three hundred injured, following a largely Coptic demonstration culminating at the Egyptian Radio and TV Building at Maspero, in downtown Cairo. Clashes began at roughly 6:30pm and lasted long into the night, involving the military police, central security riot squads, demonstrators, ordinary citizens, and perhaps paid thugs.

Four main explanations have since emerged:

One Party Blaming the Other:

  • Coptic demonstrators were frustrated at recent perceived slights from the military council against their community, and at least a segment of them attacked the armed forces with stones, Molotov cocktails, and gunfire. They may also have attempted to storm and occupy the Maspero building.
  • The military council has come under increasing criticism for its handling of the democratic transition, and may even be undermining it seeking to stay in power. As such they attacked the peaceful demonstration and used State TV to blame and demonize the Copts, playing a sectarian card in order to unite the majority population behind them.

No Blame Offered for Premeditated Violence:

  •  Both military police and Coptic demonstrators were caught off guard when an unknown third party infiltrated the protest and fired on both soldiers and protestors alike. This may have been from an internal enemy, such as the remnants of the former regime or radical groups seeking to drive a wedge between the army and the people (or perhaps Christians), or external, from any number of nations wishing chaos to prevail in Egypt.
  • A series of misunderstandings and mistakes complicated and aggravated an already tense situation, in which no one is guilty of premeditated aggression but in which all parties succumbed to the use of violence and demonization.

The following report will analyze video evidence to describe what took place on the night of October 9, relying on video evidence uploaded to the internet, largely on YouTube. A few limitations must be noted:

  •  While videos have been sorted into a general timeframe, it is not possible to establish a complete sequence of events.
  • It is not possible to guarantee the integrity of these videos. Where editing or manipulation may be involved it will be noted appropriately.
  • The collection of videos followed an extensive search process, but one which cannot be described as exhaustive. Important videos may have been overlooked, and accusations exist that some videos have been removed from YouTube. This is the testimony of Hānī Labīb, managing director of the Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation, commenting on a television program on which he was a guest. The broadcast was originally on YouTube, but is now missing.

It is also the testimony of AWR executive secretary Diana Maher Ghālī, conveying the sentiment of Vivian Majdī, fiancé of Michael Mus‘ad, who was killed in the protest. Majdī told Ghālī she is in possession of videos uploaded to YouTube which have now been removed. To note, I attended two press conferences hosted by groups critical of the military council version of events, one of which included Vivian Majdī. Their videos presented did not differ significantly from the ones to follow, nor did they speak of videos being removed. If additional videos can be obtained later an update will be provided, and if readers are in possession of additional evidence they are welcome to submit it for review.

This report will not consider the evidence of written testimony, though it acknowledges its essential value. Witnesses on either side provide partial perspective, may color their testimony, or outright fabricate accounts. A full investigation must include all such evidence, weighing carefully all perspectives. Yet this report focuses only on video, which together convey images independent of explanation.

The analysis will seek to present the reader with what is visible in the videos, avoiding speculation or implications. Additional background material will be provided as necessary. It is not imagined that any of the four scenarios listed above will be confirmed through this process, but these overarching narratives will inform what follows. Links will be provided for all videos, and the reader is invited to explore the evidence on his or her own. Videos will be titled according to their original posting, and sorted into the following categories:

  • The Initial March from Shubrā
  • The Beginnings of Violence
  • Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) Driving along the Cornish
  • Scenes of General Chaos
  • Media Coverage
  • Corpses Gathered in Hospitals or Elsewhere
  • Compiled Footage

As noted above, the issue of chronology is important, and impacts especially categories three and four. This report, based on video evidence alone, leaves exact determination of instigation in these categories open for further research.

The Initial March from Shubrā

Video One: Philopater will Lead a March the Likes of which Egypt has Never Seen, which will Conclude Inside Maspero (Five minutes)

Fr. Philopater is a priest of the Coptic Orthodox Church, a member of the Maspero Youth Union, and one of the principle organizers of the demonstration. During this video he is speaking publically in church and inviting attendees to join the march the next day. Shubrā is a suburb of Cairo with a disproportionately high percentage of Christians. ‘Maspero’ is the name given to the Radio and Television Building in Cairo, which has for decades been under heavy security to prevent non-state entities from entering by force and broadcasting unofficial messages.

0:10        We love the armed forces and we love the army, since they are from us

1:15        Copts will never surrender their rights

1:30        Honor us with your presence tomorrow at Shubrā Circle at 3pm, for a march the likes of which Egypt has never seen

1:50        We will conclude our march inside Maspero

2:15        We will not be able to take our rights except with the moderate Muslims of Egypt

3:15        They say you are a minority; no, we are the majority – not as Christians, but as true Copts and moderate Muslims, against the forces of backwardness who are foreigners here in Egypt and the minority

Video Two: The Gathering of Protestors in Shubrā Circle, Demonstrating they have No Weapons and Not Even a Glass of Water (Three minutes)

This video provides a panoramic view of the protestors from their gathering point in Shubrā. Hundreds of people, including many women, are seen standing, milling about, simply waiting for the march to begin. No weapons are visible, though several people carry wooden crosses. To be noted, generally in demonstrations the chant leaders are chosen by the organizing party, and therefore their calls are sanctioned. While spontaneous chants often develop as well, anyone who deviates from the general sentiment of the crowd is shouted down.

0:50        Small chant of ‘Illegitimate’ begins among some protestors

1:22        Camera zooms on a group of protestors wearing white, with a slogan written in red saying ‘Prepared for Martyrdom’. The phrase used for ‘prepared’ is commonly found on hearses during funeral processions

2:00        The group in white marches off in a line, apparently signaling the start of the march

2:35        A chant begins calling for the downfall of the field marshal, military council head Gen. Tantāwī

Video Three: The Coptic March at Shubrā Circle (Thirteen minutes)

Despite the title locating this video at Shubrā, it is actually a compilation of several scenes from along the march route, including two interviews. All scenes appear to be free of weapons, with many women and children present.

1:00        Chanting against the military council, at one point calling ‘Dictator, dictator’

2:07        Scene switches, opening with Fr. Philopater, Fr. Mityās, and a monk walking together amidst the people

2:25        Scene switches again, the march is joined by two vehicles, among the chants are ‘The People Want the Fall of the Field Marshal’

3:27        Scene switches to an interview with Fr. Mityās, listing Coptic complaints and how they suffer attacks no one is brought to justice over, but that even sometimes, like with the Aswan governor, we are incited against; it makes us feel like this isn’t Egypt

6:00        Fr. Mityās describes demonstrations as an available and legitimate means of protest for all to express their opinions

6:34        Scene switches as the march continues under a bridge, much darker in this scene

7:40        Protestor speaking earlier in the day describing participants (Copts without Restrictions, Free Copts)

8:30        We are called a minority or a foreign entity, no we are the original inhabitants of the land

9:00        If we are not heard today after this march, we will have to study all possible, legitimate means to achieve our rights

9:20        Our demands: a committee to study the event of Marīnāb Church, arrest of all criminals in the proceedings, immediate rebuilding of the church, resignation of the Aswan governor (we will protest every day for this, and even sit-in, since he has transgressed our holy places and our possessions)

12:25     Scene switches to two more general scenes of protest and marching

(Note: Along the way, the protest march was attacked at an underpass by civilians throwing stones and glass. Footage is included in video thirty-seven, at minute 0:09.)

 

Video Four: The Reason Behind the Event of October 9 at Maspero (Two minutes)

This video features the main priests and the monk among the organizers of the march, and includes incendiary comments from the monk. His identity is unknown to AWR at this time.

0:15        Protestor chanting ‘We are the owners of this land’

0:30        What are the demands of the march? Monk answers: For the governor to give his resignation (and other demands listed above). If he doesn’t, he knows what will happen. If he doesn’t respond in 48 hours he will die a heinous death

Video Five: The Size of the March before the Clashes Clearly Showing No Weapons, as the Army had Said (Ten Minutes)

In this video the march has been underway for some time, and it is darker outside. The scene is captured by a camera filming from above on an onramp to a bridge. It appears to be right next to the Hilton Hotel leading into the Nile Cornish a few hundred meters from Maspero. If correct, this video leads directly into the clashes to be described below. Many women and children are present. Some of those clothed in white are at the front, which is very sparse at the opening.

1:38        A lone man is seen with a plank of wood using it as a walking stick

1:50        Another person seems to have a similar plank of wood, and nearby is another with a stick

2:25        Another person appears to be carrying a plank of wood, walking along the wall by himself

3:04        Another person is walking with a stick

3:50        Chant of ‘Kyrie Eleison’ (Lord have mercy) begins, an oft repeated hymn in church

4:20        Another person is visible to the left of the screen using a walking stick

4:45        Chant of ‘Raise your Head High, You’re a Copt’ begins

4:50        Two people waive objects above their heads during the chanting

5:25        A pickup truck drives down the procession with people aboard chanting the Lord’s Prayer

6:00        The procession begins to get much denser, showing the extent of the size of demonstration

6:45        The chant of ‘Illegitimate’ begins

Analysis: The march was very large, included women and children, and appeared to be peaceful at every stage along its path. Protestors were very frustrated with the current situation, and many chants were against the military council. The vast majority was certainly without weapons, though many carried crosses; though unclear it does seem that a few in the procession had planks or sticks which could be used violently.

Note: To download the full report in pdf, please click here. For  Part Two, click here.
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Video Analysis of Maspero: Introduction

October 9 witnessed riots in Cairo that led to the death of at least twenty-seven people and the injury of over 300, mostly from Egypt’s Coptic Christian community. The conflict followed a peaceful march from the neighborhood of Shubra, with its high percentage of Coptic residents, to the Radio and TV Building in Maspero, which has become the location of choice for Coptic protests following the revolution. Early on in the coverage state media announced Coptic protestors had assaulted the army assigned to guard the Maspero building with stones, Molotov cocktails, and live ammunition, killing at least three. Yet when the dust had settled nearly all dead were Copts, with many witnesses laying blame upon the military for the entire event. Since then, speculation has posited the presence of a third party which may have set the two sides upon each other. The investigation is still ongoing, undertaken by the military prosecution.

This report does not seek to answer fully the ultimate question of responsibility, yet it treats in detail one of the main sources of evidence: Video testimony. Uploaded to YouTube are accounts filmed by eyewitnesses, television channels, and State TV. In all, this report has collected thirty-seven videos, beginning with initial march from Shubra, the onset of violence, the ensuing chaos, media coverage, and ending with images of the dead bodies strewn across the floor. A link for each video is provided, and minute-by-minute commentary explains the scene.

Simple analysis will accompany each section of videos, with a final assessment of video evidence provided at the end. Though presumably a transparent rendering of events, video is limited in establishing final judgment, if only because not all evidence is filmed. Eyewitness testimony and forensic reports must also be granted a hearing, which is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, the text places the events before its readers, allowing them their independent evaluation.

Yet it is hoped as well this effort will establish a common ground of analysis in what has become fiercely divided ground of controversy. Individual videos, in isolation, threaten to distort the overall picture, which otherwise could be exploited to serve a partisan narrative. It is not a question of seeking ‘balance’ or equal guilt; when twenty-seven people die justice is demanded. Rather, it is an effort to place all video evidence possible before the public view. As tensions are already enflamed, the situation needs sober judgment; the truth will come out of its own accord. This report is intended as a contribution – for the sake of justice, and the sake of Egypt. These are difficult times; may the nation know peace.

For Part One, please click here. For the full report in pdf, click here.

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Coptic Iconography: From the Pharaonic Age to the Arab Spring

Magdy William is one of the world’s premier Coptic iconographers, having studied under the renowned reviver of the long neglected art, Isaac Fanous. William discussed his craft, its history, and spiritual impact during an exhibition hosted by St. John’s Episcopal Church in Maadi, Cairo, on October 21, 2011, under the sponsorship of Rev. Paul-Gordon Chandler. Jessica Wright served as curator for over fifty commissioned pieces, and provided translation for William’s presentation, entitled ‘The Making of Coptic Icons’. The event was part of ‘The Eternal Eye’, an exhibition desiring a new Egyptian society, which honors all its religious diversity. Bishop Daniel, bishop of Maadi and assistant to His Holiness Shenouda III, pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church, opened the event.

Rev. Chandler, Bishop Daniel, and Magdy William

There is a direct connection, William states, between Coptic icons – indeed all icons – and the artistic heritage of Egyptian Pharaohs. When a Pharaoh died, his portrait was drawn and placed on his sarcophagus to lead his spirit back to his body at the resurrection. The portrait was idealized, imagining his appearance at age 25 – the prime of life, but intended to be faithful in representation. So also do Coptic icons not seek to be a realistic picture of a saint, but to convey his spiritual reality to both teach and impact the viewer.

Production of icons also mirrors its Pharaonic history. Only natural pigments are employed, to preserve color for thousands of years as witnessed in the pyramids and royal tombs. William first prepares a piece of wood to use as the base, covering it with gelatin and then a cotton cloth. After an initial twenty-four hours he removes the cloth along with any excess, and reapplies the hot gelatin mixture. He repeats this process ten times over five days to smooth it properly for application.

Thereafter William applies a thin gold leaf over the wood, and adds first the darker colors. To this broad lines are added shaping the landscape for where lighter colors are added. A black outline then completes the picture to highlight distinction, and a final varnish covers the icon for preservation. It is a detailed process, and William is a perfectionist.

Jessica Wright, curator and translator

Early Christians in Egypt, like elsewhere, often worshipped in tombs, caves, or secret places, but drew their holy images upon the walls. Icons developed, at least in part, as a way to make their images mobile should their worship locations be discovered. Demonstrating continuity of culture, Egyptian Christians imitated the style and production of their heritage, and exported the use of icons throughout the Christian world.

This process came to an abrupt halt after the 6th Century when icons came under fire as idolatry, and many were burned as the art declined in Egypt. Elsewhere, however, Christian emperors became great sponsors of iconography, as Byzantium and Russia developed their own distinct styles. Yet except for a revival during the Fatimid period, Egyptian iconography stagnated until the 18th Century.

During this time Egypt produced only poor quality icons, as local rulers and patrons sponsored art and architecture from within their religious traditions, drawing the best artists away from the church. Seeking to outfit their community the Coptic Orthodox Church recruited Armenian iconographers, who produced worthy material on Egyptian soil.

This arrangement continued until 1965, when Pope Cyril sent Isaac Fanous to study iconography from a Russian living in Paris. He received a PhD, as well as a blessing from the Russian, who told him we received this tradition from you, and now we give it back. Returning to Egypt, Fanous revived indigenous Egyptian iconography, founding the neo-Coptic school, which William joined in 1986.

At the time William was an artist of a different sort; he created the templates for promotional movie posters, which were then mass distributed. He credits his wife for helping him turn to art of a more spiritual variety, which he called a transformation.

William was keen to impress that Copts do not worship their icons, which serve to remind of the person or event depicted. It is a lesson, recalling Biblical tales or stories of the saints, which among millions of illiterate Egyptians impart the values and knowledge of divine history. But it is more than a lesson; it is communion. Copts believe the spirits of the saints are present in prayer, drawing the believer into a wider fellowship. This is one reason icons are prominent in Orthodox churches, and many Copts set up a prayer corner with an icon in their homes.

Stories abound as well of the intercession of the saints being multiplied as an icon is contemplated, resulting in miracles of healing or fertility. Some icons are celebrated as having cried tears, which drip from their painted eyes. Such miracles happen around the world, not just in Egypt, William asserts, and is due to the choice of God, having nothing to do with the skill of the iconographer.

An exhibition attendee, contemplating an icon of St. Macarious

Today, many in the Western Christian world have turned their eye to the East, seeking additional sources of spirituality which ring with authenticity and history in a material and disjointed age. Stories of miracles may cause these sons of the Enlightenment to pause, but for Copts they are simply the continuation of the faith, for which God has worked miracles through his saints throughout the ages.

Regardless, the continuity of history is source of great comfort for Copts, especially in this current age, as Egypt and Egyptian Christians are facing an unknown future. Many fear the worst, worrying that sectarianism, even persecution, could be on the horizon.

If so, icons are a worthy reminder of God’s ultimate triumph. What are St. George, St. Mina, and even Jesus, but martyrs of earlier ages? Yet their icons are serene, reflecting the idealized portrait of their eternal restoration. The Coptic Orthodox Church is a martyrs’ church, from whose blood the seed of faith has sprouted. If Copts today fear, then a greater contemplation of their artistic heritage is recommended.

Icons are a tool to aid in connecting with the divine, and divine comfort and rebuke vary from age to age and from person to person. Magdy William is only one in a long chain of men who assist others in their path to God. Though his rendition of each saint varies slightly from the next, the eternal eye binds them as humanity, universalizing the individual, placing him in the divine story and spiritual reality of God. God’s means are many, yet the icon is there for all who wish to enter in.

 

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Arab West Report Aslan Media Middle East Published Articles

Clashes, Deaths at Coptic Protest in Maspero

Scene from the Violen Dispersal of the Protest

Egyptian State TV confirms 23 dead and over 170 injured in clashes between largely Coptic protestors, unknown assailants, and Egyptian military police on October 9, 2011. Protestors began their march from the heavily Christian neighborhood of Shubra at 5pm, culminating at the Egyptian Radio and TV Building in Maspero in downtown Cairo. The peaceful march was scheduled to end at 8pm, but was attacked at various stages along the route by unknown opposition.

I received word of the protest earlier in the day. Having witnessed the Coptic attempt at a sit-in at Maspero five days earlier, which was eventually dispersed by the army, I wished again to get a sense for the manner in which Copts were expressing their grievances. These largely centered on the burning of a purported church in the village of Marinab, in Edfu, in the Aswan governorate on September 30. Many Copts believe the interim government to be lax in protecting their community and securing equality of citizenship; what is certain is that a lack of security throughout the country has led to abuses.

I arrived by metro to Tahrir Square near Maspero at 7pm. Coming up from the underground I received a phone call from a colleague asking if I was on my way, and to be careful, as a protestor had been shot. Stunned by her statement, I immediately noticed the tension in the air as the metro entrance area was surrounded by Egyptians – many of them presumably Copts from lack of head coverings – pale, and in shock. Many had tears in their eyes. Shortly thereafter I did as well.

This group stated with vehemence they had been attacked by the army, emphasizing it was the army, and not simple thugs. People had been shot and armored vehicles had run over protestors as they swerved through the crowd. Some claimed there were snipers. Confusion reigned, and it was hard to know what was happening.

Only a few minutes later a group of protestors marched by where I was standing on their way to Tahrir Square. They were carrying what appeared to be dead body, chanting against Field Marshal Muhammad Tantawi, head of the ruling military council. I saw no signs of blood, but the body was inert.

I moved northward along the side of the Egyptian Museum toward Abdel Munim Riyadh Square, site of a major bus station. Hundreds of Egyptians were milling about, simply watching events unfold. From a distance I could see clashes between protestors and police taking place on the 6 October Bridge, both sides throwing rocks back and forth.

Ahead of me at an intersection of the Cornish Road along the Nile River several protestors were angrily destroying stop lights and street signs. A scuffle broke out around a taxi – it seemed two people were simply fighting to get in and drive away. Several of those standing around carried planks in their hands. Others carried crosses. The former were presumably informal members of ‘neighborhood committees’ which had been formed after the revolution to combat looting. The latter were presumably remnants of the protest, now scattered about.

One of these latter was an older gentleman from the church I attend in Maadi, Cairo. He was livid, but despondent. ‘Let the whole country get enflamed,’ he said. ‘It will serve them right. Do you see what is happening! They are killing us!’ I tried to comfort, and remind. ‘No, remember your faith. Let love hold in your heart. Copts must now be peacemakers.’ It was of little use, as we stood and watched another clash take place on the bridge. Comfort was better. I put my arm around him and cried. ‘I’m sorry for what is taking place. God protect Egypt.’ A moment later a stranger noticed me and asked if I was a foreigner. ‘Why are you here?’ he demanded. I kept quiet, said I was only watching, and moved away.

It should be noted that although I use the word ‘protestors’ throughout the text, it was impossible to tell Muslim from Christian, protestor from bystander from ‘thug’. Who was committing violence, and who was suffering it, was impossible to say.

This fact makes interpretation of events near impossible as well. A phone call to my wife allowed me to receive updates from the news and Twitter. Reports were conflicting. Wildly different numbers of dead were being reported, from two or three to thirty or fifty. Furthermore, there were reports that army personnel were also killed. Some said that Christians had machine guns. Others reported that State TV announced the army was under attack, and urged Egyptians to come into the streets to defend it. The largely activist and liberal Twitter community understood that official media was blaming the protestors for what happened, saying that they fired first.

I cannot say the truth of what took place, for I arrived no more than fifteen minutes or so late to the scene, and was never in a front line position. Yet before too long an acquaintance from the Maspero Youth Union recognized me and gave me his version of events. He stated there were 10,000 Copts and Muslim supporters in the march from Shubra, which was met with violence when their path was blocked. He blamed thugs sent by the army, but also that people were pelting them with rocks and glass from apartment buildings along the road. Eventually, they were able to proceed again. He insisted the group did not plan for a sit-in, but was ready to disperse freely at 8pm. Upon arrival at Maspero, however, the army began attacking immediately, he maintained. People were shot in the head, and others were run over by military vehicles. I discovered later that one member of the Maspero Youth Union, Michael Mossad, was among those killed.

As he was relating events tear gas was fired on the bridge, and he left to go check in on events. From time to time waves of protestors fell back, and gradually security regained control of the area, pushing everyone back toward the direction of Tahrir Square. Suddenly a fire engine sped through the area and was pelted by rocks as it went by. Whether or not this caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle, it swerved, hopped over the central median, struck one or two people along the way, and crashed into a street light. Waves of protestors then descended upon it, but I could not tell if they were beating the driver or pulling him from the wreck. Several climbed on top and began vandalizing. A car fire raged shortly thereafter on the other side of the street.

Contrary to media reports, however, I did not witness ‘clashes’ in Abdel Munim Riyadh Square between protestors and others. There was much tension, sounds of occasional gunfire, and tear gas lobbed throughout the area, but I never witnessed actual fighting except at a distance. The area is large, however, so I am hopeful if it took place I was stationed in the safer locations.

Contrary to other media reports, I did not witness large reactionary protests in Tahrir Square. Egyptians were all over, and at times small bands of protestors would march and chant slogans against the military council. Yet when I was present there was certainly not a mass gathering in response to what took place. I wandered a bit more throughout the area, before leaving to go home around 9pm.

As news continues to unfold there will be much to confirm amidst the rumors. There are reports the military entered media offices preventing transmission of live feeds. There are reports of clashes outside the Coptic Hospital where many injured are being treated. There are reports liquor stores – owned by Christians – are being attacked downtown. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf has called for an emergency cabinet meeting tomorrow, and has posted on his Facebook page:

What took place was not a confrontation between Muslims and Christians but an attempt to create chaos and ignite sectarian sedition, which is not fitting for the children of the nation who were and will remain ‘one hand’ against the powers of destruction and extremism. Application of the law is the ideal solution for all of Egypt’s problems. I urge all children of the nation who are keen for its future not to answer those who call for sectarian sedition. This is a fire which will consume us all, without distinction.

These are wise words. May they prove true especially now and in the days to come. God protect Egypt.

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Published on Aslan Media: An American Perspective on the Culture of Conspiracy through the Lens of Sinai

The Sinai peninsula and the present day Israel...
The Sinai Peninsula

In the last day or two I had my first text published by a source outside of Arab West Report. Aslan Media is a new media project from Reza Aslan, an author of several books on Islam such as ‘No God but God’ (read and enjoyed) and ‘How to Win a Cosmic War’ (hope to read soon). The following text was featured on the front page, but has now moved to the sidebar. Click here for the direct link.

 

As an American, I am used to politics being partisan and even at times vitriolic, but all agree on the rules of the game and the validity of the constitutional system. Moreover, though political opponents criticize their adversaries as being servants of particular agendas, these cries generally do not descend into the realm of conspiracy. Yes, some on the Left believe there is a theocratic effort to take over government, and some on the Right find liberal secular humanism on the prowl to destroy traditional values. Yet on the whole the mantra proves true: Politics is the art of compromise. Following their vitriol, most American politicians do just that, and Americans appreciate it.

In contrast, the American resident in Egypt – if he or she pays attention to local politics – finds the culture awash in conspiracies. Worse, many of them are directed at his or her home shores. The tendency is to be dismissive; it is the response of a paralyzed people seeking to blame others for their problems, and a government actively encouraging the paranoia. Yet as a respected Egyptian journalist friend has said, with experience on both sides of the Mediterranean, foreign hands have been playing in Egypt for centuries. A palpable paranoia is fueled by reality.

The odd thing as an American is that the longer you live here with an open heart to the people, the more the culture of conspiracy can take hold. There are a thousand applications to choose from, but of particular recent concern is the development of threats in the Sinai. Here is found a regional Holy Grail of conspiracy, at the intersection of Israel, Camp David, the ruling Egyptian military council, and Islamic terrorism.

The story in brief is that Palestinian terrorists crossed into southern Israel from Gaza through the demilitarized Sinai, and killed a number of Israeli citizens during an attack on the port city of Eliat. Israel quickly targeted those it accused of responsibility with military retribution, for which Hamas unleashed heretofore largely suspended rocket fire into Israel, until a ceasefire was brokered. Meanwhile Israel also pursued fleeing Palestinians into Sinai, and several Egyptian officers were killed in the process.

Prior to this tragedy Islamist forces in Egypt conducted a massive rally in Tahrir Square and elsewhere to demand an Islamic government. In the Sinai city of Arish that evening armed bandits purporting to be Islamists attacked the local police stations, engaging in a several hour long firefight with authorities. They allegedly identified themselves as al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, seeking the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the territory. The presence of al-Qaeda in Egypt had been long denied by the government, and was rejected once more. Yet the armed forces in the days to come cooperated with Israel to allow the movement of military personnel into the peninsula – as required by the Camp David Accords – in an effort to clamp down on armed groups. This mission was pursued more urgently following the terrorist attack on Eliat.

During the Egyptian revolution it is said that several prisons were opened, and jailbreaks took place in others. A large number of these escapees remain at large, and it is reasonable to assume many have sought refuge in Sinai. With Camp David regulations limiting military presence, as well as a restive Bedouin population long frustrated with government neglect and resistant to government authority, Sinai has a reputation as a lawless frontier. Furthermore, when police stations were attacked during the revolution the weapons cache was opened. Unrest in Libya has also reportedly contributed to a dramatic increase in arms availability in Egypt. Many neighborhoods have witnessed violence in family feuds, gang activity, or attacks on police. While still small in scale, these incidents forebode what may be an emerging crisis in the Sinai, especially as the doctor of Osama bin Laden, also an explosives expert, has been allegedly identified in the territory.

Or, it is a crisis at all? This is where the power of conspiracy threatens to take over. From the Israeli side the benefits of a crisis are many. Israel has suffered widespread social protests over housing costs this summer. Israel faces a dramatic challenge to its Palestinian policy as the issue of statehood is prepared for submission to the United Nations. One can wonder also if Israel was not averse to testing the nascent Egyptian military authority, to see which way its domestic winds might influence commitment to its international agreements. More wildly, might preparations be underway to retake the Sinai to establish security, or dump responsibility for Gaza onto Egypt, or expand Gaza at Sinai’s expense, or else craft Sinai anew as an independent buffer state?

Conspiracy can take aim at the ruling military council as well. While still overwhelmingly popular with average Egyptians, it has come under severe criticism by revolutionary forces for its handling of the transition to democracy. Reuniting the people against the common enemy of Israel could diffuse attention to these complaints. Moreover, could the specter of terrorism in the Sinai lead to restoration of full Egyptian sovereignty over the territory, through amending the Camp David Accords with Israel? More wildly, might greater Egyptian control of the Sinai pave the way for the threatened million man marches from Cairo to Jerusalem, in support of Palestinian independence, or even eventual Islamist government hostility against Israel?

This is the nature of conspiracy, to delve further and further into the extreme. Conspiracy is built on explanation without information, striving to make sense of confusing events in an absence of transparency. Yet who can deny that the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others exercise influence over Egypt’s affairs? Do recent events represent an attempt to escape from this influence, or a confirmation thereof?

Whether or not Israel intended this as a test for the military council, it has quickly become one. Popular protests quickly surrounded the Israeli Embassy, and were allowed to continue several days. Mixed messages have been sent about recalling the Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv. Calls for a joint investigation into the incident have been issued, may have been rebuffed, but are still open. Meanwhile the government is erecting a wall around the building housing the Israeli Embassy, to provide further protection in case of need. Many Egyptian parties and politicians are calling for a harsher response, especially following the example of Turkey. Is the military council treading nimbly between the niceties of diplomatic language and the fury of popular demands? It is too early to tell. After all, it was a full year between the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza, and the now enacted diplomatic rift between Israel and Turkey. The test is still underway, and its results may be long in coming.

For the American living here such conspiracy musings may be entertaining, but they can summon great passion from involved Egyptians. To make clear, the label of ‘conspiracy’ is dismissive and degrading, reflecting a subtle superiority of ethnocentric origin. Of greater concern, to both Americans resident and Egyptians permanent, is the direction of the story toward greater instability. Al-Qaeda or not, weapons are proliferating, and extremist movements are (likely) in the Sinai. Increased tension between Israel and Egypt can as easily lead to war as to greater mutual respect and sovereignty. Conspiracies of invention and play acting for the benefit of domestic distraction are possible, but could also become self-fulfilling prophecies. Egypt is a peaceful nation; it is likely to remain so. These trends, however, are worrisome.

As to the culture of conspiracy, orientalist bias or not, the world is not the same as it was at America’s independence. George Washington warned of foreign entanglements, and succeeding presidencies set the nation on a path of isolation from European politics keeping the colonial powers from interfering in the Americas. It is questionable if this is even a possibility for Egypt today. To hint back at conspiracy, is it even possible in America?

If hope can be found, it is in the establishment of transparent institutions of democratic governance. People must rule, and be able to hold their elected representation accountable. The military council has promised to hand over authority to a civilian government, and this process is still underway. Though a million conspiracies posit why this will not happen, it is yet within the power of Egyptians to see the process through. As one American who still believes in the reality of our independence, I wish the same for Egypt. May she win for her people such an honorable right.

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Arab West Report Middle East Published Articles

Burning the Church Dome: AWR Investigations in Edfu

The Church Structure in Mari-Nab, Edfu

On Friday, September 30, 2011 a structure purporting to be a church was attacked and destroyed in the village of Mari-Nab, near Edfu, in the governorate of Aswan. Since then there has been much confusion in the media about what took place. Arab West Report editor-in-chief Cornelis Hulsman traveled to the village with Lamis Yahya, a researcher in Coptic affairs, and conducted interviews with Muslim and Christian residents, along with security. This report represents his notes taken and telephoned back to Cairo. A full report will be forthcoming following further research.

Mari-Nab is a large village with a population of over 50,000, but with a very small Christian presence. Muslim testimony estimated no more than 30 Christians in the whole village, while Christian testimony varied from between 30-50 families. Testimony from security personnel estimated 70 Christian people. Christians, along with the church-in-question, all reside in the same area of the village along the banks of the Nile.

The attacked structure used to be the home of the now deceased Muawwad Yusuf, who bequeathed it to his son who is no longer resident in the village. Muslims presented official documents stating the building to be a residence (manzil) and apartment (shiqqa), while Christians presented official documents stating its approval as a church. Christians also offered photos prior to the attack demonstrating the inside of the building functioned as a church, but from the outside there were no signs of distinctive church architecture. Arab West Report obtained copies of all documents and will proceed to investigate further.

The incident developed, it appears, from Christian efforts to modify the external architecture, specifically, by adding domes to the roof of the structure. Fr. Salib, deputy to Bishop Hedra of the Bishopric of Aswan, is responsible for the oversight of Edfu and its villages. He stated negotiations concerning the building have been going on for months, and that Christians have sought to be very accommodating. Christians agreed, for example, not to display any crosses on the building, but Fr. Salib complained that Muslim demands grew more and more strident. Construction of the domes proceeded, beginning during the Muslim month of Ramadan (August 2011).

Following Friday prayers Muslim youths descended on the church and began to destroy the domes. Christian testimony puts their number at around 3000, while security estimated around 1000 youths. Christians provided pictures and video evidence of the attack. Initial Muslim testimony denied these youths to be from the village, claiming they had come from elsewhere. Security sources disagreed, stating they were indeed village youth, and this was corroborated by Sheikh Habib, imam of a mosque in Mari-Nab.

Sheikh Habib, however, denied the youth acted upon instructions of the mosque or village elders. It was noted, though, he appeared to suffer little regret about the destruction.

Both Muslim and Christian testimony relates there has been an absence of government in the village. Cornelis Hulsman confirmed related visual evidence observed in his taxi ride to the village from Edfu, noting there were no checkpoints along the way, as is typical in Upper Egypt.

When the attack proceeded security arrived but stood around the church and allowed the destruction. The head of the security, a general, stated he did not have enough personnel to put a stop to the youths, and he appeared agitated he was required to come for intervention in this area. He felt it was below his status to sit outside Christian houses in a village. Fire engines also did not appear on the scene to douse the flames consuming the building.

There are some reports of damage to Christian properties within the village of Mari-Nab, though the indication is that the Muslim action targeted the church alone. Though restricted in his movements, Hulsman offered his camera to a local Christian to photograph other acts of aggression. Much was inconclusive. One shopkeeper brought evidence that his kiosk/small grocery had been vandalized, but it had not been burned. One Christian complained about the destruction of over 2000 mango trees, but photographs depicted damage against a small, newly planted area. Fr. Salib believed the mango accusation to be an exaggeration. Certainly it is possible that in the melee some youths extended their attack to Christian properties, but it was clear that if they intended to target the entire Christian community the damage would have been far more extensive.

By Friday evening Muslims and Christians came together in a traditional reconciliation session. They agreed, ostensibly, to return to the status quo in the village. This meant that Christian worship could continue in the building, but that the structure should maintain its anonymous appearance. Nevertheless, the purported ‘agreement’ did not hold much weight with Christians, as Fr. Salib later called a lawyer to inquire about legal procedures necessary to affect the desired changes.

Both Muslim and Christian testimony relates that relations between the two groups had been good prior to this incident, but other evidence reveals tensions and discontent. Hulsman met with a Muslim sheikh who referred to local Christians as infidels (kufara’), though such application was rejected by Sheikh Habib. Meanwhile in their ordinary discourse Christians were calling local Muslims ‘arab, signaling their status as Bedouins and not true Egyptians. Similarly, Muslims called local Christians ‘foreigners’ (khawaga), a term often applied to non-Egyptians resident in the country. By observation, Hulsman found both Muslims and Christians to be farmers, traders, and local businessmen, identical in all but religious identity.

Christians were very eager to speak with Hulsman, relating they were afraid and feel they are being targeted by Muslims. They spoke of persecution, though evidence was limited to the restrictions in their ability to build a church. Several inquired about how to emigrate and live abroad.

Muslims denied the above charges, but stated openly they did not want the church in their village, as it would change village identity. They complained also about how Coptic expatriates represent religious affairs in their nation.

The village of Mari-Nab is located 4km away from the nearest formal church building. Village Christians are visited by Fr. Makarious, who is responsible to serve surrounding villages on an itinerant basis.

Many media responses to this incident blamed the attack on ‘Salafis’. In his inquiries, Hulsman found some Muslims politically to favor the Muslim Brotherhood as the best option available. Other Muslims confessed to be Sufis, understood generally as a particularly inclusive and tolerant interpretation of Islam. Residents denied any local representation for the Nour Party, a recently created political party of Salafi orientation. Hulsman found Muslims of the village to be traditional, and certainly conservative. He did not find this attack to be ‘Salafi’, however, in any shape currently advanced in popular media discourse.

All the same, the incident is worrisome, regardless of the original and official license of the building in question. The Arab West Report investigation will continue, with significant questions remaining:

  • Why were local Christians insistent on transforming the external structure of the building?
  • Was this strictly a local initiative or from the greater diocese or church hierarchy?
  • What impact did the lack of security presence have on Christians to begin construction of the domes without community agreement? What impact did it have on the Muslim decision to aggressively end their efforts?
  • What pushed the Muslim youths to gather and attack the structure, on this particular occasion?
  • Was there encouragement, either direct or indirect, from village or religious leadership? Was there influence from outside the area, or Salafi trends in general, such as through satellite television?
  • Where is the mosque of Sheikh Habib located in reference to the church? Are other mosques in closer proximity? From which mosques did the youths exit?
  • What are the details of the reconciliation session, and why did Christians agree to its terms?

The final report will seek to include as much perspective on these questions as possible. For context about this type of incident please review a 2009-10 AWR investigation into a similar attack on a building/church in Ezbet Bushra, near Beni Suef. It is anticipated the final report will also seek to draw conclusions and posit recommendations in the aftermath of the attack.

For now, it will suffice to pose a question to each religious community. For Christians, will you win a church but lose its people? Though it may be possible to legally secure a formal church in the village, will the eventual result be increased tensions, greater emigration, and loss of Christian identity in Upper Egypt?

For Muslims, will you deny a church but scar a people? Though intimidation may be able to limit outward Christian identity, will the end result be social fragmentation, domestic and international approbation, and loss of Islam’s reputation as a tolerant religion in Egypt?

This is a challenging time in Egypt, wisdom is needed on all sides. Wisdom, however, is best built on solid information. It is hoped that continued investigations will illuminate the facts in Mari-Nab, so that agendas on any side are not inappropriately advanced.

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Middle East

Erdogan in Egypt: Teenage Turkey Tests Her Limits

Erdogan with his image of prominence, popularity

I had the opportunity to witness the keynote address of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on September 13. Beginning a tour of Arab Spring nations, he met with military, political, and business leaders in Cairo, and then spoke generally to the nation from the historic Opera House, in a session hosted by Cairo University. The following are a few highlights from his speech, concluding with some personal observations:

  • For a lecture scheduled to begin at 4pm, Erdogan began speaking at 6:45pm. Attendees had been asked to arrive no later than 3pm for security.
  • The audience chanted continually during the speech, lauding Erdogan for his regional politics.
  • Erdogan praised Egypt and her revolution, as well as historic Egyptian-Turkish ‘sisterhood’.
  • A devout Muslim, Erdogan laced his speech with Quranic references, though in a different setting he praised the virtues of a ‘secular’ state which values religion.
  • He believed the spirit of liberation in the Arab world was spreading to America and Europe to sensitize the whole world against injustice.
  • Turkey and the Arab world will dismiss orientalist myths that the region cannot support democracy or strong economies.
  • In a nod to protestor concerns and as a prod to military leadership, Erdogan stated the coming elections should be held according to a set schedule.
  • Erdogan highlighted the dramatic increase in trade between Turkey and Egypt, and pledged it would only increase further in the future.
  • He declared that Egypt is Turkey’s key to Africa, just as Turkey is Egypt’s key to Europe.
  • Erdogan spoke of his efforts to get Syrian President Assad to reform, but stated he can no longer trust him in his pledges.
  • Alarmingly and surprisingly, Erdogan predicted that Syria will now face sectarian problems, which are played upon by foreign forces.
  • He stated that the illegitimate policies of Israel are the biggest obstacle to peace in the region, especially in her disregard for international law.
  • Erdogan prompted the greatest applause when he reiterated Turkey’s diplomatic efforts against Israel will continue until an apology is received for Turkish deaths aboard last year’s flotilla.
  • He also condemned as illegitimate the deaths of Egyptian officers in an Israeli raid across the Sinai border; he also offered his condolences to their families.
  • He expressed hope the Israeli people would realize their settlements are illegitimate, and that they are leading the nation into difficulties.
  • Erdogan pledged to hold Israeli leaders accountable while expressing he bore no ill will against the Israeli citizen, who like all must be respected on account of their creator.
  • He promised to always stand side by side with Palestine, hoping for an independent state in the framework of the United Nations.
  • Erdogan counseled the United States to reconsider its stance toward Palestinian statehood, to better accord with traditional concerns of justice in American foreign policy.
  • He believed Fatah and Hamas needed to keep from being divided and to love each other.
  • Erdogan predicted the Egyptian economy would rebound after elections, and promised that Turkey would stand by Egypt’s side forever.
  • Erdogan closed by announcing he cannot forget, and will never forget, what was accomplished in Tahrir Square.
Erdogan addressing the crowd

I have few strong opinions on Turkey. The nation has done well to craft for itself a strong economy and independent foreign policy. All is not perfect, of course: Turkey has major problems with her Kurdish minority, and human rights organizations complain about a lack of journalistic freedom and other issues. The Armenian massacre and the division of Cyprus are long unresolved issues still staining Turkish public image. Yet there is little denying the accomplishments of her democracy as well as her emergence from supervisory military rule.

I wonder, however, if Turkey in recent weeks has become like a teenager in an adult body seeking to assert his newfound power. Sometimes bravado is found right, as in Turkey’s early calls for Mubarak to heed the will of protestors. Sometimes bravado is found empty, as in Turkish impotence to stand up to Syria. Sometimes bravado takes on unwise enemies, as in Turkey’s threat to freeze EU relations if the presidency – assigned by rotation – is awarded to Cyprus. And sometimes bravado can be for its own sake, as in Turkey’s increased tension with Israel.

To be sure, Turkey’s diplomatic row with Israel is a matter of principle. Turkey opposes the Gaza blockade and the illegal settlements in the West Bank. Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli commandos in international waters, no matter how much provocation may have been directed at the soldiers. Yet the feeling is that Turkey’s response to Israel is measured and calculated. Is Turkey using her Israel policy to enhance her regional power?

Certainly Turkey is placing Israel in a no win situation. An apology conveys guilt, and admission of guilt can precede liability. Israel’s soldiers, though the initiators of overt hostility (as opposed to the symbolic hostility of breaking the blockade), were severely attacked. No nation will sell out its military to appease a demanding neighbor, unless her soldiers were clearly at fault (which remains disputed, of course).

Yet Turkey’s announcement of downgrading diplomatic relations came immediately on the heels of Egyptian outrage at her military leadership for failing to take a hard line with Israel following the death of her officers in a cross-border Israeli military raid. Turkey had already been lauded by many liberals and Islamists alike as a possible model for democratic transition. Shortly thereafter the Arab Spring diplomatic tour begins.

Beyond rhetoric, the main substantial element of this tour is the promotion of business. This seems shrewd. While the West and the IMF offer loans and the Gulf States offer cash influx, Turkey seeks job creation. It remains to be seen how much capital remains in Turkish hands, but this is the appropriate action of a growing economy, and may well serve to buttress Egypt’s economic needs as well. Is there more behind the courtship, however?

Though Egyptian populism celebrated Erdogan’s arrival, political leaders – both liberal and Islamist – were more cautious. Despite claims to historic ‘sisterhood’, Arab-Turk relations have not always been rosy. Is Turkey carpet-bagging on Arab Spring gains?

It remains to be seen if the Turkish teenager is ready for adulthood. Turkey has been an ally to the West, while maintaining relationships with Syrian and Iran. She has been an Islamic model, while maintaining relationships with Israel. Turkey’s efforts to craft a ‘Zero Problems’ foreign policy are coming apart at the seams, but this could simply be the teenager outgrowing his clothes (after significant muscle flexing).

Can Turkey stand as an independent actor on the world’s stage? Can she continue to risk offenses against entrenched Western positions? Is Turkey too big for her britches, or has she reached geopolitical maturity? Perhaps like a teenager, the only way to know is to test her limits.

 

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Storming the Israeli Embassy in Cairo: The Greater Context

Breaking down the barrier outside the embassy

Seven months since the beginning of the Egyptian revolution, the nation is still in the process of democratic transition, and the focus of the world has greatly receded. Yesterday, September 9, could threaten to draw back the world’s eye, and possibly serve to confirm many misgivings held about the readiness of Egypt for democracy. It would be a mistake to judge so simply; hopefully this context will fill in the gaps over recent events.

On a superficial level the actions of Egyptian protestors to storm the Israeli Embassy has parallels to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. One narrative current is that just as the Iranian protests began as a liberal movement only to be overwhelmed by extremist religious forces, the Egyptian revolution may bear a similar fate. While this is still an open possibility, feared by many both within Egypt and abroad, yesterday’s events do not reinforce this narrative.

The Israeli Embassy is located at the top of an Egyptian highrise apartment surrounding by like buildings in the Cairo neighborhood of Giza, along a major thoroughfare. Protests at the embassy have been frequent since the departure of Mubarak, but have always remained peaceful, though vitriolic. On an earlier occasion several months ago protests were dismissed forcefully by security personnel.

The most recent surge in anger against Israel, however, began three weeks ago following the death of five Egyptian border guards in Sinai, at the hands of the Israeli military. That day Israel suffered a horrible terrorist attack, believed conducted by militants from Gaza who crossed into Israel through the demilitarized Sinai border. In pursuit of these criminals Israel crossed the Egyptian border in violation of the Camp David Accords, and killed the Egyptian officers accidentally in the process. Israel issued a statement of ‘great regret’ at their deaths, but stopped short of issuing an official apology. They have also resisted Egyptian calls to conduct a joint investigation.

For several days afterwards protestors gathered at the Embassy, chanting for the expulsion of the ambassador. One protestor even scaled the building to its roof and replaced the Israeli flag with an Egyptian one. This breach of diplomatic protocol was celebrated widely, with ‘Flagman’ (punning off Spiderman) receiving the gift of an apartment from the Giza governor. It was clear that on this occasion the people were allowed to vent their anger. On the diplomatic front, however, the government issued equivocal statements, drawing the frustration of the people. After a few days the protests subsided, and security forces cleared the area of the few remaining protestors.

A few days later the Egyptian government contracted to build a wall in front of the Israeli Embassy, stating it was meant to protect residents of the area from any future demonstrations. ‘Egypt above all’ was written prominently across its face, but it is difficult to imagine the wall being received as anything other than a provocation – resembling the security fence/apartheid wall in Israel/the West Bank, depending on perspective. Yet a scheduled protest at the wall a few days ago fell flat, drawing only tens of demonstrators.

In the final days of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of fasting in which protests largely subsided, a call was issued for a major demonstration on September 9, labeled ‘The Friday of Correcting the Path’. Its main demand was to put an end to the military trial of civilians, but also included a call for a clear timetable to transfer power to civilian rule, judicial independence, and further purging state institutions of former regime figures. Though Islamist political forces had earlier spoken out forcefully against the military trial of civilians, their largest representatives boycotted this protest, opting instead to not put additional pressure on the ruling military council. The day of the protest between 10-35,000 demonstrators descended on Tahrir Square. These were mostly liberal groups and youthful revolutionaries, whose numbers, though impressive, did not measure up to the numerical strength of earlier protests. Instead of concentrating solely at Tahrir Square, however, bands dispersed for separate protests at the Interior Ministry, the People’s Assembly, the Radio and Television Building – and the Israeli Embassy.

Ever since forcibly dismissing a sit-in protest at Tahrir Square on August 1, which had lasted three weeks and prevented all traffic from accessing this major hub, the security forces had occupied the central garden area of Tahrir and prevented all protests from accessing the area. The government relented, however, to allow the September 9 protest, but warned they would be responsible for their own security, and the police withdrew from the area, as well as from other major government institutions. At the Interior Ministry, for example, protestors were able to draw graffiti on the walls and remove the official insignia, while security restrained itself behind the walls.

In addition to the liberal and youth demonstrators, however, there was a surprise participant in the protests – soccer hooligans. The three largest teams in the Egyptian division each have their own groups of rowdy followers, who often clash with each other as well as the police. These groups had contributed greatly to the Egyptian revolution, providing discipline and organization – along with the Muslim Brotherhood – when their demonstrations came under attack. Since then, however, they have returned to soccer.

A few days before September 9 there was a relatively minor soccer match involving one of these squads, at the end of which the hooligans began chanting slogans against the police and the now incarcerated former minister of the interior. It is not clear if the provocation was also physical, but the police thereafter rushed into the crowd and began beating the hooligans. Nearly a hundred people on both sides suffered injuries, and the hooligans vowed revenge after several of their group were arrested.

This event rallied the three different groups of hooligans together, who descended united to Tahrir Square. This swelled the numbers and vibrancy of the protest, but also de-dignified it, as they spent the day chanting curses against the police. Yet for the most part, however, they and the other protestors exercised restraint, with one group even issuing a public declaration it withdrew from the protest at the end of the day, to shield itself should violence occur later from unknown ‘thugs’. This hooligan group had split off from the main demonstration in Tahrir to protest directly at the Ministry of Interior.

A second group, however, went to the Israeli Embassy. They and many others carried hammers, seeking to destroy the recently erected wall. Numbers swelled as Egyptians, frustrated by the response of the government to the border killings, compared the sharp rise in condemnation issued to Israel by Turkey, in response to the death of its citizens on board last year’s Freedom Flotilla. It took several hours to demolish the wall, as protestors cheered and encouraged joyously. Some even repeated the action of Flagman, and lowered the Israeli flag once again.

Around this time a group of unknown protestors, numbering about 100, rushed into the building housing the embassy and ascended the floors, breaking into at least part of the upper complex. They then proceeded to hurl documents to the crowd below, seemingly seeking a Wikileaks-type moment. About an hour later, security arrived en masse and bombarded the area with tear gas. Street fighting erupted thereafter throughout the night, injuring around 1000 and killing three.

Israel’s response was swift. The recently returned ambassador – not at the embassy – evacuated Cairo with his family and staff. Israel issued a statement asking for the United States to help secure the embassy – clearly a slap in the face to the Egyptian government. It denied that protestors had entered the embassy and had only apprehended pamphlets. Israeli sources also state the Egyptian government conducted an emergency raid to free six people inside the embassy. I have not seen confirmation of this from the Egyptian side, but neighboring residents interviewed stated the embassy was empty, and had been for the last three weeks. A friend connected with the US Embassy in Cairo stated, however, that it was fully conceivable personnel could be in the embassy at such an odd time over the weekend.

In the days to come more facts will emerge. For now it is hoped this greater context will demonstrate the dissimilarity to the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979. First and foremost, this was the action of either liberal activists, soccer hooligans, or, as many revolutionaries have accused in like incidents over the past several months, ‘thugs’ working on behalf of the former regime to stir up trouble and ruin the reputation of the Egyptian revolution. It was not done by Islamic extremists, who were wholly absent from the day’s protest. Most Egyptians find the politics of the Israeli government reprehensible in their treatment of the Palestinian issue. Large numbers oppose the peace treaty, and not a few would apply their approbation on the Jews as a whole. The storming of the embassy, however, had more to do with the work of a small minority, and the aftermath was a battle with security, reminding many of its severity under the Mubarak regime.

At the same time, it should be recognized that many Egyptians hold no ill will toward Jews, and have no desire to enter into war with Israel. Almost none would defend the policies of Israel, and most would have the treaty adjusted. The masses were enthused following the revolution that Egyptian foreign policy might more closely follow the popular will. Yet harboring conviction that ‘peace with Israel’ was largely imposed on Egypt from abroad through the grip of Mubarak, six months since his departure Egyptians find they still have no voice on this issue. It is not that Egyptians wish a rush to war; they desire instead a reflection of sovereignty.

Yet some do call for a semblance of war in terms of a peaceful march on Jerusalem, ready to die as martyrs by the millions. While this tends toward being an extreme Islamic position, ratcheting up rhetoric against Israel is an easy populist political play. The storming of the embassy was a shameful act. While most Egyptians condemned the action, many were eager to compare its lack of real damage with the blockade of Gaza, expanding settlements, and other breaches of international law issuing real suffering on Palestinians, for which there is less world outrage.

By all accounts Egyptians should act from respect for diplomatic laws and agreements. There is far too much dismissive anti-Israeli sentiment on the street, reflective of abject rejection of this enemy. September 9, however, was not the first step toward the anti-Western takeover of the revolution. It was either a reaction driven by frustration of impotence on the Israeli issue, or a counterrevolutionary measure to contrast with the ‘stability’ of the previous regime. More than likely both factors are in play, besides others.

It is a worrisome sign, by all accounts. If the Israeli Embassy can be violated, then what about other embassies, institutions, or places of worship? Many people note that the term ‘revolution’ is a misnomer for the experience of Egypt. Revolutions are violent, conducted by people with insatiable ambition, frustration, or hunger. Such ambition may exist among Islamists, but their conduct has been generally wise and prudent. Such frustration exists among liberals and the youth, and their frustration has amplified in the transitional period. Such hunger exists among much of the lower and working classes.

Too much should not be made of these possibilities. Storming the Israeli Embassy, though incredibly foolish and illegal, was not particularly violent. Egyptians are not a violent people by nature, as has been confirmed a hundred times over during the last half year. The outcome of the ‘revolution’ is still an open matter, and progress is needed toward the promised democracy. What is needed now on the part of the West is not a knee-jerk reaction to events, but continued support for a democratic transition. This may well produce anti-Western or anti-Israeli policies. Yet it will also produce sovereignty; that its government might be of, by, and for the people. This is what the Egyptian people desire. They do not desire Iran.

For a sample prayer about these matters, click here. Please note it was written before the embassy was actually stormed.

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Africa Arab West Report Middle East Published Articles

Early Warning and Early Response Training in Cairo and Alexandria

Imam Mohamed Ashafa describing Alternative Dispute Resolution

Disagreements abound in every society. Properly handled, they result in consensus, healthy competition, and increased understanding between diverse groups. Improperly handled, they result in tension, conflict, and civil discord. If religious overtones come to characterize the disagreements, the effect can be even more troublesome. This negative description came to characterize relations in Nigeria, in which Muslims and Christians descended into rioting and violence in response to claimed affronts, both material and religious. Yet within this environment two leaders, Imam Mohamed Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye, were able to overcome their own differences, forgive each other, and work together for peace.

While the Nigerian reality does not resemble the situation in Egypt, Ashafa and Wuye have developed techniques useful in addressing disagreements in any society. Beyond the power of their personal testimony – Wuye had his right hand chopped off in militia fighting, while Ashafa’s spiritual teacher was murdered by such militias – they are able to enter diverse locations, share the tools of their peacemaking efforts, and leave practical application to the nation’s citizens. Disagreements exist in Egypt, as they exist everywhere. It is the hope of Ashafa and Wuye that Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) Training will prevent disagreements in Egypt from deteriorating into outright conflict.

It is in this spirit that the Center for Arab West Understanding, an Egyptian NGO, invited Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye to conduct two workshops in Egypt, in collaboration with Initiatives of Change in the UK and its Egyptian sister organization, the Moral Rearmament Association. The first workshop was in Alexandria, June 13-14, hosted by the Alexandria Intercultural Dialogue Committee. The second workshop was in Cairo, June 15-16, hosted by the Center for Arab-West Understanding and the Goethe Institute. Over sixty people received training at these locations.

Introduction

Ashafa and Wuye repeated the same training course in both Alexandria and Cairo. They began with a description of alternative dispute resolution stages, seeking to emphasize the need for Early Warning and Early Response in effort to head off the more damaging stages as conflict escalates. They then proceeded to describe Conflict Mapping Tools, which are useful in breaking down a disagreement into manageable parts which divest it of the emotional fervor so often preventing understanding and agreement. Along these lines, they helped each person gauge his or her readiness to participate in the process through self-evaluation along different Levels of Identity and the Ladder of Tolerance.

Ashafa and Wuye then moved directly into the concept of Early Warning and Early Response, describing it as a systematic collection and categorization of social indicators, in order to anticipate and prevent escalation of problems. They spoke of the Cyclone of Conflict, describing why it is best to intervene early. They also encouraged efforts to engender EWER, to include all segments of society. They led participants in outlining the structures of EWER unique to Egypt, and concluded by getting participants to self-organize into an EWER Committee. Each of their training techniques will be described below.

Following the summary of their presentation will be examples of interaction the participants had with the ideas of EWER as presented by Ashafa and Wuye. In both questions and breakout groups Egyptian applications were sought by those in attendance. Finally, to close the report, testimonials from the participants will be listed, highlighting the chief gains and areas for improvement for any coming workshops.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

The importance of an Early Warning and Early Response system is clear when one considers the natural progression of conflict. Initially, all disagreements are dealt with in the communication stage, in which matters are discussed rationally and on friendly terms. Only slightly more complicating is the collaboration stage, in which parties admit the presence of an issue to solve together, and then seek win-win scenarios all can agree to willingly.

If this effort breaks down, parties enter the negotiation stage. At this level things are still friendly, but now each side must consider what must be given up in order to reach an agreement. Win-win is still a possibility, but in all likelihood it involves some loss.

Should the losses become unbearable, the next stage involves mediation. The disputants call on the assistance of a mutually acceptable third party to help them work through the issue. If necessary, this can develop into a hybrid mediation/arbitration stage, in which the parties agree to be bound by his or her decision. While this may solve the issue, should the ruling fail to satisfy one or both parties, they enter into strict arbitration in a court of law. Should that ruling fail to suffice, litigation/adjudication takes over as both sides hire lawyers to represent their interests. By now they are a long way from friendly communication and collaboration.

Unfortunately, there are stages of devolution still possible. If the court ruling fails to bring agreement, parties may seek their interest through violence or, even worse, war [this last stage does not apply to Egypt as Egypt has never entered that stage] Violence often results in neighboring parties leveling sanction against the disputants, in order to end the conflict, but which also humiliates and possibly impoverishes the two sides.

At this level, with all possible resolution strategies exhausted, the only option is for the two parties to be forced back all the way to the beginning: They must communicate. This fact reveals the near futility of ratcheting up the pressure to secure one’s interest; while solution can be found at any level, at each step more and more control is lost over the proceedings. Furthermore, more and more damage is done to the relationship between the two parties.

With this schema in mind, parties to a disagreement will realize the great importance of solving their issues in the early stages of communication and collaboration. Having now received Early Warning and Early Response training, those walking alongside them can help them to see this likely progression. By itself, it may encourage all parties to peace.

Tools for Mapping Conflict

Once the necessity of alternative dispute resolution is understood, tools are needed to move the disagreement from the level of emotion to the level of analysis. What is the issue, and what is at stake? Ashafa and Wuye led participants through four analysis methods: the Onion, the ABC Triangle, the Carpet, and the Circles.

The Onion

In order to get to the center of an onion, layer after layer must be pulled back, and the operation can be somewhat unpleasant and tear-inducing. Similarly, most problems are not immediately apparent at first glance, and there can be resistance to digging deeper.

The first level of the issue is a person’s position. This seems straightforward, but it masks the real issues. This layer must be peeled back, so that a person’s interest is revealed. Why does the individual or party state their position so? What interest are they pursuing? Even this level is not sufficient for conflict resolution, however; the essential need must be discovered. If an issue can be reduced to one’s interpretation of legitimate need, communication now proceeds on the basis of reality, not propaganda. When the need of each one is similarly identified and discussed, solutions become possible.

The ABC Triangle

The three parts of the triangle are labeled attitude, behavior, and context. The usual first look into a disagreement finds attitudes entrenched and behaviors counterproductive. Efforts to change either of these – though of worthy intention – will not succeed long term. Instead, context is at the head of this interconnected triangle. If change can be brought to the context of the issue, then the behavior of the disputants will change as well. Similarly, once behavior begins to change, hostile attitudes will also begin to give way. The key point for EWER is a matter of perspective. Resist the temptation to judge a situation by the attitudes and behavior of those involved. Analyze the context of the issue, and the others will more readily fall into place.

The Carpet

The picture of a carpet illustrates how various parties of a dispute interact. In the center of the carpet is the issue at hand, and the two disputants sit opposite each other, close to the issue. Conflict, however, is usually not isolated between two parties; others come alongside to support or oppose, with some relation to the issue in the center, though a bit farther removed from it. What drives this interaction?

Along the thread line that connects each party to the issue should be noted the interests, fears, and needs of each participant. Such analysis again serves to de-emotionalize a disagreement, but also is useful to judge the involvement of parties in alignment with the main disputants. As such mapping provides clarity to the reality underneath appearances, finding solutions becomes less difficult.

The Circles

Drawing circles is a method to connect and illustrate the various relationships amidst a disagreement. The manner of drawing signals the nature of relationship. Each circle represents a person or party, and a line between them designates a relationship exists.

The larger the circle size, the more power is held by the party encircled. An arrow between two circles illustrates the direction this power is exercised. Meanwhile, a zig-zag line signals conflict exists between the two parties, whereas a double line represents an alliance. If the line between is dotted, this shows a weak relationship, and for all lines, if an issue exists between the two parties, it is written in a box connecting the two circles.

A circle drawn with dotted lines indicates the presence of a ‘shadow’. A shadow party is not actually there in the field of the dispute, but influences surrounding relationships all the same. These can have great effect on the outcome, but can easily fail to be identified if the analysis is not objective.

Drawing circles, in addition to the other tools mentioned above, allow for all parties to achieve a description of the disagreement in terms as objective as possible. As they communicate their findings with each other, discoveries are sure to occur revealing differences of perspective. Yet within the effort to depict reality, a basis is created for finding the essential solutions that meet the needs of all involved.

Essential Self-Analysis

These tools are useless, however, in the hands of an unprepared craftsman. Yes, they can be utilized in order to help conflicting sides come to terms. But what about the bias of the to-be peacemaker employing EWER? He or she must first self-reckon on two levels. First, what is his or her understanding of self-identity, from which help is offered to others in navigating theirs? Second, what level of tolerance or intolerance does he or she harbor? Many times disagreements escalate due to conflicts in identity; without self-analysis the peacemaker may trip up.

The Levels of Identity

Ashafa and Wuye explained that the human identity is a fluid amalgamation of several relationships. Everyone negotiates these differently, and manages them according to circumstances and context. Yet if one gets stuck or overemphasizes a particular aspect of identity, it can cause conflict with the self or with others. While the order to be described should not be held as hard and fast, generally speaking, as one moves up the levels, he or she becomes better equipped to negotiate all of them.

The most basic and essential level of identity is family. One’s identity then expands to include tribe/language groupings, in which the individual moves about comfortably. Then comes the larger community group of a particular area, taking greater geographical scope in nation. In these labels it is clear to see how one conducts relationships of peace in wider and wider comfort zones, the more one’s overall identity expands.

The next levels of identity are gender, race, and profession. These bonds help one to further traverse barriers in identity, as a woman might easily take refuge in another woman, no matter the national differences. Professional bonds can do similarly. Yet while race as an identity marker can also help one broaden relational ties, it and others below can be found to divide and separate, rather than unite.

For this, the last two levels represent higher planes: Humanity and spirituality. To the degree that individuals see each other as fellow humans, rather than through defining and limiting lower identities, they are able to build bonds of peace. Spiritual identity, grounded in the paths of the great religions, also help to overcome lesser identities, uniting the individual beyond the material human nature into the fabric of the cosmos. It is at these levels the EWER peacemaker does best to ground his or her identity, granting patience for those worked with as they negotiate their essential identity level.

The Ladder of Tolerance

The Ladder of Tolerance asks the individual to consider his relation vis-à-vis the other, however defined. The relationship can issue from the fear of the unknown, driving attitudes and behavior downward toward intolerance. At a basic level this issues forth rejection, but can increase in severity producing oppression, dehumanization, murder, and genocide.

It is not likely the participants at the conference suffer from placement on the intolerant side of the ladder, but depending on the other in question, a review of their positive tolerance level is beneficial. First and foremost, an open posture toward the other results in examination of differences. As one ascends the ladder he or she is able to welcome the place of the other in acceptance. Still higher develops the posture of learning from the other, with the differences in question.

More difficult to achieve, however, is the valuing of the other. At this level one’s self identity can be challenged, threatening the comfort zone of associations lower than that of humanity. The peak step in the ladder culminates in celebration of the other, especially of all commonalities discovered. It is here that solutions to disagreement are all the easier to achieve. Getting there, however, requires work and vigilance, both internal to self and external in society.

Early Warning and Early Response

As mentioned above, Early Warning and Early Response is a systematic collection and categorization of social indicators, in order to anticipate and prevent escalation of problems. Escalation can be visually depicted through a cyclone, as early effects do not appear severe, but widens in scope and severity until all are aware of the problem. The most essential work, therefore, is to be done at the pre-conflict stage when the cyclone has not yet developed. This work can be thankless, as few people at this stage are even aware of a problem. Yet it is vital; once the cyclonic conflict is underway, many people look to help but the damage has already been done.

Ashafa and Wuye also encouraged participants to involve all segments of society into the effort to head off conflict before it explodes. Specifically, this means deliberately enrolling women in the effort. Women often suffer the most in times of conflict, and have great influence on their families, especially the young, to curb emotional, destructive tendencies. But it also means creative thinking to involve other groups as well; Wuye, having lost his hand, emphasized the role of the handicapped in keeping conflict at bay.

The Structures of EWER

Ashafa and Wuye led the participants through sessions in which they discussed their local context, trying to put their fingers on indicators that could potentially lead to conflict. The brainstorming was useful to get people thinking, but it led into a basic question: From where do you obtain your information, and to whom do you pass it on? Ashafa and Wuye emphasized the success of Early Warning and Early Response depends upon contact with sources of information, as well as contact with sources of authority. EWER is an effort to connect the two – to be a social middleman in the management of conflict.

Early Warning

The following is very basic, but unless one thinks deliberately to connect with sources of information, he or she will likely overlook vital indicators. Where does one hear about possible troubles to come? Here is the assembled list of participants: Media, the street, church and mosque, social clubs, NGOs, schools, previous research, taxi drivers, family meetings, cafés, cybercafés, public transportation, work, market, on the beach, restaurants, hospitals, conferences, jokes, the street, foreign media, posters/flyers/pamphlets, family meetings, friends, markets, SMS messages, advertising, cultural centers, and professional syndicates.

While it may be difficult for any one person to monitor all these outlets of information, this demonstrates that EWER must be a group effort. More will be described about this below, but Ashafa and Wuye emphasized that those concerned to be on the watch for early warnings of conflict must have sources in all these areas. Together, it is not difficult, for these are all normal facets of everyday life. The key is simply being connected.

As an important aside, Ashafa and Wuye also took the time to address the difference between EWER and intelligence gathering. They emphasized that intelligence is the realm of spies who work in secret, on the behest of the state and its security. EWER, however, is done openly by volunteers who work in conjunction with the state for the security of society. While there are lines not to be crossed, assurances were given this work is not illegal, especially if reported properly, as described next.

Early Response

Similarly, a list of viable outlets to inform amidst signs of conflict is also basic. While the ordinary citizen has little power or authority to curb negative indicators, he or she is connected to several community organs which do possess influence and strength. Participants listed the following possibilities: Community leaders, government, NGOs, journalists, religious leaders, God, colleagues, courts/lawyers, teachers, lobbying groups, policy makers, political leaders, specialist institutes, media, activists, businessmen, social media groups, syndicate bodies, famous people, tribal/family heads, and parents.

Again, few people can maintain active contact with such a diverse group. What is essential is that those concerned with EWER group together, comparing sources on who knows which authority. In combination, all of these groups can be covered, and must be renewed in contact at least once a month.

Thus, when trouble emerges, rumors are heard, or palpitations are sensed on the street, EWER volunteers will seek intervention through the appropriate channel. Choosing the correct channel is important, so that the one informed actually has influence to rectify a situation. If the problem is urgent then obviously all concerned citizens will contact police to pacify the situation. It is the not-quite-right scenario, however, which activates EWER in its formal sense, described next.

Central and Subcommittees

Those committed to EWER must move beyond the plane of individual awareness. Though the tools provided produce a conscientious citizen, he or she can do little alone. Instead, Ashafa and Wuye sought to give participants a group identity, asking them to divide into subcommittees from which they can monitor developments in their community.

Three subcommittees were suggested: Youth, women, and political/religious. Participants signed up based on their interest and preference, but with an eye toward their area of influence. What circles do you already inhabit, and what contacts do you already have?

Once these subcommittees become active, they should choose among their members to designate a few for participation also in the central committee. The central committee can be of variable makeup – five, seven, eleven members, etc. – but is tasked with the decision making authority for the EWER team. It is the central committee which should convey any early warning to authorities, assisting them in taking the necessary early response.

Each subcommittee is tasked with finding the spark which can ignite a fire in its community, and to put it out before damage is done. These should be people already involved on the ground, who know how to feel the ebb and flow on the street. They should be connected to local community and religious leaders, so as to be able to act quickly in times of budding tension.

Conversely, the central committee should be composed of individuals with credibility, leadership, responsibility, and experience. They should have developed contacts with higher level authority figures, to help bridge the gap that often exists between administration and the street. Information, strategy, and creative solutions should flow frequently between the subcommittees and the central committee, but decisive and official communication must be delivered by the central committee leaders.

By the conclusion of the two workshops participants were excited about their potential roles in the EWER effort. Leadership and continuity, however, were left for later development. CAWU will first submit the report of the workshop to the ruling Supreme Military Council, and will coordinate any future planning under the auspices of the proper authorities. A foundation, however, has been laid among the now-trained participants; it is for them, as concerned Egyptian citizens, to continue and enroll others in the process.

Attendees listening attentively

Egyptian Interactions

Throughout the workshops Ashafa and Wuye encouraged participants to ask questions and respond creatively to the material based on their Egyptian context. Early on they were asked about the concept of Early Warning and Early Response, and what this meant to them. Several aspects were given, both in terms of tremors that could be sensed early on, as well as structural issues requiring efforts at reform.

In terms of early warning signs, participants mentioned the presence of extremists in an area, rumors, and manipulative teaching coming from places of worship. Broader issues included poverty, unemployment, discrimination, draconian laws, lack of security, lack of transparency, and a lack of social justice. Given the latter, the early warning signs become more critical, and necessitate action.

Participants also interacted with Ashafa and Wuye over two well known Egyptian religious issues: mixed marriages and conversion. Concerning mixed marriages, they counseled simply to obey the dictates of religion, which cannot be changed, and which encourage husband and wife to be of the same faith. They did give an example from Nigeria, however, which illustrates how they worked through a tense situation.

A Christian woman married a Muslim man and converted to his religion, and they lived in peace with neighbors all their life. At the woman’s death, however, a dispute arose whether to bury her in the Muslim burial plot, as per her religion, or the Christian burial plot back in her original village, as per her tribal affiliation. The woman’s tribal family demanded the body, and Muslims of the area were also prepared to fight for it.

The issue was heated especially in that Muslim rites call for a burial within twenty-four hours, but negotiation could not resolve the issue that quickly. Ashafa and Wuye invoked the Muslim law of necessity, postponing burial until harmony could be achieved, given that the body will rest until the Day of Resurrection. In the end, after two days, an agreement was crafted to allow the tribal family its burial customs, but to also allow respect to the woman’s chosen faith, and have Muslims perform Islamic burial rites there. This decision was accepted by all, and a potential crisis was averted.

In terms of conversion, participants mentioned that especially sensitive in Egypt is the movement of a Christian into Islam. Applying the principles learned in the workshop, the Alexandria delegation decided they should divide the city into different regions, and seek wise Muslims and Christians in each who are non-political and accepted by the majority. For the neighborhood in question, then, whenever a rumor surfaces about a conversion, they wise leaders must be informed, and investigate together. Regardless of the details, they then must speak publically into the rumor, to disarm it, and promote peaceful solutions acceptable to the community.

Ashafa and Wuye allowed time during the workshop for the participants to divide into groups and discuss issues and possible EWER solutions. They were asked to especially consider Egypt as they knew it in their local environments.

One group considered the presence of a religious extremist in an area, disseminating hateful teachings. The solution was to be able to inform mainstream religious leaders about this quickly, so they could formally denounce and religiously counter such thought. Then, the media should be employed so that these moderate voices receive primacy in contradistinction to the extremist preacher, who gets discredited.

Another group considered a situation in which a threat is issued against a place of worship. Should even a rumor about this be heard, residents should quickly be assembled to create a popular committee to protect it, while security forces are contacted to also be on alert.

A third group referenced the recent trend in which some Christians have placed the sign of a fish – an ancient Christian symbol – on their cars as an expression of religious identity. They then related that some Muslims have responded by placing a shark sticker on their vehicles. While no violence has been committed, it is a worrisome sign of increased division.

This group recommended that NGOs be utilized to advance peace education, hoping to counter the drifting apart of communities. They also promoted the government use of reconciliation committees headed by recognized religious leaders, following incidents of tension. This latter solution, however, was not accepted by all, as some believe this practice only contributes to the sectarian issues of Egypt, by setting aside the rule of law necessary to punish infractions.

Another topic of discussion concerned how to work with extremist elements of society. Ashafa and Wuye spoke of two possibilities. In the first, the extremist leader is motivated by greed and/or power. In this situation there is not much that can be done with the leader himself, but instead they go to his followers, and educate them about how they are being used. They have also made local monitoring groups, so as evidence is gained about his ill motivation, it can be exposed to the people.

In the case of an extremist in sincere ideology, however, they do not move away from him. Instead, they stay in dialogue, admitting that intra-religious peace is often harder to craft than inter-religious peace. Ashafa and Wuye have been criticized as traitors by their respective religious communities, or else as compromisers who benefit from funding from the West. The majority, though silent, believes they are doing the right thing.

Another participant noted Wuye’s artificial right hand, suffered in clashes with Muslims, and wanted to know what Wuye would do if he met that individual. Wuye stated he had no idea who cut off his hand, given that the clashes were mob violence, but that if he were to meet him, he would forgive him. He stated that earlier he had hate, but that God changed him, and now he would seek to love that individual – excessive love is the means to disarm an enemy.

Along similar lines Ashafa sought to answer the best way to deal with your enemy. He stated that he no longer had enemies in this world, only friends he has yet to meet. To adopt this attitude you must break the barriers of fear and insecurity, but the best way to defeat an enemy is to turn him into a friend.

A particularly astute participant, in a different context, gave practical application to these ideas. He recommended that following any sectarian conflict, efforts should be made cross-religiously to visit the victims of violence. Others spoke positively of the Family House initiative, which aims to bring together the heads of Egypt’s various religious communities. Some, however, emphasized while love and dialogue are good, it is the rule of law and better education which must be cornerstone for diffusing interreligious tensions.

Conclusion

Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye have been successful in implementing such techniques in communities throughout Nigeria and other countries, and in some areas have curbed violence almost entirely. As they and the participants of the two workshops emphasized, Nigeria is not Egypt. Yet it should be clear from the description of the training that these are location-neutral tools which can be applied regardless of context.

Egypt has witnessed community tension since the revolution; given the breakdown of security provision it is not surprising some disagreements have sparked wider conflict. This situation helps explain the great usefulness behind EWER as a community based strategy. Egyptians have already grouped themselves into popular neighborhood communities during the revolution to protect their homes and properties. If marshaled and trained, this same spirit can provide increasing levels of cushion to keep both ordinary disagreements and targeted bigotry from escalating and dividing the citizenry. It can be a safety valve to keep authorities aware of the situation on the ground, but yet find solutions before they must become actively involved.

EWER is a tool to keep the community peace. If effective, its necessity will never be noticed. If absent, its necessity may become painfully obvious. EWER is only one tool among many, yet it is hoped the principles therein may become successfully translated to address perfectly the needs of Egypt. Nigeria is like Egypt, and like nations everywhere, in that they are filled with ordinary people, with ordinary disagreements. Though circumstances differ, the solution is common: Community cooperation keeps disagreements from becoming divisions. Early Warning and Early Response encourages this reality.

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Africa Arab West Report Middle East Published Articles Reconciliation

On Nigeria and Egypt: An Interview with the Imam and the Pastor

The Imam and the Pastor

The Imam and the Pastor, Mohamed Ashafa and James Wuye, are a Nigerian Muslim and Christian who have worked tirelessly for the sake of peace and reconciliation between their countrymen. Formerly bitter enemies in armed conflict, in which Wuye lost his hand and Ashafa’s spiritual mentor was murdered, they have now forgiven each other.  Furthermore, they use both their personal example and their Early Warning and Early Response monitoring system to limit the escalation of violence, as is sadly common in Nigeria.

Though their focus is at home, the Imam and the Pastor have traveled the world, helping to solve conflict and spread their message abroad. It was in this effort they were invited to Egypt by the Center for Arab West Understanding (CAWU), presenting two workshops in Alexandria and Cairo.

During the Alexandria workshop they were interviewed by Salwa Uthman of Alexandria Magazine, at which CAWU was also present. The following records an important glimpse into Nigerian society, the origins of conflict, and their view on the state of Egypt, post-revolution.

Alexandria Magazine: Please give us an overview of Muslim-Christian conflict in Nigeria.

Wuye: During the 1980s the Israeli-Palestinian conflict greatly affected Nigeria, especially in the schools. This trend was amplified by religious leaders who would misrepresent their holy books, which then encouraged people to descend into conflict.

Recently, politicians have appropriated religion into their campaigns, asking people to elect them on the basis of their religious affiliation. Relations have been damaged, to the extent that over 100,000 people have lost their lives in this misunderstanding of religion. Most of these deaths have been among the poor.

AM: How did you get to know each other? Is it unusual for a Muslim and a Christian to cooperate in this way?

Wuye: It may be we are the only people in the world who used to fight each other but now are friends and work together for peace.

In 1995 we were both invited by the governor of our region to participate in a children’s immunization project sponsored by UNICEF. While there, a journalist who knew of our stories away from violence brought us together, made us to grasp hands, and encouraged us to work together for peace. At this point we began talking to each other.

AM: What is your view of sectarian conflict in Egypt?

Ashafa: To speak of Nigeria first: Our founding fathers were Muslims and Christians who worked together to build the nation, but a hurt developed between the colonialist British and the Muslims in the north. There, an Islamic system had been in place for centuries, but the colonialists replaced this with an English system.

Muslims then split into three groups. Some rejected the British queen altogether and moved to Sudan. Others separated themselves from the system and isolated from government contact. The third group decided to join the government and seek to use it to reestablish the glories of Islam.

Unfortunately, the colonial government employed this third group to exploit the non-Muslim populations in the south, using them as tax collectors. These animist peoples eventually became Christians and developed animosity toward the Muslims.

These pains have remained since Nigerian independence, and all problems can quickly take on religious dimensions. It is not unusual for a small conflict to develop into a big issue.

This colonial heritage is shared between Nigeria and Egypt. In Egypt, Muslims and Christians have lived together for centuries, but recently the relationship has been getting sour, as we saw in Imbaba.

Your problems are minor compared to ours, but we have seen our problems explode, and we don’t want to see your problems degenerate as ours have done. Overall, we are very proud of Egypt. Behind us, you are the 2nd most populous country in Africa.

AM: How do you describe your work, and why did you set it up?

Wuye: Our work is non-governmental, non-political, and focused on civil society. We set it up for three reasons: First, to prevent conflict from happening. Second, to mediate between those in conflict. Third, to build bridges and encourage forgiveness.

We do work with the government at the grassroots level if requested to help solve community problems. But we do not work for the government.

AM: Do you have support from the government?

Wuye: Moral support, yes. Financial support, no.

Ashafa: In terms of the community, people are divided. Some think that we betray each other’s particular religious group. Others believe we are compromisers, and benefit from the support of the West. Most people, though, the silent majority, believe we are doing the right thing.

AM: What is your organizational structure?

Wuye: We are composed only of Nigerians, aiming to be equal in number between Muslims and Christians. In our headquarters we are fourteen people, seven and seven. We have at least one Muslim and one Christian volunteer in 36 of the Nigerian states.

Ashafa: We also have worked in Sudan, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Burundi, South Africa, Bosnia, and Iraq. We have also presented our story in many other nations.

AM: What is the concept of religion in Nigeria?

Ashafa: According to the BBC World study in February 2003, Nigeria is the most religious nation in the world. And according to the Bettleman Foundation study in 2007, it has an 82% rating on religious sensitivity. Among the traditional Muslim and Christian communities in Nigeria are emerging Salafi and evangelical trends.

It is not possible to say that religion in Nigeria is moderate, since our great religious sensitivity can lead easily to explosions of violence, especially in the north. But, it is not proper to call it extremist either, though we do have radical movements that name themselves after Gaza, Kandahar, and the like.

AM: What word do you have for Muslims and Christians in Egypt?

Wuye: We know you are for peace. We watched during your revolution as Muslims and Christians protected each other during times of prayer. Continue this relation. God bless Egypt.

Ashafa: Egypt is the hope of the Arab world. You are going through a democratic process – make sure it is non-violent. We are proud of Egypt, and hope you can consolidate your gains in the September elections.

 

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A Muslim Clears a Path through Prayers

Friday Prayers in a neighborhood of Cairo (not from this story)

Friday in Egypt is the day for Muslim prayers, which throughout Islamic history have been a communal event. Around midday the faithful flock to the neighborhood mosque, listen to a sermon, and perform their prayers.

Over the last few decades in Egypt this communal event has spilled out into the street, as Muslims unfurl their prayer rugs and close off the area to traffic for about an hour. In one explanation, this is due to the increasing number of Muslim participants. In another, this is due to the desire of many to assert their religious identity on the fabric of society. In a third, it is the preferred practice to pray in the open air, according to Sunni traditions. But it is a well established pattern and causes little social disruption.

That is, unless in you are driving during the hour when the time of prayer is approaching.

Sherry Ramzy lives in the Cairo isle of Manial enveloped within the Nile River. Out and about on Friday she was passing by the local mosque, as the street was beginning to fill with worshippers.

Hesitant to brave the crowd but already committed in her path, Sherry followed the lead of the taxi driver in front of her, who moved through carefully, but successfully.

As she trailed him, however, the taxi driver stopped to get out and pray, and a donkey cart with vegetables for sale crossed the road and set up shop, blocking the remaining small opening through the mass of people. Before too long, Sherry was surrounded. Meanwhile, the lady with the donkey cart began shouting, “She saw the prayers were beginning, she should have stopped!”

A sense of panic began to settle in. Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt are generally calm, but as the religious identity of both communities has increased, tensions have sometimes developed. Sherry is one who believes prevailing Christian and Muslim attitudes toward each other is too negative. Nevertheless, as a Christian out of place, possibly disturbing a holy Muslim moment, she began to fear. At the very least she faced sitting locked in her car for the next hour. At the worst, she could become a spark that aroused Muslim anger. Helplessness has a way of letting the imagination run wild.

Helplessness also increases the joy of rescue. Before too long the taxi driver took notice of her plight, and asked the owner of the donkey cart to move. This opened a path just wide enough for Sherry to drive through, enabling her to continue on her way. She took notice that her salvation came from one with a long beard and white robe, and wondered if he was not only a Muslim, but a Salafi.

Salafi Muslims follow a conservative interpretation of Islam, calling for the imitation of the life and practice of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, generally rejecting modernity as inimical to Islam. They have become feared as a social force which could sideline democracy through democratic means. They have also aroused the worry of Christians, as a number of pejorative comments and physical attacks have issued from their community.

Sherry, however, wishes to see that such generalizations are not applied to the whole community. She wrote a description of her experience and posted it on her Facebook page. She desires to see good relationships formed between the Christians and Salafis of Egypt. These may have opposite goals for society, but one must not reject the other out of hand.

Sherry had an open mind and heart to Muslims before her incident, but note the power of kindness while in need. The Muslim in question did nothing more than ask a donkey cart be moved a few feet. But to do so, he needed also to inconvenience those preparing for prayer around it. It was a small matter, but required a fair number of people to adjust in favor of a displaced Christian.

The repercussions of this kindness, however, multiply. Sherry has over two hundred friends on her Facebook page; add to this those who read this article. The taxi driver could easily have ignored her; instead, a positive testimony reaches hundreds of people.

This testimony does not invalidate the true accounts of Salafi provocation, heard by thousands. Unfortunately, bad news travels far faster than good. Yet it seeks to show the humanity, goodness, and, as Sherry emphasizes, the Arabness of individuals within the movement. It may well be this testimony represents the majority.

May we be mindful of the unknown consequences – both positive and negative – that our seemingly minor actions set in motion. Furthermore, may we purpose to exhibit such kindness, especially to those considered as against us. Egypt needs repair; it needs relationships built and reestablished. Such actions have the ability to warm hearts and change opinions.

As Sherry received, may we all so give. The world is no less needy.

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In Memoriam: Dr. Ahmed al-Sayih, Azhar Scholar

Fully deserving of his many titles, the glorious scholar and professor, Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Rahim al-Sayih passed away on July 7, 2011, fully engaged in life at the age of 74. Dr. al-Sayih died while filming an interview for the revolutionary-born al-Tahrir Television channel, speaking about his lifelong efforts in international popular diplomacy, to display a peaceful image of Islam and Egypt wherever he went. The world will miss him, his sharp mind, and his openness to people of all faiths.

Dr. al-Sayih was born in 1937 in Ezbet al-Sayih, a community roughly thirty kilometers from Nag Hamadi in the governorate of Qena, in Upper Egypt. Late in his life Nag Hamadi witnessed the horrific killing of six Christians and a Muslim police guard on Coptic Christmas Eve in 2010, an infamous incident which raised questions about Muslim-Christian relations. Dr. al-Sayih’s interaction with Christians, however, was completely different. He was a member of the noble Qulaiyat branch of the Arab tribe, and grew up with warm, friendly relations with the five or six Christian families of Ezbet al-Sayih. As he matured in his studies these Christians proudly recognized him as ‘our’ sheikh. Following the murders he helped organize an interfaith delegation from the Moral Rearmament Association to visit the families of those killed, explore the cultural environment of the crime, and discuss ways to overcome the national tragedy.

The journey Dr. al-Sayih pursued, however, did not begin as it ended, with real exposure to and open embrace of the Copts of Egypt. Though never an extremist, he pursued his studies with Muslim particularity, coming to master Islamic doctrine and philosophy after leaving his village and enrolling in the Azhar University. After several years he engaged in a professor exchange program, teaching five years in the Faculty of Sharia Law at the University of Qatar. Here his scholarly insight took the attention of the prestigious Umm al-Qurra University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, but contractual regulations with the Azhar required him to first complete his doctorate while teaching at the Cairo-based institution. After obtaining his PhD in Islamic doctrine and philosophy in 1986 from the Azhar, serving as dean in the Faculty of Da’wa (the Islamic Missionary Call), he accepted the post in Mecca, where he taught for nine years.

After many years of exposure to religious thought in the Gulf, however, Dr. al-Sayih began to grow increasingly uncomfortable with its extremist Islamic trends, especially Wahhabism. Wahhabism is an austere interpretation of Islam, seeking imitation of the manner of life as lived by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Unfortunately, it often results in a reactionary attitude to modern life, as well as rejection of other viewpoints and commonality with other religions. With growing awareness of the danger Wahhabism proved to authentic Islam, Dr. al-Sayih dedicated his life to exposing its errors.

This zeal resulted in a scholarly output of over 150 books and hundreds of articles written for Arabic journals around the world. Some of these books were co-authored by such luminaries as Dr. Ahmed Shawqy al-Fangary, Dr. Abdel Fatah Asaker, Dr. Rifaat Sidi Ahmed, Dr. Mohammed al-Halafawy and Sheikh Nasr Ramadan Abdel Hamid. His boldness in critiquing Wahhabism led also to the finding that much of what is attributed to Islam today is actually based on pious misunderstandings from poorly transmitted hadith, the stories recorded of Muhammad’s words and deeds. Never one to shy from controversy, Dr. al-Sayih was committed to discovering and teaching the truth as it revealed itself, finding in this the path to God.

Though he never committed himself to an actual spiritual guide or designated path, Dr. al-Sayih found sympathy with the Sufi interpretation of Islam. Over the course of his life, he attended over fifty international Sufi conferences, promoting an open and tolerant picture of Islam. This was more than a simple intellectual position. Dr. al-Sayih visited Makarious Monastery in Wadi Natroun, Egypt, and prayed over the grave of John the Baptist and the Prophet Elisha. He esteemed the monks there to be the truest of Sufis, who represent the best of Islam.

Furthermore, Dr. al-Sayih’s openness towards Copts facilitated his frequent collaboration with Arab West Report. Together they found commonality in the belief that Islam is not to blame for the often true difficulties Copts face in Egypt, but rather the ill interpretation of Islam which exasperates social tensions, giving ordinary community problems a religious face. This phenomena is often made worse when these tensions are manipulated by politics or religion. Dr. al-Sayih’s contribution toward promoting Coptic understanding in Egypt resulted in his commendation by no less an organization than Copts United, an American based group highlighting Christian difficulties in Egypt. Following the death of the Grand Sheikh of the Azhar, Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi, Copts United nominated him for succession.

Dr. Ahmad al-Sayih leaves behind a wife, three sons, and five daughters. He was buried in his village of Ezbet al-Sayih, and on July 12 received a commemorative farewell in Al Rashdan Mosque in Nasr City, near his home in Cairo. He was a man of both great mind and great heart, and will be missed by all who knew him. May Egypt produce similar scholars, who are able to follow in his footsteps.

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Kidnapped Girls and a Besieged Church: Conflicting Details

Coptic Protestors Block Road in Minya

Issues of sectarian tension in Upper Egypt create a double problem in establishing fact. First, many news agencies do not commit resources to the area, so journalism often relies on hearsay rather than first-hand reporting. Second, religious biases often serve to either cover over or amplify aspects of the story that play into an established narrative. This is true both among those involved and in the reporters themselves, as rumors are easily conflated into facts.

In the last week the governorate of Minya in Upper Egypt witnessed two examples of Muslim-Christian tension. Unfortunately, these incidents often go unreported in major media outlets, and within Egypt often receive scant coverage as well. This is seen in the brevity of two reports in al-Masry al Youm, English edition, which also serve to establish the basic facts.

In the first report, clashes are reported between Copts and the police, when the former attempted to block a road in protest of two local girls who were rumored to have been kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam.

In the second report, the police this time disperse hundreds of Muslims surrounding a church in Beni Ahmad village in the governorate of Minya. They were protesting the reinstatement of a priest who had been previously removed by agreement of the church and authorities, allegedly for inciting sectarian tension.

With the dearth of first-hand, in-depth reporting, however, comes coverage that often relies on one-sided sources, promoting a cause with lack of objectivity. Whereas the lack of coverage can be interpreted as complicit silence against Coptic grievances, this latter reporting is wholesale adoption of their perspective. Indicative are these two articles from the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA), which tells these stories, and others as well.

These articles rely on statements taken from the area, and do a good job of increasing the level of detail.

In the first report, the two Coptic girls are identified as Christine Azat (age 16) and Nancy Magdi (age 14). These were reportedly abducted on June 12 while on their way to church. The article quotes Christine’s father, and describes how the Christians of the area have scrambled to assemble the 200,000 LE ($33,333 US) ransom demanded for their release. Once done, however, they were rebuffed saying the girls were already sold to another group, which was now demanding twelve million LE (two million USD) to hand them over. The article mentions the rumor that they ran away and willingly embraced Islam, but dismisses this as the Azhar rejects underage conversions.

In the second report, the village of Beni Ahmad West is located seven kilometers south of Minya. The conflict relates to an incident from March 23rd, 2011, in which Muslims surrounded St. George Church and threatened to destroy it when licensed renovation appeared to be expanding the building. Eyewitnesses are quoted saying the Muslims chanted they would kill the priest, Fr. George Thabit, for his role in events if he and his family did not leave the village. In a previous article AINA states there are 23,000 Muslims and 8,000 Christians resident in the village.

The report states that Fr. George did leave the village. Muslims, however, heard rumors he would be returning, and began to camp out at the church in small numbers. When he did come back, on June 24 there was another major demonstration against him. Five hours later he was escorted away in a police vehicle. The Muslims remained until security later dispersed them. The archbishopric is quoted as condemning this interference in ecclesiastic affairs, asking for the rule of law and maintenance of security.

The information above is fair enough, but it is couched in language that betrays bias. For example, the report about the two girls ends with the speculation that, “as females, their lot is to be raped, enslaved, and sold off to some rich, sexually-depraved man who believes it his divine right to own infidel sex-slaves.” The second report does not have such blatant speculation, but ends with communication of a non-identified threat from the Muslim ‘mob’, that unless they hear that, “the priest is banned from returning to the village, they will hold their Friday prayers tomorrow, June 24, inside St. George’s church.”

If indeed this is the story, it is important to relate it as such. Given the sensitive reality of sectarian tension, however, it is vital to either consult contrary sources or else convey the story with appropriate doubt. The English language Ahram Online web newspaper provides alternate coverage of the kidnapped girls.

This article places both girls’ ages at 14, and states they ran away from home months ago, with their families searching for them frantically. A policeman discovered them walking on the streets, conspicuous with their face veil but with the tattoo of a cross on their wrists. The article states the girls have produced a YouTube video stating their voluntary conversion to Islam, and that they were not kidnapped. It states they are being held in a safe house until an Azhar scholar can determine if the story of their conversion is true. Meanwhile, the families of the girls have asked that they be returned home.

It should be noted that Ahram Online is a government owned newspaper. Though it has appeared to have more freedom to criticize the government than its printed counterpart, al-Ahram, the story must still be understood in light of its ownership reality.

Arab West Report was able to contact Nermine Rida, a Coptic Orthodox journalist for Akhbar al-Minya. She stated the girls were involved in a teenage crush with two Muslims, Ali Gomaa Rashid and his relative Ezzat Gomaa Rashid. These along with another relative, Saudi Gomaa Rashid, were currently being held in custody, along with five Copts still detained for their role in the demonstrations. Rida stated that Copts transgressed the acceptable levels of peaceful demonstration by blocking the road, and that the police were justified in breaking up their protest.

Rida also stated that the Azhar rejected the girls’ conversion to Islam since the law does not allow for  the conversion of anyone under eighteen years of age. She did watch the YouTube video, however, and was convinced the girls were not kidnapped and made the video without compulsion. She understood that they were being held currently by authorities, but were soon due to return to their homes.

Rida was unable to confirm the ransom demand, except to say a call to raise 200,000 LE was issued by a Christian satellite channel, al-Tariq.

Concerning the incident in Beni Ahmad village, Rida confirmed the outlines of the story centering around Muslim demonstrations and Fr. George Thabit. There was a disagreement about the dimensions of the church and the role played by Fr. George, resulting in an agreement with Bishop Arsanius of Minya to send him away. During his absence from the village the church was repaired satisfactorily along the lines agreed upon by all village members.

After completion, the bishop returned Fr. George to the village, and Muslims were angered and resumed their demonstration. Yet Rida makes clear Muslims were not the only party in disagreement with his decision. Around thirty Copts joined the Muslims in demonstrating against the return of Fr. George, headed by one named Rifaat al-Qummus.

Arab West Report is unable to independently verify the account of Nermine Rida.

What should be made of these situations, then? Without traveling to the area and investigating directly, one should be cautious about claiming certainty about events. Even then, one would be likely to discover contradictory testimony.

Kidnappings regardless of religion have taken place in Egypt within the security vacuum since the revolution. Many Copts, however, believe their community is especially targeted by extremist Muslims. Yet it is also clear that at times Copts respond with accusations of kidnapping when facing the shame of a female relative running away from home, either due to a bad family situation or in a love affair with a Muslim.

One of the issues lies in the definition of kidnapping. Generally understood, kidnapping involves the use of physical force in an abduction. Some Copts, however, expand the meaning to include the luring away of adolescent women from their family, helping (or deceiving) her to escape from difficult domestic situations. Cornelis Hulsman of Arab West Report has written extensively on this issue.[1]

Camilia Shehata represents the most recent example of an imagined kidnapping, which captured the attention of the nation. Frustrated by her marital situation, she ran away and disappeared for four days. Local Copts immediately began demonstrating demanding her return from her assumed Muslim captors.

Muslims, meanwhile, circulated pictures in which she was wearing a hijab, and claimed Copts had kidnapped her – a willing convert to Islam – holding her in a church or monastery. Salafi Muslims held rallies in her defense, and some threatened to storm the monasteries in search of their ‘sister’. Immediately on the heels of this story followed the case of Abeer Talaat, which culminated in the horrors of Imbaba when Muslims tried to enter the church upon a rumor she was captive there, held apart from her Muslim husband.  The ensuing clash resulted in multiple deaths and the burning of a nearby church with no connection to the rumor.

One day before the Imbaba incident, Camilia Shehata appeared on al-Hayat Christian satellite channel and told the truth of her story. She sat with her husband and child, and confessed to running away from home, due to marital issues. She never converted to Islam, however, and she was sorry for the trouble caused.

In terms of church building issues, it is well known that Christians have had difficulty securing permits. During the Mubarak era, decision-making power was held by the security apparatus, which often decided upon granting or withholding permits due to the perceived reception of Muslims in the area. There is currently a new, draft, unified law for building houses of worship, to govern both churches and mosques on an administrative basis. The first draft has been rejected by the churches of Egypt, in part due to the perception the locus of decision will not move from security.

This issue is similar to a church building conflict in Ezbet Bushra from June 2009, in the governorate of Beni Suef. In this location Fr. Ishaq Kastour was involved in a controversy in which Copts built a factory which was actually purposed to become a church, which included a place for his personal residence. The process was done without approval, and Muslims vandalized the building at various stages. Fr. Ishaq was also removed from the village by the bishop (presumably at the urging of the security apparatus), returned, but was eventually permanently assigned elsewhere. A government sponsored Muslim-Christian reconciliation meeting led to the decision to grant Copts a church building, but on the outskirts of the village, as a hastily constructed mosque was given preference at the original location. As of the completion of an AWR report on the subject, authorization of the church had not yet been granted.

It also is not uncommon for parishioners to disagree about their church leadership. The Coptic Orthodox Church is a hierarchical organization which appoints priests to their diocese. While local sentiment can be and often is taken into consideration, it is not unheard of for a small but active contingent of a congregation to reject their given priest. According to Rida’s report, only thirty Copts participated in the protest against Fr. George. Was this a contingent of malcontents, or indicative of widespread frustration with his leadership? In any event, it would be improper to label the demonstration strictly as Muslim transgression in church affairs.

None of this explanation should be used to justify the parameters of the two stories, but will hopefully make actions more understandable. The girls may have been kidnapped or not, but if not, surely most demonstrators did not know the truth of the situation. It is the case in Egypt, and certainly since the revolution, that the best way to achieve results is to gather masses of people and pressure authorities to grant your demands. In the face of perceived official neglect of Coptic issues, including other cases of alleged kidnapped girls, the demonstration on the part of most was in imitation of other groups’ success.

Should this be necessary? No. Should underage girls have been immediately returned to their family? Yes. Should Copts have blocked roads and resisted dismissal? No. Have there been real cases of kidnapping Coptic adolescents? Perhaps.  Is there blame, when in occurrence, on those who quickly circulate false or unsubstantiated claims of kidnapping? Absolutely.

What is the reality of this case? It is not altogether clear.

Similarly, Muslims have used the power of demonstration to great success in pressuring government to yield to their will. This was seen most recently in the case of the appointed Coptic governor of Qena. Initial demonstrations against him were joined by Copts, in protest of the previous Coptic governor’s poor record and the newly appointed governor’s alleged role in killing protestors during the revolution. Yet the demonstrations against him quickly took on a religious dimension, as area Salafis, and some Muslim Brothers, rejected the idea of having a non-Muslim governor altogether. They blocked roads and threatened to cut off supply lines to popular tourist areas to the east on the Red Sea coast. The government was unable to dislodge them, and a solution was crafted in which the governor was ‘suspended’ for three months. When he left the area, the demonstrations subsided.

Were the Muslims of Beni Ahmad looking to similarly assert their will against a rejected priest? Perhaps. Was the conduct of this priest deserving of their rejection? It is not known. Is it the reality of Upper Egypt that decisions are taken communally rather than through the rule of law? Yes. Is this an acceptable way to govern a nation? No. Is it right for the priest to be removed in this way? No.

What is the reality of this case? It is not altogether clear.

What is clear is the poor, partisan, and inflammatory reporting of these incidents by the Assyrian International News Agency. Whereas AINA did an admirable job of presenting a perspective of these events, when much mainstream reporting is either in ignorance or dismissive of its importance, they failed to present other sides of the issue. Furthermore, amidst this negligence, they assumed the total credibility of the reported Coptic position, in doing so warping the perspective of their readership.

Sectarian issues do not plague Egypt, but they are a significant social problem. Underlying them is an unspoken frustration with the ‘other’, as competing storylines place explanation of these incidents into a greater narrative. Depending on perspective, they are either aberrations in a centuries-long culture of tolerance, or else a disturbing confirmation of pervasive discrimination.

Greater narratives, however, smooth over details. Each individual sectarian incident has its own details, many of which are disputed or unknown. Reporting of these events must take utmost care to prevent their automatic assumption into a narrative. At the same time, reporting must call a spade a spade, when this is clear.

Such clarity is difficult to achieve. With sectarian conflict, both metaphorically and literally, the devil is in the details.


[1] Cornelis Hulsman, “Forced Conversions or not?”, report presented to the New York Council of Churches, June 28, 1999 [RNSAW, 1999, week 26A, art. 37], http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/2126

Rodolph Yanney, “Conversions of Christians to Islam,” January 9, 2001 [RNSAW, 2001, week 01A, art. 4] http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/4251

Cornelis Hulsman, “Open letter to former US Congressman Pastor Ed McNeely for writing President Bush a letter with wrong claims about Christian girls being kidnapped by Muslims,” AWR, 2003, week 30, art. 34, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/11472

Cornelis Hulsman, Usāmah W. al-Ahwānī, Sawsan Jabrah and Nirmīn Fawzī, Was converted girl kidnapped? AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 21, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/16317

Usāmah Wadīc al-Ahwānī, Christian girl Ingy became a member of a Muslim Family, AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 22, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/6372

AWR editorial board, “Western misreporting on Ingy’s conversion to Islam,” AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 38, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/6361

Cornelis Hulsman, Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt; opinions from Egyptians in various positions, AWR, 2004, week 38, art. 28, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/7698 (with a comment of rev. Menes Abdel Nour about the alleged kidnap of Injī Edward Nājī)

Janique Blattmann, Christian Solidarity International claiming forced conversion of Coptic girls to Islam, AWR, 2005, week 53, art. 8, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/12409

Sara Aguzzoni, Media reports of Christians converting to Islam, Arab-West Papers no. 6, August 2008, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/27517

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Sympathy for Islamists

Translation: Against Torture

While Egypt is currently soul searching about its coming political identity, with Islamist governance among the many possible democratic choices, it is good to remember the suffering endured by these groups over the past several decades. The following excerpts are not meant to offer support for the Islamist cause, nor to deny that numbers of Islamists engaged in terrorist or violent revolutionary activity. Rather, it is an attempt to highlight the humanity of these individuals, especially in reference to the operations of state which dehumanized them.

The first selection concerns Kamal Habib, an active Egyptian jihadist from the 1970s. The excerpt comes from ‘Journey of the Jihadist’, by Fawaz Gerges. When asked, “Isn’t jihad by its very nature revolutionary rather than peaceful?” he replied:

We did not fire the first round in this battle. The rulers had closed all avenues for a peaceful transfer of power. We had no choice but to take up arms to raise Islam’s banner. The fight was imposed on us.

… Some of us arrived at different conclusions as to what could and should be done to resist aggression against our Islamic identity. The prison years also radicalized [the youth] and set them on another violent journey. The torture left deep physical and psychological scars on jihadists and fueled their thirst for vengeance.

Look at my hands – still spotted with the scars from cigarette burns nineteen years later. For days on end we were brutalized – our faces bloodied, our bodies broken with electrical shocks and other devices. The torturers aimed at breaking our souls and brainwashing us. They wanted to humiliate us and force us to betray the closest members of our cells. I spent sleepless nights listening to the screams of young men echoing from the torture chambers.

A degrading, dehumanizing experience. I cannot convey to you the rage felt by [the youth] who were tortured after Sadat’s assassination. Some left the prisons and the country determined to exact revenge on their tormentors and torturers. The authorities’ brutal methods nourished fanaticism and sowed the seeds for more violence and bloodshed.

Since the revolution, Kamal Habib is still prominent among his group, Islamic Jihad, which has abandoned violence and is seeking to form a political party. Among his recent statements has been a call to eliminate all foreign universities in Egypt, since they work against the development of Islamic thought.

The second selection is more recent, concerning the case of Adel Futuh Ali al-Gazzar, who was arrested following his return to Egypt after having been interred at Guantanamo Bay. The excerpt comes from al-Masry al-Youm, an Egyptian daily newspaper with an online English component.

Gazzar was picked up by US forces while working for the Red Crescent [the equivalent of the Red Cross in Islamic countries] in Afghanistan. He was transferred to a US prison facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, and other forms of torture, according to Reprieve, a UK advocacy group for prisoners’ rights. During this time, Gazzar lost his leg, which had been injured in a US bombing raid, due to lack of medical treatment.

He was then sent to the United States’ Guantanamo prison for terrorism suspects where he was held incommunicado for nine years. The Guantanamo bay prison camp has been widely condemned by US and international human rights organizations.

In 2010 the US government cleared Gazzar of the charges against him and released him to Slovakia. He was not repatriated to Egypt out of fear that he would be tortured.

According to the article, Gazzar had been convicted by an Egyptian court in absentia in 2001, concerning involvement in a plot to overthrow Mubarak. He was arrested at the airport so that the government would be able to assess his current legal status.

There is a current sentiment which imagines groups like the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy favor in post-revolutionary Egypt because they are best placed to both appeal to the masses on the basis of religion and secure the stability of middle and upper class economic interests. It is true that many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are businessmen of means. It is also true that many in Egypt accuse them of playing with religion in order to make money.

Yet like the Islamists described above, they have also suffered. Even though their political opposition was not violent, many, if not most, have spent time in prison. As such, an understandable premise is that Islamists have not accepted the fact of their oppression simply to make money. This would suggest that the above sentiment is wrong. It would suggest they have their eyes on full transformation of society, which would include a reshaping of the political system, with themselves, and those of like mind, the principle shapers.

If this interpretation would turn pragmatic and callous, it might suggest that such severe repression was necessary to keep their vision from being implemented, and might be necessary still. If it would turn cynical it might suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be trusted when they make promises of sharing power; this could be a temporary measure in preparation for their ultimate designs. If it were to turn hopeful, it might suggest that having suffered, they would be loathe to inflict others with the same fate, and may indeed craft a system of governance resonant with Egyptian religious realities.

I do not mean to state I have a feel for which of these suggestions is closest to reality. Rather, I hope these portions serve only to lend a level of appreciation for the Islamists of Egypt. By all appearances, though appearances can be deceiving, they have suffered for what they believe in. While the power of conviction may make them dangerous, it also makes them worthy of respect.

Other articles and analysis may suggest ways in which they have manipulated, compromised, and disassembled throughout the years. For these, respect may possibly be withdrawn. Yet no man undergoes torture for only his self-interest. Suffering under conviction makes possible a wide and idealistic following. While this following should not be overestimated, neither should it be dismissed. If they are opposed out of fear, fear will bend before their courage. If they are engaged from appreciation, love is able to trump courage. It will do so in humility, weighing the worth of their convictions. Some may wither, others may remain.

Little else, and certainly not brute power, can challenge such powerful example.

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The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party: First Conference and Key Questions

The speakers' platform. Dr. al-Erian is seated in the middle.

Dr. Essam al-Erian, vice-president for the Muslim Brotherhood established Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), officially commenced party activity in a conference in Shubra, Cairo. The location was specifically chosen, he stated, due to the fact it was an area long neglected and marginalized by the former regime. The FJP wishes to see Egypt become completely independent of all foreign powers, especially economically, so that all, especially the poor, may benefit.

Also in attendance were Dr. Mohamed al-Beltagi and Mr. Gamal Shehata of the Muslim Brotherhood, each of whom also gave speeches. They were joined by the Egyptian poet Mohamed Goudah and artist Wagih al-Arabi, as well as Dr. Duaa’ Maghazi, a Muslim sister. Dr. Rafik Habib, the Egyptian Christian researcher and vice-president of the FJP was listed among the presenters, but was not in attendance.

Dr. Mohamed al-Beltagi

Al-Erian railed against the long scope of foreign interference in the Egyptian economy, stretching back to the British occupation, the monastic period of King Farouk, the Free Officers led by President Jamal Abdel Nasser, and culminating in President Mubarak. Each allowed foreign powers to profit off the Egyptian people. Al-Erian insisted that any current loans accepted by the Egyptian state must be completely absent of conditions.

Al-Erian was also critical of the current security situation in Egypt. He made a parallel to the failures of officers in 1973, during which their ranks were purged to remove incapable or corrupt figures. He wondered why this has not yet been done among police following the revolution, when many have been involved in torture and used live ammunition against protestors.

Yet while he was critical of the police, al-Erian offered praise and thanks to the military. First and foremost this was for their role in protecting the people during the revolution, contrary to their orders to fire upon them. He also praised the army for its promise to surrender authority to a civilian, elected government, and awaited its fulfillment in time, with full confidence.

At the same time, al-Erian denied there was an agreement between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, stating the FJP would not hesitate to criticize the military if it diverged from its revolutionary mandate. So far, however, their mistakes have been minor.

Speaking to the fears of an Islamist dominated government, al-Erian stated the FJP was not looking for a parliamentary majority. In fact, the party aim is to capture between 30-35% of the seats. Recalling cooperation during the revolution, he stated that the Muslim Brotherhood, nor any other group, would have been able to overthrow Mubarak on its own. The common interests of all political parties are substantial, and they should work together to craft a national unity government. The political system needs strong and diverse parties, reiterating the FJP desires a civil state based on the law.

Dr. al-Erian

Al-Erian spoke briefly about foreign policy, urging the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan, and NATO to cease operations in Libya. The Libyan people are capable to rid themselves of Gaddafi on their own, and NATO strikes only serve to demolish the country and its infrastructure.

Al-Erian closed by assuring the audience the FJP, due to the skills gained by the Muslim Brotherhood, was capable to undertake its political responsibilities and participate in rebuilding Egypt. The party welcomed all in this task, Muslims and Christians, men and women, workers and farmers, the young and the old. Furthermore, it was dedicated to serving the interests of this entire constituency.

There were approximately 800-1000 people in attendance, seated in a tent erected in a central square of Shubra under the evening sky. Most people appeared to be of lower middle class economic status.

While no space was given for questions and answers, in subsequent research we would like to probe further the relationships between the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi movement. Specifically:

  • What is the relationship between the FJP and the Brotherhood? According to reports it is to be independent in administration and finance, yet its leaders are all Brotherhood veterans, appointed by the group. How will the political party function in practice?
  • What is the role of the FJP headquarters in Manial, Cairo? By appearance this is a small office on the 3rd floor of a nondescript building. Yet inside was a caretaker, with his bed set up near the conference table, with a direct line to al-Erian. The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters, meanwhile, are an impressive stand alone multi-story building recently constructed on a major road in Muqattam, Cairo. Does this suggest a practical subjection of party to greater Brotherhood leadership?
  • To what degree does the FJP include Muslim Brotherhood youth? These are depicted in the media of having disagreements with the traditional Brotherhood leadership. Is this a reality?
  • What is the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas? Several years ago al-Erian was heavily involved in supplying Gaza with medical supplies through the doctors’ syndicate, utilizing Hamas connections.[1] Do official links between the movements exist? Is their coordination or funding involved? However sympathetic with the plight of Gaza, does the Muslim Brotherhood approve of Hamas’ tactics?
  •  What relationships exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military council? Through personal conversations between Cornelis Hulsman and Osama Farid, a Muslim Brotherhood senior figure, the group maintains a direct line with senior military officers. What is the extent of their communication? Does it differ from that between the military council and other political or social groups?
  • What links exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups? Will there be political cooperation between the FJP and Salafi parties? Some Brotherhood members have criticized the Salafis, while others have hosted conferences between the two groups. Is there an official stance?
  • What are the different trends among Salafis, who generally are not an organized presence in society? What are their methods of propagation? From where does their funding originate? Do they serve foreign or transnational agendas? Does the Muslim Brotherhood?

Many people, both in Egypt and the west, are asking these questions right now. While both the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood are working hard to demonstrate they are a moderate, centrist political and social force, their answers to questions like these will go a long way in demonstrating their credibility.

One final note concerning the historical reality of the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighted by Badran, a resident of Shubra and a Brotherhood supporter: in 1948 the Muslim Brotherhood first began conversations with the Egyptian armed forces, which were repeated in 1952. This opened the political space for them, but by 1954 they suffered repression. In 1970 President Sadat, a military official, once again engaged the Muslim Brotherhood, giving wide space for operation, but by 1980 began repression once again.

This pattern is undoubtedly known and feared by the Muslim Brotherhood. Regardless of conspiracy theories which posit military favor for the group, it is certain that once again the Brotherhood has approval to operate openly. This may be one reason behind the constant reassertions of their civil, democratic, moderate intentions. If true, there is no need for repression. Yet it may be asked if they also wonder if their window of opportunity is now open, and that they intend to consolidate power before they are repressed once again.

The political future of Egypt is wide open. May all participants operate from integrity and concern for the nation. The short term horizon will be very interesting, and perhaps foundational. May peace, stability, freedom, and justice mark what is to come, Islamist or otherwise.

 


[1] From a personal conversation several years ago between al-Erian and Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of Arab West Report.

 

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Conventional Wisdom and the Muslim Brotherhood

Logo Muslim Brotherhood
Muslim Brotherhood Logo

In the early days of the Egyptian revolution, one of the significant fears, especially in the West, was that a transition to democratic rule would usher in an Islamic government headed by the Muslim Brotherhood. This has since been established as the conventional wisdom, even in Egypt. Liberal groups urge postponing anticipated September parliamentary elections, in order to gain more time to form viable political parties able to compete with the newly created and Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party.

Conventional wisdom was established following the results of the March 19 popular referendum on amendments to the Egyptian constitution. A yes vote was the adopted position by Islamist groups, many of which portrayed the effort as a defense of religion. They won overwhelmingly, with 77% of the vote, in unprecedented 40% voter turnout.

Yet in recent days there have been a few contrarian indicators concerning widespread popular support for the Brotherhood. Gallop conducted a poll in which only 15% said they support the group. The poll does match the uncertain and contradictory state of Egyptian politics, however, for although only 1% support a theocracy, 69% believe religious leaders should have an advisory role in legislation. Depending on how campaign rhetoric is spun, the population may vote Islamist out of fear from godless liberals, or else run screaming out of fear of becoming a new Iran. Yet in terms of tangible support, if the poll is accurate, the Muslim Brotherhood is not inherently perched to assume political power.

Part of the assumption of Brotherhood popularity is built upon their reputation of providing support to the poor in social services. This is true from their inception, and in the 1940s they built a wide network of service provision throughout rural and urban Egypt. Yet in the more recent decades under Mubarak in which the Brotherhood was an outlawed, though tolerated, social presence and the only semi-legitimate opposition political force, measuring and verifying their welfare reach became more difficult. Nevertheless, the assumption remained.

This assumption has been challenged in research conducted by Daniella Pioppi. She argues:

The Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities after the Nasser parenthesis have never reached the levels of diffusion and organization of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, they are generally aimed at the middle to upper classes rather than the most disadvantaged social strata. Since the repression cycle that started in the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities have been drastically reduced and do not seem to play a significant role in popular mobilization, not least for lack of a clear political and social project.

Her paper, and others, can be found here.

Excepting the previously stated referendum, Egypt has not had open, democratic elections for over fifty years. In the absence of criteria by which to judge, it is nearly impossible to forecast the electoral choices of over 80 million Egyptians, most of whom have been depoliticized their entire life. Will the ‘uneducated, religious masses’ be swayed to vote Islamist, believing this to be a vote for God? Will the ‘taste of freedom and liberty’ make them forswear the Muslim Brotherhood, widely known as an authoritarian organization in its own right? No one knows. Neither the Gallop poll, nor the referendum should be taken as an accurate gauge of political currents.

Politics is always full of surprises. In all likelihood, an unfettered election process will produce nothing less, no matter what the end result may be.

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Refuting bin Laden’s Martyrdom

The Middle East Media Research Institute recently highlighted a YouTube video issued by the former Mufti of Egypt, Nasr Farid Wassel, on May 7, 2011. In his presentation, MEMRI quotes him as saying:

The martyr bin Laden, Allah’s mercy upon him, waged Jihad for the sake of Allah against the Soviets and against America. … There was a call at the Al-Nour Mosque to pray for the soul of bin Laden, since he is a martyr. But I said that we were forbidden to pray for the soul of a martyr, and that bin Laden lives on. He is not dead. ‘Do not consider those who were killed for the sake of Allah to be dead. They live on, sustained by their Lord.’ Therefore, I said, immediately after his martyrdom, that he was a martyr, and that he had been killed by the enemies.

The link to the video clip presented by MEMRI can be accessed here.

Arab West Report spoke with Dr. Abd al-Muti Bayoumi, member of the Islamic Research Academy at the Azhar. Bayoumi did not know what would lead the former Mufti to issue a statement such as this. From his personal viewpoint, however, Bayoumi declared that bin Laden killed civilians, and therefore, was not a martyr.

Bayoumi stated that the Islamic Research Academy has not discussed the question whether or not bin Laden was a martyr.